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Abstract. 
The Yukos case is known for its unprecedented character and complexity as a 
Russian corporate, tax and money laundering case. It continues to raise political and legal 
problems, both domestically and internationally, and has already become a symbol of the 
contemporary Russian political regime. This dissertation analyses in detail the criminal and 
corporate aspects of the case, and focuses mainly on the reasons for, and the development 
and implications of the embezzlement and money laundering case, which is known as the 
backbone of the Yukos Affair. 
The thesis is primarily based on a comparative analysis of the international 
academic findings, case law and the Russian data on the case. The dissertation also 
discusses in detail the political nature of the Yukos Affair, whilst attempting to show the 
substantive aspects of case. 
The findings of the dissertation highlight new types of risk that result from the 
politically motivated application of Russian anti money laundering legislation to the 
activities of the international corporate groups, which has been enacted on the basis of the 
internationally recognised principles. 
The paper also describes the nexus between the corporate tax evasion schemes, 
which have been widely used in Russia, and money laundering risks for corporations. Such 
a situation creates potentially unavoidable criminal risks for all corporate groups that have 
functioned in Russia over the recent decade. The thesis shows that the corporations, which 
invest directly and indirectly in the Russian economy, must be aware of the politically 
driven corporate criminal risks, which quite commonly are not reflected in the corporate 
disclosure data, and remain unnoticed by the investors. 
The paper is unique as reflects the personal experiences of the author as the long- 
term leading lawyer to the Yukos group and as the consultant on the Yukos-related cases. 
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Federal'nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii of 7 Avgusta 2001 
The Amendments to CC 
Ns 121-FZ `Ob izmenenii zakonodatel'nykh aktov RF v 
RF 
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svyazi s prinyatiem Federal'nogo Zakona `O protivodejstvii 
legalizatsii (otmyvaniyu) dokhodov, poluchennykh 
prestupnym putem i protivodejstvii terrorizmu' (s ism. i dop. ) 
[Federal Law RF X2 121-FZ of 7 August 2001 `On amending 
the legislative acts of the Russian Federation in connection 
with the enactment of the Federal Law on countering the 
legislation of earnings received in an illegal way (money 
laundering)' (amended)] Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection 
of Legislation] 2001 Ns 33 Item 3419 
Osnovnye usloviya ispol'zovaniya magistralnykh 
The Main Conditions 
nefteprovodov, nefteproducktoprovodov i terminalov v 
morskikh portakh dlya vyvoza nefti, nefteproduktov za 
predely tamozennoi territorii RF (s ism. i dop. ) [The Main 
Conditions, regulating access to the oil-main pipelines and 
terminals in sea-ports for oil export operations (amended)] 
Odobrenny Postanovleniem Pravitelstva RF of 31 Deakhabrya 
1994 N2 1466 [Approved by the Government Decree Ns 1466 
of 31 December 1994] Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 1995 Ns 2 Item 162 
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The title and other details of the act of judiciary The abbreviations, used 
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Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii of 
Res of CC RF Ns 9-P 
27 Maya 2003 No 9-P "0 konstitutsionnosti statii 199 
Ugolovnogo Kodeksa RF" [Resolution of the Constitutional 
Court of Russia of 27 May 2003 No 9-P "On the 
constitutionality of section 199 (tax evasion) of the Criminal 
Code of Russia"] Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [VCS] [Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of 
Russian Federation] 2003 Ns 4 
Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii of 
Res of CC RF Ns 41-0 
22 Yanvarya 2004 No 41-0 [Resolution of the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation of 22 January 2004 NN 41-0] 
Ekonomika i Zizn [Economy and Life] 2004 Ns 20 
Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii of 
Res of CC RF Ns 9-P (II) 
14 Iyulya 2005 Ns 9-P "0 konstitutsionnosti polozenii stat'i 
113 Nalogovogo Kodeksa" [Resolution of the Constitutional 
Court of Russian Federation of 14 July 2005 Ns 9-P "On 
verification of constitutionality of the provisions of article 
113 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation] Sobranie 
Zakonodatel'stva RF [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection 
of Legislation] 2005 Ns 30 Item 3200 
Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii of 
Res of CC RF Ns 329-0 
16 Oktyabrya 2007 No 329-0 "Ob otkaze v rassmotrenii 
zayavlenya o narushenii konstitutsionnykh pray i svobod 
stat'yei 176.4 Nalogovogo Kodeksa" [Resolution of the 
Constitutional Court of Russian Federation of 16 October 
2007 No. 329-0 "On the refusal to consider a complaint of 
Export Service LLC concerning the violation of constitutional 
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rights and freedoms established by section 176.4 of the Tax 
Code"] <www. garant. ru > accessed 20 January 2008 
Postanovlenie Plenums Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR of 4 Iyulya 
Res of SC (USSR) Ns 4 
1972 Ns 4 "0 sudebnoi praktike po delam o khiscenii 
gosudarstvennogo i obshestvennogo imuscestva" [Resolution 
of Plenum the Supreme Court of the Union of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics of 11 July 1972 N2 4 "On the court policy 
on the theft (embezzlement) of the statutory and public 
property"] Sbornik Postanovlenii Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR 
1924-1977 (Chast 2) [Sbornik VS] [The Supreme Court of the 
USSR Reporter 1924-1977 (part 2)] 
Postanovlenie Plenuma Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda of 26 
Res of SAC Ns 53 
Oktyabrya 2006 Ns 53 "On otsenke arbiraznimi sudami 
obosnovannosti poluchenya nalogoplatelscikami nalogovoi 
vygody" [Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme 
Arbitration Court of RF of 26 October 2006 Ns 53 "On 
assessment by arbitration courts of tax benefits validity"] 
Vestnik Vysshego Arbirazhnogo Suda RF [Vestn VAS] 2006 
Ns 12 
Postanovlenie Plenuma Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda of 10 
Res of SAC Ns 22 
Aprelya 2008 Ns 22 "0 nekotorykh voprosakh praktiki 
rassmotreniya sporov, svyazannykh s primeneniem stat'i 169 
Grazdanskogo Kodeksa RF" [Resolution of the Plenum of the 
Supreme Arbitration Court of RF of 10 April 2008 Ns 22 "On 
some aspects of application of article 169 of the Civil Code of 
RF"] <arbitr. ru>accessed 23 May 2008 
Postaovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Res of SC Ns 23 
Federatsii of 18 Noyabrya 2004 Ns 23 "0 sudebnoi praktike 
po delam o nezakonnom predprinimatel'stve i legalizatsii 
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(otmyvanii) deneznikh sredstv ili inogo imuscestva, 
priobretennogo prestupnym putem" [The Resolution of the 
Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
Plenary Session of 18 November 2004 Ns 23 "On the court 
policy on the illegal entrepreneurship and legalization cases"] 
Byulleten Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [BVS] 
[Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 
2005 Ns 1 
Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Res of SC Ns 64 
Federatsii of 28 Dekabrya 2006 Ns 64 "O praktike 
primeneniya sudami ugolovnogo zakonodatelstva ob 
otvetstvennosti za nalogovye prestupleniya" [The Resolution 
of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
Plenary Session of 28 December 2006 Ns 64 "On the court 
policy on the application of the criminal law on the tax 
crimes"] Byulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation] 2007 Ns 3 
Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Res of SC Ns 51 
Federatsii of 27 Dekabrya 2007 Ns 51 "0 sudebnoii praktike 
po delam o moshennichestve, prisvoenii i rastrate" [The 
Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation Plenary Session of 27 December 2007 Ns 
51 "On the court policy on fraud, misappropriation and 
embezzlement cases"] Byulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of 
the Russian Federation] 2008 Ns 2 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction. 
1.1. Problem Statement and Importance of the Study. 
The Russian transitional period (1991-2003) is known for its widely condemned 
privatisation deals and post-privatisation schemes, which led to the creation of the 
"oligarchy" clans. ' Several powerful financial groups have subsequently formed the 
centres of potential financial and industrial growth in the contemporary Russian economic 
system? These groups participated in the sharing of statutory prosperity, worth hundreds of 
billions, that was inherited from the collapsed Soviet Union. Some of these groups 
successfully survived the stormy post-privatisation and the collapse caused by the 1998 
financial crisis, followed by Yeltsin's resignation and Putin's "restoration", and emerged 
as contemporary business conglomerates, powerful enough to compete with the world's 
industrial majors. 
Regardless of the formal adherence of these companies to internationally required 
advanced accounting and governance standards, some powerful Russian financial groups 
' See eg H-H Schroder, 'El'tsin and the Oligarchs: The Role of Financial Groups in Russian Politic between 
1993 and July 1998' (1999) 51 (6) Europe-Asia Stud 957-88; D Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power 
in the New Russia (Public Affairs, New York 2002). 
2 See eg S Guriev and A Rachinsky, 'The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism' (2005) 19 (1) J Econ 
Perspect 20; S Poukliakova, Corporate Governance in a Transitions Economy: Business Groups in Russia 
(PhD thesis, Simon Fraser University 2005). 
3 See eg W Tompson, 'Privatisation in Russia: Scope, Methods and Impact' (2003) 
<www. bbk. ac. uk/polsoc/staff/academic/bill-tompson/privatisation-in-russial992-2002>accessed 1 March 
2007; E Medova and L Tischenko, 'Lawless Privatization? ' (2006) Judge Business School University of 
Cambridge Working Paper Ns 29 <http: //www-cfap. jbs. cam. ac. uk/publications/files/WP%2029. pdf>accessed 
23 June 2007. 
4 See eg Y Latynina, 'Goodbye Oligarchs, Hello Feudal Capitalism' (2004) 8 December The Moscow 
Times. com 10 <http: //www. moscowtimes. ru/stories/2004/12/08/007. html>accessed 17 July 2007; L Harding, 
'The Richer They Come ... Can Russia's Oligarchs Keep Their Billions - and Their Freedom? ' (2007) 2 July 
Guardian <http //www. guardian. co. uk/print/0,, 330117550-103680,00. html>accessed 17 August 2007; G 
Pitts, 'Deripaska on Top, as Oligarchs Collide' (2007) 31 July The Globe and Mail 
<httpi/www. theglobeandmail. com/servlet/story/LAC. 20070731. ROLIGARCHS31 /TPStoryBusiness>acces 
sed 31 July 2007. 
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have encountered unexpected problems arising from the application of various 
questionable tax optimisation and financial schemes, which facilitated their rapid growth. 
Widespread application of such schemes was possible due to the willful blindness of an 
emerging market state, concerned only with swift economic growth. 5 As transitional states 
often do not have established democratic traditions or judicial systems, nothing prevents 
them from applying redistributive justice to companies and their questionable schemes. 6 
Emerging corporate groups from countries with transition economies penetrate 
international production and securities markets, fighting for positions of success and 
prosperity. A route to this expansion was a series of Russian IPOs in London, which has 
led to the internationalisation of the Russian risks related to the privatisation of the 1990s 
and its aftermath. 7 Although the obvious attractions of investing in Russia are difficult to 
ignore, the international business community is now significantly dependent on embedded 
risks, the nature of which it does not completely understand. 8 
The Yukos case should be regarded as a landmark case that shows the scope, 
complexity and dangers that the Russian risk poses to the international political and 
business community. The Yukos case is considered to be the biggest case of corporate 
fraud and money laundering in recent Russian history-9 It raises a number of legal 
S See V Korchagina, 'Sibneft's Owners Nation's Worst-Kept Secret' Mos Times (Moscow 11 April 2000) 11; J 
Whalen and G Chazan, Russia Considers Probe into Oil Industry's Taxes - Official Accuses Companies of 
Evading Payments' Asian Wall St J (Hong Kong 31 July 2000) A24; M Mironov, 'Economics of Spacemen: 
Tax Evasion and Firm Performance. Evidence from Russian Banking Transaction Data' (2006) 30 June 
University of Chicago Working Papers 26 <http: //home. uchicago. edu/-mmironol/ research/spacemen. pdf> 
accessed 4 April 2007. 
6 See eg EA Posner and A Vermeule, 'Transitional justice as Ordinary Justice' (2003-2004) 117 Harv L Rev 
762-825; T Allen, 'Restitution and Transitional Justice in the European Court of Human Rights' (2006-2007) 
13 Colum J Eur L 1-46. 
7 See eg A Ostrovsky, 'Russia's IPO Rush' (2005) <http: //www. fcsm. ru/eng/document. asp? 
obno=18520>accessed 20 April 2007; M Ermakova, 'London and Moscow Exchanges to Cooperate on 
IPOs' (2006) 1 March Herald Tribune <http: /www. iht. com/articles/2006/02/28/bloomberg/bxlse. php> 
accessed 25 April 2007. 
8 See eg C Hecker, 'Dispelling Russian IPO Myths' (2006) August Control Risks 
<http: /www. schinnerer. com/risk_mgmt/kidnap_ransom/perspective aug06. pdf>accessed 24 December 
2007; J Mackintosh, TSA to Act on Foreign IPO Concerns' (2007) 5 April FT. com <http: //www. ft. com 
/cros/s/0121 f053eO-e312-11 db-al c9-000b5dfl 0621. html>accessed 23 June 2007. 
9D Gololobov, 'The Yukos Money Laundering Case: A Never-Ending Stork' (2007) 28 (4) Mich J Intl L 
711-64. 
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problems never previously addressed, 1° and is one of the most exceptional corporate and 
accounting cases in recent times. 
A major Russian oil company, Yukos, was first privatised then acquired and headed 
by the Menatep Group. Yukos overcame post-privatisation problems by using the same 
questionable tax optimization and financial strategies employed by other oligarchy 
groups. " Those strategies were implicitly accepted as usual practice by the contemporary 
legal, bureaucratic bodies and by the business community. The Yeltsin Government, seeing 
no other way of dealing with threatening regional financial and social problems, gave its 
consent to these practices in the form of willful blindness towards Menatep and others. 
12 
However Yukos continued on a new trajectory. Having dealt with its tax debts and the 
social problems of its employees, Yukos decided to develop new corporate strategies as 
well as increasing production. 13 As a result, the Company became the first top ranking 
Russian oil-production company to have successfully applied international standards of 
accountability, transparency and disclosure. This boosted its capitalization and made it the 
leading company in the corporate governance sphere; The "Yukos phenomenon" had been 
created. 14 The Company became the undisputed leader of the Russian ADR's market and 
its depositary shares were traded on several international stock exchanges. 
10 See eg E Shamseeva, 'Yukos's Affairs and the Yukos Case' (2003) <http: //bd. english. fom. ru 
/report/map/shamseeva/ed032836>accessed 5 March 2007; A Goriaev and K. Sonin, 'Prosecutors and 
Financial Markets: A Case Study of the Yukos Affair' (2004) New Economic School/CEFIR and CEPR 
Working Papers <www. departments. bucknell. edu/management/apfa/Stockholm%20Papers /Goriaev. pdf> 
accessed 15 October 2007; U Klaus, 'The Yukos Case under the Energy Charter Treaty and the Provisional 
Application of International Treaties' (2005) Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law 8 
<http: //www2 jura. uni-halle. de/telc/policy_papers. htn-d>accessed 17 March 2007. 
11 See eg Y Iji, 'Corporate Control and Governance Practices in Russia' (2003) University College London, 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies Working Paper No 33 1-37 
<http: //www. ssees. ac. uk/publications/working_papers/wp33. pdf>accessed 5 April 2007; K Korotov and 
others, 'Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos. Man with a Ruble' (2003) INSEAD Cases for Learning 
<http: //www. sovest. org/gb/Yukos a_ case_study. pdf>accessed 3 April 2007; M Chudnovsky, Privatizing 
Russia: Case Study of Yukos Oil Company (Europe: East and West Undergraduate Research Symposium 
2004) <http: //www. ucis. pitt. edu/ursymposium/2004/Publication%20FINAL. pdf>accessed 15 December 
2006. 
12 See eg F Louvard, K Joffroy and L Rogleff, Privatisation in Russia' (1995) 23 Intl Bus Law 260-67; S 
Hedlund, Property without Rights: Dimensions of Russian Privatisation' (2001) 53 (2) Europe-Asia Stud 
213-37; Tompson, 'Privatisation in Russia: Scope, Methods and Impact'. 
I; See eg Yukos, 'Yukos Wins Four Good Corporate Governance Awards' (2001) <http: //www. yukos. com/ 
vpo/news. asp? year-2001 &month=12>accessed 10 April 2007. 
'4See MS Salter, 'OAO Yukos Oil Company' (2001) Harvard Business School Cases N9-901-021 
<http: //harvardbusinessonline. hbsp. harvard. edu>accessed 10 July 2001; L Aron, The Yukos Affair' (2003) 
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The combination of international corporate standards with Russian business practices 
and political ambition, led Khodorkovsky and Yukos into conflict with the powerful 
"Siloviki" group headed by President Putin. The "Siloviki" used state bureaucratic and 
judicial resources, to attack Yukos and its core shareholders. 15 The attack was successful, 
through its use of creative application of criminal law and the retrospective treatment of 
Yukos's tax and cash flow optimisation strategies. As a result of the vast tax claims, the 
main production unit was sold and the Company was declared bankrupt. 16 The core 
shareholders and managers left the country, and their attempts to start an international 
campaign against Putin's regime had limited success. 17 
The Yukos' case involves: 
a) Some corporate cases: asset stripping, corporate fraud, and misappropriations of 
assets; 
b) A large number of different tax avoidance cases, and; 
c) Money laundering to the amount of $ 27 bn. 
The corporate tax and money laundering story provides the basis of all the cases 
collectively called "the Yukos case". This case was based on the fact that Russian law does 
not recognise corporate groups and consolidated company schemes. As a result, the 
government was able to re-brand Yukos the legal Integrated Company into "Yukos the 
illegal Organised Group". 18 The Yukos case is of great significance for the wider business 
Fall American Enterprise Insitutes for Public Policy Research <www. aei. org>accessed 7 March 2007; 
ICFAL, `Yukos: The Fall of a Russian Oil Giant' (2004) Economics Case Studies Collection 2 
<http: //icmr. icfai. org/casestudies/catalogue/Economics/ECOAI 14. htm>accessed 21 March 2007. 
15 See eg F Hill, 'Putin, Yukos and Russia' (20(4) 1 December The Globalist <httpJ/www. theglobalist. com/ 
StoryId. aspx? Storyld=4276>accessed 12 July 2007; S Eizenstat, 'Putin Inc. / after the Yukos Affair' Wall St J 
(New York 14 July 2006) 2. 
16 See D Gololobov, Tyatiletka Yukosa: Tupikovoe Delo [The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock Case]' 
(2007) 26 July Vedomosti <http //www. vedomosti. ru/newspaper/article. shtml? 2007/07/26/l29922>accessed 
26 July 2007; Gololobov, 'The Yukos Money Laundering Case'. 
17 See Russian Press Center, Exiled Russian Oligarchs: Battle for Moscow 2008' (2007) 
<http: //www. russianpresscenter. com/reportmay_2007. pdf accessed 20 July 2007. 
18 See - Ugolovno-Pravovoi Analiz Deistvii, Sovershennykh Rukovoditelyami I Sobstvennikami Gruppy 
"Menatep-Rosprom-Yukos" v Protsesse Predprinimatel'skoi Deyatel'nosti [The Criminal Analysis of the 
Actions Committed by the Yukos Group]' (2003) <http: //www. compromat. ru/main/hodorkovskiy/ugo. htm> 
accessed 20 July 2006; L Sigal, 'Organisovannaya Predprnimatel'skaya Gruppa [Organised Business Group]' 
(2005) 20 July Russkii Zhurnal [Russian Journal] <http: //www. russ. ru/layout/set/ 
print//politics/docs/organizovannaya predprinimatel_skaya gruppa>accessed 5 March 2006. 
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community: in emerging economies difficulty surrounds the recognition of the "corporate 
groups /consolidated company" concept. In addition emerging economy governments tend 
to use money laundering charges as an instrument to solve their economic problems. These 
combined factors may result in further, unexpected, Enron-sized, international money 
laundering scandals. 
When examining the collapse of Yukos, scholarly attention should focus on the 
complex problems related to the concept of the modern corporate group, and issues of 
white-collar crime in the context of post-transitional justice-19 The Yukos case highlights a 
number of interrelated domestic and international legal problems which need urgent 
solutions. Amongst them are: 
  The problem of predicate offence in corporate groups' operational schemes; 
  The nexus between money laundering and tax evasion in corporate groups; 
  The involvement of auditors and other gatekeepers in money laundering schemes; 
  The politically motivated enforcement of money laundering legislation; 
  The application of the "Rule of Law" in Russia as a country with a transitional 
economy. 
The solutions to these problems are sure to create precedents for similar criminal 
cases in the future. 
19 See JAE Pottow, 'Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions 
To "Local Interests"' (2005-2006) 104 Mich L Rev 1899-950,1899. 
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1.2. Research Questions. 
The Yukos case demonstrated that corporate groups emerging from transition 
economies are subject to unexpected risks, even when they adhere to internationally 
recognised rules. The nature and limitations of these risks remain unclear to the 
international community. 20 The Yukos case has shown that advanced legal standards and 
rules can both help and hinder. 21 
Firstly, such standards and rules can hinder by playing the role of "false friend". 
They assure potential investors and creditors that companies that comply with advanced 
standards and rules are attractive options for investment, and are protected to a certain 
extent, from potential market disasters. 2 Thus, a compliant company is likely to become a 
favourite of the securities market and the risks will remain hidden, lurking as a potential 
danger for shareholders. Neither further improvement of the regulatory framework, nor 
additional pressure on gatekeepers will improve the situation significantly, since emerging 
corporate groups are always able to retain sophisticated consultants and auditors who 
prepare their papers in full compliance with even the most advanced regulations. 
23 
The second hindrance lies in that advanced standards and rules are being applied in 
situations where uncertainty surrounds the concept of white-collar crime 24 and where there 
ZÖ See Goriaev and Sonin, 'Prosecutors and Financial Markets'; A Goriaev and K Sonin, 'Is Political Risk 
Company - Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair' (2005) CEPR Discussion Papers No 5076 
<http: //www. cepr. org/pubs/dps/DP5076. asp>accessed 20 August 2005. 
21 See D Gololobov and J Tanega, 'Yukos Risk: The Double Edged Sword' (2007) 3 (2) NYU JL& Bus 
557-648. 
u See eg S Allen, E Satskov and J Henderson, Yukos: Growth Prospects Outweigh Risks (Company Profile 
2001) 52 <httpi/www. russiaenergy. co. uk/assets/applets/Yukos_2001. pdfyaccessed 20 May 2007; B 
Misamore, 'Goldman Sachs Global Energy Conference' (2003) <yukos. com/new-ir/pdf/Jan-2003. pdf> 
accessed 20 January 2006. 
23 See S Guriev, 'Enron, Yukos and the Gatekeepers' (2004) 2 December The Moscow Times. com 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2004/12/02/005. htm1>accessed 10 December 2005; D Schor, The 
Yukos Affair: Rectifying the Past or Polluting the Future? ' (2006) <http: /www. thebirchonline. org/ 
schor. htm>accessed 14 February 2007. 
24 GS Moohr, 'An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime' (2003) 
55 Fla L Rev 937-76,959-60. 
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are general problems with criminal procedures and post-transitional redistributive justice. 25 
This serves to create new opportunities for the government to apply certain legislative 
provisions to suppress political opponents or purely for economic reasons, such as re- 
privatisation or the re-distribution of property. 26 This may happen even when advanced 
standards and rules are adopted in formal compliance with the international framework. 
This was the case with Russian money laundering legislation. 
In the situation when the first paradigm directly conflicts with the second, a question, 
critically important for the prevention of further money laundering scandals, is raised: How 
could a big international corporate group, known for its adherence to transparency and 
advanced corporate governance principles, be involved in money laundering schemes? 
Such scandals are ruinous for corporations and their investors and compromise relevant 
laws at the same time. The ongoing events with other Russian oil and gas companies 
confirm that this question needs a detailed and timely answer. 27 
Many commentators consider the events taking place in the Russian oil and gas 
industry since 2000 as politically driven. It has been suggested that this political drive aims 
to put large-scale industrial property into the hands of the pro-Putin "Silovarchs", thus 
creating a new international political regime in which Russia will play the role of the 
energy superpower master. 28 Yet the complex and controversial decisions taken by 
different judicial authorities during the legal campaign against Yukos-related individuals29 
25 See eg The Wall Street Journal, 'Russian Justice (2007) 7 February Wall St J 1; Washington Post, 
'Potemkin Justice; Mr. Putin's Legal System at Work' Wash Post (Washington 8 February 2007) 1. 
26 See eg Hill, 'Putin, Yukos and Russia'; The Economist, 'After Yukos: The Far-Reaching Legacy of the 
Yukos Affair' (2007) 10 May Economist. com <http: //www. economist. com/business/PrinterFriendly. 
cfm? story_id=9167397>accessed 10 May 2007. 
27 See L Harding, 'From Russia with $3 Billion. Another Putin Opponent May Have Fled to London' (2007) 
30 August Guardian Unlimited <http //www. guardian. co. uk/russia/article/0,, 2158599,00. html? gusrc 
=rss&feed=l2>accessed 30 August 2007; I Reznik, 'Lichnoe Delo Gutsirieva [Gutseriyev's Personal Case]' 
(2007) 30 July Vedomosti <http: //w w. vedomosti. ru/newspaper/article. shtml? 2007/07/30/130103>accessed 
30 July 2007. 
28 See Eizenstat, Putin Inc. / after the Yukos Affair; SL Myers and AE Kramer, 'From Ashes of Yukos, New 
Russian Oil Giant Emerges' (2007) 27 March NYtimes. com <httpJ/www. nytimes. com/2007/ 03/27/ 
world/europet27russia. html? ex=1 179201 600&en=6c8d95I79683dbce&ei=5070>accessed 10 May 2007; The 
Economist, 'The Making of a Neo-KGB State' (2007) 23 August Economist. com 
<http: //www. economist. com/world/displaystory. cfm? story_id=9682621>accessed 24 August 2007. 
29 See eg A Ostrovsky, 'Russia Accuses Former Yukos Chiefs of Asset Theft' The Financial Times (London 
18 August 2006) 20; F Gibb, 'British Lawyer Accused over Collapse of Yukos'(2007) 24 April Timesonline 
<http: //business. timesonline. co. uk/tol/business/law/articlel695805. ece>accessed 10 May 2007. 
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and the ongoing professional debates30 show that politicising the case does not provide a 
proper answer to the question: What are the reasons that led to the scandal and collapse of 
the company, and what are the implications for corporate groups and the AML regime? 
This research aims to identify the legal grounds of the Yukos embezzlement and money 
laundering case. It will be analysed within the context of the Yukos affair as a complex, 
multidimensional and politicised series of events that have had a significant impact on the 
Russian political and economic system and have created international precedents 31 
1.3. Methodology. 
13.1. Basic Principles Pertaining to the Subject of the Research. 
13.1.1. The Political Aspect of the Research. 
The Yukos case stems from the conflict between the oligarchy business traditions, 
advanced international corporate governance and accounting principles, and politically 
motivated persecution as an instrument of state policy. 32 Moreover the case, which is still 
ongoing, was launched and investigated in Russia: a country with a post-transitional 
economy, dominated by state giants, weak democratic traditions and a corrupt rule of law 
which has been macerated by extensive democratic rhetoric. The judicial system of Russia 
30 See eg P Clateman, 'Legal Obeseravations on the Yukos Affair: Part V (2005) 17 January Johnson's Russia 
List <httpi/www. cdi. org/russia/johnson/Yukos-auction. pdf>accessed 20 January 2006; W Kononczuk, The 
"Yukos Affair", Its Motives and Implications (Prace OSW / CES Studies 2006); Schor, 'The Yukos Affair: 
Rectifying the Past or Polluting the Future?. 
3' See eg Aron, The Yukos Affair; L Shevtsova, 'Implications of the Yukos Scandal for Russian Domestic 
Politics' (2003) <http: //www. carnegieendowment. org/events/index. cfm? fa=evend)etail&id=643>accessed 15 
March 2007. 
32 See Shamseeva, 'Yukos's Affairs and the Yukos Case'; M Delyagin, The Yukos Case as a Mirror on the 
"Dictatorship of Squalor" (2005) <www. khodorkovsky. info/docs/Delyagin_4_19_05. pdf->accessed 20 May 
2007; V Volkov, 'Standard Oil and Yukos Cases' (2005) September - October Pro et Contra 66-91. 
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is recognized as being based on Stalinist-rooted principles and managed by the Kremlin. 
33 
It would therefore be misleading to assume that the application of international doctrines, 
concepts, theories and standards would produce the same effect in Russia as it does in 
Anglo-American jurisdictions or EU countries. 
Any analysis of corporate groups in Russia, on the level of strategic major 
corporations, should take into account the political situation and relationship of business 
groups with the ruling regime. The same concept is applicable to criminal law, which is 
highly politicized. Its application in the sphere of white-collar crime is politically driven 
and criminal law is widely used as an apolitical instrument for the management of the 
economic system. For the purpose of this study the events will be analysed in the context 
of their political background. 
13.1.2. The General Uncertainty Surrounding Issues of White-collar Crime 
and Justice in Transition and Post Transition Economies. 
An assumption relevant to the Yukos affair in general, and the Yukos tax case in 
particular has been made by Geraldine Moohr in her article on the role of criminal law in 
the prevention of white-collar crime in the post-Enron era. She says on the nature of 
white-collar crime: "Compared to other forms of criminal activity, white-collar crime is 
famously written in shades of gray. In this realm, conduct that is immoral or harmful is not 
always criminal fraud, while conduct that is not obviously immoral or harmful may be 
criminal fraud. "34Another writer supports Moohr's point by remarking: "One of the chief 
distinctions between white-collar crime and other crimes is that often neither the accused 
nor the prosecutor knows whether a criminal act has occurred, even after conduct has been 
identified. "35 Moohr also points out that laws are broadly written in nonspecific, general 
33 See eg Russian Axis, The Judicial System of the Russian Federation: A System-Crisis of Independence 
(Russian Axis, London 2004); The Wall Street Journal, Russian Justice'. 
34 Moohr, 'An Enron Lesson' 959-60. 
35 PH Bucy, 'Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability (1991) 75 Minn L Rev 
1095-184,1147. 
33 
terms in order to capture a broad range of conduct. The result is that such laws fail to 
provide notice that certain conduct is criminal 36 
This assumption overlaps with Tom Allen's conclusion in his research on the 
problem of restitution and transitional justice, based on the recent decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights. He writes: "The majority in the Grand Chamber 
maintained that taking without compensation was not unfair because the property owners 
should have "expected the unexpected" in the period immediately following the 
transition. s37 
He adds that although the Grand Chamber believed that the ordinary principles of 
justice to be relevant in the transitional context; the circumstances may be different. 
38 So, 
according to Allen's conclusion corrective or distributive justice in the post-transition 
period is generally unpredictable. 
Apart from the recognized strong political issues, the Yukos tax case has two 
dimensions of uncertainty: 
(a) As being classified as white collar crime, and; 
(b) As a case directly aimed at redistribution of the assets acquired through the 
period of privatisation and transition in Russia. 
The lack of practice in commercial and tax fraud cases in Russia increases the level 
of legal uncertainty that crystallizes in the Yukos case. 9 As a result, some assumptions 
made in the present study will inevitably have a streak of uncertainty, predisposed by the 
nature of the case. 
36 Moohr, 'An Enron Lesson' 960. 
37 Allen, 'Restitution and Transitional Justice in the European Court of Human Rights' 41. 
38 ibid. 
39 See eg S Crompton, How Risky Is Russia? (2004) 2004 Intl Fin L Rev 24-25. 
34 
13.13. The Influence of the Public Relations (PR) Strategies. 
The case is subject to the influence of different partisan PR strategies, which are 
indirectly or directly supported by the state and statutory-owned business conglomerates or 
the core shareholders and former management of Yukos 40 As a result the case is presented 
to the political and business community from diametrically opposed angles, which makes 
any independent assessment difficult 41 The principle of multiple-aspect analysis has to be 
applied in order to avoid using biased data. For an acute analysis of each significant 
occurrence pertaining to the case, information from at least three different sources, 
representing different political views will be obtained. 
13.1.4. Personal involvement in the researched case. 
My personal involvement in the Yukos case has two dimensions: as one of the 
leading lawyers to the company and the head of the Yukos legal team in 2004, and as a 
person targeted by the Russian judiciary. Therefore the following issues may be raised: (i) 
the use of privileged or confidential data in the course of research and (ii) the utilization of 
biased data which may result in biased conclusions and distort the study. 
1.3.1.3.1. Usage of the privileged or confidential data. 
No privileged or confidential data has been ever used for my research, although I, 
as a former employee and service provider to the Yukos group had a legitimate access to it. 
Since 1995 1 have had an acccess to the following types of data: 
40 See www. khodorkovsky. info, www. robertamsterdam. com. 
41 See eg B Volkhonsky, S Farizova and A Ahundov, 'Yuri Chaika Wants Europe in Court' (2005) 3 
November Kommersant Online <httpJ/commersant. com/p623478/r I/Yuri_Chalka Wants Europe 
in_Court>accessed 7 September 2007; N Sergeev, 'Leonid Newlin Gets Polonium and Mercury' (2006) 28 
December Kommersant Online <http: /www. kommersant. com/p733651/r 527/ Nevzlin_Gets_Polonium> 
accessed 30 August 2007. 
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1.3.1.4.2. Data, obtained by me in the course of my employment. 
Since 1995 and until 2002 1 was employed by the various companies in the 
Rosprom/Yukos Group and signed usual undertakings which prohibited me in accordance 
with the Law of Commercial Secrets42 to use any information, obtained in the course of my 
employment, for any other purposes except ones mentioned in my contracts. However, 
this undertaking in accordance with article 139 of the Civil Code could not, in any case, 
cover publicly available data and expired in three years after the termination of my 
employment. Moreover, the data received in the course of my employment has little 
relevance to the Yukos case as this case was launched in 2003. 
1.3.1.4.3. Privileged data, obtained in a course of providing legal services to the 
Yukos Group. 
Since 2002, when I obtained advocate status and joined an advocate settlement, I was 
retained by the holding company of the Yukos Group, and owed the company duties of 
confidentiality and care in accordance with the applicable Russian laws. Article 8 of the 
Law on Advocacy43 provides that only information related to the legal assistance of a 
particular client can be classed as privileged. The Russian law on advocacy and the Code 
of Ethics 44 do not prohibit advocates from using publicly available data, including 
officially published acts of courts of law, and information obtained not in the course of 
providing legal assistance, for publications and commentaries. 45 My contracts with Yukos 
also did not provide for any requirements for preserving privileged information other than 
42 See Federal'nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii of 26 Iyulya 2004 Ns 98-FZ `O kommercheskoi taine' (s ism. i 
dop. ) [The Federal Law RF of 26 July 2004 Ns 98-FZ `On commercial secrets" (amended)] Sobranie 
Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2004 Ns 32 
Item 3283. 
43 See Federal'nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii of 31 Maya 2002 Ns 63-FZ `Ob advokature I advokatskoii 
deyatelnosti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (s ism. i dop. ) [The Federal Law RF of 31 May 2002 Ns 63-FZ `On 
advocacy" (amended)] Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 2002 Ns 23 Item 2102. 
"See <http: //www. fparfru/laws/normativ_akt fpa/kodex_etika. htin> 
as See eg commentaries at <http: //www. bestlawyers. ru> 
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specified by the law. Therefore, Russian law and my previous relationships with the 
Yukos group do not prevent me from conducting research and publishing on the Yukos- 
related cases. 
1.3.1.4.4. Owing any duty of confidentiality to the State. 
In accordance with Art 161 of CCP, advocates, involved in criminal defence, may be 
obliged to sign a special undertaking, prohibiting them disclosure of the information, 
obtained in the course of investigation to anyone else. I has never directly been involved as 
a defence attorney in any criminal investigation, related to Yukos, I have not signed such 
an undertaking. Consequently I owe no duty of confidentiality to the State or any statutory 
organisation regarding the Yukos-related cases. 
1.3.1.4.5. The problem of biased data and conclusions in the thesis. 
My position as both the consultant and direct participant may give raise to some 
suspicions that the data, used in the research, and the conclusions can be biased. 
There is an assumption that scientific research cannot rely on biased data, nor on 
collectors who participate in the area being studied, nor on those who have an interest in 
the outcome. This is to avoid biased results and a bias towards obtaining a desired 
conclusion. However, there is no basic tenet of scientific research that the methodology 
must be unbiased: 
No human being is even approximately free from these subjective influences; 
the honest and enlightened investigator devises the experiment so that his own 
prejudices cannot influence the result. Only the naive or dishonest claim that 
their own objectiveness is a sufficient safeguard a6 
My position as one of the leading lawyers to Yukos provided me with exceptional 
experience and insight into problem. Moreover, any ethnically based research, including 
46 See W E. Bright, An Introduction to Scientific Research (Dover, New York 1991) 41. 
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research on Russia predisposes a profound understanding of regional history, problems and 
realities. Considering the unique character of the Russian criminal judiciary and political 
cases, any researcher with significant legal experience should posess a certain degree of 
involvement. This involvement may be either in the activities of particular legal firms that 
provide assistance in such cases, or directly as an employee or a consultant to a 
organisation subject to investigation. A long track record of books and memoirs, published 
by prominent Russian lawyers, directly confirms this hypothesis. 47 
Also, one of the ways of dealing with biased data is utilization of multiple informants 
or collateral sources. Respectively, the methodological principle in this body of research is 
to employ multiple data sources to achieve convergent verification of the relevant 
hypotheses. For the better accomplishment of this goal most sources are either in English 
or with translations, available on-line. One of the reasons, which allows me to claim a 
certain degree of independence in my study is that my conclusions in the PhD thesis and 
my previous publications do not correspond either to the official position of the 
prosecution and courts, nor with the position of the defendants and their lawyers. 
All these factors confirm that this thesis represents a comparatively independent 
research, not substantially distorted by biased data or conclusions. 
13.2. Qualitative Method and Ethical issues. 
A descriptive single case study design is used for the research, 
48 which aims to study 
a group of criminal and civil cases known as the Yukos case, with emphasis on the 
embezzlement and money laundering case. 
Case study is a valuable method of research with distinctive characteristics that make 
it ideal for many types of investigations 49 A frequent criticism of case study methodology 
"See eg S Ariya, Mozaika [Mosaic] (De-Yure, Moscow 2001) 
48 A Strauss and B Glaser, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Aldine, 
Chicago 1967); R Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd edn, Sage Publishing, Beverly Hills 
1994); G Walsham, 'Interpretive Case Studies in Is Research: Nature and Method' (1995) 4 (2) Eur J of 
Information Systems 74-81; P Darke, G Shanks and M Broadbent, 'Successfully Completing Case Study 
Research: Combining Rigour, Relevance and Pragmatism' (1998) 8 Inform Syst J 273-89. 
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is that dependence on a single case renders it incapable of providing a generalizing 
conclusion 50 Therefore the limitations of the single-case design have been taken into 
account and the author has conducted careful investigation to avoid misrepresentation and 
maximize the investigator's access to the evidence. 
The research method will be qualitative, incuding personal observation, analysis of 
the reports, minutes and historical data. " Taking into consideration the author's personal 
involvement in the case and, to avoid using biased data, the publicly available opinions of 
independent Russian and international lawyers and consultants will be used. 
133. Other Methodological Issues and Data Collection. 
The application of the comparative method is determined by the nature and the aims 
of the research. The corporate governance, accounting, tax optimisation and anti-money 
laundering practice applied from 1999-2003, and the legal techniques used by the Russian 
authorities in the "Yukos case" will be compared with the international regulations, 
judicial practice and theoretical findings. Due to political sensitivity, the criminal character 
of the case, the peculiarities of the Russian judiciary, and the significant threat to the 
potential interviewees, no interviews for this thesis will be conducted. 
49 W Tellis, 'Introduction to Case Study' (1997) 3 (2) The Qualitative Report <http: //www. nova. edu/ssss/ 
QR/QR3-2/tellisl. htmlaccessed 20 March 2006. 
50 See eg G Trasler, 'Strategic Problems in the Study of Criminal Behaviour' (1963-1964) 4 Brit J 
Criminology 422-42,432; PG Schrag, 'Policy, Procedures, and People: Governmental Response to a 
Privately Initiated Nuclear Test Monitoring Project as a Case Study in National Security Decision-Making' 
(1988-1989) 21 NYU J Intl L& Pol 1-146,131; WD Coleman and S Wayland, 'The Origins of Global Civil 
Society and Nonterritorial Governance: Some Empirical Reflections' (2006) 12 Global Governance 241-62, 
257. See in general J Hamel, S Dufour and D Fortin, Case Study Methods (Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 
CA 1993); R Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (Sage Publishing, Beverly Hills, CA 1993). 
51 On the qualitative method see eg J Lofland and LH Lofland, Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to 
Qualitative Observations and Analysis (2nd edn, Sage, London 1984); MQ Patton, How to Use Qualitative 
Methods in Evaluation (Sage, London 1987); AL Strauss, Qualitative Methods for Social Sciences 
(Cambridge John New York 1987); RA Morrow and DD Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology (Sage, 
London 1994). 
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The collection of secondary data will be primarily based on the researcher's personal 
library of more than three hundred titles on issues surrounding the research topic, the 
researcher's personal archives and Russian and international legal firms' working papers. 52 
1.4. Scope of the Study. 
1.4.1. The Russian Transition Experience. 
There are several limitations on the study based on the substance of the case. The 
dissertation deals with a number of problems with are rooted in Russian history, mostly 
from when the former Soviet Union collapsed and the country went through a period of 
transition from pseudo-socialism to state capitalism. It is recognized as a period of 
political, economic and legal uncertainty. 53 One of the distinctive features of the transition 
was the wholesale privatisation of former socialist property. Privatisation gave birth to new 
economic structures including financial-industrial groups, which determined the landscape 
of Russian politics and economics in the last decade of the twentieth century. 
54 The 
Menatep Group, Bank Menatep and the Yukos OR Company should be seen as structures 
emerging from this transitional period and as being inextricably linked to privatisation and 
its problems 55 Russian privatisation, its history, stages and implications comprise an 
independent, highly politicized and thoroughly researched problem which will be 
52 See eg SM Saunders, AJ Pappalardo and MP Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal Charges against and the 
Trial of Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev' (2005) 25 <khodorkovsky. ru/docs/2620_ 
29 May 2006; R Amsterdam and D Peroff 'White Paper on Abuse of State Authority 
in the Russian Federation - the New Politically Driven Charges against Michail Khodorkovsk) (2007) 
<http l/www. robertamsterdam. com/Abuse%20oP'/o2OState%2oAuthority9/o2Oin%2Othe%2ORussian%20 
Federation. pdf>accessed 7 February 2007. 
s; See eg Hedlund, Property without Rights: Dimensions of Russian Privatisation'; Medova and Tischenko, 
'Lawless Privatization?. 
54 See eg A Barnes, 'Russia's New Business Groups and State Power' (2003) 19 (2) Post-Soviet Aff 154-86; 
Guriev and Rachinsky, 'The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism'. 
ss See Iji, 'Corporate Control and Governance Practices in Russia; Chudnovsky, Privatizing Russia: Case 
Study of Yukos Oil Company, A Latta, 'Khodorkovsky, Menatep, and Yukos' (2004) 11 April The Moscow 
News. com <http: //www. mit. ru/english/issue. php. )2004-11-2 >accessed 23 September 2007. 
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highlighted in this thesis only to provide a general understanding of the genesis of the 
Menatep-Rosprom-Yukos group. 
1.4.2. The New Regime Paradigm. 
The above approach will be used to research the emergence of Putin's regime, its 
relationship with the oligarchs, the rise of the Siloviki group, and the re-creation of Russia 
as a super-power state. 56 All these factors will be analysed only in the light of their direct 
effect on the Yukos affair. As the research does not aim to review the socio-legal aspects 
of the late transition and the rise of Putin; only the main characteristics and theories 
pertaining to relevant legal and political phenomenon will be provided. 
1.4.3. The Yukos Affair Limitations. 
The study attempts to provide a comprehensive and fair picture of the Yukos affair. It 
focuses on the embezzlement and money laundering case according to the aims of the 
study. Some minor cases, not significant for a comprehensive picture of the main case, 
may be ignored or referenced in a summarised form 57 Some lengthy and highly politicized 
legal disputes that have not crystallized in any recognized precedents, will be highlighted 
in an abridged form or simply referenced to the relevant sources. 
8 
56 See MA Smith, The Putinite System' (2003) Conflict Studies Research Centre Publications Ns Ell I 
<httpl/www. csrc. ac. uk>accessed 20 April 2006; G Kasparov, 'Putin's Gangster State' (2007) 30 March Wall 
St J Online <http. //online. wsj. com/article/SB 117522235247454187. html? mod=rss_opinion main>accessed 
10 May 2007; D Treisman, Putin's Silovarchs' (2007) 51 (1) Orbis 141-53. 
S' See eg L Rychkova and M Lepina, The Prosecutor Doesn't Believe He's Innocent (2005) 28 July 
Kommersant Online <http//commersant. com/page. asp? id=596770>accessed 20 July 2007. 
58 See eg Bundesgerich [Bger] [Federal Court] 13 August 2007 <httpi/relevancybgerch/php/aza>accessed 
20 September 2007. 
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1.4.4. The Russian Data Sources. 
One of the key points of the research is the extensive use of Russian data, including 
relevant recent statutes and case law, never previously analysed and commented upon in 
international or Anglo-American academic sources. 59 Detailed observation of recent 
developments and trends in contemporary Russian law and legal research is out of the 
scope of this dissertation, therefore comments on the points which are unclear for a person 
untrained in Russian law will mostly be limited to references to the available international 
and Russian electronic sources. The general availability of the main Russian legal 
61 databases in English60 will be considered. 
59 See eg Postanovlenie Prezidiuma Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda po zayavlen yu NK Yukos of 4 Oktyabrya 
2005 Ns 8665/04 [The Decision of the VAS RF on the case FTS v Yukos of 4 October 2005 N@ 8665/04] 
Vestnik Vysshego Arbiraznogo Suda RF [Vestn VAS] 2005 Ns 2. 
60 See eg Law of Russia in English / System GARANT <httpi/www. garant. ru>. 
61 On the problem of legal translation see eg SMF Geeroms, 'Comarative Law and Legal Translation: Why 
the Terms Cassation, Revision and Appwal Should Not Be Translated' (2002) 50 Am J Comp L 201; B Pozzo 
(ed), Ordinary Language and Legal Language (Giuffr6, Milan 2005); MI Ahmad, 'Interpreting Communities: 
Lawyering across Language Difference' (2007) 54 UCLA L Rev 999-1076. 
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1.4.5. Personal Data Protection. 
This research deals with criminal cases related to particular individuals, some of 
whom are officially recognized as political prisoners or political refugees. 2 Although, the 
general data on criminal cases is publicly assessable, the use of personal details pertaining 
to the individuals charged or sentenced in the Yukos case will be limited. The cases will be 
represented in a form sufficient for comprehensive interpretation of their substance. 
1.4.6. The Continuous Nature of the Case. 
One of the main characteristics of the case is its continuing nature. Several important 
legal proceedings that may have a significant impact on the case, are still ongoing or 
pending. 63 Therefore, although the dissertation aims to provide a vision of the subsequent 
events, these prognoses may turn out to be incorrect or misleading. Taking into 
consideration the politicized character of the case, some subsequent events may be 
regarded as critical for the content of the research. Thus at certain points several parts of 
the research may need significant reconsideration. 
1.5. Thesis Outline. 
The introduction will specify the problem statement. The subchapters will focus on 
the methodology and limitations of the study and are particularly important for this 
62 See eg MosNews, 'Russian Court Jails Former Yukos Manager for 14 Years' (2005) 5 March 
Mosnews. com <httpJ/www. mosnews. com/news/2005/12/01/yukosmanager. shtml>accessed 12 September 
2007. 
63 See eg E Zapodinskaya, 'Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Turn to European Court' (2006) 22 March 
Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. com/p659616/Khodorkovsky_and Lebedev_ 
Turn 
_to 
European... >accessed 20 March 2007; D Sidorov and G Sysoyev, 'Khodorkovsky Forecasts 
Progress and Verdict of Future Trial' (2007) 7 February Kommersant Online 
<http: //www. kommersant. com/p-10056/Khodorkovsky_trial/>accessed 2 March 2007. 
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research, as it is based, in significant part, on actual court filings and data, which can be 
partly confidential or privileged. The chapter explains the restrictions regarding the use of 
the data. The introductory chapter also contains three other subsections: a section on the 
concept of international corporate groups and the concept of a consolidated company; an 
overview of the history of the Yukos Group in the context of the recent history of Russian 
corporate developments from 1990 until the present time; and a section on the problems 
related to application of the Rule of Law concept in Russia. 
The second chapter describes the "The Yukos Case" and consists of two parts: 
1. The "First Khodorkovsky Case", based on the allegations brought 
personally against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the CEO and the core shareholder of the 
Company and his friend Platon Lebedev, and; 
2. A number of cases against other individuals, shareholders, managers and 
employees of the Company. 
This chapter does not discuss the core problem of the research, i. e. the allegations of 
embezzlement and money laundering brought against Yukos managers and employees. 
The key goal of this chapter is to explain the structure of the case and to define several 
basic terms used. The chapter also explains the correlation between "The Yukos Case", the 
"First Khodorkovsky Case", the Second Khodorkovsky Case, etc. 
The third chapter also consists of two parts. The first part provides an analysis of 
the existing concepts of political motivation and its correlation with criminal law in 
general. The second part describes the problem of political persecution in the Yukos and 
Khodorkovsky cases. The chapter focuses on the position and arguements of the defenders 
of Yukos and Khodorkovsky, including PACE and the U. S. Senate, and represents the 
arguements of the opposition. It also explains the position of Amnesty International, which 
has refused to grant Khodorkovsky political prisoner status. 
The next chapter is divided in three parts. The first part represents an overview of 
the structure of Yukos's operational schemes and tax minimization methods, in context of 
the general Russian tax optimisation strategies used in the 90s. The second part focuses on 
different aspects of the Yukos tax avoidance/evasion case, including its international aspect 
and the implications for contemporary judicial practice. It summarises the new doctrines 
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creatively applied by the Russian courts in the Yukos tax case. The fourth chapter deals 
with the international dimension of the tax optimisation problem, reviewing the main 
western and international doctrines of tax avoidance and tax evasion, with the purpose of 
further comparison with those applied in the Yukos tax case. The chapter contains an 
extensive conclusion, comparing the internationally recognized model of tax avoidance 
and tax evasion with models applied in the Yukos case. 
The fifth chapter is focused on the embezzlement and money laundering case, 
resulting from the application of Yukos' tax optimisation strategies, cash flow\business 
operations and optimisation schemes. The Yukos money laundering case is also known as 
"The Second Khodorkovsky case", as the main charges have been brought against Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky personally as the CEO, core shareholder and as the actual controlling 
person of the Company and the Menatep Group. The purpose of this chapter is the 
description and analysis of the characteristics of the money laundering offence pertaining 
to the Yukos corporate group's business schemes, with emphasis on the elements of the 
offence that may be prevalent and therefore could represent a problem for all international 
corporate groups. 
The first subchapter describes the framework of the money laundering case 
highlighting the actual role of the cash flow and tax optimisation schemes, the application 
of which led to the collapse of the Yukos Empire. A separate subchapter discusses the 
problem of transfer pricing as the form of embezzlement, and as a predicate offence in the 
Yukos money laundering case. One of the subchapters provides an overview of the history 
of Russian money laundering legislation and assesses its compliance with international 
treaties. The fourth subchapter analyses the structure of the charges in the Yukos tax 
evasion and money laundering case. This subchapter highlights the parallels between the 
money laundering charges and normal business operations of a consolidated business 
group. The next subchapter investigates the nexus between Yukos' tax optimisation 
schemes and money laundering. 
The conclusion to the dissertation is a comprehensive analysis of the findings of all 
the chapters and summarises the answers to the research questions of the thesis. 
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1.6. The Concept of "Corporate Group" in the Dissertation. 
The paradox of the Yukos case is connected to the problems stemming from the 
theory of so-called "corporate groups" or "multinational enterprises". The limitations of 
this study do not allow for comprehensive research on this theory but several remarks 
outlining the concept of a modem corporate group will be made. 
1.6.1. Application of the U. S. Legislation in Respect of the Yukos 
Group. 
Application of U. S. common law and statutes to the activities of the Yukos corporate 
group is justified not only because of cross-border application of the U. S. law in general 
and of securities laws in particular, but due to the special ties between Yukos Oil Company 
and the U. S. jurisdiction, based on the following reasons: 
- The company launched a Level 1 ADR (American Depositary Receipt) programme, 
in March 2001.64 Yukos was subject to several requirements of the U. S. securities laws 
and regulations. 65 
- The reports audited by PwC, issued by the Company pertain to the years 1997- 
2002. The Company prepared and published the annual and quarterly accounts in 
compliance with the U. S. GAAP. 66 
-In 2004 the company made an attempt to file for Chapter 11 with the U. S. 
bankruptcy court. Although the case was dismissed, the Court's findings confirmed Yukos' 
close relationship with the U. S. jurisdiction. 67 
64 F-6EF Registration of American Depository Receipt Shares Filing Number: 333-104052 03619238 
<httpi/www. sec. gov>accessed 15 May 2007. 
65 See Re Yukos Oil Company Securities Litigation No 04 Civ 5243 (WHP) 2006 WL 800736 (SDNY 30 
March 2006). 
66 See the reports available at: , -httpJ/www. yukos. coffi/New-IR/Financial-rePorts. asp> 
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- Approximately 24% of the common stock of Yukos is owned by entities, many of 
which are United States residents, which purchased their stock through public market 
sources. 68 
- Yukos U. S. A. Inc., a subsidiary of Yukos has been incorporated under the laws of 
Texas. 69 
-A number of the security class actions have been filed in the U. S. again several 
Yukos' managers and its core shareholders. 0 
These circumstances show that although Yukos Oil Company formally resided in 
Russia and its corporate and operational activity was primarily regulated by Russian laws, 
a significant part of the Yukos Group's corporate activities, including issues relating to the 
liability of its managers and auditors, are subject to the U. S. laws and the jurisdiction of the 
U. S. courts. 1 These circumstances have also influenced the findings of U. S. academics 
when reviewing theoretical concepts of corporate groups. 
1.6.2. Introduction of Corporate Groups. 
In the modern economy, a business of large or moderate size is typically conducted 
not by a single corporation but by a group of affiliated companies under the control of a 
67 On the U. S. Yukos bankruptcy filing see MM Winkler, 'Arbitration without Privity and Russian Oil: The 
Yukos Case before the Houston Court' (2006) 27 (1) UPaJ Intl EconL 115-53,115-54. 
68 Misamore's Affid Re Yukos Oil Company 2005 WL 517959 (Bankr SD Tex 2005) 5. 
69 Re Yukos Oil Company 16. 
70 See eg Re Yukos Oil Company Securities Litigation. 
71 Eg Riches v Khodorkovsky et al (3: 07-cv-05654-MJJ). 
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parent corporation 72 Multinational enterprises are the most talked about business 
associations in the contemporary "globalizing" world. 73 Blumberg points out: 
In the modem world, parent corporations operate multinational groups of 
enormous dimensions through multi-tiered corporate structures of "incredible 
complexity" composed of dozens or hundreds of subsidiaries organised under 
the laws of scores of countries collectively conducting assigned segments of a 
single business under the "control" of the parent corporation. To the public and 
to economists, the multinational corporation is a single enterprise, "the firm". 74 
Commenting on the growth of multinationals, Muchlinski attributed their legal 
evolution to the possession of technological advantages and large firm size, whilst 
recognising the primacy of economic reasons. 5 
1.63. Multinational and Uni-national Groups. 
Multinational companies, whilst sharing common features, differ from the uni- 
national enterprises. 76 Multinationals operate their assets, and use control, over 
borders, whilst domestic companies remain within their borders. 
7 Muchlinski 
summarises the following features of multinational companies distinguishing them from 
domestic companies: they have the capacity to locate productive facilities across national 
borders, and thus can exploit local factor inputs. They also have the capacity to trade across 
frontiers in factor inputs between affiliates, to exploit their know-how in foreign markets 
72 PI Blumberg, 'The Corporate Personality in American Law: A Summary Review' (1990) 38 Am J Comp L 
49-69,326; PI Blumberg, 'The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of Corporate Groups' 
(2005) 37 (3) Conn L Rev 605-17,605. 
73 P Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2007) 
3. 
74 PI Blumberg, 'Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by Concepts of the 
Corporate Juridical Entity' (2001) 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 297-319,303. 
75 Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 33-43. 
76ibid7. 
77 ibid. 
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without losing control over it, and to organise their managerial structure globally according 
to the most suitable mix of divisional lines of authority. 78 
The research on the genesis of the Yukos group shows that although the group 
represented a multinational company in substance by having some assets in different 
jurisdictions, the majority of its trading and production operations and its main profit 
generating activities were located in Russia. This actually determined the framework of the 
Yukos case. Therefore this research will deal primarily with the concept of a corporate 
group, rather than the concept of a multinational company. 
1.6.4. The Corporate Group Concept and Definition of a Group. 
Western legal systems mainly focus on individuals, their rights and liabilities. To deal 
with this institutional weakness, traditional law in a growing number of areas is being 
supplemented by a doctrine of enterprise law that focuses on the business enterprise as a whole, 
not on its fragmented components. 9 According to Lutter, the main regulatory tasks of group 
law are very simple: first, to close the gap between reality and law by treating the 
economic unity as a legal unity (the group should then be regulated as a 'super- 
corporation', which should be vested with an independent legal personality). Secondly, the 
life of this new legal subject should be regulated by endowing it internally with its own 
regulatory organs whilst externally rearranging its relationships with third parties 
80 
In principle, company in a group is a separate legal entity with its own rights, 
liabilities and assets. There are several basic principles of the company's separate 
personality: (a) each company has a distinct legal personality, with separate rights and 
obligations, regardless of company's ownership; " (b) the shareholders of each company 
78 ibid 8. 
79 Blumberg, The Transformation of Modem Corporation Law: The Law of Corporate Groups' 606. 
80 M Lutter, The Law of Groups of Companies in Europe: A Challenge for Jurisprudence (Kluwer, Deventer 
1983)11. 
81 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing 
the Structure' (2000) Better Business Framework Paper Ns 00/1335 178 <httpJ/www. berr. gov. uk/bbf/co-act- 
2006/clr-review/page25080. html>accessed 16 November 2006. 
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have limited liability, regardless of who they are; 82 (c) the creditors of each company have 
claims against that company only; 83 and, (d) the director of a company must act in its 
interests. 84 However, in a corporate group these features should be perceived through the 
prism of the group concept. 
The two essential characteristics of corporate groups are recognised by the legislation of 
most countries with common law and civil law: (a) common or interlocking shareholdings 85 and 
(b) unified management or control 86 A paradox at the heart of corporation law, according to 
Antunes, is that on one hand, it is conceived of and designed on the model of the 
corporation as an autonomous, closed and sovereign legal entity; but on the other hand, it 
has gradually admitted and legitimised a number of institutional devices of intercorporate 
control, likely to destroy such autonomy and sovereignty. 87 The key to group structure is 
the existence of a shareholder or shareholders who have the ability to control the general 
meetings of all the companies within the group 88 The word "group" is generally applied to a 
number of companies associated by common or interlocking shareholdings, allied to 
unified control or capacity to control. 89 The definition of the "corporate group" may 
differ significantly depending on jurisdiction 90 According to the OECD Guidelines 
multinational enterprises: 
Usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one 
country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various 
ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant 
influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the 
enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. 
91 
82 ibid. 
83 ibid. 
94 ibid. 
85 See eg Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 56. 
86 PI Blumberg, 'The American Law of Corporate Groups' in SP Joseph McCahery Colin Scott (ed), 
Corporate Control and Accountability (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992)305-43,332. 
87 EJ Antunes, Liability of Corporate Groups: Anatomy and Control in Parent- Subsidiary Relationships in 
the U. S., German and the EULaw (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Boston 1994) 122. 
88 Blumberg, The American Law of Corporate Groups' 305-43. 
89 Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1 529. 
90 See Antunes, Liability of Corporate Groups. 
91 OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD, Paris 2000) 17-18. 
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The U. S. /UK and EU legislative and case law models of corporate groups differ in 
several material aspects, and the international treaties do not provide a sufficient regulatory 
framework to the problem 92 Consequently, it is hardly possible to produce a universal, 
comprehensive model of a corporate group, which may be used to test different corporate 
foundations for their compliance with general characteristics of corporate groups. 3 
Hadden remarked on this problem of corporate groups: 
Neither of the two simplest approaches to the legal status of corporate groups- 
the maintenance of the traditional view that each constituent company in the 
group must retain an entirely separate legal personality, and the recognition of the 
group as a legal entity in its own right which submerges that of its constituent 
companies-is likely to prove either workable or acceptable 94 
However, the impossibility of creating of a universal model of a corporate group, 
does not exclude the option of listing its core elements of organisational and operational 
structure or the creation of an outline concept of a corporate group. According to 
Blumberg, the American law of corporate groups rests on a series of different statutory and 
common-law standards, which define its theoretical, regulatory and case law framework. 95 
His findings, supplemented by the findings of Antunes, Muchlinski and others, enable us to 
create a list of the areas in which these "standards" determine the regulatory and the case 
law framework specific to corporate groups, thus distinguishing them from sole 
corporations. These areas, although regulated differently in different jurisdictions, bear 
certain similarities and they may be understood as "pillars" which form a rough conceptual 
model for a corporate group. Therefore any corporate group, either multinational or uni- 
national, should exist within the following conceptual framework: 
92 See Antunes, Liability of Corporate Groups 283-87. See also J Hort (ed), Groups of Companies in 
European Law (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1982). 
93 See T Hadden, 'Regulating Corporate Groups: An International Perspective in M Cahery (ed), Corporate 
Control andAccountability (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992) 343. 
94 ibid. 
95 PI Blumberg, 'The American Law of Corporate Groups' in ibid 305-43,309. 
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1.6.4.1. Unitary Business Doctrine: Management and Control. 
The corporate group contains two central and somewhat contradictory features of 
96 
modem corporation law: corporate autonomy and corporate control. Thus a corporate 
group should be understood as a cluster of legally independent entities (affiliated corporations) 
that submit to common economic directions exercised by one of them (parent company). 97 
Unified management is responsible for the existence of a unitary business policy for the whole 
corporate group 98 Unified management policy undermines centralization of management 
decisions in a high-tier subsidiary (the head company). It covers corporate group planning, 
supervision of subsidiaries, consolidated accounting service. 9 Therefore, the essential 
characteristics of a corporate group pertaining to the concept of Autonomy and Control 
are: 1) economic unity of the group; 2) united management; 3) united economic doctrine 
and policy and 4) the conflicting situation between the united management/ economic 
doctrine and the fiduciary duties of the directors of the subsidiaries and the interests of 
their shareholders, in the case of not wholly owned groups-100 
1.6.4.2. Corporate Groups' Structure: Centralization and Decentralization. 
Centralisation and decentralisation are the 'two basic organisational principles' or the 
'two general structures principles' of corporate groups. 101 Antunes points out that the 
efficiency and synergy advantages of poly-corporate structures over their single- 
corporations result from their more elaborate and legally supported blend of hierarchical 
96 CD Wallace, Legal Control of the Multinational Enterprise (Martinus Nijhoff, The Haghe 1982) 20. 
97 ibid. 
98 Antunes, Liability of Corporate Groups 69. 
9M Brook and HL Remmers, The Strategy of Multinational Enterprise (Pitman, London 1978) 57. 
100 See eg RP Austin, 'Problems for Directors within Corporate Groups' in M Gillooly (ed), The Law Relating 
to Corporate Groups (Federation Press, Sydney 1993) 133-59,140-45. 
1°'Antunes, Liability of Corporate Groups 163. 
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control and contextual autonomy. 102 The degree of parent control varies from group to 
group, and it is virtually impossible to generalise due to a variety of factors according to 
which the balance between autonomy/control can vary, and due to infinite group 
configurations. 'o3 
1.6.43. Group Operation, Taxation and Financial Reporting. 
According to internationally recognised principles, a parent company must deal fairly 
with a partly owned subsidiary both in transactions between the parent and the subsidiary 
and in self-interested conduct by the parent not involving a transaction between the parent 
and the subsidiary. 104 This obligation conventionally crystallizes into the "arms' length 
principle. Different countries describe the arm's length principle with different language such 
as: (a) Revenues and expenses that are 'reasonable in the circumstances' (Canada), (b) 
Terms and conditions which deviate from those which unrelated third parties would have 
agreed upon (West Germany), (c) "... will adjust transaction to that which would have applied if 
the transaction had been between independent parties dealing at arm's length" (United 
Kingdom). However, this language demonstrates the presence of a similar approach. ' 05 The arm's 
length principle, as embodied in the model tax treaties, permits national tax authorities to 
adjust the accounts of enterprises under common control if they consider that 'conditions 
are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations 
which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises', in order to 
reallocate profit which would have accrued but for those conditions. '°6 
102 ibid. 
'03 H Stieglitz, Top Management Organizations in Divisionalized Companies (National Industrial Conference 
Board, New York 1965) 4. 
104 AM Eisenberg, 'Corporate Groups' in M Gillooly (ed), The Law Relating to Corporate Groups (Federation 
Press, Sydney 1993) 1-29,19. 
'os RW Lawlor (ed), Cross-Border Transactions between Related Companies (Kluwer, Deventer 1985) 4. 
106 S Picciotto, Transfer Pricing and Corporate Regulation' in M Cahery (ed), Corporate Control and 
Accountability (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992) 398. 
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It is recognised that the taxation of related companies within a single corporate group 
should take into account its overall unity. Within a single tax system, affiliated 
corporations could be required to file a consolidated tax return and prepare consolidated 
accounts. 107 The necessity for group accounts arises from the fact that the annual accounts of 
a single company that is a member of a group are less meaningful than the accounts of an 
independent company. 108 The importance of proper disclosure for corporate groups can be 
perceived from the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Disclosure 
Guidelines. 109 Statutory requirements in respect of the consolidation of group accounts are 
now almost universal, though the legislation was introduced much earlier in common-law 
than in civil-law jurisdictions. "0 
1.6.4.4. Statutes of General Application. 
Judicial and administrative developments in the construction and application of 
statutes of general application to corporate groups make no specific reference to corporate 
groups or enterprise principles. "' Blumberg commented on the statutes of general 
application: 
In the case of corporate groups, as distinct from corporations controlled by 
individuals, the question is under what circumstances the statutory obligations 
of a subsidiary (or parent) corporation may also apply to its parent (or 
subsidiary and affiliate corporations)? In other words when does a statute of 
general application receive an enterprise or "group" construction? 
' 12 
107 ibid 394. 
108 W Muller, 'Group Accounts under the Proposed Seventh EEC Directive: A Practitioner's View: The 
English Experience' in J Hort (ed), Groups of Companies in European Law (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1982) 
176. 
109 See Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and theLaw 337-40. 
10 Hadden, 'Regulating Corporate Groups: An International Perspective' 362. 
'" PI Blumberg, 'The American Law of Corporate Groups' in SP Joseph McCahery, Colin Scott (ed), ibid 
(1992) 305-43,309. 
112 PI Blumberg, Problems of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations under Statutory Law Specifically Applying 
Enterprise Principles (The Law of Corporate Groups Series, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1992) 5. 
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In deciding whether a statutory provision is applicable in case of a particular 
corporate group, courts may use either statutory construction or "piercing the veil' 
jurisprudence. 113 
1.6.45. Statutes of Specific Application to Corporate Groups. 
Legislative and administrative developments in the enactment of statutes and 
regulations adopt enterprise principles and apply them to corporate groups, sometimes for 
pervasive industry-wide regulation, but most frequently for selected purposes in statutes 
otherwise resting on entity law. 114 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(RICO), 115the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)116 and the Sherman Antitrust Act'17 
are examples of such statutes. ' 18 Such statutes refer to a general class in the manner of other 
types of statutes, yet they also specifically refer to those who "control" or are "controlled by" 
or are `under common control" of a member of the class, and they may specifically refer to a 
parent, subsidiary or affiliated corporation. ' 19 In such statutes, uncertainty no longer exists. 120 
113 See PI Blumberg, Blumberg on Corporate Groups (Second edn, Panel Publishers 2005) 96.6-96.8. 
114 Blumberg, The American Law of Corporate Groups' 309. 
11518 USC §§ 1961-1968 (1976). 
1615 USC §§ 78dd-1 and -2 (1988). 
11715 USC §§ 1,2 (1988). 
118 See also Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 385-428,73-575. 
19 Blumberg, Blumberg on Corporate Groups 96-4. 
120 ibid. 
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1.6.4.6. Bankruptcy and Protection of the Creditors. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, the courts may exercise an approach based on 
universalism or territorialism in respect of bankruptcy of corporate groups. 
121 
"Territorialism" is based on traditional rules of private international law and advocates the 
rule of territorial jurisdiction. 122 "Universalism" refers to a system in which a single 
bankruptcy court controls the administration of the debtor's assets and makes the 
distributions to creditors worldwide. 123 Therefore, in some common law jurisdictions, the 
courts are able to consolidate the assets of the corporate group that faces bankruptcy and 
impose the relevant liability for the debts of the subsidiaries on the parent company. 
'24 
1.6.4.7. Liability of Corporate Groups. Piercing the Veil Jurisprudence. 
The Entity Law Approach is the fundamental principle of liability in corporate 
groups. One member of a corporate group, namely the parent corporation, cannot be made 
liable for the debts or the acts of another group member, for the reason that they are 
distinct legal entities. Only in exceptional cases could a corporate entity of the corporation 
involved be disregarded. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the direct liability of a parent 
company can arise both in contract and tort. 125 In tort, the parent corporation can be liable 
if it is shown that, by its acts or omissions, it was a joint tortfeasor with its subsidiary. 
126 
121 See in general PB Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial 
Law' (1999) 39 VA J INT'L L 743-98; Pottow, 'Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems 
of and Proposed Solutions To "Local Interests"". 
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Forum' (1991) 65 Am Bankr LJ 457-90,458; DT Trautman, 'Four Models for International Bankruptcy' 
(1993) 41 Am J Comp L573-625,579. 
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The U. S. doctrine of piercing the corporate veil offers a means of justifying group 
liability in circumstances where the subsidiary has insufficient assets to meet the claims 
against it, and where the case for compensation of the claimants is hard to resist on policy 
grounds. 127 The doctrine is characterized by bringing intra-group liability issues under a 
rule-exception approach. 128 In traditional piercing the veil jurisprudence, the existence of 
some fraudulent, inequitable or other fundamentally unfair conduct detrimental to creditors has 
been viewed as essential for application of the doctrine. Modem cases are departing from this 
requirement in an impressive number of decisions, expanding the capacity of the legal system 
to disregard the confining limitations of entity law in order to achieve the objectives of the law 
in this area. 129 The primacy of the 'piercing the corporate veil' jurisprudence in the treatment of 
intra-group liability in the U. S. legal system, did not prevent the emergence of competing 
doctrines. These doctrines also serve as an alternative basis for the imposition of liability on 
parent corporations, without any disregard for the corporate entity of the subsidiaries involved 
(commonly known as the 'functional equivalents' of piercing). 
130 
The above review shows that regardless to the significant differences in both the 
theoretical understanding of the corporate group concept and the regulatory framework, there 
are several "loose" conceptual similarities, depending on jurisdiction, which enable a 
corporate group to be distinguished from other corporate foundations. 
127 ibid 313-14. 
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1.7. The Notion of the Rule of Law in the Dissertation: 
International and Domestic Aspects. 
One of the most frequently cited terms in this dissertation is the notion of the rule of 
law. Any discussion of the rule of law in the successor states of the USSR, including 
Russia, presupposes an understanding of what is meant by "rule of law" in this context. 131 
1.7.1. Defining the Rule of Law. 
Several preliminary remarks have to be made before discussing the problem of 
definition. First, the concept of the rule of law plays an important role in any developed 
judicial system. For example, American lawyers point out that respect for the rule of law is 
central to the U. S. political and rhetorical traditions, even to its sense of national 
identity. 132 Secondly, the rule of law is a relative concept and is best treated as an ideal. No 
country has ever fully realized the rule of law. 133 Thirdly, there is broad consensus in 
political science that the rule of law is as integral to an effectively functioning modem 
democratic system as electoral politics and a robust civil society. 134 
Broadly described, but by no means defined, the rule of law is the tenet that both 
citizens and government are subject to a set of accepted laws that are fairly and equally 
applied to all members of society. The rule of law is characterized and ensured by the 
separation of powers in government, by holding free elections, and by having an 
independent judiciary. 
131 FJ Feldbrugge, The Rule of Law in the European CIS States' (2000) 26 Rev Cent &E Eur L 213-30,214. 
132 See F Michelman, 'Law's Republic' (1987-1988) 97 Yale LJ 1493-537,1499-503. 
"' K Hendley, 'Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia' (2006) 14 Cardozo J Int'l & Comp L 349. 
134 J Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia' (2006) 37 Geo J Intl L 353-97,358. 
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The rule of law concept has been a fundamental notion in Western legal theory since 
the time of the French Revolution. 135 However the rule of law is "a notoriously contested 
concept' 'and its precise meaning is subject to debate. 136 
The British version of the rule of law, with an "unwritten constitution" and 
parliamentary sovereignty, is different from the U. S. form that has a strong tradition of 
judicial review. Both of these differ significantly from the German and French models. 
137 
Although there may be disagreement over the importance or desirability of the rule 
of law as a virtue, there is a well-understood core understanding of its meaning. Zywicki 
points out that the fact that the rule of law has spawned so many detractors indicates that 
its meaning is well-understood among both enthusiasts and detractors. 
138 
Nearly all scholars agree that the rule of law means the supremacy of law over 
government. 139 Reitz says that the core concept of the rule of law is that the exercise of all 
power, public or private, must be subject to limitation by law. To the extent that law limits 
the power of private parties, the rule of law is consonant with "law and order. 
040 Carothers 
points out that the rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public 
knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. 
141 The rule of law, 
according to George Gins, is based on two systems, public and private law, the first 
granting the state limited rights, and the second protecting the rights of citizens. 
142 Albert 
Dicey, the leading British constitutional theorist, states that no one, including the state, 
15 J Quigley, 'The Soviet Union as a State under the Rule of Law: An Overview' (1990) 23 Cornell Int'l LJ 
205-26,205. 
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should stand above the law and that the rule of the people must be based on the rule of 
law. 143 
Based on the general principal concepts of the rule of law, academics suggest 
different defmitions of this term, dividing it into several values. '44 
Zywicki points out that the core and traditional definition of the rule of law contains 
three basic values or concepts: (1) constitutionalism; (2) rule-based decision making; and 
(3) a commitment to neutral principles, such as federalism, separation of powers, and 
textualism. '45 Constitutionalism, according to Zywicki, comprises procedural and 
substantive limitations on the exercise of governmental authority. 146 
Hayek identified several characteristics of constitutionalism. 147 First, the rule of law 
requires that government action be "bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand. "148 
Second, rules must be known and certain, so that individuals can conform their behavior to 
those laws. 149 Third, the rule of law requires equality in the sense that the law applies 
equally to all persons and does not prejudice some categories of people at the expense of 
others. 'so 
The second essential characteristic of the rule of law, according to Zywicki, is the 
requirement of rule-based decision-making. 151 To quote a key U. S. Supreme Court judge, 
A. Scalia, this is the idea of "the rule of law as a law of rules. i152 
Zywicki's third characteristic is the "neutral principle" for judicial and constitutional 
decision-making. 153 Wechsler defined this principle as "one that rests on reasons with 
143 DD Atchinson, 'Notes on Constitutionalism for a 21 st-Century Russian President' (1998) 6 Cardozo J Int'1 
& Comp L 239-98,304. 
144 See RHJ Fallon, "The Rule of Law" Asa Concept in Constitutional Discourse (1997) 97 Colum L Rev I- 
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146 ibid. 
147 ibid S. 
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respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality 
transcend any immediate result that is involved. ""4 
Hendley also suggests breaking the concept down into three parts: (1) procedural 
regularity; (2) accessibility; and (3) efficacy. Procedural regularity in its institutional 
manifestation is judicial independence. 155 The second element of any rule of law definition 
is a legal system that is accessible. The hallmark of accessibility is transparency, in terms 
of an ability to find the law and an ability to observe and participate in the formulation of 
that law. 156 In respect of efficacy, Hendley points out that, "even a well-drafted law can lie 
dormant if it is overly ambitious. Thus, any assessment of the rule of law should be 
sensitive to the presence of laws that are literally impossible to obey. "' 57 
Kahn in his article on the rule of law in Russia also enumerates the three constituent 
parts of the concept. According to him, the first aspect of the rule of law is supremacy of 
law over government. This means that there can be no offence - criminal, civil, political or 
administrative - without law. 158 As Dicey expressed it, "no man is punishable or can be 
lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in 
the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. "159 A second principle 
represents a universalization of the first principle: all law applies equally to all citizens. 
Political elites in the executive and the legislative branches do not enjoy the perogative to 
choose when the law applies, or to whom, a feature common to authoritarian regimes. 160 
According to Kahn these two principles imply a third principle: the capacity for 
enforcement of this supremacy of law over government. Thus, the third principle of the 
rule of law requires the existence of an independent and politically neutral judiciary that is 
accessible to aggrieved individuals. 161 
'53 Zywicki, 'The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity' 14. 
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Various scholars have tried to take basic concepts to identify elements essential to 
the rule of law. 162 Taking into consideration the limitations of the study the most known 
sets of elements are compared in Appendix 1. 
Scholars have also identified limitations, concerning the definition of the rule of law 
concept. First, several of its conventional elements are vague, such as the requirement that 
the law should be "reasonably stable". 163 Second, no agreed standard exists for measuring 
the significance of departures from the rule of law's different elements. Nor is there 
agreement concerning what kinds of departures are the primary objects of concern. 
164 
Third, the extent to which a legal system approaches the rule of law ideal is itself a matter 
of degree. 165 It is unlikely that any legal system realizes all of the desiderata perfectly. 
Moreover, the defining elements of the rule of law can sometimes conflict. 
166 Fourth, it 
seems impossible to specify the elements of the rule of law without reference to "the law. " 
Among the most crucial questions is what this reference means, especially insofar as the 
rule of law implies that officials, including judges, must be ruled by law. 
167 
The enumerations cited above suggest several important aspects of the rule of law 
upon which experts would agree: the independence of the judiciary, a limitation of the 
legislative (decree-making) power of the executive, a balance of power between the 
legislature and the executive, judicial review of administrative acts, etc. Other elements 
mentioned seem to have a less obvious relationship to the rule of law-168 The essential 
elements of the concept will be used for the analysis of current situation with the rule of 
law in Russia. 
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'63 Fallon, "'The Rule of Law" As a Concept in Constitutional Discourse 9. 
164 ibid. 
'65 J Raz, The Rule of Law and Its "Virtue'" in J Raz (ed), The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality (Oxford University Press, New York 1979) 210-32,228. 
'66 G de Q Walker, The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Melbourne University, 
Melbourne 1988) 42-44. 
167 FA Hayek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law (National Bank of Egypt, Cairo 1955) 33. 
168 See Feldbrugge, 'The Rule of Law in the European CIS States' 214. 
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1.7.2. Legal Certainty. 
When analyzing the rule of law in contemporary Russian case law and politics, 
emphasis should be placed on legal certainty as an important principle of the rule of 
law. 169 The 'certainty of the law' focuses on the predictability of the application of formal 
law by the judge, the government and the administration, who are in turn bound by the 
law. The acts of parliament are presupposed to be rational, general and transparent. Their 
existence is supposed to guarantee personal freedom and certainty within a society. "o 
There are several principles (sub-principles), through which legal certainty manifests itself 
as a legal principle: (1) the prohibition of retroactive legal effects, (2) the protection of 
legitimate expectations, (3) the protection of vested rights, (4) the accounting of time- 
limits, and (5) the requirement of comprehensible language. 171 
Legal certainty is conventionally understood as a guiding principle of the European 
legal system. '72 The ECHR integrates the principle of the certainty of law in the articles of 
the European Convention of Human Rights, especially in Article 7 and Clause I of the 
First Protocol (the right of property) and in the qualitative definition of the 'law', which is 
necessary to restrict human rights in accordance with the Treaty. 173 This principle has 
found numerous reflections in European case law. 174 For example, in one of the cases the 
ECHR pointed out the principle of legal certainty: "... requires that all law [must] be 
sufficiently precise to allow the person - if need be, with appropriate advice - to force to a 
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail. "l75 
169 Z Bankowski, I White and U Hahn, Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning (Springer, Berlin 
1995) 94. 
10 P Popelier, 'Legal Certainty and Principles of Proper Law Making' (2000) 2 Eur JL Reform 32142,326. 
'" Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: 
Threat to the Rule of Law' 141. 
172 See JR Maxeiner, 'Legal Certainty. A European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy' (2006- 
2007) 41 Val UL Rev 517-90,534. 
13 Popelier, 'Legal Certainty and Principles of Proper Law Making' 328. 
'" See J Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law (Springer, Berlin 2003) 125-389. 
175 Korchuganova v Russia (App no 75039/01) (2006) ECHR <http: //www. echr. coe. int>accessed 7 April 
2007. 
63 
Legal certainty in the American sense can also be understood as "the prediction of the 
outcome of a lawsuit based on deduction from the content of a legal rule". 176 
1.7.3. The Rule of Law in Russia: the Recent History and Public 
Perception. 
The Russian Federation is proclaimed to be "a democratic federative "rule of law" 
state in its fundamental law - the Constitution. 
' 77 However, the genesis of the rule of law 
concept in Russia, which found its reflection in the concepts of "law-based state", 
178 
"dictatorship of law" and others, has its own distinct specifics. The key historical problem 
is that the rule of law in Russia has always been weak and remains so. Moreover, it does 
not show any signs that it is changing for the better. 179 Hendley, for example, pointed out: 
`By almost any definition, the "rule of law" [in Russia] has been mostly absent., 
180 In a 
qualitative study of Russian legal culture, Kurkchiyan argues that "the negative myth of the 
rule of law is dominant" and that it is "self-perpetuating. "181 
One of most important conceptual aspects of the rule of law in Russia is proper 
definition and enforcement of property rights, broad access to those rights, and predictable 
rules for resolving property rights disputes. 182 The absence of the rule of law meant that, 
reportedly, even ownership rights were of dubious value. 183 
176 KN Llewellyn, P Gewirtz and M Ansaldi, 'The Case Law System in America' (1988) 88 Colum L Rev 
989-1020,1008. 
'77 NT Vedernikov, Problems of Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Formulation of a Rule of Law State in 
Russia' (1993-1994) 38 St Louis U LJ 907-14,907. 
179 See eg NJ Jamieson and A Trapeznik, 'A Legislative (Logico-Linguistic) Analysis of the Common Law 
Components of the Russian Constitution' (2006-2007) 16 Transnat'l L& Contemp Probs 431-90,435-36. 
19 See Hendley, 'Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia' 351. 
180 ibid. 
'a' M Kurkchiyan, The Illegitimacy of Law in Post-Soviet Societies' in DJ Galligan and M Kurkchiyan (eds), 
Law and Informal Practices: The Post-Communist Experience (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 25- 
46,30. 
192 K Hoff and JE Stiglitz, 'After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post- 
Communist Societies' (2004) 94 (3) Am Econ Rev 753-63,754. 
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A central reason for weakness of the rule of law is the weakness of the political 
demand for the rule of law and general understanding of the law as a tool in the hands of a 
state. '84 The general perception of the weakness of the rule of law in Russia finds its 
reflection in a Russia proverb, which reveals an understanding of the law as a tool: "zakon 
kak dyshlo -- kuda povernul, tuda i vyshlo: The law is like the shaft of a wagon; it goes 
wherever you tam it. " 185 One respected American scholar urges that: 
... [t]o build a state that abides 
by the rule of law, individual Russian judges, 
lawyers, and citizens must adopt a fundamentally new relationship with the 
law and make it a tool of defence that emanates from society rather than an 
instrument of control in the hands of the state. 186 
Nevertheless, nationwide surveys conducted in 1996,1998, and 2000 to measure 
mass attitudes towards the rule of law revealed generally strong, albeit abstract, support for 
rule of law principles, at levels roughly comparable to those expressed by citizens in 
Western European countries. '87 But asked to apply those ideals to their own circumstances, 
a 2004 nationwide survey found that "[a]n overwhelming majority of Russians do not think 
that they live under a rule of law state. " 88 
The story of the rule of law in Russia can be traced back to the time of the Peter the 
Great, but the limitations of the study only permit brief look at the most recent 
developments, which took place after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. 
In the USSR the concept of the rule of law was viewed as reflecting the false legality 
found in Western states. 189 A 1956 Soviet legal dictionary defined pravovoe gosudarstvo, 
usually translated as "the law-based state", 190 as "... an unscientific concept depicting the 
184 ibid 2-3. 
185 Or "One law for the rich, and another for the poor" See <http: //en. wikiquote. org/wiki/Russian_proverbs>. 
186 M McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Cornell 
University Press, New York 2002) 328. 
197 See JL Gibson, 'Russian Attitudes toward the Rule of Law: An Analysis of Survey Data' in DJ Galligan 
and M Kurkchiyan (eds), Law and Informal Practices the Post-Communist Experience (Oxford University 
Press, New York 2003) 77-93,77-78,88. 
188 R Rose, N Munro and W Mishler, 'Resigned Acceptance of an Incomplete Democracy: Russia's Political 
Equilibrium' (2004) 20 (3) Post-Soviet Aff 195-218,200. 
189 Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State under the Rule of Law: An Overview' 206. 
190 DD Barry, 'Introduction' Introduction in toward The "Rule of Law"In Russia? Political and Legal Reform 
in the Transition Period (M. E. Sharpe, Armonk 1992) xiii. 
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bourgeois state as one in which there is supposedly no place for arbitrariness on the part of 
the executive authority and where, supposedly, the law and legality reign. "19' 
Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to make a systematic effort to change the role 
of the law. 192 He expressed the need to return to a pravovoe gosudarstvo. '93 In his speech 
at Stanford, Gorbachev said: "In its ideal development the state must act only according to 
the law and according to justice, and any act of the state authority must have a basis in law. 
That is how I see the essence of the rule of law. " 194 
In this context, the then Director of the Institute of State and Law, and one of 
Gorbachev's frequent advisers, Vladimir Kudriavtsev, wrote in December 1986: "Of the 
two possible principles, 'You may do only what is permitted, ' and'You may do everything 
which is not forbidden, ' priority should be given to the latter inasmuch as it unleashes the 
initiative and activism of people. "195 
As Archie Brown observed, Gorbachev "drew attention to the significance of moving 
to a state based upon the rule of law, pointing out that this meant that every person and all 
institutions must be subordinate to the law, including the Politburo. 096 
The Yeltsin era was a melange of extraordinarily rapid statutory reform of Russia's 
civil, political, economic, and legal institutions and a painfully slow reform of attitudes and 
norms of behavior in each of those spheres. 197 Atchison points out that the term "legal 
nihilism" can be used to describe Yeltsin's approach to the rule of law as the President 
ignored the law to suit his personal political interests. 198 Figure 1 represents the 
191 Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State under the Rule of Law: An Overview' 206, quoting PI Kudryavtsev 
(ed), Yuridicheskii Slovar'[Legal Dictionary] (Gosyurizdat, Moscow 1956) 196. 
'92 Hendley, 'Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia' 352. 
193 In German the term rechtsstaat, meaning "legal state" or "law-based state, " describes this principle; the 
Russian phrase pravovoe gosudarstvo is a literal translation. The English-speaking world uses the more 
cumbersome phrase "state under the rule of law. " Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State under the Rule of 
Law: An Overview' 206. 
194 M Gorbachev, The Rule of Law' (1991-1992) 28 Stan J Intl L477-84,481. 
195 V Kudryavtsev, 'Pravovaya Sistema: Puti Perestroiki [The Legal System: Ways of Reconstruction]' Pravda [The 
Truth] (Moscow 5 December 1986) 3. 
'96 A Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press, New York 1996) 176 
197 Kahn, 'The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia' 393-94. 
198 Atchinson, Notes on Constitutionalism for a 21 st-Century Russian President' 304 
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development of the Rule of Law in Russia during the Yeltsin administration. This laid the 
path for the problems ultimately faced by Putin. ""' 
Figure 1. "The Rule of Law in Russia under Yeltsin. " 
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As his predecessors had done before him, the Prime Minister, then President, 
Vladimir Putin, announced his intention to end the disorder of the Yeltsin era and fight 
organised crime and corruption through a `dictatorship of law'. 201 The presumption was 
that Russians, raised in the communist Soviet Union, would be willing to give up their civil 
rights in exchange for economic growth and stability in their daily lives. 202 
19' Kahn, 'The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia' 393-94. 
2(x' R Kleinfeld, 'Completing Defentioons of the Rule of Law' in T Carothers (ed), Promoting the Rule of 'Law 
Abroad (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Whasington 2006) 31-74,62. 
`01 AV Orlova, 'Organized Crime and the Rule of Law in the Russian Federation' (2006) 2 (1) EHRR 23-37, 
28. 
202 ES Burger, The Price of Russia's "Dictatorship of Law(2006) 12 October Christ Sci Monit 
<http: //www. csmonitor. com/2006/1012/pO9sO 1-coop. html>accessed 15 November 2007. 
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Putin's speeches and writings on democracy and law were both encouraging and 
chilling. 203 His use of democratic concepts often left unclear in what manner he thought 
them best applied: 
In a non-law-governed, i. e. weak, state the individual is detenceless and not 
free. The stronger the state, the freer the individual. In a democracy, your and 
my rights are limited only by the same rights enjoyed by other people. It is on 
recognizing this simple truth that the law is based, the law that is to be 
followed by all - from an authority figure to a simple citizen... But 
democracy 
is the dictatorship of the law - not of those placed in an official position to 
defend that law.... 204 
The continuing developments during Putin's presidency exposed reactionary 
undercurrents below the surface. 2"5 Figure 2 shows the contribution of the Putin 
administration to the Rule of Law in Russia, Although, unlike Yeltsin, Putin placed an 
emphasis on the development of law and order, he did not manage to improve the situation 
in all the significant aspects. 
Figure 2. "The Rule of Law in Russia under Putin. " 
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J Kahn, 'Russian Compliance with Arcticles Five and Six of the European Convention of Human Rights as 
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204 V Putin 'Otkrytoe Pis'mo Vladimira Putina Rossiiskim Izberatelyam [Open Letter by Vladimir Putin to 
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The Russian version of "law-based state" concept, which includes the notion of 
"dictatorship of law", has much in common with the international perceptions of the rule of 
law. This term can be found in the Pre-Revolutionary writings of prominent Russian 
lawyers as an equivalent of the German term "Rechtsstaat" 207 Kotlarevsky said that the 
goal of the state based on law is to ensure public order and help to implement all possible 
human desires . 
208 Another pre-Soviet Russian academic added: "The state in such 
countries [U. S., European countries] is called "based on the law" as the main laws of these 
countries recognize the supremacy of the people in establishing a form of governance in 
the state and general supremacy of the law. 09 
The modem perception of the "law-based state" concept does not differ in substance 
from its Pre-Revolutionary perception. 210 One prominent Russian theoretician, Leo 
Mamut, remarks: "The Russian democratic law-based state has two basic elements... One 
is common to all contemporary civilized states principles of formation and the functioning 
of the state... The most important of them are: equality ... 
fair elections... separation of 
powers.... "ýýI 
There are three main parts, comprising the concept of the rule of law, which have 
attracted harsh criticism from Putin's opponents, both domestically and internationally. 
207 S Kotlyarevskii, Vlast' I Pravo. Problemy Pravovogo Gosudarstva [Power and Law. The Problem of the 
State Based on the Law] (Moscow 1915) 47. 
208 ibid 54. 
209 G Novotorzhskii, Chto Takoe Pravovoe Gosudarstvo [What Is a State, Based on Law] (Otto Dervich 
Publishin House, Berlin 1914) 4-5. 
210 See eg OF Skakun, The Theory of the Law-Base State in the Pre-Revolutionary Russia' (1990) 12 SOIP 
113-20,113-20. 
211 L Mamut, 'Demokraticheskoe Pravovoe Gosudarstvo v Rossii: Problemy Stanovleniya [A Democratic 
State Based on Law in Russia: Problems of Formation]' (2006) 12 Zhurnal Rossiiskogo Prava [Journal of 
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1.73.1. Government, the Law and the Balance of Power. 
Putin's initiatives were focused on strengthening "vertical power" and expanding the 
rights of the executive (presidential) branch. 212 These initiatives included the cancellation 
of governors' elections, significant modification of the election legislation and the actual 
formation of the Presidential Administration as the ultimate decision-making centre 213 
So, nowadays Russia is in reality a "corporate state", managed exclusively by and in 
the interest of Putin's allies, a close group, which represents the Law as such. 14 
One of the key problems with the application and enforcement of Russian Law 
remains the lack of legal certainty, 215 which includes the problem of retrospective 
application. It pertains especially to the transitional period (1991-2003), when the majority 
of privatisation deals were conducted. 216 Quite a number of criminal cases that are deemed 
to be politically motivated stem from this uncertainty, which also surrounds tax legislation 
and case law. 
217 
212 See PH Solomon, 'Vladimir Putin's Quest for a Strong State' (2005) 22.2 Intl J on World Peace 3-8; L 
Aron, What Does Putin Want? ' (2006) 29 November AEI 6 <httpJ/www. aei. org/publication25204>accessed 
10 March 2007. 
213 See eg G Kasparov, 'Don Putin' (2007) 26 July Wall St J <http: //online. wsj. com/article 
/SB118541208507078414. html? mod=rss_opinion main>accessed 26 July 2007; Treisman, 'Putin's 
Silovarchs'. 
214 See A Illarionov, The Siloviki Regime in Russia (CATO Institute & Institute of Economic Analysis Papers 
2007) <www. iea. ru/article/siloviki_model/10_I1_2007. ppt>accessed 15 November 2007; Kasparov, 'Don 
Putin'. 
215 See eg PH Rubin, 'Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies' (1994) 27 Cornell Int'l LJ 
148,27-33; 0 Mikhailova, 'Doing Business in Russia' (2001) 29 Intl Bus Law 211-15,211. 
216 See eg Allen, 'Restitution and Transitional Justice in the European Court of Human Rights'. 
217 See G Kisunko, 'Economic Crime in Russia' (2001) <http: //www. worldbank. org/ 
html/prddr/trans/j&a96/art7. htm>accessed 30 November 2007; Y Latynina, 'Billion-Dollar Principles' (2007) 
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1.73.2. Human Rights and Equality before the Law. 
The current situation with human rights in Russia remains a key area of strident 
criticism from the international community. 218 The main concerns are the continuous 
harassment of NGOs219 and the freedom of the press, as all core media companies are 
under control of the state or the state-controlled giants 220 On this issue the U. S. 
Department of State commented: 
The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, 
government pressure on the media persisted, resulting in numerous 
infringements of these rights... The government used its controlling ownership 
interest in all national television and radio stations, as well as the majority of 
influential regional ones, to restrict access to information about issues deemed 
sensitive 221 
The Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006, issued by the U. S. Department 
of State222 enumerates several other significant human rights problems, such as: alleged 
government involvement in politically motivated abductions, disappearances, and unlawful 
killing in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus; hazing in the armed forces 
resulting in several deaths; and harassment. There have also been some cases of the 
abduction of individuals who have appealed to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). Allegedly the abductions were aimed to convince the appellant to drop their cases 
which told of, torture, violence, and other brutal or humiliating treatment; harsh and 
frequently life-threatening prison conditions; corruption in law enforcement; arbitrary 
arrest and detention, etc. Despite all this, Putin continues to present himself as a believer in 
democracy and human rights - and it appears that most of the international community 
218 See eg Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2007, Russian Federation (2007) 6 
<http: //thereport. amnesty. orgleng/Regions/Europe-and-Central-Asia/Russian-Federation>a. ccessed 20 
December 2007. 
219 See MP Maxwell, 'NGOs in Russia: Is the Recent Russian NGO Legislation the End of Civil Society in 
Russia' (2006-2007)15 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 235-64. 
220 See eg BF Lowenkron, 'Human Rights, Civil Society, and Democratic Governance in Russia: Current 
Situation and Prospects for the Future' (2006) <httpi/www. state. gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2006/68669. htm>accessed 
15 March 2006. 
221 U. S. Department of State, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices' (2006) <www. thepersecution. org 
/ussd/us2006. html>accessed 10 March 2006. 
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believe him. 23 Figure 3 below demonstrates a steady decline in the Civil Liberties and 
Political Rights Index in Russia since the collapse of the USSR in 1991 to the beginning of 
the Yukos case in 2003. Following the Yukos case, the index plummets. 
Figure 3. "Civil Liberties and Political Rights Index (CLPRI) in Russia, 1991-2006. " 
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1.7.33. Independent Judiciary. 
The most crucial point in the development of the rule of law in Russia is the 
corruption of the independent judiciary and its transformation into an instrument of the 
political authorities, namely the Presidential Administration. 225 
223 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2005: The Events of 2004 (Human Rights 
Watch, New York 2005) 406. 
224 Illarionov, The Si/oviki Regime in Russia 89. 
225 See FreedomHouse, Russia: Khodorkovskv Sentencing Illuminates Erosion of Rule of Law (2005) 404-07 
<http: //www. freedomhouse. org/template. cfm? page=70&release=276>accessed 20 March 2007; Orlova, 
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However, it should be noted that a number of commentators stress Putin's positive 
achievements in this area. For example, Hendley, defending Putin, points out that: "Over 
the past two decades, Russia's legal system has undergone a profound set of institutional 
reforms. Judged on those terms, it has surely moved closer to the ideal of the "rule of 
law. "226 Kahn adds: "Putin has increased the salaries of judges and law enforcement 
personnel, and he has called for more funding for the courts °'227 Nevertheless, other 
sources show that these positive results, mainly concerning the organisational side of 
justice, are a facade, camouflaging the deep erosion of the Russian judiciary. 228 The 
worrying and essential product of such erosion in Russia is basmannoe pravosudie 
(`Basmanny justice"), which crystallized as a notion in the course of the Yukos case: 
This is the rapid and demonstrative transformation of law enforcement 
agencies: not only into simply obedient, but also into zealous, executors of 
political orders, who break the law and don't even bother to camouflage it, 
who present it as a merit, and show off their muscle and impunity to the 
world 229 
One of the leading Russian legal experts, the former judge of the Constitutional 
Court Tamara Morshchakova stresses that judicial independence in Russian is non- 
existent, noting, "Any official can dictate any decision in any case"230 Putin's former 
adviser Illarionov makes even stronger comments: "The Russian version of the eternal 
Hamlet question "To be or not to be? " in today's Russia sounds like "To be or not to be 
behind bars? "231 
A report on the independence of the Russian judiciary, prepared by a number of 
experts, summarises the current situation in the judiciary by pointing out that a partial 
restoration of the Soviet system, under which the judicial power depends on the political 
226 Hendley, 'Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia' 370. 
221 Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia' 396. 
228 See eg SL Myers, 'Russia and the Rule of Law: Poisoning Case Underscores Europe's Doubts' (2007) 27 
May International Herald Tribune <http: //www. iht. com/articles/2007/05/27/news/russia. php#end main 
accessed 28 October 2007. 
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administration and the "prosecution conveyor belt", is taking place and President Putin's 
team and the Kremlin will most likely continue to suppress the judicial system. 232 
It should be noted that the successful formation of the neo-KGB (FSB) state and the 
erosion of democratic freedoms and rule of law in Russia wouldn't have been possible 
without the willful blindness and conciliatory position of Western leaders. 233 Figure 4 
describes the ways in which Western leaders have encouraged the anti-democratic regime 
in Russia. 
Figure 4. "The West's Approval of the Siloviki Model. " 
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Based on the conclusions of the reports by various international organisations, the 
existing rule of law rankings235 consistantly give Russia low marks and demonstrate an 
inclination for its further downgrading. 236 
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Summarising the issues of the rule of law both in Russia, in general, and in the 
Yukos case in particular, Lavelle remarked: `The largest casualty of the Yukos case has 
been Putin's "Dictatorship of Law". 37 In fact it has become a missed opportunity to 
enforce that principle. '238 
A brief review of the international perception of the rule of law, and the genesis of 
similar concepts in Russia shows that they have much in common. Thus in this study, the 
concept of the rule of law will be used as understood in its application to Russia as 
explained in this part of the dissertation. Discussion will cover core values as: government, 
law and the balance of power, human rights and equality before the law, and the 
independence of the judiciary. 
1.8. The Yukos Story: the Historical Context* 239 
With its complex mixture of political, social, economic and legal factors, the Yukos 
case can be considered only within the socio-economic context of the last two decades of 
Russian history, from the command Soviet system to a free market economy. 240 
235 See eg Swivel, 'Rule of Law Percentile Rank' (2007) <http: //www. swivel. com/data columns/ 
show/4218261>accessed 20 November 2007; The World Bank, 'Governance Matters 2007: Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 1996-2006' (2007) <http: //info. worldbank. org/governance/wgi2007/ 
mc_countries. asp>accessed 20 November 2007. 
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239 For the detailed review see Appendix 4. 
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Transitions to Capitalism and Democracy in Russia and Central Europe: Achievements, Problems, Prospects 
(CT: Praeger Publishers, Westport 2000) 11-28. 
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1.8.1. Perestroika, Financial-Industrial Groups, Privatisation and the 
Menatep Bank. 
The general reform of the Soviet financial sector that occurred during Gorbachev's 
governance resulted in the emergence of a new financial institution known as the 
`commercial bank', which played a critical role in the formation of the new Russian 
economy. Several of these institutions later became the centres of the large business 
conglomerates241: These conglomerates were the Financial-Industrial Groups which 
aggressively participated in the privatisation of the of the former Soviet Union economy. 242 
The business conglomerate known as the Menatep Group went through the same 
development. Its founder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky used cash from his small co-operative 
fine to found the Menatep Bank. 243 In August 1988, the co-operative, established by him 
with his friends, was reorganised into the Interbank Organisation for Scientific Technical 
Progress. Later, in 1990 the Commercial Innovative Bank was rechartered as Menatep, a 
joint stock company, and Khodorkovsky became chairman of the board of directors. In 
1997 Menatep was ranked 10th amongst the largest Russian banks. 245 In the mid 1990s the 
bank was at the heart of the Khodorkovsky's empire, but after the rise of Yukos, Menatep 
began playing a subordinate role, as its income could not be compared with Yukos's oil 
revenues. In 1998 Menatep, like many other Russian banks, was hit by Russia's biggest 
financial crisis . 
246 As a result the bank was liquidated, but the Menatep Group and Yukos 
organised a complex buy-out scheme that helped them to accumulate the bulk of bank's 
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debts for a fraction of their real price. 47 This scheme helped Khodorkovsky to rescue his 
reputation, as the other liquidated banks had paid nothing to their creditors. 248 
Russian privatisation began in late 1991249 as an experiment, only to emerge as the 
government's most popular reform ?0 The premise of privatisation was that companies 
would perform more efficiently if they were controlled by private owners rather than by 
governmental officials 251 The results of the privatisation are closely linked to the approach 
to privatisation that was adopted by the Russian government, 252 which was both rapid and 
pervasive. 53 The gigantic Soviet economy was privatised within a three-year period. M 
Russian privatisation was conducted in several distinct stages and gave birth to the 
notorious oligarchic system. 255 Three main models of privatisation were adopted in Russia 
in line with practices existing in transitional economies: Mass Privatisation (MP), Insider's 
Model, (MEBO - Management and Employees Buy Out), and Initial Majority 
Shareholdings (IMS). 256 The first stage was meant to symbolize populist capitalism, which 
247 See Yukos, Annual Report for 2000 (2001) 45-46. 
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was compliant with Yeltsin's statement that Russia needed millions of owners, but not a 
handful of billionaires. 57 
Among many other foreign innovations imported to Russia and used in the 
privatisation process, the Russian Government resorted to the use of holding companies. 58 
The holding company structure was suitable for a situation when the state planned to 
reserve a majority ownership in a large number of enterprises in the same or related 
industries. 259 Instead of achieving this objective by retaining a majority interest in each of 
the numerous industrial producers, the state would obtain the desired 51 per cent interest in 
a holding company that controlled production companies 260 
Yeltsin's Decree established vertically integrated oil companies (VIOCs) using the 
principles of holdings with certain exemptions. 61 Each oil holding company (VIOC) was 
made up of oil production subsidiaries and refining subsidiaries. 62 The first three 
vertically integrated oil companies were Yukos, Lukoil and Surgut 263 
On July 22,1994, Yeltsin issued a decree on the second stage of privatisation, 
leading to the notorious loans-for-shares auctions. 264 Privatisation of the major holdings, 
created in accordance with the Decree, took place from 1995-1999 via investment tenders 
and the loans-for-shares programme265 as part of the `cash stage' of privatisation 266 The 
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loans-for-shares scheme (LFS) was a pseudo-privatisation programme, whereby selected 
commercial banks served as trustees and auctioneers for rights to manage the stock in 
major Russian companies in exchange for loans. 267 The banks chosen to organise the 
auctions were controlled by the "oligarchs" who had already obtained the blessing from the 
Russian government to buy these companies, camouflaging the real sale by pledging the 
stock for loans. 268 
The result of the second stage of privatisation (1992- 1997) was the formation of 
gigantic private financial-industrial-media groups. 269 For a short period, Russia seemed to 
have moved toward a system of corporate control, concentrated in huge financial and 
production conglomerates, organised around chief oligarchs. 
270 These groups quickly 
became centres for the control of the Russian economy and politics. 
7' 
The auctions of 1995 are the most controversial episode in recent Russian political- 
economic history. 272 The "jewels" of the former Soviet Union industry were sold in a 
corrupt fashion to a handful of well-connected men, forming the new Russian elite. 
273 
Subsequently, attitudes to oligarchs and their role in Russia have always been controversial 
and mostly negative, 274 but their real contribution to the Russian business and politics is 
unlikely to get its final assessment for several decades. 275 
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From 1996-97 several entrepreneurs who, according to Berezovsky, controlled fifty 
percent of the Russian economy276 and were actively involved in political events, 
established themselves as a "Group of Seven" and began to play the role of "shadow 
cabinet". 27 In order to prevent the possible return of the Communists, the Group of Seven 
decided to finance Yeltsin's re-election campaign 278 Thus the oligarchs, in return for future 
tax exemptions, greater investment opportunities, protection of their assets and government 
posts, offered Yeltsin's team control over oligarchy media and funds. 
279 Therefore, the 
transition period that took place in Russia from 1995-1999 can be characterized as a period 
when perilously accumulated financial capital obtained control over the bulk of Russian 
industry, and maintained its control by using all available political means. 
When the state-wide privatisation campaign began, Khodorkovsky and his team saw 
a unique opportunity to expand beyond banking. Menatep was regarded as the only 
Russian bank that expressed its industrial orientation from the very beginning, and it 
formed a large, well-structured, diversified, industrial group. 80 Ultimately the bank and its 
affiliates acquired stock in more than a hundred industrial enterprises. 
281 
In 1995 the bank incorporated ZAO Rosprom to manage its industrial port folio, 282 
which included six basic categories of companies: chemicals, construction, textiles, 
consumer goods, mining, and oil. 283 Later, Yukos and Apatit were reorganised in 
independent holdings and Rosprom was liquidated. 284 
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The jewel in the Khodorkovsky crown - Yukos285 was formed on April 15,1993.286 
Before the formation of the holding, the Yukos oil production daughter companies, such as 
Yuganskneftegaz and Samaraneftegaz, were corporatized into joint stock companies and 
went through the privatisation process. 297 Using the example of the main Yukos' 
production unit, the figure 5 shows the typical distribution of shares of a Russian public 
company established in the course of privatisation. 
Figure 5. "Scheme of the Yganskneftegas Privatisation. " 
288 
In the mid 1990s the Russian government decided to sell its stake in Yukos to private 
investors, 289 along with other Russian oil production companies experiencing significant 
production and structural problems. 290 
285 Yuganskneftegas + KuibyshevnefteOrgSintez = YUKOS. See Center for Managment Research, 'Yukos: 
The Fall of a Russian Oil Giant' (2004) 2004 ICFAL <http: //www. icmr. icfai. org/ casestudies/catalogue/ 
Economics/ECON007. htm>accessed 18 July 2007. 
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Menatep, having obtained Governmental approval to buy Yukos, organised a group 
of commercial banks, Russian companies, and individuals to bid for seventy-eight percent 
of Yukos shares. 291 As a result of the preplanned auction, Group Menatep, dominated by 
Khodorkovsky and his five friends, gained control of Yukos for $300 million. 92 
After winning the LFS auction, Menatep began aggressively acquiring Yukos shares 
from different minor investors. By the beginning of 1997 approximately 85 percent of 
Yukos's shares were owned by the Menatep group. 293 
When Menatep took over Yukos in 1996, the company was suffering from the same 
problems that were affecting the rest of the post Soviet oil sector. 294 Oil production by its 
main production company Yuganskneftegas had dropped from 1.4 million barrels a day 
(1987) to 0.5 million barrels a day (1995) 295 After establishing managerial control over 
Yukos, Khodorkovsky had to solve the threefold problem of how to optimise the taxes, 
provide a reasonable level of investment to maintain the company as an ongoing concern, 
and how to stop the practice of theft. 296 This task required several years of hard managerial 
work and lobbying. Expanding into new regions under Khodorkovsky's management, 
Yukos acquired a controlling interest in VNK (Eastern Oil Company) privatised in an 
investment tender in 1997 for $800 million. 297 
The money-spinning strategies used by the Khodorkovsky-controlled management of 
the Yukos-VNK holding in the late 1990s, resembled ones used by other Russian 
production companies. Experts alleged that Khodorkovsky had skimmed over 30 cents per 
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dollar of revenue while cutting down his workers' wages, defaulting on tax payments, 
destroying the value of minority shares in Yukos and not reinvesting in Yukos' oil fields 298 
The problems experienced by Yukos in the mid 1990s were aggravated by the 1998 
crisis. The collapse of the Russian banking system and the 90-day moratorium decreed 
by Russia for paying off its debt had a tremendously negative impact on the Russian oil 
industry. 300 
Responding to the crisis, Khodorkovsky approved and implemented several drastic 
cost-cutting measures, which began to pay off quickly. 301 Yukos spun off many services 
and centralized the management of the remaining services, splitting "upstream" and 
"downstream" operations into separate business lines. 02 The company also made 
significant employee layoffs, 303 
A significant problem experienced by many Russian privatised companies was dual- 
level privatisation. 04 The duality was due to the creation of vertically-integrated oil 
holding companies, that included existing enterprises as subsidiaries, followed by the 
privatisation of the subsidiaries and then of the holdings 
305 The shareholders in the 
subsidiaries were concerned about the dividends that they would receive from the 
companies where they held the stock, not the profit of the holding company that was 
controlled by an oligarchy group. 306 This situation gave rise to numerous corporate 
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conflicts in the industry and in the oil holdings. 07 Although standards of corporate 
governance remained generally very low, some companies made attempts to change the 
situation for the better. 308 
From 1998-1999 Yukos, aiming to solve the problem of "duality" inside the holding 
and improve corporate governance regime, started a campaign of consolidation (buy-out) 
of its production subsidiaries shares 309 The programme provided different buy-out options 
for cash and shares of the holding company. 310 During the implementation of the 
consolidation programme, Yukos had to go through a heavyweight fight with the 
international greenmailer Kenneth Dart, who tried to oppose consolidation, aiming to sell 
shares of the Yukos subsidiaries belonging to him at a exhorbitant price. Although victory 
in the battle with Dart helped Yukos to deal with the issue of "duality" it also contributed 
to Khodorkovsky's reputation as a corporate "bad-boy" 31 Nevertheless, the successful 
performance of the shares consolidation programme finally made Yukos a holding 
company that owned one hundred per cent of the stock of all its main subsidiaries 312 
Having earned the reputation of a `corporate gangster" because of its battles with 
313 minority shareholders, Yukos began making efforts to clean up its image in 2000. The 
new approach to management involved three key reforms: western-style disclosure, 
independence of the board, and a corporate governance charter. 314 
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Over three years, the company established an international, independent Board of 
Directors with mostly non-executive directors 315 Yukos also developed a corporate 
governance code, 316 published financial statements in accordance with U. S. GAAP, which 
were audited by outside auditors, 317 and in Russia Yukos became a leader in the corporate 
governance sphere318 
In 1998 Berezovsky signed a settlement agreement with Khodorkovsky, aiming to 
create Yuksi, Russia's biggest oil company. 319 This new alliance would have given 
Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky enough funds and power to buy Rosneft (the strategic 
state-owned oil company). However, the Kremlin announced that Rosneft would no longer 
represent the state in production sharing agreements with foreign oil companies and the 
deal collapsed. 320 
By 2001, Yukos had become the giant of the Russian oil industry and was among the 
top private oil producers in the world, turning out 1.1 million barrels per day. 321 The 
company raised dividends on common stock from $300 million in 2000 and $500 million 
in 2001 to $2.0 billion in the first nine months of 2003 322 In December 2001 Yukos ADR 
Level 1 began to be traded on NEWEX. 323 The company planned to issue ADR Levels 2 
and 3324 
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As previously mentioned, under the leadership of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Yukos had 
become Russia's largest oil corporation implementing global best practices such as good 
corporate governance and transparency, improving efficiency and performance, and 
creating value for its shareholders 325 
One more step towards transparency was taken in 2002 when Menatep Group 
revealed the ownership structure for a 61.01 % stake in Yukos 326 
In 2001 Yukos began its expansion abroad. 27 Unlike other Russian companies from 
the energy sector, Yukos intended to focus outside the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. Yukos' major foreign investments included purchasing 49% of Slovak Transpetrol 
shares, 53% of shares in the Mazeikiu Nafta refinery in Lithuania in 2002 and others. 328 
Figure 6 describes the relationships of ownership and control inside and outside the Yukos 
corporate group, including its ultimate shareholders. 
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Figure 6. "The Structure of Ownership and Control of the Yukos Oil Company 
(2002). " 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Mikhail Broudno - 7" Mikhail Khodorkovs- 
Vassily Shakhonovsky - 7" Platon Lebedc 
Others - 4.5% Vladimir Doubov -7 
Special Trust Agreement - 50` Leonid Nevzlin - 8' 
Group MENATEP 
(Gibraltar) 
1 
100% ownership 
YUKOS Universal 
(Isle of Man) 
100% ownership 
Veteran Petroleum 3.54% shares _ 
iieY Enterprises 
Trust (Cyprus) 
10 % shares 57.47% shares 
100% ownership 
i 
OIL PRODUCTION 
SUBSIDIARIES 
Yuganskneftegaz 
Samaraneftegaz 
Tomskneft VNK 
Manoil 
VSNK 
Sakhaneftegaz 
YUKOS- 
100% Moscow 
_ 
100% 
ownership - (Management ownership r 
Company) 
l 
AS PRODUCTI( 
SUBSIDIARIES 
Arctic Gas 
Urengoil 
129 See Gololobov and Tanega. 'Yukos Risk' 584. 
MARKETING 
SUBSIDIARIES 
egional marketing 
ompanies 
1200 gas stations 
REFINING 
SUBSIDIARIES 
)vokuibyshevskii 
Kuibishevskii NPZ 
Syzranskil NPZ 
Achinskii NPZ 
Strejevskoi NPZ 
87 
From summer 1999 to spring 2003 (the tenth anniversary of Yukos), its market 
capitalization grew from $320 million to $21 billion, and in March 2004 reached a peak of 
$36 billion. 30 S&P331 and Moody's332 awarded it the highest long-term credit rating for 
Russian companies 333 
In 2001 the Company was awarded three Investor Protection Association's titles at 
once: Company with the Best Dividend Policy, Company with the Best Site, and Company 
with the Best Progress in Corporate Governance 334 In 2003, the corporation allocated $100 
million for community programmes 335 The Open Russia Foundation, created in 2001, 
supported educational and cultural projects aimed at developing young people. 336 Through 
its establishment of the not-for-profit Federation of Internet Education, Yukos promoted 
technological know-how in Russia. 337 
Figure 7 shows the characteristics of the Yukos corporate group correlating with 
main features of an international corporation. 
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Figure 7. "The Characteristics of the Company as a Business (Corporate) Group in 
2002-2003. " 
338 See Appendix 4 Para 10. 
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1.8.2. Russia after Yeltsin: Putin's "Strong State" Strategy and the 
"Equidistancing" of Oligarchs. 
Vladimir Putin's accession to the presidency in March 2000 flagged the start of the 
next period in government-business relations339 and played a critical role in the fate of 
Khodorkovsky and Yukos. Putin's meteoric rise in popularity was due to a number of 
factors: his tough policy toward Chechnya; his image as a youthful, vigorous and plain- 
talking leader; and massive support from the Yeltsin clan and state-owned mass media. ao 
Although, Putin publicly committed himself to the pursuit of democratic development, 
341he was firmly dedicated to restoring power of the state 342 His twin priorities were to 
revive the economy and strengthen the state. 343 in the same time, he brought TV and radio 
under tight state-control and virtually eliminated effective political opposition. 44 
An important change in the sphere of real governance was the substitution of the 
Yeltsin "Family"345 by the so called "St. Petersburg Clan" or Siloviki -a group of officials 
from Putin's native city who enjoyed the trust of the president. The Siloviki were not only 
the new governors of the country, but also its new economic elite. 46 Under Putin's control 
Russian foreign and internal policy had grown more self-confident and assertive, fuelled 
339 Paszyc and Wia; niewska, Big Business in the Russian Economy and Politics under Putin's Rule' 52. 
340 MB Olcott, The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Srategy: Vladimir Putin and the Geopolitics of Oil 
(Rice University Research Project Papers 2004) 4 <http: //www. rice. edu/energy/publications/ 
docs/PEC Olcott_10 2004. pdf>accessed 14 May 2007; SD Goldman, Russian Political, Economic, and 
Security Issues and U. S. Interests (CRS Report for Congress-Russian Political, Economic, and Security 
Issues and U. S. Interests RL33407,2006) CRS3. 
341 See eg N Robinson, The Economy and the Prospects for Anti-Democratic Development in Russia' (2000) 
52 (8) Europe-Asia Stud 1391-416. 
342 See eg TF Remington, Putin's Third Way: Russia and the "Strong State" Ideal' (2000) 9 (1/2) EECR 65- 
69; Solomon, 'Vladimir Putin's Quest for a Strong State'. 
343 Crompton, 'How Risky Is Russia? 25. 
344 Goldman, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U. S. Interests i. 
sas See B Powell, 'Masters of the Kremlin : Yeltsin's 'Family' of Close Confidants Engineers a Moscow 
Power Shift' (1999) August Newsweek International <http: //findarticles. com/p/ 
articles/mi_hb3335/is_199908/ai_n8047899>accessed 12 August 2007; -, 'Yeltsin, "The Family" And the 
Bureaucratic Mafia' (2000) 26 Class Struggle Magazine <http: //www. the-spark. net/csart264. html>accessed 
18 June 2007. 
346 J Morales, 'Who Rules Russia Todayl: An Analysis of Vladimir Putin and His Political Project (II)' (2003) 
UNISCI Discussion Papers Ns 46 <httpJ/www. ucm. es/eprints/6370/>accessed 12 April 2007. 
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by its perceived status as an "energy superpower". 47 As a result the Russian energy sector 
has come to represent Russian state interests globally and Russia's energy companies are 
expanding internationally with the assistance of the government. 348 
Under Putin the roles of the FIGs as political and economic actors changed. When 
Putin rose to power, the media commented on the following strategy: the President would 
not disturb the billionaires who enriched themselves during the privatisation era 
(oligarchs)-if they stayed out of politics. 349 Following the widely publicized meeting on 
28th July 2000 with 21 representatives of big business, the tycoons claimed they had agreed 
a pact with the President: they would be immune from prosecution over privatisation deals 
as long as they refrained from being involved in politics 350 
However, several oligarchs, including Gusinsky and Berezovsky, refused to conform 
to Putin's rules. 351 Subsequently, politically motivated civil and criminal suits were used to 
deprive them of key assets and both went into exile in order to avoid criminal charges in 
Russia. 352 The Russian government and media portrayed efforts against the oligarchs as the 
restoration of law and order. 353 
In these political conditions Khodorkovsky's initiative to merge Yukos' with Sibneft, 
which would have established Khodorkovsky's leadership in the Russian oil sector, looked 
extremely risky. 354 Yukos would have acquired 92% in Sibneft in return for $3 billion in 
cash and 26% of Yukos stock355 and Khodorkovsky would have become the CEO of 
347 L Aron, Russia's Oil Woes' (2007) January 08 AMERICANCOM 3 
<http: //www. american. com/archive/2007/January-february-magazine-contents/russia20... >accessed 7 March 
2007. 
348 F Hill, 'Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia's Revival' (2004) The Foreign Policy Centre Papers 27 
<www. fpc. org. uk/publications>accessed 2 March 2007. 
349 Goldhaber, 'Russian Roulette'. 
350 See Tompson, Putin and the `Oligarchs': A Two-Sided Commitment Problem' 10. 
351 Goldhaber, 'Russian Roulette'. 
352 Tompson, 'Putin and the `Oligarchs': A Two-Sided Commitment Problem' 4-5. 
35' See D Patterson, 'Russian Oligarchs, Taming' (1999) 30 November IDEA 
<http: //www. idebate. org/debatabase/topic_details. php? topiclD=292>accessed 18 July 2007. 
354 Poussenkova, From Rigs to Richers: Oilmen Vs Financiers in the Russian Oil Sector 36. 
ass See Yukos, 'Yukos Clarifies Terms of Share Buy-Back and Sibneft Share Exchange' (2003) 
<http: //www. yukos. com/vpo/news. asp? year=2003&month=7>accessed 23 July 2007. 
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YukosSibneft. 356 The Yukos-Sibneft deal would have created the world's fourth biggest oil 
company worth approximately $35bn 357 It was widely rumored that a 25-50 per cent share 
of the new concern might have been taken by ExxonMobil. 358 The merger announced in 
April 2003 was understood as a political manoeuvre, rather than a business deal; it would 
first have to be approved by the Kremlin, and it would have created a tremendously 
politically influential business group 359 Formally, the Russian authorities approved the 
deal and the merger was almost completed in October 2003. 
1.83. The Beginning of the Attack on Yukos. 
The events, later named "the Yukos Affair", actually marked the start of a new stage 
in the process of concentrating power in Russia. 360 The Yukos campaign was largely 
intended to remind the oligarchs that they remained vulnerable-and was also intended to 
scare off foreign investors, whose acquisition of large stakes in `oligarchic' companies 
would make those companies harder to subject to political pressure or bureaucratic rent- 
seeking 361 
Flagging the beginning of the attack on Khodorkovsky and Yukos, his friend Platon 
Lebedev, was arrested in July 2003 362 Lebedev was the second most important person in 
Yukos, the head of the Group Menatep, one of Yukos' major shareholders. 363 
Khodorkovsky's desperate attempts to free Lebedev failed completely. 
356 Korotov and others, 'Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos. Man with a Ruble' 1. 
357 V Panyushkin, Mikhail Khodorkovskii: Uznik Tishiny [Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Prisoner of Thishina] 
(Sekret Firmy, Moscow 2006) 164-65. 
358 Y Galukhina and M Rubchenko, 'Yukos/Sibneft. A Gift for the President. (2003) 10 December Gateway 
to Russia <http: //www. gateway2russia. com/st/art 180088. php>accessed 8 May 2007; T Orszag-Land, Putin 
Pursues Russia's Oil Oligarchs' (2004) August Contemp Rev 65-71,66. 
359 See D Butrin and P Sapozhnikov, The Oil and Gas Industry 2000-2004' (2004) 17 May Kommersant 
Online <httpJ/www. kommersantcom/tree. asp? rubric=3&node=33&doc_id=474677>accessed 28 July 2007. 
360 Morales, 'Who Rules Russia Today?: An Analysis of Vladimir Putin and His Political Project (II)' 6. 
361 Tompson, Putin and the `Oligarchs': A Two-Sided Commitment Problem' 9. 
362 Kononczuk, The "Yukos Affair". Its Motives and Implications 34. 
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The crisis around the company eventually led to the cancellation of the Yukos-Sibneft 
merger, 364 which was seen as a political decision dictated by the Kremlin to 
Abramovich 365 
On 25 October 2003 Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Chief Executive of Yukos, was 
arrested on board his plane in Siberia. 366 Khodorkovsky's arrest was seen as politically 
motivated, aimed at eliminating a political enemy. 367 It was rumored that Khodorkovsky 
had violated the `unwritten rules, ' announced in June 2000 at the meeting between Putin 
and the oligarchs, who were told not to intervene in politics. 368 Formally, Khodorkovsky's 
arrest was linked to the 1996 privatisation of the Apatit fertilizer company by the 
Menatep369 and several other post privatisation episodes 370 
The tax attack on Yukos began several months after Khodorkovsky's detention. 371 At 
the end of 2003 the Ministry of Tax and Levies conducted an extraordinary audit of the 
Yukos accounts. 72 Just before the New Year vacation the Company was hit with a claim 
I" P Vahtra, 'Russian Oil Sector Today and Tomorrow: The Implications of the Case OAO Yukos' (2004) 
<http: //www. tukkk. fi/peihaccessed 10 February 2007. 
365 J Strauss, 'Oil Marriage Is over, Confirms Besieged Yukos' (2003) 18 December Telegraph. co. uk 
<http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/money/main jhtml? xml=/money/2003/12/18/cnoilI8. xml>accessed 20 July 
2007. 
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Airport' Evening Stand (London 22 October 2004) 48. 
367 D Satter, 'Yukos State' (2003) 6 November Nationalreviewonline <http: //www. nationalreview. com/ 
comment/satter2003110609l6. asp>accessed 10 July 2007; Goldman, Russian Political, Economic, and 
Security Issues and US. Interests CRS5. 
368 See eg E Helque, 'The Oligarchs and the President: A Farce in Three Acts' (2004) (March -April) Russ 
Life 22-31; W Tompson, Putin and the 'Oligarchs. A Two-Sided Commitment Problem (Prosepects for 
Russian Federartion Project Briefing Note No REP BN 04/03 2004). 
369 On the Apatit case see sections 2.6. and 2.7. 
370 See eg A Rodionov, Nalogovye Skhemy, Za Kotorye Posadili Khodorkovskogo [Tax Schemes That Lead 
Khodorkovsky to Prison] (Vershina, Moscow 2005); Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the 
Criminal Charges'. 
371 See A Kuchins, 'Putin's Pandora's Box' (2002) 8 November Carnegie Moscow Center Publications 
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Testimony050217. pdf>accessed 20 June 2005. 
372 See Gololobov, "The Yukos Money Laundering Case' 6. 
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of U. S. $3.4 bn. 373 In May - August 2004 the courts found Yukos guilty of tax 
avoidance/evasion in 2000,374 obliging the company to pay the bill 375 In September the 
Ministry of Taxation announced an additional claim against Yukos of Rb 120 bn for 
2001376 The same procedure was repeated for 2002 and 2003. Including massive penalties, 
fines and interest, these assessments totaled approximately $27.5 bn 377 
All the proposals concerning the debt restructuring sent by the Company's 
management to the Government and the Administration were promptly ignored or rejected 
on formal grounds. 78 
The trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev is considered by some to be 
the most important 'legal" case in Russian history since the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. 79 Regardless of the lawyers' best efforts, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were found 
guilty of six of the seven charges of tax evasion, fraud and embezzlement and were 
sentenced to nine years. 380 The appeal reduced Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's sentences to 
eight years and they were sent to Siberia 381 
373 See Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Resolution # 14-3-05/1609-1 to Hold the Taxpayer Fiscally Liable for 
a Tax Offence (2004) <http: //www. yukos. com/taxes/YUKOStaxResolution full. pdf>accessed 1 March 
2007; PL Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited' (2005) 16 May Johnson's Russia List 
<http: //www. cdi. org/russia/johnson/Yukos-tax-revisited. pdf>accessed 7 March 2007. 
374 On the term see section 4.5.2. 
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Approximately a year later prosecutors, pursuing a strategy of ruining the Company 
and the image of its shareholders, brought fresh charges against Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
that are likely to ensure that the former Yukos oil magnate will not leave his Siberian 
prison camp in the foreseeable future 382 
On November 19th the Russian Federal Property Fund announced its intention to 
auction off the shares held by Yukos in its largest subsidiary, Yuganskneftegaz, to pay off 
the parent's debts. 83 Yuganskneftegaz was at the core of Yukos operations, accounting for 
around 60% of the company's oil production in 2003.384 The auction was preceded by 
incredible pressure applied by the prosecutors on the company's key managers with the 
goal of squeezing them out of the country. 385 Most of the management, wishing to avoid 
detention, flew to the U. S. and the UK. 
A few days before the Yuganskneftegaz auction, the management of Yukos filed a 
voluntary chapter 11 petition in an effort to prevent the sale of Yuganskneftegaz 
386 
Although initially the TRO was granted, ultimately the case was dismissed by the U. S. 
Bankruptcy Court which found Russia to be the appropriate forum for resolution of the 
parties' dispute. 87 Aiming to comply with the TRO, prohibiting the sale to a number of the 
parties named in it, the Government organised the sale of Yuganskneftegaz to a shell 
382 Presscenter, 'Statement on the New Chargers' (2007) 1 <httpi/www. mbktrial. com/ 
about/new charges. cfm>accessed 15 March 2007 (the full name of the publisher is "Presscenter for Defence 
Attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev"; The Wall Street Journal, 'Russian Justice'. 
393 BrokerCreditService, Yukos. Go Ahead, Make My Day (2004) 6; Y Alexandrov, 'The End of Yukos or 
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detail. asp? art id=1232>accessed 25 May 2006. 
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accessed 21 June 2007; B Condie, Moscow Levels Charges at Yukos Boss in London' Evening Stand 
(London 18 July 2005) 1. 
386 See on the case P Sapozhniikov and others, 'Yukos Surrenders to the Allies' (2004) 16 December 
Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. com/page. asp? id=533815>accessed 21 July 2007; GC Moss, 
'Between Private and Public International Law: Exorbitant Jurisdiction as Illustrated by the Yukos Case' 
(2007) 32 Rev Cent &E Eur L 1-17. 
387 See G Moss, 'Dismissal of Yukos Chapter 11 Proceedings' (2005) 18 (5) Insolv Int 77-78 
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company Bikalfinancegroup. 388 After the auction it became absolutely clear that the days 
of the company were numbered. 
In spring 2006 a consortium of the Western banks declared that Yukos had defaulted 
on several loans and obtained a decision from the International Arbitration confirming the 
company's debt, and filed a bankruptcy application with the Arbitration Court of 
Moscow. 389 An interim receiver was appointed, who after examining the solvency of the 
company, recommended the creditors and the court to liquidate it 390 Yukos was declared 
bankrupt and the liquidation of its assets to pay creditors was ordered 391 All the 
company's assets were sold on a series of pre-organised auctions, mostly to Rosneft and 
Gasprom 392 
The `Yukos affair' has been a catalyst for a fundamental transformation of the 
Russian oil sector and the energy sector as a whole. 393 Putin made it clear that the state 
expected big business to share the burden of tackling Russia's social problems and that the 
resource-extraction industries in particular, would be required to bear a heavier tax 
burden 394 Those oligarchs who have remained out of politics and participated in politics 
only in so far as they refrained from opposition to the Kremlin, have remained 
388 See Gololobov and Tanega, 'Yakos Ris' 602-08. 
389 See BBC News, 'Bankruptcy Court Opens Yukos Case (2006) 28 March BBC News 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/business/4854530. stm>accessed 29 June 2007; C Belton, Yukos Bankruptcy 
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1186. html>accessed 15 September 2006; V Korchagina, 'Court Declares Yukos Bankrupt' (2006) 2 August 
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2007. 
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unscathed 395 The new "slovarch" regime functions in two main directions: the control of 
all the profitable business and direct confiscation from those who are not loyal. 
396 
The economic outcome of the Kremlin's attack against Khodorkovsky and Yukos is 
the merger of the company into a large new oligarchic group of banks and companies 
controlled by Putin and his loyalists. 97 
Russian society, on the whole, approved of the attack on Yukos 
398 As many as 73 
percent of Russians believe that the privatisation process of the 1990s was illegitimate. 
99 
The Western community tends to understand the Yukos case as being motivated by 
politics, not by the rule of law 400 The European Court of Human Rights and Amnesty 
International have shown interest in the Yukos case. 401 
The Yukos case is a vivid illustration of how state institutions can be used to carry out 
attacks on influential business groups 402 There are several lessons that can be drawn from 
the case. First, the rule of law in Russia remains weak . 
403 Secondly, the Kremlin's taming of 
the media in 2000-02 has largely been successful. 404 Thirdly, there are no other institutions, 
395 Lavelle, 'Experts on the Yukos Affair and Impact'. 
3% See eg T Netreba, 'The Shape of Putin's Russia' (2002) September - October Russ Life 22-28; The 
Economist, The Making of a Neo-KGB State'. 
397S Menshikov, 'The Anatomy of Russian Capitalism' (2005) 48 (2) Challenge 67-89,75. 
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state or private, prepared to challenge the federal executive 405 Fourthly, property rights in 
Russia remain insecure, and the Yeltsin-era privatisation settlement remains open to further, 
4°6 possibly substantial, revision 
405 See M Khodorkovsky, 'Liberalism in Crisis: What Is to Be Done? (2004) 1 April The Moscow 
Times. com <http: //www. khodorkovskytrial-com/pdfs/liberalism. pdf>accessed 12 August 2006. 
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Chapter 2. 
The Yukos Case: General Overview. 
2.1. Introduction. 
In 2003 the General Prosecutors Office of the Russian Federation, acting with the 
Kremlin's political blessing, 407 launched a series of planned criminal investigations aimed 
at crushing Russia's wealthiest businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his allies. 
408 
Yukos Oil Company was also attacked as the core source of Khodorkovsky's wealth and 
power. 409 As the names of Khodorkovsky and Yukos were closely associated, 
410 the whole 
affair was called "The Yukos Case" 411 
For some analysts the case is seen as an attempt to attack all the so-called "oligarchs" 
and is publicly understood to be a success for Putin's promotion of the "Rule of Law" in 
Russia. 412 Others understand the case as a restoration of Stalinist methods of political 
governance and the rigid abuse of human rights and basic democratic freedoms 
413 
407 -, 'Kremlin Vs. Yukos: Oil Company Caught in Kremlin Sights' (2003) 
September-October Russ Life. 
408 Defence Attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 'Political Persecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Comments 
on MBK's Arrest' (2006) <httpi/www. supporimbk. com/suppordcomments_legal. cfm>accessed 1 March 
2007. 
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410 See MK de Vries and others, The Two - Headed Eagle - Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos' (2005) 5 
March Managmenttoday. com <http //www. managementtoday. co. uk/search/article/548120/the-two-headed- 
eagle-mikhail-khodorkovsky-yukoshaccessed 30 October 2007. 
411 See eg Shamseeva, 'Yukos's Affairs and the Yukos Case'; Jobatey and Vacano, 'The Yukos Case and Its 
Consequences - Interview with Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger'. 
412 Guriev and Rachinsky, The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism' 146-47. 
413 See CJ Chivers, 'Return of the Show Trial; Stalin and the Czars Haunt Khodorkovsky in the Dock' (2004) 
7 November NYTimes <http: //www. nytimes. conV2004/11/07/weeldnreview/07chiv. htrnl? r=I&oref= 
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The Yukos case is the first known Russian corporate disaster. 414 The political, 415 
legal and economica16 implications of the case are manifold and their comprehensive 
assessment will probably take several decades. 17 Some academics compare the Yukos 
case with the collapse of other international corporate giants, putting the notorious Enron 
case at the helm. 418 Yet the Yukos case contains more ambiguities, legal "black spots" and 
raises more questions than any other case in recent corporate and white-collar crime 
history. It flags a completely new era of corporate fraud and money laundering 
scandals 419 
This chapter pursues the main aim of describing the Yukos case concisely, showing 
the links between the "secondary level" cases comprising the "Big Yukos Case" and their 
overlap. 
It is important to note that whilst the Yukos case is recognized as a "legal beast" of 
tremendous complexity, it is still developing420 and branching out. 421 Therefore, the case is 
to be reviewed as an ongoing progress, including the analysis of possible future events. 
The main events in the Yukos criminal case have been highlighted in the previous chapter 
that describes the timeline of events in the Yukos affair as a whole. 
414 FOM (Public Opinion Foundation), 'Yukos and the Re-Division of Large Property. ; Shamseeva, 'Yukos's 
Affairs and the Yukos Case'. 
415 See eg Kononczuk, The "Yukos Affair" Its Motives and Implications. 
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Schnarrenberger'; Schor, The Yukos Affair: Rectifying the Past or Polluting the Future? '. 
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2.2. Literature Review. 
The sources on the problem of Yukos/Khodorkovsky case and its political motivation 
are numerous as the case has lasted for more than four years and is still in progress. 
422 
However, the criminal side of the Yukos story has been analysed only in a limited number 
of sources, amongst which the most comprehensive ones are electronic. This can be 
explained by the unprecedented and politically controversial nature of the case. 
It should be noted that the information environment surrounding the Yukos case is 
extremely politicised 423 The Kremlin never stops playing its own public relations games, 
trying to persuade the international community that Khodorkovsky and his allies are just 
high profile, experienced criminals. 24 Therefore, the Yukos-related information landscape 
can be divided into three main groups of sources. 
Non-sponsored academic and professional sources 
From the sources regarded as neutral, only one book is published: "The schemes for 
which Khodorkovsky is behind bars", by A. Rodionov. However, this book is only an 
overview of the summary of charges of the "First Khodorkovsky case" with some 
comments and special emphasis on the tax evasion issues, and cannot claim to be a 
comprehensive source on the case as a whole 425 The principles of the Khodorkovsky case 
in the context of the current Russian business and legal environment were further 
researched by Rodionov and his co-author in the book "Tax Evaders of Putin's Epoch: 
Who are they? "426 
422 See eg Gololobov, The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock Case'. 
423 See cg Orszag-Land, Tutin Pursues Russia's Oil Oligarchs; Tompson, Putin and the `Oligarchs': A Two- 
Sided Commitment Problem. 
424 See cg V Perekrest, 'What Is Mikhail Khodorkovsky Behind Bars for (Part 1)' (2006) 18 May Prigovor. 
RU <http: //prigovor. com/info/37302. html>accessed 14 December 2006 and his subsequent publications. 
425 See Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky to Prison. 
426 See J Vitkina and A Rodionov, Nalogovye Prestupniki Epokhi Putina: Klo Oni? [Tax Evaders of Putin's 
Epoch: Who Are They? ] (Vershina, Moscow 2007). 
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Amongst western commentators on the Yukos/Khodorkovsky case, only one 
commenting comprehensively on the legal aspects of the case has been identified so far. In 
2004 the American lawyer Peter Clateman, who has practiced in Russia for several years, 
posted some papers to Johnson's list 427 These papers concern the early developments of 
the Yukos/Khodorkovsky case, and, unfortunately, have not been updated. They represent 
a rare attempt to comment on a Russian criminal case from an international perspective 
428 
The recently published Fortescue book, "Russian's Oil and Barons and Metal Magnates" 
mostly analyses the socio-economic reasons for the Yukos affair rather than the criminal 
case itself 429 
Sources, presumably sponsored by Khodorkovsky defence and Group Menatep 
The sources that defend Yukos and Khodorkovsky are primarily international or 
foreign newspapers and magazines 430 The main publications are summarised on two 
international web sites www. khodorkovsky. info and 
www. mikhailkhodorkovs societ blogspot. com. www. khodorkovsky. info has its 
"mirror" site in Russian www. khodorkovsky. ru, which is known as the main site about the 
attack on Yukos/Khodorkovsky. After the commencement of the Yukos bankruptcy 
procedure, the main Yukos site, www. yukos. com, stopped being properly maintained and 
the relevant information concerning Yukos began to be posted by the Khodorkovsky press- 
centre on www. khodorkovsky. ru. The main players on the Yukos/ Khodorkovsky side 
have their own web sites such as www. platonlebedev. ru (the official site of Platon 
Lebedev); http: /www. robertamsterdam. com (the official site of Khodorkovsky's 
international lawyer Robert Amsterdam) 43' There are several other web resources, which 
427 See <http: //www. cdi. org/russia/johnson/default. cfm>. 
428 See eg P Clateman, 'Summary and Analysis of the "Statement on the Form of the Indictment Presented to 
Platon Lebedev'" (2004) April 1 Johnson's Russia List <http: //www. cdi. org/russia/johnson/7462- 
9. cfm>accessed 10 February 2007; P Clateman, 'Further Legal Observations on the Yukos Affair' (2004) 3 
September Johnson's Russia List <http: //www. cdi. org/russia/johnson/Yukos-tax. pdf>accessed 6 March 
2007; and his other publications, assesible on Johnson's list. 
429 S Fortescue, Russian's Oil Barons and Metal Magnates (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006). 
aso The comprehensive list of the main publications is located on <http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/media>. 
431 Amsterdam & Peroff(www. amsterdamandperofr. com). 
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continually publish supportive information on the case, 432 belonging to the main Russian 
human rights institutions or NGOs (for example, the Sovset Graupe - www. sovest. org). 
However, these sites merely reproduce the information posted on Lebedev and 
Khodorkovsky's main web sites. 
There are also several recently published books on the case including "Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky: The prisoner of Tishina", 433 which, unfortunately is just a highly 
politicised semi-fictional story about Khodorkovsky's preliminary detention and trial. 
Sources, sponsored by the Russian authorities and state-owned companies 
There are three main groups of the sources on the case, which represent opposition 
views on the case and deliver pro-governmental information to the public and other mass 
media. Firstly there is the "general" official public mass media, controlled by the 
government, official political parties or state-controlled companies. 34 A well known 
project was the publication of a series of articles: "What is Mikhail Khodorkovsky behind 
bars for? " by Vladimir Perekrest in one of the most popular "Former-Soviet" Russian 
newspapers "Izvestia". These articles attempt to explain that Khodorkovsky and his allies 
have been prosecuted for an attempt to commit a "soft oligarchy coup" and for attempting 
to monopolize political power in the country. 435 The second source is comprised of web 
resources, created exclusively for the "information war" within the Yukos/Khodorkovsky 
case. The typical representative of this group is the web site www. prigovor. com with its 
Russian language "mirror" www. prigovor. ru, which gathers and publishes all the 
"opponent" data on the case 436 
The third group of anti-Yukos mass media comprises of one important official web- 
site belonging to the General Prosecutors Office of the Russian Federation. It has published 
quite a number of press releases and the main summaries of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's 
432 See eg <http: /Ietthemgonow. org>. 
433 See Panyushkin, Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Prisoner of Thishina. 
434 RBC. ru, Press Freedom List: Russia Ranked 121st out of 139' (2003) 
<http: //www. eng. yabloko. ru/Publ/2003/I-NET/030910 rbc ru. html>accessed 2 March 2007. 
ass Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky(Part 1)' and his subsequent publications in Izvestija. 
436 On this site see <http //nevzlin. livejournal. com/133993. htm1>. 
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charges. So the domestic mass media is completely under state control and exclusively on 
the side of the prosecution. 37 
The difference in the approaches to the same events makes the proper cross-checking 
and triangulation of the relevant data extremely important. 
2.3. Methodological Issues. 
23.1. The Limitations of the Study Related to Russian Criminal Law 
and Procedure. 
This research will be focused on the issues related to Russian criminal law and 
procedure as the Yukos criminal investigations and court hearings have mostly taken place 
in Russia. However, the former management of the Company and its core shareholders, 
who represented part of the opposition to Vladimir Putin, have made desperate efforts to 
give the case international publicity, presenting it as a benchmark case which illustrate the 
evils of Putin's regime 438 As mentioned previously, the case, in its various aspects, has 
been reviewed by the U. S 439 and U. K. " courts and several other jurisdictions 441 and 
extensive comments have been issued by a number of international political institutions. 442 
Therefore, the Yukos-related criminal cases ought to be seen through the prism of 
international legal developments. An example is the Dutch case, concerning the forceful 
437 See U. S. Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U. S. Record 2006. 
439 See eg Osbome, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 'Democracy on the Retreat in 
Russia'" 18-20. 
439 See eg Re Yukos Oil Company 2005 WL 517959 (Bankr SD Tex 2005). 
440 See eg Russian Federation v Temerko (Bow Street Magistrates' Court 23 December 2005). 
441 MosNews, 'Russia Asks Extradition of Former Yukos Executive Held in Italy (2006) 16 May 
Mosnews. com <http: /www. mosnews. com/news/2006/05/16/golubovich. shtml>accessed 27 March 2007; 
Kommersant. com, 'Khodorkovsky Accomplice Freed in Cyprus' (2007) 25 January Kommersant Online 
<http: //www. kommersant. com/p736650/r 500Nladislav_Kartashov_YUKOS_Cyprushaccessed 25 March 
2007. 
442 See Osborne, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "Democracy on the Retreat in 
Russia'"; Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper'. 
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sale of the Yukos Dutch subsidiary Yukos International B. V., where the court criticised the 
procedural issues of the tax cases against Yukos 443 
There are three main types of action undertaken by Khodorkovsky and the Yukos 
defendants: 1) Political action aimed at getting international institutions and the U. S. and 
EU governments to recognize the case as being political; 44 2) Applications filed with the 
international courts, including ECHR, and hearings in different jurisdictions, focused on 
the recognition of the political and selective nature of the Yukos case; 44' 3) Cases filed 
with the purpose of blackening the international reputation of the Russian political regime 
and creating certain obstacles to the business activities of the state owned companies that 
directly or indirectly participated in the seizure and confiscation of Yukos' assets, 
including in the first instance the YNG auction. 446 
The named groups of legal actions, taken abroad, should be seen as the main 
contributors to the "legal data" of the Yukos case besides the Russian criminal 
developments. Those cases should also be understood as creating the political and legal 
environment for further international and foreign disputes and for ECHR decisions. 7 
The series of tax avoidance and evasions cases, known as the "Yukos tax case" 
should be distinguished from other non-criminal cases. Although these cases are civil in 
their legal substance, they are closely linked to the criminal cases and their findings are 
actively used in them. The tax cases are connected to the money laundering side of the 
Yukos story and should be considered in their interrelation. 8 
443 See M Elder, 'Court Rebuffs Yukos Receiver' (2007) 1 November The Moscow Times. com 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2007/11/01/002. html>accessed 1 November 2007; Reuters, Dutch 
Court Voids Yukos Bankruptcy in Netherlands' (2007) 31 October Reuters UK 
<http: //uk. reuters. com/article%oilRpt/idUKL3131955920071031? sp=trae>accessed 1 November 2007. 
44° MosNews, 'Wanted Yukos Shareholders Meet Bush in White House' (2005) 4 February Mosnews. com 5 
<http: //www. mosnews. com/news/2005/02/04/brudno. shtml>accessed 7 April 2007; MosNews, 'Yukos 
Shareholder Tells U. S. Audience of Putin's Authoritarianism' (2005) 15 December Mosnews. com 
<http: //www. mosnews. com/feature/2005/07/14/newhelsinki. shtml>accessed 18 September 2007. 
445 The best example is the extradition cases in the UK. See Russian Federation v Maruev et al (Bow Street 
Magistrates' Court 18 March 2005); Russian Federation v Temerko. 
' See Yukos et al v FSA et al [2006] EWHC 2044 (admin). 
447 See eg K Zigfeld, 'Is Mikhail Khodorkovsky a Political Prisoner? (2007) 28 October Free Dominion 
<http: //www. freedominion. ca/phpBB2/viewtopic. php? t=89688&sid=9f84c99c938aabf5075 af9b27656885d> 
accessed 28 October 2007. 
448 The case is reviewed in Chapter 4. 
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When researching the Yukos-related criminal case several important remarks and 
reservations regarding the limitations on the scope of the study must be made. 
One significant limitation on this research, mostly with regard to this chapter, is 
general accessibility of the data on the Yukos-related criminal cases. Due to the non- 
disclosure requirements imposed on the criminal defence lawyers by Russian law, only 
publicly available data may be used for this study. Use of such significantly abridged data 
may result in the exclusion of certain information (names, dates, figures, etc. ) pertaining to 
the criminal cases °49 
The next significant limitation on scope concerns alleged violent crimes. Although 
they comprise a highly publicised side to the Yukos story, they have to be excluded from 
the scope of this study as they are unrelated to the corporate and money laundering cases. 
Any research on such cases is likely to fail due to the strict non-disclosure commitments 
put on the defence by the prosecution. Therefore, any research on this area would have to 
overcome insurmountable obstacles resulting from very limited access to the relevant 
data. 45° 
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition and detailed elaboration, criminal cases 
based on the same grounds (for example, different cases on tax evasion, pertaining to the 
same company, but to different years - i. e. "secondary cases") will be reviewed as one 
case 451 
One of the significant problems concerning methodology is the problem of 
definitions, accurate "translation" and correct use of Russian legal vocabulary and legal 
data in the context of the study. 452 The limitations of this study do not allow for comment 
on the Russian legislation and practice at any time when Russian law or cases are cited. 
Thus, in order to avoid any possible mistranslations and misinterpretations the relevant 
449 See eg The International Protection Centre, 'Harassment of Defence Lawyers of M. B. Khodorkovsky and 
P. L. Lebedev' (2006) <http: //www. ip-centre. ru/modules. php? name=News&file=article&sid=204>accessed 
27 May 2007. 
450 See D Igoshina and I Petrakova, 'Prosecutors Persevere with Yukos Murder Case' (2003) 28 September 
Gazeta <http: /www. gazeta. ru/print/2003/09/19/Prosecutorsp. shtml>accessed 14 September 2006. 
451 See S Koverga, 'Tax Evasion Cases Slowed by Indecisive Courts' (2006)19 October WPS Russian Media 
Monitoring Agency <http //global. factiva. com/aa/default. aspx? napc=S&fcpil=en& XFORMSTATE= 
AAN>accessed 25 October 2006. 
452 See footnote 61. 
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terms will be used in meaning given to them by the western courts and international 
institutions, or the international lawyers in their comments and white papers. The necessary 
comments and clarifications will be provided where Russian law and practice significantly 
differ from the international or Anglo-American treaties, or where terminology, used in 
statutes or case law, being linguistically similar, has a different meaning in different 
judicial systems. 
23.2. The Definitions of "the Case" and "the Group" in this Research. 
23.2.1. The Case. 
This chapter raises the problem of definitions, which is important for the whole 
research. It is important to note that the term "The Yukos case" is political in nature and 
used mostly by politicians and journalists, but not lawyers, to describe the attack on all 
Yukos and Khodorkovsky-affiliated companies and individuals. Such use of this term 
creates some problems and ambiguities for practitioners and academics. 
In the current situation, when the "Main Yukos Case" or its constituent cases are still 
developing, being investigated, or are subject to certain judicial procedures in different 
common and civil law jurisdictions, the problem of definitions is aggravated. Cross- 
submission of the legal documentation makes the issue even more complicated 453 
Therefore, the primary terminological problem concerning the dissertation is how to define 
the term "case" in a way that is both comprehensible for Russian and international 
practitioners and academics. 
The word "case" in the Yukos story is commonly used with three substantially 
different meanings: 
453 For example, PACER list of filings for the case Re Yukos Oil Company 2005 WL 517959 (Bankr SD Tex 
2005) contains 244 entry (<https: //ecf. txcb. uscourts. gov>). 
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The "Yukos case" (the "Yukos Affair') or the "Yukos-Khodorkovsky case" in its 
entirety, can be defined as a state attack on the company, its shareholders, managers, 
employees, and other directly or indirectly affiliated individuals or companies. Sometimes, 
in order to be associated with the Yukos case it was sufficient just to declare a particular 
relationship to Yukos, Khodorkovsky or his allies 454 
It can be used to describe the "group of cases"; launched against the same 
individuals or on the grounds of the same circumstances ass An example of such an 
approach is the so-called "VNK" case, launched on Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, Newlin and 
others in respect of the alleged embezzlement and laundering of the shares belonging to 
VNK. 
The term `case' is also used in accordance with the meaning given to it by the 
Criminal-Procedural Code of the Russian Federation - i. e. a formally separate criminal 
investigation procedure with particular identification details (a particular number, a 
responsible investigator, etc. 456 
In the first two instances, the term "case" is used in its public and political meaning, 
which does not bear any particular legal significance, except for describing a nebulous 
group of cases, related to Yukos or Khodorkovsky. However, an analysis of the groups of 
interrelated cases will be used in this chapter in order to simplify the structure of the study. 
When researching the criminal side of the Yukos story, it should be noted that one of 
the key reasons for the close interrelation between the Yukos tax case, as a corporate tax 
avoidance and evasion case, and the Khodorkovsky cases (the first and second) is the 
absence of criminal liability and criminal prosecution for legal entities in the Russian 
Federation 457 Although this problem is under constant academic discussion, 458 Russian 
454 MosNews, 'Lithuanian Court Refuses to Extradite Former Yukos Banker' (2006) 2 March Mosnews. com 
<http: //www. mosnews. com/news/2006/10/23/babenko. shtml>accessed 20 September 2007. --, 'DJ 
Lithuanian Court Confirms Russian Banker's Asylum Status' (2006) 16 October Comtex News Network 1-1. 
455 See eg Compromat. RU, 'Vyvod Aktivov VNK [VNK Assets Stripping]' (2003) <www. compromatru/ 
main/hodorkovskiy/shahn3. htm>accessed 10 March 2007. 
456 L Orland, 'A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002 Criminal Procedure Code' (2002-2003) 18 Conn J Int'1 
L 133 - 388,162-65,76-79,232-37. 
457 See CC RF art 19. On the Russina Criminal Code see Appendix 5 and Appendix 6. 
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law stipulates that legal entities of any type can only be subject to civil and administrative 
sanctions 459 The principal characteristics of Russian administrative law, and its system of 
sanctions, make the question of how it differs from criminal law completely theoretical. 460 
Administrative sanctions can be imposed on legal entities for violations of environmental 
law, labour law, custom law, anti-trust law and other branches of law, in the form of 
pecuniary penalties or different restrictions 461 Tax sanctions for legal entities are 
classified as administrative, although managers responsible for large-scale tax evasions are 
criminally liable, as are managers responsible for serious violations of labour law, 
environmental law, etc. 2 Such duality means that in the business sphere, especially in 
taxation, sanctions for tax evasion can be imposed on a legal entity in the form of fines and 
criminal sanctions in different forms. These may include the detention of the responsible 
managers of a company. Therefore the tax authorities may conduct a tax audit and an 
administrative investigation against a company, and on the basis of their findings, the 
463 prosecution may launch a criminal investigation against the managers 
In the Yukos/Khodorkovsky case, the prosecutors have used the methodology of 
bringing charges against the core shareholder and the chief executive officer of the 
corporation, instead of bringing charges of money laundering, fraud and tax evasion 
against the legal entity. This is despite the alleged crimes being "corporate" in nature. 
Within a different judicial system these alleged crimes could be attributed to the whole 
corporation as their primary beneficiary. 464 
458 See Y Kravets, 'Ob Ugolovnoi Otvetstvennosti Yuridicheskikh Lits v Sfere Predprinimatel'skoi 
Deyatel'nosti [On the Criminal Liability of Legal Entities]' (2004) 6 Zhurnal Rossiiskogo Prava [Journal of 
Russian Law] 70-77,70. 
459 See eg ibid. 
460 See on the problems of administrative liability of legal entities in Russia D Cherkaev, 'Administrativnaya 
Otvetstvennost' Yuridicheskih Lits [The Administrative Liability of Legal Entities]' (2001) 11 
Zakonodatel'stvo [Legislation] 51-59; L Ivanov, 'Administrativnaya Otvetstvennost Yuridicheskikh Lits [The 
Administrative Liability of Legal Entities]' (2001) 3 Rossiiskaya Yustitsiya [Russian Justice] 21-23. 
a6' Kravets, 'On the Criminal Liability of Legal Entities' 71. 
462 See eg A Borisov and I Makhrov, 'Administrativnaya Otvetstvennost' Za Narushenie Zakonodatel'stva 0 
Nalogakh [Administrative Sanctions for Violations of Tax Laws]' (2003) 10 Pravo i Ekonomika [Law and 
Business] 53 - 59. 
463 See eg Vitkina and Rodionov, Tax Evaders of Putin's Epoch 235-40. 
464 See Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal Charges' 11-12,16-18. 
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To avoid any possible misunderstanding all the cases should be referenced in a 
manner that permits their correct and accurate identification. Hence, the following system 
of definitions will be used exclusively for the purpose of this dissertation. 
The "Yukon case" will mean all the Yukos-related cases jointly as a group, 
concerning all the individuals and entities who are subject to criminal prosecution or 
adverse consequences under civil law, resulting, directly or indirectly from the conflict 
between Khodorkovsky and the State 465 The terms "the Yukos/Khodorkovsky case" and 
"the Yukos case", will be used interchangeably, except for the cases related to 
Khodorkovsky exclusively. 
A case with a particular name (for example, "VNK case") may include several 
legally or logically interrelated investigations, launched against particular individuals on 
similar grounds. 6 
A case with additional identification characteristics (for example, the case against Mr 
Smith, concerning the deals with VNK shares) will mean a particular investigatory case. 467 
23.2.2. The Group. 
The term "organised criminal group" is also one of the core terms in the Yukos case. 
There are a number of problems in giving this term an accurate definition. The most 
important issue is its correspondence with the international and western understanding of 
organised criminal groups and the difference between the legal and political use of the 
term. 
465 See eg Shamseeva, 'Yukos's Affairs and the Yukos Case'; Jobatey and Vacano, The Yukos Case and Its 
Consequences - Interview with Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger; Volkov, 'Standard Oil and Yukos 
Cases'. 
466 See Koverga, Tax Evasion Cases Slowed by Indecisive Courts'. 
467 See -- 'Informatsiya 0 Dele Khodorkovskogo Ns 18/41-03 [Information on the Khodorkovsky Case Ns 
18/41-03]' (2003) 21 July Kompromat. RU <http: /www. compromat. ru/main/hodorkovskiy/ 
spravka. htm>accessed 12 March 2007 
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In legal documentation, including the relevant Bills of Indictment, the term 
"Organised Group" or "Organised Criminal Group" are used in their direct legal meaning 
given in the Russian Criminal Code 468 The commentary to the Code defines an organised 
group as "comprise[d] of two or more individuals who have joined efforts in order to 
commit one or several crimes. This variety of complicity is characterized by 
professionalism and stability. "469 Complicity refers to the agreement by the members of the 
organised group to engage in one or more criminal acts prior to their actually taking steps 
to implement any criminal objective. 70 The stability component requires the existence of 
"permanent ties between the member of the organised group and [choice] of particular 
methods of activity involved in the preparation and perpetration of their crimes. The 
stability of an organised group, therefore, requires prior agreement and a degree of 
organisation. "all 
The concept of an "organised group" bears some similarities to the concept of 
"organised crime" as defined in organised crimes statutes in the U. S. 472 An "organised 
group" under Russian law is closer to a group of conspirators under U. S. law. It does not 
require the use of a legal entity or of a quasi-corporate entity. Forming and acting as an 
"organised group" does not form a separate crime (although it stiffens the punishment 
applicable to specific crimes). The Russian Criminal Code does contain a separate concept 
of "organised crime"; Article 210 of the Criminal Code establishes a separate crime for 
what mirrors the definition of "organised crime" under U. S. federal and local statutes. 473 
However, neither Khodorkovsky nor Lebedev are charged with this offence. 474 
469 Presscenter, The Bill of Indictment' (2003) <httpi/www. khodorkovsky. info/trial/case/133827. html> 
accessed 1 March 2007. 
469 CC RFart35. 
470 Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal Charges' 34. 
471 ibid. 
472 It also corresponds to the definition of "organised criminal group" given in the Article 2 of Palermo 
Convention. See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime GA Res 55/25 (2000) 
UN GAOR 55th Sess Supp No 49 UN Doc A/RES/55/25 art 2. 
473 CCRFart210. 
474 Clateman, 'Summary and Analysis of the "Statement on the Form of the Indictment Presented to Platon 
Lebedev'". 
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Applying the concept of the "organised group" to the offences, allegedly committed 
by Khodorkovsky and his allies, the prosecutors aimed to achieve certain procedural and 
political goals: 475 
" holding Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and other defendants (existing and prospective) 
criminally liable for the alleged acts of other conspirators in the "organised criminal 
group""476 
9 extending the statute of limitations periods for the charged offences; 477 
" materially increasing penalties and tightening security measures such as pre-trial 
detention. 78 
According to existing Russian practice, any individual, employed or contracted by a 
company used by an organised criminal group for its criminal goals, may be charged with 
participation in organised crime. 479 He/she may also be documented as a member of 
several "organised criminal groups" allegedly involved in the criminal commitments of 
different criminal groups 4'0 One popular investigative techinque is that sometimes not all 
the members of the relevant criminal group are named in the investigative documentation, 
and the legal formula: "the unknown (unidentified) members of the group" is used. 81 Such 
475 See in general Defence Attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 'Specific General Comments Regarding 
Charging Khodorkovsky with Having Committed Joint Crimes. ' (2005) <http. //www. khodorkovsky. info/ 
docs/134205_AppealGroup. pdf>accessed 26 October 2007. 
476 See eg A Arutyunov, 'Organisovannye Gruppy I Prestupnye Soobscestva: Voprosy Kvalifikatsii 
[Organised Groups and Criminal Associations: Issues of Qualification]' (2002) 9 Zakonodatel'stvo i 
Ekonomika [Law and Business] 38-40,38-39. 
477 See eg ibid. 
478 See Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal Charges' 2. 
479 See C Belton, 'Officials Outline Case against Raided Bank' (2005) 12 December The Moscow Times. com 
<http: //iib. ru/eng/news/fin/2005/12/fii1012. htm1>accessed 20 September 2007; M Lepina, Top 
Menedzherov Neftyanogo Obvinili v Sozdanii Ustoichivoi Gruppy [Bank Neftyanoi Top-Managers Are 
Charged with Organised Crime]' (2007) 3 October Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. ru/ 
doc. aspx? docsid=810851>accessed 10 October 2007. 
480 Khodorkovsky-Lebedev-Krainov in the first Khodorkovsky case for the episode of the privatisation of 
Apatit and the Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, Nevzlin and others for the episode of VNK in the Second 
Khodorkovsky-Yukos case. 
481 See eg General Prosecutors Office, 'Obvinitel'noe Zaklyuchenie Po Obvineniyu Lebedeva Platons 
Leonidovicha v Sovershenii Prestupleniya [Bill of Indictment for Lebedev]' (2004) 
<http: //www. khodorkovsky. ru/docs/1174 Obvinitel_noe zaklyuchenie Lebedevadoc>accessed 13 March 
2007,22,28,35. 
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formulae enable investigators to bring charges against any individual allegedly related to a 
particular group 482 
The term "organised group" or "organised criminal group" may be used in this study 
with a reference to a case (e. g. "an organised group" in the Yukos embezzlement and 
money laundering case) or to the individuals involved (e. g. Khodorkovsky-Lebedev- 
Krainov group). 483 Any other reference to a group of people involved in a crime will need 
an explanation of the characteristics of a group and its membership. 
2.4. The Structure of the Yukos Case. 
The Khodorkovsky-Yukos case involves cases that mostly belong to one of the three 
main groups: 
Group 1 "Khodorkovsky - related criminal cases" 
This group comprises of criminal cases directly related to Khodorkovsky, based on 
the charges brought against him. Almost all these cases also pertain to his friend Platon 
Lebedev. 484 
These cases can be separated into two main groups: so called `The First 
Khodorkovsky Case" and "The Second Khodorkovsky Case", which began in December 
ass 2006 and, quite evidently, will continue to develop for several years to come 
482 See NovayaGazeta, Defence Attacks' (2005) 7 April NovayaGazeta. Ru <httpi/2005. novayagazeta. ru/ 
nomer/2005/25n/n25n-s14. shtml>accessed 23 September 2007. 
483 See eg Opredelenie Po Delu M. B. IChodorkovskogo, P. L. Lebedeva I A. Y. Krainova Otnositelno 
Prekrasheniya Proizvodstva Po Episodu "Apatit" [Russian Federation v Mb Khodorkovsky, PI Lebedev and 
Av Kraynov (Court Decision in the Part ofAccusation of Fraudulent Acquisition of the Shares of Open Stock 
Company «Apatit)] (The Meshchansky District Court of the city of Moscow 16 May 2005) 
<httpJ/wwwkhodorkovskyinfo/docs/133825_Court 
_Decisionpdt5 
accessesd 26 May 2006 (hereinafter - 
Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Court Decision)). 
484 BBC News, 'Yukos Ex-Chief Jailed for 9 Years'. V. Krainov (a former manager of Menatep Bank) was 
also a member of the organised group in the "First Khodorkovky Case" (several episodes), but in order to 
avoid a real sentence he actively cooperated with the GPO. See also 0 Luchterhandt, 'Legal Nihilism in 
Action' (2006) 4 April Eurozine <http l/www. eurozine. com/articles/2006-04-04-luchterhandt-en. html> 
accessed 30 March 2007. 
485 See Appendix 7. See also CPC RF chapters JX-XV. 
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Group 2 "Other Yukos - related criminal cases" 
These are criminal cases related to other individuals with different degrees of 
affiliation to Yukos, Yukos-related companies or the Menatep Group. 
86 It should be noted 
that the scope of such cases can only be defined in general terms as some of them are of 
little or arguable relevance to the Yukos Affair. 487 
Group 3 "Yukos corporate civil and tax cases" 
This group comprises civil and administrative cases related to Yukos Oil Company, 
its subsidiaries or other directly or indirectly affiliated legal entities, based on the charges 
brought against the individuals or serving as the grounds for bringing such charges. 
Figure 8 summarises the civil, administrative and criminal cases comprising the 
Yukos case and shows their subordination. Other figures in this chapter represent findings 
of the courts in the relevant cases, focusing on the relationships of the participants which 
gave grounds for bringing criminal charges. The tables in this chapter describe, in an 
abridged form, the charges brought in the relevant episodes with references to particular 
articles of CC, summarising the court verdicts and the decisions of the cassation. 
486 See eg MosNews, 'Russian Court Jails Former Yukos Manager for 14 Years'; R Ukolov, 'The Case of 
Yukos: Trial Three' Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow 8 July 2005) 3. 
487 See eg Commodities Service DowJones, DJ Lithuanian Court Confirms Russian Banker's Asylum Status' 
(2006) <http J/global. factiva. com/aa/default. aspx? napc=S&fcpil=en&_XFORMSTATE=AAN... >accessed 16 
March 2007; Kommersant. com, 'Lithuania Denies Asylum to Russian Banker' (2006) 23 May Kommersant 
Online <http: //www. kommersantcom/p675494/Lithuania_Denies_Asylum_to_Russian Banker/>accessed 
20 March 2007. 
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Figure 8. "The Principal Structure of the Yukos Case. " 
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2.5. The Arguements of the Defence Regarding the "Organised 
Criminal Group". 
The core arguements used by the Khodorkovsky and Lebedev defence throughout the 
case were: 1) the absence of an organised group488 and 2) personal non-involvement of 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev in the alleged crimes committed 489 
Firstly, the defence lawyers unanimously rejected Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's role 
as "organisers" of the group and existence of the group itself They pointed out that there 
was no evidence in the case materials to confirm that the Bank "Menatep", which operated 
lawfully, or the persons who headed it, or served it, had collaborated for criminal purposes. 
Although it was acknowledged that a feature of organised crime is a common criminal 
intent and the common purposes of an operation490 the lawyers also pointed out that the 
witness statements were extremely contradictory and did not confirm the presence of an 
organised group. 49' Khodorkovsky personally commented on the charges in the 
courtroom: 
... when prosecutors assert that I set up an organised group - or organised groups 
- or enterprises, having unlawful actions as an objective, I firmly and confidently 
say: no, I did not do any such things. 
All of my decisions were public - i. e. transparent for employees, directors, 
shareholders, and the regulatory bodies that audited the enterprises hundreds of 
times every year, both internal and external audits - and were intended to achieve 
lawful and socially useful objectives 492 
488 See Defence Attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 'Specific General Comments Regarding Charging 
Khodorkovsky with Having Committed Joint Crimes'. 
489 See G Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the Meshchansky Court on April 6' (2005) Presscenter 
<http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/docs/ClosingArgumentsPadva04O6_e. pdf>accessed 6 April 2007; G Padva, 
'Closing Arguements Given in the Meshchansky Court on April 5' (2005) Presscenter 
<http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/docs/ClosingArgumentsPadva04O5 e. pdf>accessed 15 April 2007. 
49° Defence Attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 'Specific General Comments Regarding Charging 
Khodorkovsky with Having Committed Joint Crimes' 1. 
491 See Presscenter, The Prosecution's Defence-Friendly Witnesses' (2005) <http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/ 
trial/prosecution/witnesses/l33098. html>accessed 19 October 2007. 
492 See Khodorkovsky (2) v Russia (App no 11082/06) ECHR Annex One to App (21 September 2006) 
(hereinafter - "Annex One) 1-2. 
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Secondly, the advocates pointed out that the prosecutors and the court had not 
specified when, among what persons, or how the roles in the Organised Criminal Group 
had been distributed, when such a declaration had been necessary according to the Law. 
Instead, the decision of the court contained general phrases that the distribution of the roles 
had allegedly taken place 493 
Thirdly, the lawyers stressed that de facto, the case materials established the 
existence of various associations close to the concept of a financial and industrial group, 
such as the "YUKOS" group of companies, which comprised OAO "NK "YUKOS" and its 
subsidiaries, "Group Menatep Limited" (GML) Holding, and, finally, the "Menatep" group 
of companies. A financial and industrial group under the Federal Law "On Financial and 
Industrial Groups" was a set of legal entities acting as a parent company and subsidiaries, 
which consolidated their tangible and intangible assets, fully or partially. 494 However, the 
prosecutors and the court effectively replaced the concept of "management of a 
commercial entity" with that of "management of an organised group created to commit a 
crime". Therefore, in a number of cases, the prosecutors and the court adduced evidence of 
Khodorkovsky's involvement in management of commercial entities as evidence of 
management of an organised group 495 
Lawyers summarised their arguements on the organised group in the following 
manner: 
Thus, both in the charges and in the verdict there are irreconcilable 
contradictions regarding the creation and operation of the group. The 
membership of "the organised group" and the roles of Khodorkovsky and 
Lebedev are described in the same inconsistent manner. 496 
The arguements related to the "organised group concept" were critically important 
for bringing the guilty verdict necessary for Khodorkovsky's enemies. Therefore, all the 
arguements of the defence inevitably failed. The key reason for this failure was the actual 
leading role, played by Khodorkovsky in the management of Menatep Group and Yukos, 
493 Defence Attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 'Specific General Comments Regarding Charging 
Khodorkovsky with Having Committed Joint Crimes' 8. 
494 ibid 5-6. 
495 ibid 6. 
496 i. e. the prosecutors have fused concept of the governance of corporations with the management of 
criminal groups. See ibid 10-11. 
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which was quite evident for the prosecutors and the court, regardless of the defence's 
attempts to challenge it. 497 
As the above arguements of the defence were used with some slight differences in 
respect of each particular episode of the case, the relevant clarifications will be given 
where necessary. 
2.6. APATIT "Privatisation" Case. 
This case is understood to be a core part of "The First Khodorkovsky case", as it 
unfolded around the problem of fair privatisation in Russia. 498 The accused in this case 
were Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Krainov. 49' 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were accused of leading an organised group in the 
fraudulent acquisition of a 20% stake in the fertiliser producer Apatit at an investment 
tender in the summer of 1994 500 The case began in 1994 when Bank Menatep and its 
controlled (affiliated) companies won a tender for Apatit, Russian largest fertilizer 
company. 50' The government auction to privatise 20% of Apatit was won by Volna, a firm 
controlled by the Menatep group 502 According to the tender, Volna paid $225,000 for the 
stock and had to invest $283 million within a year in the development of the company and 
the city where the company was located (the "Investment Plan"). 503 Volna failed to fulfill 
497 See eg Figure 21. 
498 See Economist. com, 'Crime and Punishment' (2005) 25 May Economist. com I 
<http: //proquest. umi. com/pgdweb? did=843880441 &sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=44714&RQT=309&VName=P 
QD>accessed 16 March 2007; J Scott-Joynt, 'Khodorkovsky: An Oligarch Undone' (2005) 31 May BBC 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/business/4482203. stm>accessed 28 September 2007. 
499 See Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Court Decision). 
500 Annex One 2. 
sm See the details of the Apatit story L Komisar, 'Yukos Kingpin on Trial. Billionaite Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky Faces the Music in Moscow. Are the Charges Politically Motivated? ' (2005) 
<http: //www. gnn. tv/print/1376/Yukos-Kingpin-on-Trial>accessed 2 March 2007. For more information on 
Apatit see <http: //eng. phosagro. biz>. 
$02 Four entities bid in the Auction - Volna, Malakhit, Flora and Intermedinvest Latta, 'Khodorkovsky, 
Menatep, and Yukos'. 
503 ibid. 
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several material requirements of Investment Plan for a number of reasons, the main one 
being the conditions of the Investment Plan were substantially outdated and its fulfillment 
would lead to negative consequences for the company and the investor. 504 However, the 
authorities succeeded in terminating the sale and purchase agreement in the Arbitration 
Court, so the share of Apatit had to be returned to the State. By the time the court decision 
became enforceable, the notorious shares were resold to the other companies and could not 
be transferred back to the State. 505 All that led to a lengthy and fruitless dispute between 
the State, represented by the Fund and Menatep Group. 
In 2002 the Menatep and Yukos officials reached a compromise agreement with the 
Federal Property Fund, under which a settlement was paid to the Fund to the amount of 
$15 million as consideration for non-returned shares. 506 Just before the attack on Yukos the 
Prosecutor General conducted a special review of the Apatit privatisation procedure and 
the results of the tender, and reported no violations to the President. 507 However, it did not 
prevent this episode from being dragged into the Yukos case. 
504 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Court Decision). 
sos ibid. 
5°6 Goldhaber, 'Russian Roulette'. 
507 Latte'Khodorkovsky, Menatep, and Yukos'. 
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Table 1. "Summary of the "Apatit" Case. "508 
INDICTMENT VERDICT" SENTENCE C. -I. SSATIONAL 
DEciSION, 511 
Apatit-fraud Pursuant to Art. 10 of the 
July 1994 CC, 
513 the Defendants' actions 
were labeled under Art. 147 
Art. 159 para 3 a, b of para. 3 CC RSFSR (fraud 
CC RF (1996) committed in large quantities 
[Acquisition of other by an organised group) 514 
people's property by way The statute of limitation period 
of deceit by an organised expired during the court trial, 
group in large quantities so the criminal case in the part 
on repeated occasions. ] of this episode was 
discontinued. "' 
Apatit -malicious non- Art. 33 para. 3 and Art. 315 of 1.5 years Conviction 
execution of Court CC RF (All reversed. 
Judgement Defendants) 
1998-2002 516 
Art. 33 para. 3 and Art. 
315 of CC RF (1996) 
[Malicious non- 
execution of an injured 
Court Judgement. ] 
509 See Annex One 2-3, Khodorkovsky (2) v Russia (App no 11082/06) ECHR Annex Two to App (21 
September 2006) (hereinafter - "Annex Two") 3. 
509 Labelling according to indictment. 
510 Re-labelling in verdict. 
511 Sentence for the charge. 
512 Moscow City Court Cassational Decision. 
513 On Article 10 "The retroactive effect of Criminal Law" see Appendix 6. 
514 As this crime was committed in July 1994, then according to article 10 of the CC of RF, the court qualifies 
their actions under part 3 article 147 of the Criminal Code of RSFRS. See Russian Federation v 
Khokorkovsky et al (Court Decision). 
'15 ibid. 
sib See Prigovor Po Delu M. B. Khodorkovskogo, P. L. Lebedeva IA. V. Krainova [Russian Federation v MB 
Khodorkovsky, PL Lebedev and AV Kraynov (Judgement)] (The Meshchansky District Court of the city of 
Moscow 16 May 2005) <http: //wwwkhodorkovskyru/does/prigovor 16052005pdf>accessed 12 March 2006, 
660-61. 
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In this case the prosecutors alleged three forms of fraudulent conduct. Firstly, the 
defendants conspired to create shell companies secretly controlled by Bank Menatep for 
the purpose of bidding. Secondly, the defendants knew that Volna, at the time it bid, had 
no intention of complying with the Investment Plan. Thirdly, the defendants organised the 
submission of false documents to the MRPF as part of thebidding process. 17 
As discussed before, the arguements of the defence were based on complete 
rejections of the existence of any ties between Khodorkovsky and Lebedev and the Apatit 
privatisation deal. According to the defence advocates there was no legal or factual basis 
for the Procuracy's leveling the criminal fraud charges regarding the Apatit episode. Under 
both the Russian Criminal Code and U. S. criminal law, a fraud conviction requires the 
establishment of a specific intent to defraud - scienter, malicious intent, or mens rea - at 
the time of the initial act. There was no, and could be no, evidence of any requisite 
malicious intent on the part of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. 518 
The defence also pointed out that Bank Menatep owned no stock in any of the 
bidding companies, each of which was a separate and distinct corporate entity from the 
others, and had no business relationship with them beyond Volna, Flora and Malakhit 
being bank customers. 519 They also stressed that Menatep's relationship to the bidding 
entities had been disclosed. The Procurator's charges ignored this critical fact: Volna, 
Malakhit and Flora520 each expressly disclosed their relationships with Bank Menatep in 
their submissions of applications for the privatisation tender: that each was a client of the 
bank; maintained a valid account with it; and that the bank guaranteed the financial 
performance of the Investment Plan. 52' 
The defence argued that neither Khodorkovsky nor Lebedev was under an obligation 
to disclose any alleged common ownership, control or business relationships between or 
among the bidding entities. There was no express, affirmative obligation to make any such 
517 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Court Decision); Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky ei al 
(Judgement) 15-16. 
518 Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal Charges' S. 
519 ibid 6. 
520 The bidding entities. See ibid 5. 
521 ibid 6. 
121 
disclosure. Then, the applicable law did not prohibit affiliated entities from participating in 
the same auction. 577 
The defence also argued that the Meschansky Court should have terminated 
proceedings in relation to this charge as the statute of limitation period - i. e. the 10-year 
deadline from the date the crime was allegedly committed expired during the court trial. 523 
The case shows evident loopholes in the Russian privatisation legislation, especially 
concerning the obligations of purchasers to invest in newly acquired companies; and it 
highlights the questionable strategies employed by oligarchs to keep the control over the 
privatised assets 524 Similar situations have taken place in two out of three privatisation 
scenarios. The case has gone some way to confirm that the whole case was politically 
motivated, as the deal was carefully examined by the prosecutors just before the attack was 
launched 525 The case in this part was discontinued as the statute of limitation period had 
expired. 526 
su ibid. 
523 Annex One 3. 
sea Eg L Aron, 'The Yukos Affair' (2003) Fall Russian Outlook 1-10,2-5. 
521 It was confnned in the letter of the Prosecutor General to the President. See Group Sovest, 'Khronika 
Sobytii [Chronicle]' (2006) <http: /www. sovest. org/cron. html>accessed 20 August 2008. 
526 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Court Decision). 
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2.7. The "APATIT Trading" Case. 
The case is closely connected to the episode regarding the acquisition of the control 
of the Apatit shares and, according to the prosecutors, represents the second stage of the 
crime - benefiting from the illegal acquisition of the shares through the privatisation 
tender. The prosecutors alleged that Lebedev and Khodorkovsky organised and 
implemented the fraudulent transfer-pricing scheme, which allowed them to siphon off the 
profit from Apatit, accumulating it in the offshore entities, presumably controlled by 
Menatep 527 The "Apatit trading case" charges formally included charges of 
misappropriation and of causing damage to property 528 in the process of implementing the 
transfer pricing scheme. 
Table 2. "Summary of the "Apatit Trading" Case. " 529 
INDICTMENT 
APATIT 
VERDICT 
The matter 
SENTENCE 
7 years 
CASSAI IONAL 
DECISION 
Requalified 
Misappropriation of "repeated (Khodorkovsky actions so that 
occasions" and Lebedev)ssi they came (1995-2002) was within Article 
Art. 160 para. 3 a, b of CC excluded. 530 165 (3) (a) but 
RF(1996) the proceedings 
[Misappropriation of other people's 
were dismissed 
because of the 
property in large quantities on ex ir of th 
repeated occasions. ] 
p y e 
limitation 
period. 
527 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement)14-19. 
518 As a result of the trading policy of the persons, controlling the company, adverse for Apatit. 
529 See Annex Two 2. 
sso This matter had been excluded from CC RF. 
531 See Russian Federation vKhokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 660-61. 
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APATIT The matter 3 years Reclassified 
Causing damage to property of 
"repeated (All from Article 165 
occasions" Defendants)ssz (3) (a) (b) of the (1995-2002) was CC RF (1996) to 
Art. 165 pars 3 a, b of CC RF excluded. fall within 
(1996) Article 165 (3) 
[Causing on repeated occasions 
(a) of CC RF. 
damage property to the property Sentence 
owners in large quantities by an upheld. 
organised group in the absence of 
elements of stealing. ] 
The prosecutors alleged that Khodorkovsky and Lebedev seized control of Apatit, its 
production and cash flows. 533 Acting under their management the company managers set 
up a transfer pricing scheme, selling Apatit products at low prices to their shell companies, 
which in turn sold them on the world market for much more 534 The taxes and dividends 
were paid at a low figure, 535 and therefore, Khodorkovsky defrauded the company and 
shareholders of more than $200 million and the country of millions in taxes 536 The 
prosecutors alleged that Lebedev and Khodorkovsky plundered a total amount of $ 
approximately 32 000000 . 
537 
In this case, the defence again put forward the old arguement by saying that 
Khodorkovsky did not participate in the management of Apatit during this period 538 They 
also stressed that only by using the questionable trading schemes was Apatit able to pay its 
debts and survive. 39 Under Menatep management, the loss-making company Apatit 
$32 See ibid. 
533 ibid 14. 
534 ibid 14-19. 
535 ibid 20. 
s'6 Komisar, Yukos Kingpin on Trial. Billionaite Mikhail Khodorkovsky Faces the Music in Moscow. Are 
the Charges Politically Motivated?. 
537 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 18-19. See also Annex One 5. 
538 M Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' (2005) 4 
<http: /www. khodorkovskytrial. com>accessed 11 April 2007. 
539 Y Schmidt, 'The Khodorkovsky Case: A Defence Attorneys Standpoint' (2004) 
<http: //www. supportmbk. com/documents/schmidt standpoint. cfin>accessed 15 December 2006. 
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became a profitable business 540 The lawyers emphasized that no claims were filed by the 
authorities against the management and the trading policy. Moreover, the trading policy 
was approved by the Board of Directors and reported to the shareholders sal The advocates 
pointed out that the PwC opinion on the Apatit accounts contradicts the prosecutors' 
allegations. 542 
Clateman's comments on the "trading episode" of the case were not favorable for the 
defence: 
Although this charge is based on the same scheme described in the previous 
charge, it focuses on a different set of transactions, which took place during 
1997-2000. Specific allegations made regarding these transactions and the flow 
of funds serve to demonstrate that K and L, through the organised group, 
converted funds representing the transfer price difference to their own use. This 
charge is straightforward embezzlement M 
The case is one in a series of contemporary "privatisation-related" cases, which like 
the Apatit acquisition, highlight the ambiguities and misinterpretations in the Russian 
privatisation and corporate legislation, 544 and simultaneously demonstrates the 
questionable methods of oligarchy groups, 545 who tried to use any loophole in the law to 
maximize their profit from the newly privatised assets. The case concerns the creation and 
the application of a plain "transfer pricing" scheme, ubiquitously used in 1990s' Russia, 
and should be regarded as the "predecessor" to the "Second Khodorkovsky Case". Taking 
into consideration the political significance of the case, which set up the precedent for 
challenging a whole class of "transfer pricing" schemes, 546 it is not surprising that 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were found guilty. 
Sao ibid; Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' 4. 
541 Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' 4. 
542 Schmidt, 'The Khodorkovsky Case: A Defence Attorney's Standpoint; Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to 
Meshchansky Court' 4. 
sas Clateman, 'Summary and Analysis of the "Statement on the Form of the Indictment Presented to Platon 
Lebedev"". 
5 Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' 4. 
say See RC Schneider, 'Property and Small-Scale Privitization in Russia' (1992-1993) 24 St Marys LJ 507-38, 
531-36; Shamseeva, 'Yukos's Affairs and the Yukos Case'. 
546 See eg V Ram, 'Yukos Memories Haunt Mechel' (2008) 25 July Forbes corn 
<http: //www. forbes. com/markets/2008/0725/mechel-putin-zyuzin-markets-equity-cx_vr 0725markets 
26. html>accessed 26 July 2008. 
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Figure 9. "The Scheme of the "APATIT Trading" Case. " 
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2.8. The "NIUIF" Case. 
The `NIUIF'547 case represents the same type of case as the "Apatit-privatisation" 
case, built on 90s oligarchy privatisation principles: acquisition by arranging a shell 
company scheme, and the evasion of the fulfilment of the investment programme 
requirements, which amounted to alleged illegal profit. 548 Forty-four percent of ordinary 
"NIUIF shares were acquired in an investment tender by `Wallton', controlled by 
Menatep and were resold to the other shell companies as a result of the allegedly 
fraudulent scheme, based on the forged documents. 549 By implementing this scheme the 
possibility of termination of the sale and purchase contract were excluded. 550 The episode 
includes two formal charges, brought against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev: 
fraud and non-execution of a court decision (similar to U. S. "abstraction of justice"). 551 
547 AO 'NIUIF"_ 'Professor Ya. V. Samoylov Research Institute of Fertilizers and Insecto-Fungicides' 
Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 4. 
5as _, 'Advokat Dyavola: Kartinki S Vystavki - Delo NIUIF [The Devil's Advocate: the Pictures from the 
Exhibition- the Niuif Case]' (2004) <httpi/www. compromat. ru/main/ hodorkovskiy/ niuifhtm>accessed 22 
July 2006. See also Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the Meshchansky Court on April 6' 4-18. 
549 __, 'fie Devil's Advocate: the Pictures from the Exhibition - the NIUIF Case'. 
550 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 4-14; Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the 
Meshchansky Court on April 6' 5. 
5" See Annex One 11. 
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Table 3. "Summary of the ""NIUIF" Case. , 552 
INDICTMENT VERDICT SENTENCE CASSATIONAL 
DECISION 
NIUIF- Fraud A) The matter of 7 years Conviction 
21.09.1995 "repeated occasions" was (Khodorkovsky upheld 
excluded. and Lebedev) s53 Art. 159 para. 3 a, b of 
CC RF (1996) B) Pursuant to Art. 10 of 
the CC, the Defendants' 
actions were labeled 
under Art. 147 para. 3 
CC RSFSR (fraud 
committed in large 
quantities by an 
organised group). 
NIUIF-malicious non- Art. 33 para. 3 and Art. 1.5 years Conviction 
execution of Court 315 of CC RF (Khodorkovsky reversed 
Judgement 
and Lebedev)ss4 
Art. 33 para. 3 and Art. 
315 of CC RF(1996) 
In the "NIUIF" case the prosecutors alleged that the organised group, directed by 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, developed and implemented a fraudulent scheme to plunder 
44% of shares in 'NIUIF'. 555 Menatep Bank officials subordinate to Khodorkovsky and 
Lebedev abused their powers in order to draw up forged official documents that were 
requisite for the investment tender for sale of the 'NIUIF' shares. Lebedev also misused his 
powers as President of Bank Menatep in order to direct the conduct of the organised group, 
other persons working for the Bank, and associated companies under his control. 556 By 
552 See Annex Two 1. 
553 See Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et a! (Judgement) 660-61. 
554 See ibid. 
... ibid 4. 
556 ibid. 
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submitting the deliberately forged documents, the organised group misled the Russian 
Federal Property Fund (RFFI) officials as to the state of finances and good standing of the 
shell companies that had participated in the tender. 557 
The prosecutors also alleged that the organised group fraudulently persuaded the 
director of 'NIUIF' to approve a statement as to the performance of the investment 
commitments. They alleged that the director was coaxed into signing the papers that 
allowed for the transfer of the fraudulently invested funds back to `Wallton' S58 Because of 
the fraudulent actions, the organised group facilitated the transfer of the shares to the other 
shell companies, fraudulently evading the investment obligations . 
59 
On 24 November 1997, the Moscow Arbitration Court annulled the purchase 
agreement for the 44 % block of shares in "NIUIF". The "NIUIF" shares were not returned 
to the state, but instead were sold by "Wallton" to the "dummy" companies. Thus the court 
decision was not executed. 56° 
The arguements of the defence in this case can be divided into two main groups. The 
first set of arguements concerns the legality of the privatisation transaction and the material 
subsequent events concerning the investment obligations of the purchaser. The defence 
pointed out that the price of the privatisation transaction was fair and based on the political 
and economic realities of that time. 56' It was irrelevant whether the company that 
purchased the shares was a front company. The important factor was that Menatep Bank as 
the guarantor of the deal was a real structure, which could have been charged with the 
failure to comply with investment obligations 562 They emphasised that the investment plan 
was outdated, but was fulfilled and the company suffered no damage 563 It was stressed that 
557ibid 9. 
558 ibid 10. 
559 AOZT `Wallton', as an investor, undertook to transfer the funds amounting to $ 25,000,000 or RUR 
116,200,000,000 bid 9. 
560 Annex One 11. 
561 Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' 3. 
562 Schmidt, The Khodorkovsky Case: A Defence Attorney's Standpoint; Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given 
in the Meshchansky Court on April 6' 12. 
563 --, 'Obseravtions from the Courtroom' (2004) <http: //www. khodorkovsky. info>accessed 2 March 2007; 
Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' 3; Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the 
Meshchansky Court on April 6' 18. 
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the failure to comply with the investment provision of the privatisation sale and purchase 
agreement was wrongly interpreted by the investigation as fraud, or gaining control of 
property by way of deception. 64 
Secondly, the defence lawyers employed their usual arguement that Khodorkovsky 
had not been personally involved and had not controlled the shell companies. 565 They also 
used the arguement of the passage of time: The commitment took place some 9 years ago 
and the statute of limitation period was likely to expire before the Judgement would come 
into force. 66 
In respect of non fulfillment of the court decision the defence argued that there was 
no court decision ordering the return of the block of shares in "NIUIF" to the state and so 
there was no possibility of evading any such decision 567 
Clateman in his comments on the "NIUIF" episode paid attention on the lawyers 
"games" around the detention of the "purchase price". He pointed out: 
... (The) arguement attempts to assert a rather peculiar 
definition of fraud and 
the Criminal Code and commentary make clear that fraud may be based on 
any attempt to evade full or partial compensation for property, whether or 
not such compensation is formally called the "price". 568 
Thus, he stressed that the "price" of the assets ("NIUIF") included the prospective 
investments that were never made. 
In the NIUIF case as in the "Apatit trading" case, 569 ambiguities and monitions in the 
privatisation legislation, grossly supplemented by the oligarchy methods570 of business 
564 Schmidt, 'The Khodorkovsky Case: A Defence Attorneys Standpoint'. 
565 Padua, 'Closing Arguements Given in the Meshchansky Court on April 69-14. 
566 Schmidt, The Khodorkovsky Case: A Defence Attorneys Standpoint'. According to Article 78 of CC RF 
for such crimes it is ten years since the date of the alleged commitment of the offence. For comments see VK 
Duyunov and others, Kommentarft K Ugolovnomu Kodeksu Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Commentaries on the 
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation] (Walters Kluwer, Moscow 2005) art 78. 
567 Annex One 11-12. 
568 PL Clateman, 'Yukos Affair, Part VII: Review of the Criminal Sentence and Appeal' (2006)16 April 1-29, 
9 <www. cdi. org/russia/johnson/Yukos-VII-Sentence-and-Appeal. pdf>accessed 29 March 2006. 
569 Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' 3. 
570 See Tompson, Privatisation in Russia: Scope, Methods and Impact'. 
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conduct gave rise to a case full of legal ambiguities. As with the "Apatit trading" case, 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were convicted and sentenced. 571 
Figure 10. "The Scheme of the "NIUIF" Case. " 
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571 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 57-58. 
572 --, 'The Devil's Advocate: the Pictures from the Exhibition - the NITUIF Case'. 
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2.9. The "Most" Case. 
In the "Most" Case Mikhail Khodorkovsky was accused of illegally taking 
2,649,906,620 roubles from accounts belonging to YUKOS and some of its subsidiaries, 
and giving that money to Media Most group, 573 which was controlled by another oligarch 
Vladimir Gusinsky. 574 The problem is related to the recognition of the corporate groups 
and consolidated accounts in Russian case law. The company (as a consolidated business 
group) provided financing to another consolidated business group in exchange for several 
promissory notes. 75 Due to the unfavorable circumstances (the collapse of the Most bank) 
the borrowing business group was unable to repay the debt and the interest in full, and the 
part of the debt was written off on the decision of Yukos Group 576 
Table 4. "Summary of the "Most" Case. "577 
573 On Media Most group see Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal Charges' 22. 
574 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 49-50. 
575 See Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the Meshchansky Court on April 5' 15-16. 
576 Sigal, 'Organised Business Group'. 
sn See Annex Two 5. 
578 See Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 660-61. 
132 
The prosecutors declared that Khodorkovsky had been engaged in a scheme to funnel 
money from Yukos OR Company to Vladimir Gusinsky, and in doing so caused the 
"organised group, illegally and gratuitously to remove and put into the hands of V. A. 
Gusinsky" monies belonging to Yukos and its shareholders, therefore committing a crime 
of misappropriation. 579 Khodorkovsky allegedly caused Yukos to loan RUR 
2,649,906,620.00 (approximately $ 92 000 000) to Media Most Corporation and related 
companies ("Media Most") for the benefit of its largest shareholder, Gusinsky, in exchange 
sso for certain corporate notes and then wrote off the debt 
The defence lawyers took the position that the agreements under which the 
"embezzled" funds were provided were public, official and compensated agreements. 58' 
The transfer of money was carried out, neither by the Defendant personally nor on his 
instructions. The transfer of money was carried out based on the authorization granted by 
the relevant managers of the company. 582 
The funds were transferred in exchange for interest-bearing notes of the Most bank, 
one of the largest banks in Russia at that time 583A11 funds granted under the agreements to 
the Most Group's companies were repaid by the borrowers 584 The lawyers also pointed out 
that the General Prosecutor's Office had not filed claims against the managers of these 
enterprises in regard of the transaction, confirming, thus, the absence of actus reus. 
In considering the cassation complaint, the Moscow City Court nullified the verdict 
and terminated the case because of the absence of actus reus. 
S85 Clateman commented on 
the reasons of this decision: 
579 ibid 49. 
580 ibid 50. 
581 Khodorkovsky, Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' 4; Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the 
Meshchansky Court on April 5' 5. 
582 See Annex One 11. 
583 Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court' 4. 
584 ibid; Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the Meshchansky Court on April 5' 20. 
sss Court used the arguement that the funds could not be misappropriated in principle as they were allegedly 
acquired by illegal means and were not entrusted to Khodorkovsky. See Kassatchionnoe Opredelenie Po 
Delu MB. Khodorkovskogo, PL. Lebedeva IA. V Krainova [Russian Federation v MB Khodorkovsky, PL 
Lebedev, AV Kraynov (Cassation Decision)] (Moscow City Court 22 September 2005)<http: //www. 
khodorkovsky. ra/docs/3810_Opredelenie_2pdf>accessed 18 April 2006. 
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... 
The court identified these specific funds with the fruits of the tax schemes 
used by Yukos. Since these funds, as the fruit of a crime, were not legally 
owned by Yukos in the first place, the court reasons that K cannot be accused 
of illegally depriving Yukos of these funds. The problem with this arguement 
is that the court does not make clear how it succeeds identifying the specific 
funds channelled from Yukos to Media Most with the fruits of the tax 
586 evasion. 
The "Most" case demonstrates that Russian case law is far from recognising 
corporate\consolidated groups and treating the transactions between them as normal 
business practice. The existing ambiguities always create grounds for criminal cases. 
Figure 11. "The Scheme of the "Most" Case. " 
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516 Clateman, 'Yukos Affair, Part VII: Review of the Criminal Sentence and Appeal' 19-20. 
587 For the particularties of the transactions see Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal 
Charges' 22-23. 
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2.10. The "ZATO"5II Case. 89 
Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and several other individuals, 590 related to Menatep and 
Yukos, were charged with conspiring to evade taxes payable by businesses involved in 
marketing crude oil and petroleum products. 591 
Table 5. "Summary of the "ZATO" Case. "592 
INDICTMENT VERDICT 
DECISION 
ZATO- Art. 33 para. 3 and Art. 5 years The sentence 
corporate tax evasion 
199 para. 2 a, b of CC RF - (Khodorkov upheld. 
organising of corporate tax sky and 4 years 10 1999-2000 evasion by an organised 593 Lebedev) months 
Art. 33 para. 3 and Art. group by prior criminal 
199 para. 2 a, d of CC RF conspiracy on a 
(1998) particularly large scale by 
failure to submit [Corporate tax evasion on documents or by deliberate 
repeated occasions by an inclusion of false data into 
organised group by prior documents. 
criminal conspiracy in 
especially large quantities 
by other means] 
588 "ZATO" or closed administrative area. See eg V Samoylenko, Government Policies in Regard to Internal 
Tax Havens in Russia (International Tax & Investment Center Publications 2003) <http: //www. itienet. org/ 
publications/Special%20Report%20%20ZATO%2OPaper%2Oeng. pdf>accessed 20 August 2006. See also 
ZATO Law. 
589 For the tax part of the "ZATO" case see sections 4.5.4.1 and 4.5.4.2. 
59° Some of them are still on the Interpol search list. See A Krutilin, 'Criminal Alphabet of Yukos' (2007) 
<http: //prigovor. com/info/37657. html>accessed 10 March 2007. 
591 Bill of Indictment for Lebedev 41-81; General Prosecutors Office, 'Obvinitel'noe Zaklyuchenie Po 
Obvineniyu Khodorkovskogo Mikhaila Borisovicha v Sovershenii Prestupleniya [Bill of Indictment for 
Khodorkovsky] (Extracts)' (2004) <www. khodorkovsky. ru/docs/71_Obvinitel_noe_zaklyuchenie FINdoc> 
accessed 13 March 2007,19-29. 
592 See Annex One 7-8, Annex Two 4-5. 
593 See Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 660-61. 
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ZATO - fraud The matter of "repeated 7 years Conviction 
2000-2001 occasions" was excluded. (Khodorkov upheld595 
Art. 159 para. 3 a, b of sky and 594 
CC RF (1996) Lebedev) 
The prosecutors alleged that the Defendants and the Yukos group used dummy 
companies, which, for the purpose of tax evasion and in violation of Article 45 of the RF 
Taxation Code, paid taxes with promissory notes rather than with monetary funds. 596 The 
Defendants were also charged with fraud in connection with claiming refunds of tax 
overpayments that had been made in 1999. The prosecutors claimed that there was no 
entitlement to these refunds as they had been paid by promissory notes and the Applicant 
was charged under Article 159 (3) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. 597 
The Defendants claimed that they did not control or direct the dummy trading 
companies. These companies were lawfully registered in the ZATOs and lawfully 
transferred the promissory notes as a means of tax payment. The payment of taxes in non- 
monetary form was widespread until 1999 and was accepted as lawful by the RF Ministry 
for Taxes and Duties and the Ministry of Finance, as shown in their joint letter issued in 
December 1999 598 Defendants pointed out that all of the promissory notes had been 
redeemed and therefore there was no pecuniary loss suffered by the ZATO at all, in fact 
the ZATO benefited from the payments received. Concerning the corporate tax fraud 
charge, the GPO did not dispute the fact that there had been an overpayment of tax. The 
overpayments were subsequently returned by the ZATO to the trading companies in full 
594 See ibid. 
59s The Defendants was found guilty of this charge by the Meschansky Court. On appeal the Moscow City 
Court dismissed the charge but found him guilty on other grounds which had never been specified in the Bill 
of Indictment. 
596 See Bill of Indictment for Lebedev 41-81; Bill of Indictment for Khodorkovsky 19-29. On payments with 
promissory notes see Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky to Prison 75-76. 
597 See ibid. 
598 See Annex One 7-8. See also Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the Meshchansky Court on April 6' 
32-38. 
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compliance with the law. No damage was inflicted to the budget in the process of 
refunding the tax overpayments. 99 
The episode represents a typical case relating to the transitional period, when the 
Government used all possible means to collect the taxes due. Various regulations and 
clarifications made the situation with payment of taxes due by promissory notes unclear 
and ambiguous. 
2.11. The "Personal Tax Evasion" Cases. 
The defendants in this group of cases were Khodorkovsky and Lebedev (as an 
episode of the First Khodorkovsky Case) and several other individuals who were charged 
separately. 6W 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev used a technique that was widespread in Russia at that 
time 601 The salary and bonuses of top-managers were paid to them partly as fees for 
independent consultancy services, provided under a separate agreement, to the company by 
which they were employed, or to a company belonging to the same corporate group. 02 
This scheme allowed for the avoidance of the "social tax" payable on the salary fund. If a 
person, to whom the payments were made, was registered as a private entrepreneur with a 
special tax status enabling him to pay his taxes in a fixed form regardless to the income, a 
substantial portion of income tax could be avoided as well. 603 
Other individuals were charged with using a similar tax avoidance technique widely 
employed by the big Russian companies for their employees at the end of 1990s and 
"9 See Annex One 7-8. 
600 A Rodionov, 'A Look at Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Taxes' (2005) 12 October Kommersant Online 
<httpJ/www. kommersant. com/p616159/A_Look_at_Khodorkovsky_and Lebedev_s Taxeshaccessed 25 
March 2007. 
601 ibid. 
602 See Bill oflndiclmentforLebedev 52-58; Bill oflndictment forKhodorkovsky 30-34. 
603 Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky to Prison 8-9. 
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beginning of 2000s 604 According to the scheme, a substantial part of the employee's 
income was paid to him as an annuity payable pursue to the life insurance contract. The 
contract specified that an employee was entailed to a monthly payment after surviving a 
period of one month (so-called "survival insurance"). The insurance payment for a certain 
period was not taxable by personal income tax and, even when the tax legislation was 
amended; it helped the companies to avoid social tax on the salary fund 605 
Therefore, all the named individuals committed large-scale personal tax evasion by 
means of the inclusion of knowingly distorted data in the tax declaration 606 
Table 6. "Summary of the "Personal Tax Evasion" Cases. "607 
INDICTMENT VERDICT SENTENCE CASSAI IONAL 
DLCISION 
Entrepreneur Scheme None 1 year 6 months Conviction in 
Individual tax evasion (Khodorkovsky relation 
to 1998 
and Lebedev)608 reversed 
because 
1998-1999 of expiry of the 
Art. 198 para. 2 of CC RF (1998) Limitation period. 
Conviction for 
[Evasion of payment of a tax or 1999 upheld insurance premium to state extra- 
budgetary funds committed by an Sentence reduced 
individual by way of deliberate to 1 year and 4 
inclusion of false data into tax months 
declarations, in especially large 
quantities. ] 
604 A Krutilin, 'Why Is Vasily Alexanyan Behind the Bars? ' (2006) 26 November Prigovor. RU 
<http: //prigovor. com/info/37479. html>accessed 19 March 2007; M Lepina and V Trifonov, 'Svetlana 
Bakhmina Gets Seven Years' (2006) 20 April Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. conV 
page. asp? idr=530&id=668151>accessed 20 March 2007. 
605 utilin, 'Why Is Vasily Alexanyan Behind the Bars? 
606 Rodionov, 'A Look at Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Taxes'. 
607 See Annex One 9-10, Annex Two 3. 
608 See Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 660-61. 
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Insurance Schemes None Two years610 Conviction in 
Individual tax evasion609 relation to 
2001 
and 2002 was re- 
2001-2002 labeled under Art. 
Art. 198 para. 2 of CC RF (1998) 198 para. 1 and 
reversed because 
of expiry of the 
Limitation 
period 611 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev612 allegedly evaded personal taxes by registering as self- 
employed entrepreneurs, thereby making themselves eligible for the use of a simplified tax 
system 613 
The prosecutors charged Khodorkovsky and Lebedev with illegal filing for 
transference to a simplified system of taxation, accounting and bookkeeping for the 
purposes of evasion of tax payments 614 The defendants were also charged with including 
knowingly distorted data stating that they were providing consulting and managing 
services as entrepreneurs, which entitled them to obtain an exemption from income tax and 
fees to be paid to the Pension Fund. 615 The only reason they needed the exemption was to 
evade personal income tax. 616 
The prosecutors alleged that the defendants were fully aware that the funds they 
received from the company `Status Services Limited' appeared to be their remuneration for 
609 As an example on the basis of one of the verdicts. See Lepina and Trifonov, 'Svetlana Bakhmina Gets 
Seven Years ;T Smolenskaya, `Yukos Lawyer Jailed for Embezzlement and Tax Evasion' (2006) 21 April 
Tax -News. com <http: //www. tax-news. conVarcbive/story/Yukosý_Lawyetý_Jailed_ For Embezzlement And 
Tax Evasion xxxx23385. html>accessed 27 September 2007. 
610 See Kommersant. com, 'Court Turns Down an Appeal of Yukos Ex-Lawyer' (2006) 25 August 
Kommersant Online <http: /www. kommersant. com/p700085/r 500/Court Tums Down an Appeal_of 
YUKOS_Ex-Lawyer>accessed 10 October 2007. 
611 See ibid. 
612 Similar allegations were brought against several other individuals see Krutilin, Why Is Vasily Alexanyan 
Behind the Bars? '. See for the Shaknovsky's Sentence Y Biryukov, Ubiistvo Bez Motiva [Murder without 
Motive] (Olma Press, Moscow 2007)124-47. 
613 See Annex One 9. 
614 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 32-43. 
615 ibid 35,41. 
616 ibid 34,39. 
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working for Rosprom and had to be taxed as any income earned. 17 Thus, having 
deliberately ensured conditions securing evasion of personal income tax and fees to be paid 
to the Pension Fund, the Defendants signed forged contracts with foreign companies 
`Hinchley Ltd. ' and `Status Services Limited' 618 Both included knowingly distorted data 
in the above contracts 619 
Individuals involved in the insurance schemes were also charged with the inclusion 
of knowingly distorted data stating that they were genuinely obtaining non-taxable 
insurance payments, knowing that the funds they received from the insurance company 
actually appeared to be their remuneration for working for the companies of the Yukos 
Group 620 
In Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's defence the lawyers extensively used political and 
social arguements. They said that not many people in Russia had independently declared 
their income from 1994 onwards as Khodorkovsky and Lebedev had done. Many 
entrepreneurs used similar schemes 621 The tax authorities accepted the defendants' tax 
declarations and did not present him with any demands until criminal charges had been 
brought. 622The defence also pointed out that no evidence of any reciprocal obligations with 
Rosprom or Yukos-Moscow was set forth in an employment agreement. 23 It was 
emphasised by the defence that no evidence of malicious intention or plot had also been 
submitted to the court. 
As the individuals involved into the insurance schemes were mere middle level 
managers, their lawyers used different arguements. They stressed that their clients had to 
use the scheme as an essential part of their employment commitments. They also were not 
experts in taxation, so they did not know how to draw their annual tax returns and simply 
617 ibid 36-37. 
618 ibid 33. 
619 ibid 33-34,42. 
620 See eg Biryukov, Murder without Motive 97-98,124-47. 
621 On personal tax-avoidance in Russia see: JL Franklin, 'Tax Avoidance by Citizens of the Russian 
Federation: Will the Draft Tax Code Provide a Solution' (1997-1998) (8) Duke J Comp & Int'l L 135-74; 
Vitkina and Rodionov, Tax Evaders of Putin 's Epoch 209-22. 
61 See Annex One 10. 
623 See Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court'. 
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followed the advice provided by the Company. Their defence pointed out that all the 
accused had paid all the underpaid taxes and penalties voluntarily. 624 
Clateman represented a detailed analysis of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's 
remuneration schemes in his articles on the Yukos case: 
The sentence sets forth various forms of evidence supporting its conclusion 
that these consulting contracts were "fake" and really represented pay for 
work at Yukos, Rosprom and Menatep.... All of the work performed in 
preparing applications for K and L to receive status as entrepreneurs and fill 
out their tax forms was performed by Yukos or Menatep employees 
6zs 
The personal tax evasion cases have created the precedents of challenging the core 
personal tax optimisation schemes, including the questionable practice of using 
secondment contracts. Actually the court, applying the "substance over form" doctrine, 
626 
which is rarely used in Russia, considered all the insurance contracts null and void and 
declared all the payments made under them a part of employees salary. 627 Episodes 
concerning personal tax evasion can exemplify the outcome of "pedagogical" justice, as 
Khodorkovsky's trial flagged the beginning of the unprecedented fight with so-called 
"grey" (illegal) salary schemes. 628 
624 Author's summary of the court speeches. 
625 Clateman, 'Yukos Affair, Part VII: Review of the Criminal Sentence and Appeal' 15-16. 
626 On this and other international anti-avoidance doctrines see 174. 
627 See on the doctrine in Russia Clateman, 'Summary and Analysis of the "Statement on the Form of the 
Indictment Presented to Platon Lebedev"' and his other publications. 
62S For more details see Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky to Prison; Rodionov, 'A Look at 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Taxes'; Vitkina and Rodionov, Tax Evaders ofPutin's Epoch. 
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Figure 12. "The Scheme of "Personal Tax Evasion" Case. " 
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2.12. The "Charity" Case. 
Two YUKOS officials (the First Vice-President629 and the Head of the 
Administrative Department) and approximately a dozen outsiders who were allegedly 
providing services related to the laundering of the embezzled funds, 630were charged with 
large-scale embezzlement and money laundering for the implementation of a laundering 
"charity" scheme 631 The First Vice-President and the Head of the Administrative 
Department allegedly retained several individuals who registered for, and acquired, a 
number of NGOs and other fictitious foundations. 632 The NGOs approached the Company 
with false requests for charitable contributions. The requests were internally approved and 
the relevant payments to the NGOs' accounts were made 633 After that, the transferred 
funds were laundered through different schemes, including third party accounts, false cash 
orders and promissory notes 634 The cash obtained through these schemes was handed to 
the unknown intermediaries and allegedly transferred to the First Vice-President and the 
Head of the Administrative Department of the Company who were understood to be the 
organisers and managers of the scheme635 
629 Currently on the Interpol list V Perekrest, 'What Is Mikhail Khodorkovsky Behind Bars for (Part 4)' 
(2006) 8 June Prigovor. RU <http: //prigovor. com/info/37322. htm1>accessed 14 December 2006. 
630 V Korchagina, Unusually Harsh Sentence for Yukos Manager' (2005) 4 March The Moscow Times. com 
<http: //www. moscowtimes. ru/stories/2005/12/02/003. ht nl>accessed 15 October 2007; MosNews, 'Russian 
Court Jails Former Yukos Manager for 14 Years'. 
631 Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 4)'. 
632 A Kornya, 'Strashnaya Staty'a [The Shocking Charges]' (2005) 2 December Vedomosti 
<httpi/www. vedomosti. ru/newspaper/article. shtml? 2005/12/02/100267>accessed 7 March 2007. 
633 Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 4)'. 
634 Komya, The Shocking Charges ; Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 4)'. 
635 Ukolov, 'The Case of Yukos: Trial Three'. 
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Table 7. "Summary of the "Charity" Case. " 
INDICTMENT VERDICT SENTENCE CASSATIONAL 
DECISION 
Embezzlement and money None 14 years for the The sentence 
laundering Yukos was upheld in its 
2004636 manager. 
638 substantial 
pß. 
639 
Art. 160 para. 4 of CC RF 
[Large-scale misappropriation 
or embezzlement by an 
organised criminal group. ] 
Art. 174.1 para. 4 of CC 
RF 637 
[Legalization of money or 
other property obtained in a 
criminal way by an organised 
criminal group. ] 
636 There is one more case in court concerning the same Yukos managers. See TASS, Money Laundering 
Case against Yukos Property Manager in Court' (2007) 5 April Legal Oil <http: //www. legaloil. com/ 
NewsItem. asp? DocumentlDX=1176116337&Category ews>accessed 25 April 2007. 
637 See cg I Paramonova, 'Yukos Money Was Laundered for Charity's Sake' (2005) 3 March Kommersant 
Online <http: //www. konunersant. com/page. asp? id=551800>acccssed 24 September 2007. 
638 See Mosnews, Prosecutors Seek Lengthy Jail Terms for Yukos Executives Accused of Money 
Laundering' (2005) 28 October Mosnews. com<http: /pl96. ezboard. com/fredcatsboardsfrm58. 
showMessage? topiclD=2. topic&index=26>accessed 30 October 2006; Krutilin, 'Criminal Alphabet of 
Yukos'. 
639 See Y Zapodinskaya, '14 Years of Deprivation of Liberty for Alexey Kurtsin Is Upheld' (2006) 15 
Chronicle of Political Persecution in Present Day Russia 7-8,7-8 <http: //www. khodorkovsky. info 
/docs/bulletin 60. pdf>accessed 10 October 2007. 
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The prosecutors alleged that 342 million roubles were transferred from the 
company's accounts under the guise of charity aid to fictitious nongovernmental 
organisations and foundations and later laundered M0 Certain individuals registered these 
organisations in Moscow, Tula and other cities and channelled the embezzled funds 
through their accounts 64'The investigators stressed that the majority of the money thus 
transferred was then transmitted to the First Vice-President and the Head of the 
Administrative Department and used for unknown purposes. 642 
Several of the accused individuals pleaded their guilt, partly or in full, saying that 
they had been involved in a series of the laundering operations and handed the cash 
obtained through them to unknown individuals. 3 However, the core accused (Head of the 
Administrative Department) denied all the charges and announced that he had simply 
performed his professional duties by signing orders to transfer the charitable payments. W 
His lawyers pointed out that the orders had been of a technical character and designated for 
the interim accounting procedures . 
645 Moreover, all decisions to make payment were 
approved by the committee for consideration of corporate charitable projects comprised of 
respectable outsiders. 6 The defendant received no benefits in any form from the funds 
allegedly handed to the first Vice-President. 647 
The Head of the Administrative Department was sentenced to 14 years. 648 Other 
individuals have also been sentenced to various significant terms in spite of their 
confessions and assistance provided to the investigators. The case differs from the other 
Yukos-related cases, as it is based on commitments that took place after Khodorkovsky's 
I Ukolov, 'The Case of Yukos: Trial Three. 
641 ibid; Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 4)'. 
642 M Gessen, The Dear Departed Judiciary' (2005) 29 December The Moscow Times. com 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2005/12/29/006. html>accessed 7 March 2007; Komya, The 
Shocking Charges'. 
643 See eg Kornya, The Shocking Charges; MosNews, 'Prosecutors Seek Lengthy Jail Terms for Yukos 
Executives Accused of Money Laundering' (2005) 3 March Mosnews. com 
<http: /www. mosnews. com/news/2005/10/28/yukstaffcharges. shtrnl>accessed 18 April 2007. 
644 Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 4)'. 
645 ibid. 
646 Komya, The Shocking Charges'. 
647 MosNews, 'Prosecutors Seek Lengthy Jail Terms for Yukos Executives Accused of Money Laundering'. 
648 MosNews, 'Russian Court Jails Former Yukos Manager for 14 Years'. 
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detention. TM9 As the allegations of the prosecutors and legal assessment of the scheme are 
grounded mainly on the evidence and presence of intention of the Yukos' officials to 
commit an embezzlement, it is difficult to make any conclusion about either the ties of this 
case with the main Yukos case or its general validity. 
Figure 13. "The Scheme of "Charity" Case. " 
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2.13. The "VNK" Case. 
The VNK case was launched in 2000 initially to address an alleged management 
misconduct (minor offence), but several years later the investigators upgraded the charges 
to the large-scale embezzlement and after the commencement of the attack on Yukos and 
Khodorkovsky, new money laundering charges were brought 650 The investigation reached 
its zenith in February 2007 when the relevant charges were brought against Khodorkovsky 
and Lebedev. The case is related to theoretical problems surrounding the conduct of 
international corporate groups and the liabilities of the parent company for damages 
incurred by its subsidiary-65' 
The case consists of one main episode (the operations with VNK's shares) and 
secondary episodes (the corporate restructuring of Tomskneft) and represents the two parts 
of the "Second Khodorkovsky case". The accused in the case are Khodorkovsky, 
Lebedev652 and five other Yukos managers 653 
sso Compromat. RU, 'VNK Assets Stripping'. 
651 A Shvarev, 'Kstati 0 Vase [Concering Vasya]' (2007) <http: /www. howtotrade. ru/cgi-bin/forums/ 
arch? /webbbs config. pUread/31935>accessed 5 March 2007. 
652 Khodorkovsky and Lebedev have been charged with VNK case as an episode of "The Second 
Khodorkovsky case" Y Schmidt, 'Press Statement on Khodorkovsky Charges' (2007) 
<http: //www. robertamsterdam. com2007/02/ra exclusive_yuri schmidtLpres. htm>accessed 20 December 
2007. 
653 Krutilin, 'Criminal Alphabet ofYukos'. 
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Table 8. "Summary of the "VNK" Case. " 
INDICTMENT VERDICT SENTENCE CASSATIONAL 
DECISION 
Episode 1 - No sentence None 
Embezzlement and money laundering 
1998 -2002 
Art. 160 para. 3 a, b of CC RF(1996) 
Art 174 para. 3 of CC RF (1996)6M 
[Legalization of money or other property 
obtained in a criminal way by an organised 
criminal group. ] 
Episode 2 Not 7 years Conviction 
Embezzlement significant upheld. 
1998 -2002 
6.5 years. 
Art. 160 para. 2 v, para. 3 a, b of CC 
RF(1996) 
[Misappropriation of other people's 
property in large quantities by an 
organised group by a person through his 
official position. ] 
The first episode of the case ("VNK shares") is connected to the whole affair of the 
Menatep Group obtaining control of Yukos and other companies, which is regarded by the 
prosecutors as part of Khodorkovsky's organised criminal activities with his allies. 
According to the Summary of the Charges, in 1997 Menatep Group organised and 
implemented the acquisition of VNK shares in the course of a privatisation tender. 655 After 
654 See footnote 655. 
655 General Prosecutors Office, 'General'naya Prokuratura Rossiiskoi Federatsii Zavershila Rassledovanie 
Ugolovnogo Dela v Otnoshenii Mikhaila Khodorkovskogo I Platona Lebedeva [The GPO Has Completed Its 
Investigation of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Criminal Case]' (2007) <http: //www. genproc. gov. ru/ 
ru/news/printshtml? id=5467>accessed 17 February 2007 (hereinafter - "The Summary of the Charges"). 
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that Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, being unable to acquire the relevant amount of VNK's 
subsidiaries shares due to the adverse financial position of Menatep Bank, decided to 
employ a special scheme of acquisition. 656 Owing to the implementation of the scheme, the 
shares of the main VNK subsidiaries were transferred to the offshore shell companies in 
exchange for Yukos shares of much lower value. Upon completion of a series of 
transactions, Yukos became the sole owner of all the shares previously belonging to VNK. 
VNK was liquidated afterwards 657 
The second episode of the case ("Tomskneft corporate restructuring") is of lesser 
significance than the first, and subordinate to it. The corporate restructuring of the VNK 
main production unit, Tomskneft, was conducted in parallel with the operations with the 
shares of the VNK subsidiaries. Due to this restructuring, Tomsknefft's main production 
assets were transferred to the newly incorporated subsidiaries, the shares of which were 
sold below their fair market price and paid for with Yukos promissory notes. 658 However, 
before the final privatisation tender of 38% of the VNK stock, Yukos, which was under 
pressure from the Federal Property Fund, sold the companies back to Tomskneft, and 
659 retained Tomskneft's main production assets, which had been sold to Yukos earlier. 
In the first, more complex, episode the prosecutors alleged that by the end of 1997 
the organised group led by Khodorkovsky, who was acting on behalf of the commercial 
organisations under the group's control, participated in auctions for the purchase and sale 
of blocks of shares, acquiring in the process 54% of VNK shares. 60 In 1998 
Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and the other members of the organised group conspired to 
acquire a majority shareholding in the said joint-stock company, with which they began 
acquiring the shares of its subsidiaries. 66' As Bank Menatep was unable to provide the 
necessary financing, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev instructed their subordinates to prepare 
and sign share exchange agreements, falsely showing equal value of the exchanged shares, 
656 ibid. 
657 Krutilin, 'Why Is Vasily Alexanyan Behind the Bars?; Shvarev, 'Concering Vasya'. 
658 M Lepina, 'Sudebnoe Razbiratel'stvo Po Delu Svetlany Bakhminoi Zatyanulos' [Bakhmina's Case Is 
Delayed]' Kommers (Moscow 31 March 2006)1. 
659 V Korchagina, 'Yukos Lawyer Sentenced to 7 Years' MosTimes (Moscow 20 April 2006) 3. 
660 The Summary of the Chargers. 
661 ibid. 
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between VNK and the Cypriot shell companies under the organised group's control. 
662 
With the aim of giving a semblance of validity, false independent appraisal reports were 
prepared showing the lowered value of the VNK shares and the raised value of the Yukos 
shares 663 Therefore, Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and the other members of the organised 
group managed to misappropriate a thirty eight percent block of the subsidiaries' shares 
belonging to VNK, valued at more than 3 billion roubles. According to the prosecutors, it 
resulted in significant damages to the state, who owned 38% of the VNK shares, and who 
had a beneficial interest in the shares of the subsidiaries that belonged to VNK. 
664 Due to 
the transactions, organised and conducted by the criminal group, the state's shares were 
significantly depreciated. The prosecutors also pointed out that in order to obtain the right 
to their strategic and operational direction, Khodorkovsky together with the members of 
the organised group, incorporated management companies controlled by them for Yukos, 
VNK and their subsidiaries. They also appointed former employees of Rosprom and Bank 
Menatep to manage these incorporated management companies. 
665 
As there have been no court proceedings concerning the main episode of the VNK 
case, all legal aspects of this episode will be reviewed in the pending second 
Khodorkovsky-Lebedev trial. However, the Company's officials in their press-statement 
pointed out that Yukos did not believe that any of the employees of the Company accused 
in the "VNK case" could have committed the alleged crimes. They stressed that Yukos was 
managed in accordance with appropriate standards of corporate governance, and that the 
procedures for performing asset transactions adopted by the Company do not allow for 
"asset stripping" or "misappropriating" any of the assets of the Company. All actions of the 
Company's employees, which were considered by the General Prosecutor's Office in the 
"VNK case" as criminal, were consistent with Russian legislation. 
666 
In the second trial on the VNK case, the lawyers defending a Yukos middle-level 
lawyer, who was at the same time a non-executive member of the Tomskneft directors' 
662 ibid. 
663 ibid. 
664 ibid. 
665 ibid. 
666 Yukos, 'Statement: Yukos Refutes Continuing Unfounded Russian Government and Administration 
Allegations' (2005) <http: /www. yukos. com/vpo/news. asp? year=2005&month=5>accessed 15 March 2007. 
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board, stressed that all transitions with the assets of Tomskneft had been approved by the 
corporate bodies and were reflected in the corporate audited accounts. They pointed out no 
civil claims regarding the transactions had ever been brought neither by the state, nor by 
other shareholders. The transactions had been conducted based on the independent 
appraisal reports. The defence's most important arguement, which confirmed the absence 
of intention to commit misappropriation, was the fact that the assets had been transferred 
back to Tomskneft. 667 All employees and service providers involved in the deals had acted 
in accordance with the corporate standards and regulations. 
668 
The VNK case raises several complex corporate law and governance problems, 
which still have to be addressed by either the legislator or case law. The most important of 
them are: 
(a) recognition of corporate group principles and consolidated accounts in Russian 
case law; 
(b) protection of the rights of the state as a minority shareholder by civil and criminal 
means; 
(c) application of the recently adopted anti-money laundering legislation in complex, 
politically motivated cases. 
"' Kommersant. com, "Tomskneft" Refuses to Blame Yukos ' (2005) 9 September Kommersant Online 
<http; //www. kommersant. com/p609880/Tomskneft_Refuses_to Blame_YUKOSt>accessed 22 March 2007. 
668 Yukos, 'Statement Yukon Refutes Continuing Unfounded Russian Government and Administration 
Allegations'. 
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Figure 14. "The Scheme of the "VNK" Case. " 
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2.14. The "Eniseyneftegas Shares" Case. 
This case concerns the masterminding the embezzlement of 19.7% of shares in the 
Russian oil and gas company Eniseineftegaz in 2002.669 In 2000 Yukos acquired a holding 
in the East Siberia Oil Company, (VSNK), which directly and indirectly owned stock in 
several subsidiaries. 70 Eniseyneft was one of the indirectly controlled subsidiaries, which 
held an exploration and production licence on the Vankorsk oil field. This field was the 
object of the ongoing negotiations with several international oil companies, which were 
ready to invest in its development. Due to the apparent misconduct of the former 
management of VSNK, the subsidiaries sold the stock in Eniseyneft to a third oil 
company. 671 Yukos, aiming to obtain control of the Vankorsk field, signed a sale and 
purchase agreement with Anglo-Sibirskaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya (ASNK), which owned 
59% of Eniseyneft shares 672 However, just before the transaction, ASNK controlling stock 
was acquired by Rosneft. VSNK refused to transfer the shares, regardless of the fact that 
the purchase price had been paid. Nevertheless, because of the application of an unknown 
party, the court issued a preliminary ruling, according to which the shares under dispute 
were transferred to Yukos SPE 673 Regardless of the amicable settlement agreement signed 
later by Yukos and the third oil company, the conflict led to a criminal investigation, 
initiated by Rosneft and reopened after the commencement of the attack on Yukos 674 The 
669 E Zapodinskaya, 'Obvineniya Dlya Opravdannykh: Khodorkovskii Ostanetsya v Tyur'me Navsegda [The 
New Charges for the Acquitted Khodorkovsky Will Stay in Jail Forever]' Kommers (Moscow 14 May 2005) 
3. 
670 A Dobrov, 'Rosneft Obvinyaet Yukos v Vorovstve [Rosneft Blames Yukos for Theft]' Gazeta 
[Newspaper] (Moscow 8 July 2003). 
671 ibid. 
672 E Zapodinskaya, 'British Lawyer Refused to Question Russian Attorneys' (2005) 20 December 
Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. com/p636966/r 1/13ritish_LawyerRefused 
_To_Question_ Russian 
_Attorneys/>accessed 
12 March 2007. 
673 Dobrov, Rosneft Blames Yukos for Theft'. 
674 Zapodinskaya, British Lawyer Refused to Question Russian Attorneys'. 
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charges were brought against one former Vice-President of Yukos and one of the lawyers 
of the advocate bureau retained by Yukos 675 
Table 9. "Summary of the "Eniseyneftegas Shares" Case. " 
1"D VE') 
Large-scale Fraud and None No sentence None 
Falsification of Evidence. 
2000 
Art. 159 para 3 of CC RF 
[Acquisition of other people's 
property by way of deceit by an 
organised group in large 
quantities. ] 
Art. 303 pars 3 of CC RF 
[Falsification of documental 
evidence. ] 
This case is distinct from the rest of the Yukos-related cases, as it has been indirectly 
reviewed by the British Court during the hearing on the Vice-President's extradition. The 
court identified several significant legal peculiarities and omissions in the 
documentation 676 
... It can 
be noted that for approximately a year the Russian Federation pursued 
a Mr [a lawyer] alleging that he was solely responsible, for this fraud. Further it 
can be pointed out that at the times that these frauds are alleged to have taken 
place, Mr [Vice-President] was either not a member of the board or had no 
responsibility for the acquisition of oil which gives rise to the fraud. 
77 
675 Kommersant. com, 'Russia Attracts British Lawyer to Get Extradition for Yukos Official' (2005) 8 
November ibid <http: //www. kommersant. com/page. asp? idr-500&id=624325>accessed 3 March 2007; 
Zapodinskaya, 'British Lawyer Refused to Question Russian Attorneys'. 
676 Reuters, 'Russian Oil Manager Won't Be Extradited' (2005) <http: //www. tiscali. co. uk/ 
news/newswire. php/newstreuters2005/1223/topnews/russianoilmanagerwon3 9 tbeextradited. html>accessed 
16 March 2007. 
677 Russian Federation v Temerko. 
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The court refused the extradition request on the grounds of "political motivation", 678 
and also noticed the ambiguous character of the prosecutors' arguementation 679 
Although the case has never been heard in the Russian courts, some legal arguements 
were used by the defence in interviews and public statements. It was stressed that it was 
merely a civil case based on a private relationship between the two parties. 680 Yukos paid 
for the notorious shares that should have excluded the embezzlement charges. 68 'Moreover, 
the parties had signed an amicable settlement and, according to its provisions, Yukos 
organised the buy-back of the previously alienated shares. The lawyers' key arguement 
was the fact that the operations with shares, seen as embezzlement by the prosecutors, had 
been conducted in accordance with the court decision. 2 
This case represents an example of a "civil" case, which might have been solved in 
the Arbitration Court, but due to the politically motivated attack on the Company was 
upgraded to a criminal case, which had little chance of success. 
678 This decision is also discussed in Chapter 3.6.5. 
6'9 See also E Zapodinskaya, 'Cyprus Court Didn't Extradite Yukos Accused' (2006) 17 October Kommersant 
Online <http: //www. kommersantru/doc. aspx? docsid=713715>accessed3O October 2007. 
680 Dobrov, Rosneft Blames Yukos for Theft'. 
681 ibid. 
682 See Kommersant. com, 'Russia Attracts British Lawyer to Get Extradition for Yukos Official' (2005) 8 
November Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. comfpage. asp? idr=500&id=624325>accessed 3 
March 2007; Zapodinskaya, The New Charges for the Acquitted: Khodorkovsky Will Stay in Jail Forever'. 
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Figure 15. "The Scheme of the "Eniseyneftegas Shares" Case. " 
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2.15. The "Overproduction" Case. 
Between 2003-2006, a number of criminal cases were launched in the regions where 
the main production subsidiaries of Yukos were located. The cases were launched after the 
completion of an extraordinary compliance audit, which highlighted violations of the 
production level which was fixed in a number of the exploration and production 
licences. 4 According to the Russian Criminal Code and case law, this is punishable as 
illegal entrepreneurship. 85 Usually such violations are punishable by fines or revocation of 
licences. However, after the beginning of the attack on Yukos, the reports prepared by the 
audit committee were used as grounds for a criminal investigation. 86 The prosecutors 
treated the violations of the production levels as illegal entrepreneurship. 87 Consequently, 
four former general managers of the Yukos main production subsidiaries were charged 
with overproduction and other violations. 688 
684 See Yukos, Yukos Review. 2003 Results and 2004 Targets (Business Information Service, Moscow 2004); 
Compromat. RU, 'Riski Beilina YuA. [Beilin's Risks]' (2006) <http: //www. compromat. ru/main/ 
hodorkovskiy/bejlin1. htm>accessed 9 March 2007. 
685 According to the principle set up in Res of SC Ns 23. See also A Gapeev, 'Skvazhnaya Zhidkost' Na 
Troikh [Porous Liquid for Three]' (2006) <http: /lenta. ru/articles/2006/0323/yukos>accessed 16 March 
2007 
696 See __, 'Ministry Says Yugansk Overproducing Crude' MosTimes (Moscow 2004). 
697 See ibid, M Cherkasova and Y Dorokhov, 'Prigovorchiki v Stroyu: Dela Yukosa Postavleny Na Potok 
[The Line of Sentences: The Yukos Cases Are Being Put on the Conveyor]' (2005) 27 April Kommersant 
Online <http: //www. kommersant. ru/doc. html'. path=/daily/2005/075/26647579. htm>accessed 29 April 2006. 
688 S Gomzikova, A Bondarenko and V Svin' in, 'Novaya Metla Metet Yukos Po Staromu [New Broom 
Sweeps Yukos... In the Old Way]' (2006) 13 March Nezavisimaya Gazeta [The Independent Newspaper] 
<http: //www. ng. ru/eventst2006-06-30/7_uk os. html>accessed 20 April 2007. 
157 
Table 10. "Summary of the "Overproduction" Case. " 
INDICTMENT VERDICT SENTENCE CASSATIONAL 
1 
Illegal entrepreneurship Fully Deferred 
2000-2006 upheld689 sentences 
from 1,5 to 
Art. 171 para 2 (illegal entrepreneurship) 3,5 years690 
of CC RF (1996). 
[Operating an illegal enterprise without 
registration or a special permit (licence), in 
cases where such permit (licence) is 
obligatory, or with the breach of licensing 
terms, committed by an organised group, if 
this deed has caused large damage to 
individuals, organisations, or the State, or is 
attended by profit-making on a especially 
large scale. ] 
689 See eg Kommersant. com, Director of Former Yukos Subsidiary Given Suspended Sentence' (2005) 28 
July Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. com/p596794/Director of Former YUKOS_ 
Subsidiary_Given Suspended Sentence>accessed 24 October 2007; Kommersant, 'Pavel Anisimov Poshel 
Po Tret'emu Delu [The Third Case of Pavel Anisimov]' Kommers (Moscow 21 June 2006) 2. 
690 See Kommersant. com, Director of Former Yukos Subsidiary Given Suspended Sentence'; E Mangileva, 
'Glava Samaraneftegaz Stal Dvazhdy Sudimym [The Director of Samarneftegas Sentenced Twice]' (2007) 26 
February Kornmersant Online <httpJ/www. kommersant. ru/doc. aspx? docsid=745490>accessed 12 October 
2007. 
158 
The violations of the licence agreement provisions were evident, but the Company 
did its best to mitigate the damage. The defence pointed out that the violations were the 
result of a state policy focused on the over stimulation of oil and gas production. Such 
violations are prevalent in Russia and almost every oil and gas company faces the same 
problem, but solves it without facing criminal prosecution. 691 The Company also filed 
applications with the Ministry of the Natural Resources, asking the officials to reconsider 
the levels of production, but due to the bureaucratic procedure it did not obtain the 
approvals 692 
Nevertheless, all four top-managers were charged and sentenced to different terms. 693 
The case underlines selectivity in the Yukos case, as violations of production licences 
provisions were common in Russia, but only Yukos managers were prosecuted. 
694 
2.16. The Cases Launched Concerning Events Taking Place after 
the Commencement of the Attack on Yukos. 
2.16.1. The American Former-Management Embezzlement and Money 
Laundering Case. 
On August 17,2006, the Attorney General's Office initiated a criminal case under 
Art. 160,174 of the Russian Criminal Code (misappropriation or embezzlement of 
entrusted other people's property and legalization (laundering) of funds and other property 
acquired in an illegal way) against the former Yukos president Steven Theede and several 
senior managers of the company: the financial director Bruce Misamore and managing 
691 See D Gololobov, 'Korporativnyi I Gosudarstvennyi Shantazh [Corporate Greenmail and State Blackmail]' 
in P Barrenboim (ed), Pravovaya I Sudebnaya Reforma I Konstitutsionnaya Ekonomika [Legal Reform, 
Judicial Reform and Constitutional Economy] (Tikhomirov publishing, Moscow 2004) 179-90. 
692 Cherkasova and Dorokhov, The Line of Sentences: The Yukos Cases Are Being Put on the Conveyor'. 
693 See Krutilin, 'Criminal Alphabet ofYukos'. 
694 Gomzikova, Bondarenko and Svinin, New Broom Sweeps Yukos... In the Old Way'. 
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adviser David Godfrey, and also the director of Group Menatep Ltd., Tim Osbourne. 695 
The case was launched after the unsuccessful attempt to stop the sale of Mazeikiu Nafta 
refinery. 696 The prosecutors alleged that the American management with the assistance of 
Menatep Group restructured the off-shore network of the Company in such a way that the 
substantial part of the overseas assets remained under the control of the former manager. 697 
The accused have issued a statement that the allegations are of a political nature and the 
case comprises a part of the Yukos case 699 
This case represents a complicated story where corporate governance issues are 
interrelated with politics and human rights. However, it is undeniable that Russian minority 
shareholders and creditors of the Company have been deprived of the significant proceeds 
from the sale of the offshore assets due to the actions of the management, motivated by the 
"protection of western minority shareholders" 699 
2.16.2. Embezzlement and Money Laundering in Tomskneft. 
After the beginning of the bankruptcy procedure, Tomskneft issued promissory notes 
to the sum of $ 200 million and exchanged them for promissory notes of the bank, which 
were later transferred to other entities (laundered). 70° Subsequently, the former general 
manager of Tomskneft and several external service providers were charged with 
695 General Prosecutors Office, 'Vozbuzhdeno Esce Odno Ugolovnoe Delo Protiv Byvshikh Rukovoditelei 
Kompanii Yukos [One More Case against the Former Yukos Managment]' (2006) 
<http: /www. genproc. gov. ru/ni/news/print. shtml? id=4488>accessed 5 March 2007. 
696 0 Pleshanova, N Skorlygina and D Rebrov, 'Dutch Fortune // Most of the Money from the Sale of Yukos' 
Western Assets Will Go to Group Menatep' (2006) 18 August Kommersant Online 
<httpJ/www. kommersant. com/p698534/Dutch_Fortunet>accessed 22 March 2007. 
697 See Gololobov and Tanega, 'Yukos Risk'. 
698 Ostrovsky, 'Russia Accuses Former Yukos Chiefs of Asset Theft'; Pleshanova, Skorlygina and Rebrov, 
'Dutch Fortune // Most of the Money from the Sale of Yukos' Western Assets Will Go to Group Menatep'. 
699 Pleshanova, Skorlygina and Rebrov, Dutch Fortune // Most of the Money from the Sale of Yukos' 
Western Assets Will Go to Group Menatep; Gololobov and Tanega, 'Yukos Risk'. 
700 N Volosatova and N Sergeev, Trokuratura Dobyla Tomsknef [The Prosecutors Get Tomskteft]' (2007) 
18 January Kommersant Online <httpJ/www. konunersant. ru/ doc. html? docld=7 34771>accessed 20 March 
2007. 
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embezzlement and money laundering and money laundering in an organised group (Article 
160 para 4, Article 174.1. para 4 of CC RF). 701 The case is still under investigation. 702 
2.17. Conclusion. 
The Yukos case started more than five years ago commencing from the meeting held 
by Putin with the oligarchs in February 2003. However, the case raises even more 
questions now than when it commenced five years ago, concerning the grounds for the 
cases, the identities of the accused, the overlap between the cases, and the prosecutor's 
arguements and the strategies employed by the defence. 
The review of the Yukos-related cases, conducted in this chapter, is not supposed to 
give definitive answers to all, or even a significant part of them. Although the Yukos case 
may look like an unsystematic mixture of different episodes, partly connected by the 
figures of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, comprehensive analysis demonstrates the persistant 
presence of certain principles and regularities that run through the case as a whole. This 
analysis, is not supposed to criticise or foresee any judicial decisions on the Yukos case. It 
is aimed exclusively at showing the principal legal framework of the case and rules 
governing its development. 
The Khodorkovsky - Yukos case was in significant part based on the illegal 
privatisation cases such as "Apatit" and "NIUIF" which refer to the early period of 
spontaneous privatisation and subsequent period of "hot" transition in the Russian 
economy. It was at that time that the newly emerging "oligarchy" groups tried to survive in 
free market conditions, grabbing privatised assets and competing without any distinct 
written rules, using corruption and political ties where possible to achieve their goal. The 
policies of those Financial-Industrial groups in that period were based on two main 
strategies: to snatch and to hold on tight to the spoils of the transition, obtaining the 
maximum profit from their gains, which could be used for further purchases. When 
701 Krutilin, 'Criminal Alphabet of Yukos'. 
702 Volosatova and Sergeev, The Prosecutors Get Tomskteft'. 
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hundreds of companies were privatised every day, there were no opportunities to either 
understand the vague rules, or follow them. 
Bank Menatep just followed the general trend, sometimes even more aggressively 
than others. Apatit and "NIUIF" were acquired to be incorporated in to one of the 
production holdings (groups) or sold later to a strategic investor. The bank had no 
intention to invest additional funds in outdated investment programmes while the situation 
with the companies remained unclear, and at this time, almost nobody in Russia actually 
complied with the investment programmes. The bank, like many other players in the 
privatisation rush, played its own game with a weak corrupt state, which had neither the 
power nor the intention to force the powerful oligarchy structures to play according to 
unclear rules. 
The efforts undertaken by bank Menatep, using controlled shell companies to save its 
investments in Apatit and "NIUIF" when purchases had formally failed to fulfill the 
compulsory investment programmes were widely in use at that time. When the arbitration 
courts terminated the share purchase agreements it turned out that the shares had already 
been sold to the other shell companies. As the bank did not formally control the shell 
companies involved in the deal, it publicly "washed its hands" of it. There were other 
irregularities connected with formal fulfillment of investment programmes, like the 
transfer of investment funds back and forth in the "NIUIF" case. 
All of them were settled through semi-formal negotiations with the state officials and 
a number of "compromise" agreements as in the "Apatit" case. However, when "new 
broom" in the form of Putin appeared and Khodorkovsky and his business were put under 
scrutiny, all the privatisation skeletons were taken out of the closet. 
It is evident that the substantial arguements of the prosecutors do not stand up to 
criticism from the standpoint of the rule of law because it is difficult to say which law 
should be applied when, and the privatisation laws were quite ambiguous and vague. 
However, the attempts of the defence lawyers to use arguements of personal non- 
involvement of the defendants in the alleged criminal commitments, and subsequent 
performance results of the companies, cannot conceal the evidential presence of the 
intentional pre-planned formal violation of the "spirit" and "letter" of the privatisation laws 
and regulations, regardless to their vagueness and imperfection. 
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The second distinct group of cases, which bear certain similarities, is the group of 
cases concerning transitional operational and corporate schemes of the Menatep and 
Yukos-controlled companies. These are the "Apatit trading" case, the "VNK" case, the 
"Most case" and the "Eniseyneftegas shares" case. Regardless to the distinctions in the 
substantive legal characteristics, all of them bear one principal similarity: these cases stem 
from the creative usage of different questionable corporate techniques, which have been 
criticised by champions of advanced corporate governance. Most of these techniques are 
well-known to the international business community and have been well researched and 
regulated. However, in the transitional period of the 90s in Russia, these techniques were 
not controlled or regulated. Moreover, Russian case law and business practice used only a 
formal, literal approach to the business schemes, completely ignoring substance over form 
and economic substance doctrines, although they were formally, but vaguely fixed in the 
relevant statutes. 
For example, the "Apatit trading" case is based on the allegedly illegal transfer 
pricing scheme, when JSC "Apatit" sold the bulk of its product to specially created trading 
companies, which, according to the prosecutors, siphoned off all the company's profit. In 
the absence of economic and financial methods of determining a fair market price and, in 
the absence of well-developed minority-shareholder protection techniques, this scheme 
functioned without any problems, like thousands of similar schemes around Russia. 
However, when assessed from the position of current Russian judicial policy and case law, 
this scheme looks rather questionable. 
The third group of cases includes only tax cases, which represents the "backbone" of 
the Yukos case, and will be reviewed in a separate chapter. The only remark that is 
necessary to make here, is that the personal tax cases are based on similar grounds to the 
rest of the cases that are related to the creative application of questionable corporate 
"optimisation" schemes. The personal tax optimisations schemes, used by the managers 
and employees of Yukos exemplify the literal approach to tax legislation that ignored the 
"substance over form" doctrine and other international anti avoidance doctrines 703 The 
willful blindness of the authorities made the application of such schemes during the period 
of transition permissible, but these practices were halted when the state showed its "teeth". 
X03 See section 4.5 
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Thus, the Yukos-related tax cases are just the outcome of the optimisation malpractices of 
the 1990s, scrutinized by "pedagogical" justice. 
In the fourth group of cases, comprising of the Yukos case, the legal substance is 
obvious, but the evidential base is vague, ambiguous or insufficient. The best example is 
the ""Charity" case. If the Yukos officials had intentionally preplanned the embezzlement 
of company's funds it would have been considered an offence of embezzlement and further 
money laundering. However, the "Charity" case presents a significant problem because the 
lack of evidence of the initial fraud, and the general political thrust, makes it difficult to 
come to any conclusion as to whether or not criminal commitment took place. 
On summarising the conclusions on the separate groups of cases, it is clear that the 
Yukos case, in its substance, represents a group of investigations and subsequent trials on 
the questionable business and political practices, applied by the "oligarchy" groups through 
the 1990s to early 2000. The reasons, which led to these investigations and to the 
prosecution of particular individuals are not always evident, and lay in the political, rather 
than legal, sphere. All the Yukos-related cases, raise questions of the Rule of Law in 
Russia and the problem of whether transitional justice is just, and have been addressed in 
other chapters of this dissertation. However, they can be regarded to a certain extent as a 
questionable attempt to restore the principle of equality of justice, which was forgotten in 
the "oligarchy" period. The general complexity of the Yukos case and its transitional and 
political character makes it difficult to analyse it from the position of traditional 
jurisprudence and further analysis, after the case's full completion and after a change of the 
existing political regime in Russia, is necessary. 
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Chapter 3. 
Political Motivation in the Yukos Case. 
3.1. Political Factors in the Yukos Case. 
Political risk is a salient feature of emerging markets. 704 This axiom has found its 
perfect reflection in the Yukos case. Many independent experts understand the YUKOS 
affair as a story of a government-led assault on a private Russian company that was owned 
by a small group of politically ambitious individuals. 705 However, others have evaluated 
the case as being far more complicated than it may seem. 06 In Russian society the 
common view seems to be that Khodorkovsky may be guilty of the criminal charges 
brought against him, but he is a political prisoner because he alone among the oligarchs has 
been held accountable for his crimes. 707 
The main difficulty in analysing the `Yukos affair' is the overlap of its numerous 
plots and aspects. The `Yukos affair's multidimensionality and ambiguity makes it difficult 
to restrict analysis to one particular interpretation or one definitive cause. 708 All these 
characteristics find their reflection in the discussion of the political nature of the case. 
704 Goriaev and Sonin, Trosecutors and Financial Markets' 1. 
705 ibid. 
706 See C Gurdgiev, 'The Bad and the Ugly from Moscow: (2005) www. Techcentralstation. com 
<www. Techcentralstation. com>accessed 20 December 2007. 
707 DM Bernardelli, Russian Rule-Ette: Using Khodorkovsky's Criminal Trial to Assess the State of Russian 
judiciary' (2008) 31 BC Inf1 & Comp L Rev 85-99,98. 
70' Kononczuk, The "Yukos Affair", Its Motives and Implications 35. 
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3.1.1. Particular Political Grounds for the Attack on Yukos. 
A brief analysis of the political situation in spring 2003 reveals several issues. After 
the period of "compromise", (2000-2003), 709 the "Siloviki" group began increasing its 
influence on the Russian President and on the political situation. They were looking for 
new sources of finance, i. e. the businesses owned by oligarchs. 10 The aims of the existing 
"oligarchy" system were not in line with the aims of the "Siloviki" group, who set out to 
destroy it in order to gain ultimate control over strategic businesses. "' Therefore, a victim 
had to be chosen, to demonstrate how dangerous the new elite were. 
Yukos and Khodorkovsky were the obvious choice. According to individuals 
directly involved in the Yukos affair, 712 the Company, headed by Khodorkovsky, had made 
several key manoeuvres that may have provoked the attack on the Company and its core 
shareholders. Firstly, the company had prepared itself for a possible listing of the ADR 
Level 111111 on the New York Stock Exchange and prepared for a Eurobond issue. 713 
Secondly, on completing the unprecedented merger with Sibneft, the Company announced 
its plans to merge with one of the world oil majors, aiming to create a top rank oil and gas 
juggernaut, which was sure to exert political influence. 14 Thirdly, several of the 
Company's core shareholders who were closely involved in the Company's management, 
announced their political plans 715 These factors seemed threatening to the President's 
allies716 and signalled the attack on the core shareholders of the Company by the 
"Siloviki". This attack was headed by the Deputies of the Head of the Administration 
709 C Wheeler, 'Is Russian Oil Tycoon Stepping on the Toes of President Putin? The Globe and Mail 
(Canada) (Toronto 19 July 2003) 3. 
710 Fortescue, Russian's Oil Barons and Metal Magnates 108-09. 
7h1 ibid 109,48; Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 58,62. 
712 eg see footnote 714. 
713 Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 18. 
714 Osborne, 'Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 'Democracy on the Retreat in 
Russia'" 16. 
715 Shamseeva, 'Yukos's Affairs and the Yukos Case'. 
716 See also V Perekrest, 'What Is Mikhail Khodorkovsky Behind Bars for (Part 5)' (2006) 26 July Prigovor. 
RU <http: //prigovor. com/info/37306. html>accessed 14 December 2006. 
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Sechin and Ivanov, Putin's closest allies since his KGB service. 17 They understood that 
even an impeccably planned attack would fail unless they ruined the Khodorkovsky 
financial empire, and to do that they had to ruin Yukos. 
One company with strong intentions to get its hands on Yukos's production and 
refining assets was Rosneft. 718 Rosneft was a state-controlled, secondary level company, 
headed by Khodorkovsky's personal enemy Bogdanchikov, and it served as the 
organisational and financial platform for the attack. 719 After Sechin's appointment as the 
Head of Rosneft's Board of Directors, the intention became a state approved strategy. 720 
In the context of the attack on Khodorkovsky and Yukos, it should be noted that 
several months before its beginning, a series of official documents acknowledged the civil, 
not criminal, nature of the allegations that were being considered against Mr 
Khodorkovsky in 2003. These documents included reports and memoranda from the 
Russian Procurator-General and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 
correspondence with the Presidential Administration. The documents also indicate that the 
alleged activities constituted no violation of Russian competition law. 
721 Nevertheless, this 
knowledge did not stop the attackers. 
In May 2003, Khodorkovsky faced an attack from the Kremlin's heavy ideological 
artillery, 722 the council of national strategy, composed of eminent political analysts who 
issued a report: "Oligarch Revolution under Preparation in Russia". 723 The report 
enumerated several oligarchic "sins". Firstly, the oligarch class had become a Russian elite 
that was neither nationally, nor socially responsible. Secondly, oligarchs were always 
motivated by their financial interests and never by Russia's strategic interests as a geo- 
717 Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 66-67. 
718 See B Aris and I Watson, 'Rosneft Still Faces a Long Hard Road to Market; the Kremlin's Showcase IPO 
Is Beset with Legal Problems and Concerns About Value' The Business (Moscow/London 18 June 2006). 
719 Tompson, Putin and the 'Oligarchs': A Two-Sided Commitment Problem, 8; Amsterdam and Peroff, 
'White Paper' 40-41. 
720 See Y Zarakhovich, 'Inside the Yukos Endgame' (2004) 22 August Time <httpJ/www. time. com/ 
time/magazine/article/0,9171,901040830-685965,00. html>accessed 25 October 2007; Aron, 'What Does 
Putin WantT. 
721 See Amsterdam and Peroff, White Paper' 18. 
722 Fortescue, Russian's Oil Barons and Metal Magnates 109-10. 
723 Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 5)'. 
167 
strategic and ethno-cultural entity. The report claimed that the oligarchs displayed a 
nihilistic attitude toward the state; they stimulated illegal activities in economic life. 724 
Thirdly, due to oligarchic modernization, the structure of Russian economy had become a 
raw and transit economy. 725 
There are at least three main political reasons, which led to the commencement of the 
case: 
1. The personal political ambitions of Khodorkovsky and his allies. This included 
the intention to obtain immunity through an alliance with an international oil giant and the 
plans to seize power inside Russia by using parliamentary and corruption mechanisms 
726 
2. The general strengthening of state capitalism and the new oligarchy-siloviki 
group, which badly needed business opportunities for expansion. 27 
3. Conflicts with other oligarchy72S or business729 groups and a general negative 
attitude to oligarchs in Russia. 730 
3.1.2. The Main Political Condition for the Attack on Yukos. 
The Yukos case could not have been launched without the existing nexus between 
the status of the Rule of Law in Russia and the real political powers of the ruling elite. 731 
724 See ibid. 
725 ibid. 
726 See L Aron, 'Crime and Punishment for Capitalists' (2003) 30 October AEI 2 <http: //www. aei. org/ 
newsl9370>accessed 10 March 2007. 
727 See The Economist, The Making of a Neo-KGB State'; The Economist, Putin's People' (2007) 23 August 
Economist. com <http: /www. economist. com/opinion/displaystory. cfrn? story_id=9687285>accessed 24 
August 2007. 
728 See Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 5)'. 
729 Shevtsova, 'Implications of the Yukos Scandal for Russian Domestic Politics ; Tompson, Putin and the 
`Oligarchs': A Two-Sided Commitment Problem 9. 
730 See V Shlapentokh, 'Wealth Versus Political Power: The Russian Case' (2003) <httpd/www. cdi. org/ 
russia/johnson/7438-10. cfm>accessed 9 February 2007. 
731 See eg I Bremmer and S Charap, The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want' 
(2006-07) 30 (1) Wash Quart 83-92,86-88; A Kolesnikov, 'Sechin Kak Metafora [Sechin as a Metaphor]' 
(2008) 20 May Gazeta. Ru <http: /Avww. gazeta. ru/column/kolesnilov/2728776. shtml>accessed 20 May 2008. 
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Understanding the degree of the distortion of the Rule of Law and its suppression by the 
political power is crucial to gaining an understanding of the underlying events, and 
processes, which determine the very substance of the political regime and the framework 
of the Russian judicial system. 732 The Yukos case, and similar cases, can arise only when 
such disproportion exists and it allows the elite to manipulate the judicial system in its own 
interest. 733 
The state of positive law in Russia has little relevance to the Khodorkovsky and 
Yukos story, as the Russian law system is well developed and can successfully be used 
both to protect individual rights and freedoms and to steer the economic system. 734 
However, as Dmitry Medvedev stressed: "We must achieve true respect for the law and 
end the legal nihilism that is seriously hindering modern development. "735 His statement 
shows the main problem in Yeltsin's and Putin's epochs was a lack of respect for the 
law. 736 The law was understood only as a powerful tool in the hands of the ruling elite, 
who could bend it in any way possible, using it either for prosecution of political and 
economic opponents, or for making members of the political elite immune against criminal 
prosecution. 737 The entire legal system had become an instrument of the political 
authorities, even though "insofar as the political authorities do not exercise their power, 
private and public life are regulated either by the traditionally prevailing or newly enacted 
law "738 
732 See eg W Burnham, The New Russian Criminal Code: A Window onto Democratic Russia' (2000) 26 
Rev Cent &E Eur L 365-424; PJ De Muniz, 'Judicial Reform in Russia: Russia Looks to the Past to Create a 
New Adversarial System of Criminal Justice' (2004)11 Willamette J Int'l L& Dis Res 81-122. 
733 See eg N Lechbitskaya, 'Open Letter to Deputy of Presidential Administartion I. Sechin and Prosecutor 
General Y. Tchaika' (2008) <http: /delya-rape. livejournal. com/223582. html>accessed 14 May 2008. 
73' See eg J Kahn, 'Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation' (2008) 33 (2) Rev Cent &E Eur L 239- 
47. 
735 
--, Mr. Medvedev's 
Rule' (2008) 8 May Washingtonpost. com <http: //www. washingtonpost. com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2008/05/07/AR2008050703372. html>accessed 8 May2008. 
736 See eg FJM Feldbrugge, 'The Rule of Law in Russia in a European Context' in FJM Feldbrugge (ed), 
Russia, Europe, and the Rule of Law (Law in Eastern Europe, Brill, 2006); GB Smith, The Procuracy, Putin, 
and the Rule of Law in Russia' in FJM Feldbrugge (ed), Russia, Europe, and the Rule of Law (Law in Eastern 
Europe, Brill, 2006)1-15. 
737 See eg --, 'Russian Defence Minister's Son to Come Off Clear after Running over Elderly Lady' (2005) 24 
May Pravda. RU <http: //english. pravda. tu/hotspots/crimes/8292-1/>accessed 1 June 2008. 
738E Fraenkel, The Dual State (Oxford University Press, New York 1941) 57. 
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Putin's doctrine of power concentration and managed democracy has increased the 
misbalance between the principles of the Rule of Law and political powers that existed 
during Yeltsin's governance. 39 The lack of respect for the law and the instrumentalisation 
of the Russian judiciary 740 contradicts the international principles of the Rule of Law. 741 
Weakness of the Rule of Law and the corresponding subordination of the Russian 
judicial system to the ruling elite was the main condition for the Yukos case. As soon as 
Khodorkovsky became to be seen as a threat to the ruling elite, he was immediately 
prosecuted together with his companies and friends, and the legal system was used as an 
instrument for his suppression and prosecution. Moreover, even after the political influence 
on the judicial system on the Yukos case ended, the system continued pursuing the 
established trend as it had to protect its own decisions. 742 The instrumental leverage of the 
legal system allowed the representatives of the new elite, specifically the Siloviki and 
Sechin, to structure the Yukos case in such a way that it would not look political, simply 
using "economic" and violent crime charges: "everyone knows" MBK is a genuinely "bad 
guy". He stole billions from the Russian people and refused to comply with the new rules 
established by President Putin. "743 Such an approach also allowed Russian officials to 
attempt to represent Khodorkovsky and his allies as criminals, insisting that the case had 
no political . 
744 However, as set out in the subsequent sections, this strategy had 
limited and temporary success. 45 
739 See eg Kasparov, 'Putin's Gangster State; The Economist, The Making of a Neo-KGB State. 
740 See eg Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 64-65. 
7" See in general Russian Axis, The Judicial System of the Russian Federation; Washington Post, 'Potemkin 
Justice; Mr. Putin's Legal System at Work'. 
742 See Presscenter, Timeline of Events' (2007) <http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/timeline/>accessed 30 
March 2007. 
743 BW Bean, The Rule of Law in Russia: Getting Khodorkovsky (2006) 3 (2) TDM 4. 
744 See eg The Moscow Times, Tutin Says Yukos Case All About Murder' (2003) 22 September The 
Moscow Times. com 5 <http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2003/09/22/041. html>accessed 21 March 
2007; V Putin, "Elargir L'otan, C'est Enger De Nouveaux Murs De Berlin(2008) 31 May Le Monde 
<http: //www. lemonde. fr/europe/article/2008/05/31 /vladimir-poutine-elargir-l-otan-c-est-eriger-de-nouveaux- 
murs-de-berlin_l052123_3214. html#ens id=1051598>accessed 31 May 2008. 
745 See eg RIA Novosti, 'Khodorkovsky's Case Not Political - Prosecutors' (2007) 2 February RIA Novosti 
<http: //en. rian. ru/russia/20070209/60483608. html>accessed 6 June 2008; RR Amsterdam, 'Khodorkovsky 
Case Update: Politics Increasingly Transparent' (2008) 23 January Jursit <http: //jurist. law. pitt. edu/forumy/ 
2008/01 /khodorkovsky-case-update-politics. php>accessed 25 January 2008. 
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3.13. The State and Putin's Reaction to the Case. 
Putin's position on the Khodorkovsky/Yukos case was particularly important as he 
personified the position of the state in the conflict. He was also perceived by the 
international media as being Khodorkovsky's opponent. It is important to see how his 
words confirm the ideas regarding the instrumentalisation of the Russian judiciary. 
In the context of the defendants' extensive arguementation, Putin's arguements 
looked rather limited and narrow. 
In 2003, for example, when the legal and political campaign directed against the 
owners of Yukos was in its early stages, Putin maintained his silence for several months 
despite calls for him to take a stand. As a result, even Yukos' strongest supporters 
remained reluctant to attack Putin directly, preferring to blame the campaign on the out-of- 
control Siloviki and to pin their hopes for an early and satisfactory resolution of the 
conflict on presidential 746 
In Yukos-related speeches and interviews, Putin abstained from comments related to 
the substance of the case, choosing to remain within the formal limits appropriate for a 
head of state. For an example of Putin's comments on the Yukos case, alluding to the U. S. 
prosecutions against Enron Corp. officials, he said, "I assure you, nothing extraordinary is 
happening here.... The difference is that people with a fortune this size have never been 
criminally charged [in Russia] - unlike in other countries, " Putin said in a meeting with 
Italian journalists in Moscow: "Everyone should understand once and for all - the law 
should be followed all the time, and not just when you're caught. , 747 Another time Putin 
drew the journalists' attention to the violent side of the Yukos story: 'The case is about 
Yukos and the possible links of individuals to murders in the course of the merging and 
expansion of this company... In such a case, how can I interfere with prosecutors' 
work? 048 Later, in Rome he added that the investigation into Yukos stemmed from the 
746 Tompson, Putin and the 'Oligarchs': A Two-Sided Commitment Problem 4. 
"' K Murphy, 'Jailed Tycoon Claims Abuses by the Kremlin' LA Times (Los Angeles 4 October 2003) 3. 
748 The Moscow Times, Putin Says Yukos Case All About Murder'. 
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government's desire "to bring order to the country and to fight corruption '049 It is 
important to note that Putin's position was based on the exclusivity of the Yukos case: "It 
is necessary to stress that there will be no generalizations, analogies, precedents, especially 
relating to privatisation results, in connection with the case. 050 It is evident that this 
statement contradicted the international perception of the Rule of Law. Nevertheless, the 
majority of Putin's statements on the Khodorkovsky/Yukos case were focused on 
everybody's equality before the law, presumption of innocence in application to the Yukos 
officials and the "rule of law" in the Yukos case in general. 751 
Putin also stuck to the point that no nationalization or forced sale of the Company 
would be possible, until the liquidation procedure began. For example, on November 5, 
2003, President stated: "The state surely does not want to destroy [Yukos]" and confirmed 
it on June 17,2004 by pointing out: "Russian authorities, the government, and the 
economic officials of our country are not interested in seeing Yukos go bankrupt. "752 
After his resignation as President, Putin came back to the Yukos topic several times, 
answering questions regarding Khodorkovsky's future. Although he said the 
Khodorkovsky could be pardoned by the new president, he also stressed that 
Khodorkovsky "had grossly and openly violated the law "and the he and his allies "had 
been involved in violent crimes". 753 
The position of the General Prosecutors Office remained within the limits, 
established by the Putin: "Just crimes - no politics. "7M Other official agencies did not even 
dare to comment. Nevertheless, analysis of Putin's speeches in comparison with the 
749 RFE/RL, Putin Says Yukos Affair Is a Part of Anticorruption Effort' (2003) 4 (45) RFE/RL Reports 
<http: /www. rferl. org/reports/securitywatch/2003/11/45-121103. asp>accessed 22 March 2007. 
750 People's Daily, 'Russian President Putin Not to Interfere in Yukos Case' (2003) 27 October People's Daily 
Online <http/english. people. com. cn/20031027/eng20031027 126966. shtml>accessed 23 March 2007. 
751 Pravda. RU, 'Everyone Equal before Law, Putin Says' (2003) 27 October Pravda. RU 
<http: //newsfromrussia. com/main/2003/10/27/50804. html>accessed 24 March 2007; Prime TASS, Putin 
Says Yukos Heads Not Guilty until Proven' (2003) 13 November Prime TASS <www. supportmbk. com/ 
documents/legaLcfm >accessed 25 March 2007. 
752 Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 47. 
753 Putin, "Elargir L'otan, C'est Eriger De Nouveaux Murs De Berlin". 
754 See eg Bill of Indictment for Lebedev ; General Prosecutors Office, 'One More Case against the Former 
Yukos Managment'. 
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general timeline of the case shows that the development of the attack on Yukos was 
dependent on the "bulldogs under the carpet fights755 between the main Kremlin groups. 756 
Analysis of Putin and the state's position on the case shows that it has been 
structured in accordance within the rules of a "special undercover KGB operation", aimed 
at securing the effective prosecution of Khodorkovsky, the seizure of Yukos' assets, the 
concealment of the political substance of the case and the representation of it as a mere 
criminal case. 
3.2. Literature Review. 
The political nature of crime and justice has been clearly recognized; 757 therefore a 
general study of the interaction between crime and politics may be unlimited. Hence, in 
order to limit the observation of the available literature, the sources used in this chapter can 
be divided into three groups, corresponding to the main research "pillars": 
3.2.1. Political Crime and Political Criminals. 
Louis Proal postulated a broadened view of political crimes. 758 His definition 
covered criminal offences committed in the course of political activities, such as theft from 
'55 Winston Churchill once likened Kremlin politics to watching two dogs fight under a carpet - you know 
there's a furious spat going on but can't see what's happening. See S Schmemann, Meanwhile: A Guide to 
What's Happening in Russia' (2006) 18 December International Herald Tribune 
<http: //www. iht. com/articles12006/12/18/opinion/edserge. php>accessed 20 October 2007. 
756 See also Defence Lawyers of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and Alexei Pitchugin' 
Constitutional and Due Process Volations in the Khodorkovsky/Yukos Case' (2004) Robert Amsterdam Blog 
<http: //www. amsterdamandperof com/docs/yukos_white paper. pdf>accessed 20 March 2006; Amsterdam 
and Perof, 'White Paper'. 
757 See eg R Quinney, 'Crime in Political Perspective' (1964) 8 Am Behav Scientist 19-22,20 (please note 
that later his views changed. See Criminal Justice, 'World of Criminal Justice on Richard Quinney (2006) 
<httpJ/www. bookrags. com/biography/richard-quinney-cri/>accessed 25 September 2007). 
758 See L Proal, Political Crime (D. Appleton and Company, New York 1898). 
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public funds, corrupting police officers, or misuse of power by officials. 759 Giddings, who 
introduced the English translation of Proal's book, took a different approach in defining the 
political criminal. Although Giddings did not exclude offences committed by governments 
and politicians for political advantage, he also emphasized the fact that only the 
"powerless" can commit genuine political crimes. Giddings referred primarily to crimes 
against governments, such as treason, insurrection, and rebellion, but he defined the 
concept of the political criminal according to crimes, not classes of criminals. 760 
One way of defining political crime is to simply list a series of offences (acts), which 
the author considers "political. " For example, Elliott indicates that "the major types of 
political offenders may be subsumed under the categories of (1) traitors, (2) spies, (3) draft 
evaders, and (4) conscientious objectors. 9,761 However, the definition of political crime by 
simple reference to a special list was criticised by Void, 762 Clinard and Quinney, 763 and 
Turk, 7Mwho saw it just as one element of criminal typology. 
The theories on "pure political crime" are divided into "subjective" and "objective" 
theories. The "subjective" theories include two categories: those concerned with the 
motives of the offender, and those concerned with the final aim of the actor: the 
intention. 65 
The offender's motive is considered by a number of theorists as the sole and 
definitive criterion in defining "political crime". 766 For example, Cavan placed ideological 
criminals on the opposite end of a continuum from underworld criminals, pointing out that 
"the key motivation for the ideological deviant seems to be a desire to establish a better 
social order for themselves and often for the nation. 067 His theory actually reflected the 
759 S Schafer, The Concept of the Political Criminal' (1971) 62 (3) JCrim LC& PS 380-87,383. 
760 ibid (quoting Giddings' introductions to Proal's book). 
761 MA Elliot, Crime in Modern Society (Harper, New York 1952) 183. 
762 See GB Vold, 'Some Basic Problems in Criminological Research' (1953) 17 FedProbation 37-42. 
763 See MB Clinard and R Ouinney, Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
New York 1973). 
7" See AT Turk, Criminality and Legal Order (Rand McNally, Chicago 1969). 
765 N Passas, Political Crime and Political Offender: Theory and Practice' (1986) 8 (1) Liv L Rev 23-36,26. 
766 For example, Rossel, Holzendorf Clarke. See ibid. 
767 RS Cavan, Underworld, Conventional, and Ideological Crime' (1964) 55 JCrimLC& PS 235-40,239. 
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earlier findings of other theoreticians. For example, Maurice Parmelee viewed the concept 
of the political criminal as a confrontation between the government and those who are 
against its policy "in interest of the public. i768 Willem Bonger contended that the political 
criminal acts "for the benefit of society, " for "the oppressed classes, and consequently [for] 
all humanity. 069 
Ingraham and Tokoro defined two types of political crime based on a combination of 
act and motivation: (1) acts which, by their very nature, tend to injure the state or its 
machinery of government either internally or externally; (2) all criminal acts, regardless of 
kind, which have as their motive or object some rearrangement of political power within 
the state and which entail at the same time both an attack on the state and the private 
interests of its citizens. 70 
Clinard and Quinney significantly corrected this position by pointing out that a 
definition of political crime must include both crimes against government and crimes by 
government . 
771 For crimes against government, they stressed the need for a "purposive, 
voluntaristic conception of man", emphasizing the noble goals espoused by these 
offenders. 72 
Political crime was also discussed by Merton773 and Schafer774 as nonconformist, 
ideological, and convictional behavior. According to their theory the necessary elements of 
political crime are (1) the desire to influence existing public policy or power relations 
between groups through the commission of the crime, and (2) the predominance of concern 
for group or societal welfare over considerations of personal gain. 
768 M Parmelee, Criminology (MacMillan, New York 1918) 454 or M Parmelee, Criminology (Kessinger 
Publishing, New York 2007). 
769 WA Bonger, Criminality and Economic Conditions (Indiana U. P., Bloomington 1916) 648. 
70 BL Ingraham and K Tokoro, 'Political Crime in the United States and Japan: A Comparative Study' (1969) 
4 Issues Criminology 145-70,146. 
771 Clinard and Ouinney, Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology 154. 
772 ibid 163-64. 
773 See RK Merton, 'Social Problems and Sociological Theory' in RK Merton and RA Nisbit (eds), 
Contemporary Social Problems (Harcourt, Brace & World, New York 1966) 793-845. 
74 See S Schafer, The Political Criminal: The Problem of Morality and Crime (Free Press, New York 1974). 
175 
3.2.2. Political Trials. 
In the professional literature on political justice, Kirchheimer provides an extensive 
discussion. 775 Kirchheimer's approach was international and historical, but his conception 
of political justice was limited to political trials, ignoring the possibility of political justice 
being meted out by police or correctional authorities n6 Kirchheimer identified three types 
of political trials: 
A. The trial involving a common crime committed for political purposes and 
conducted with a view to the political benefits, which might ultimately accrue from 
successful prosecution; 
B. The classic political trial: a regime's attempt to incriminate its foe's public behavior 
with a view to evicting him from the political scene; 
C. The derivative political trial, where the weapons of defamation, perjury, and 
contempt are manipulated in an effort to bring disrepute upon a political foe. 777 
Following Kirchheimer, Becker discussed political trials as "the utilization of the 
judicial structure to engage political forces in combat by trial, and to dispose of opponents 
either permanently or temporarily. "778 Becker established a four-part classification of 
political trials based on the nature of the charge and the fairness of the proceedings: "it 
seems possible and desirable to identify and distinguish among (1) political trials, (2) 
political 'trials, ' (3) 'political' trials, and (4) 'political trials'. "79 
Professor Judith Shklar's position regarding the role of international and domestic 
political trials played an important role in the theory of political trials. Shklar stressed that 
some international trials might help in promotion of the rule of law and democratic values, 
775 WW Minor, 'Political Crime, Political Justice, and Political Prisoners' (1974-1975) 12 Criminology 385- 
98,392. 
776 ibid. 
777 0 Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends (Princeton Princeton, 
NJ. 1961) 46. 
778 TL Becker, Comparative Judicial Politics (Rand McNally, Chicago 1970) 373. 
779 TL Becker (ed), Political Trials (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 1971) xiii. 
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like the Nuremberg trial. 780 However, she flatly denied that domestic political trials could 
have a valuable role in a liberal constitutional order. 78' Professor Shklar also opinioned that 
courts could convict people only for past acts and not on the basis of future threats. 782 
Subsequent writings of political theorists, including Otto Kirchheimer, 783 did not 
depart much from Shklar's conclusions. Abel and Marsh784 argued that political trials may 
generate good political outcomes but they defined the political trial so broadly as to 
encompass virtually any case in which the court's political views may play a role in the 
decision. 785 
3.2.3. Political Prisoners. 
Liazos emphasized the importance of the systemic analysis of social problems rather 
than the approach based on personal attribution proposed earlier by Ross and Staines786: 
Only now are we beginning to realize that most prisoners are political 
prisoners-that their "criminal" actions (whether against individuals, acts such 
as robbery, or conscious political acts against the state) result largely from 
current social and political conditions, and are not the work of "disturbed" and 
"psychopathic" personalities 787 
Aptheker suggested that there are four groups of individuals who should be 
considered political prisoners. These are (1) political leaders who are victimized by police 
frame-ups, (2) civil disobedients and political criminals, (3) innocent victims of class, 
racial, and national oppression who lack adequate legal or political redress, and (4) 
790 JN Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2006) 155- 
70. 
781 ibid 220. 
792 ibid 215. 
7S. See in general Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends. 
784 See in general CF Abel, FH Marsh and BK Johnpoll, In Defence of Political Trials (Greenwood Press, 
Westport, CT 1994). 
785 EA Posner, 'Political Trials in Domestic and International Law' (2005) 55 Duke LJ 75-131,91-92. 
786 R. Ross and GL Staines, 'The Politics of Analyzing Social Problems' (1972) 20 SocProb 18-40. 
787 A Liazos, The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts, Sluts, and Perverts' ibid 20103-20,108. 
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prisoners who develop political consciousness and are therefore discriminated against by 
prison administrators and parole boards. 788 
Goodell and Minor pointed out that there were two logical bases for defining 
political imprisonment. According to them, apolitical prisoner is one who is imprisoned as 
a result of political crime or political justice (political criminals and victims of 
repression). 789 
Recognizing the difficulties in establishing the distinction between political crime 
and ordinary crime, Forsythe emphasized the importance of distinguishing between 
ordinary and political prisoners, seeing the latter as the special type of criminal: 
Indeed, notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties, there seem to be important 
aspects of world politics that can only be described as pertaining to political 
prisoners. It is evident that governments do regard a type of detainee as special - 
special in the sense of being different from other prisoners. In general, he is 
different because he is viewed by the government as a direct or indirect threat to 
the government, and therefore he is persecuted. 790 
He also pointed out that the subject of political prisoners was eminently 
characteristic of the world politics in the last third of the twentieth century, emphasizing 
the importance of the institution. 791 
3.3. "Political Motivation": Definitional Aspects. 
The key problem in Khodorkovsky-Yukos case is the problem of its political 
motivation, which has been widely recognised in the West but has been completely denied 
by Russian officials. 792 
788 B Aptheker, 'The Social Functions of the Prison in the United States' in AY Davis (ed), If They Come in 
the Morning (Signet, New York 1971) 51-59,58. 
789 C Goodell, Political Prisoners in America (Random House, New York 1973) 10-11; Minor, Political 
Crime, Political Justice, and Political Prisoners' 394. 
790 See D Forsythe, 'Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection ' (1984) 21 CompJuridRev 4. 
791 DP Forsythe, Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection' (1976) 9 Vand J Transnat'l L 295- 
322,322. 
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The starting point in the research on political motivation and political motivated 
prosecution is the recognition of the general political nature of crime and justice. Quinney 
has stated that, 
As an instrument of social control, criminal law is most importantly 
characterized by its politicality. That is: 1) specific rules of conduct are created 
by a recognized, legitimate authority, 2) designated officials interpret and 
enforce the rules, and 3) the code is binding on all persons within a given 
political unit. Criminal law is thus an aspect of politics, one of the results of 
the process of formulating and administering public policy. 
793 
Regardless to the recognition of the general political nature of criminal law, the 
question regarding the definition of "political motivation" is a difficult one. Officials and 
organisations, dealing with the politically motivated crimes and politically motivated 
prosecution794 operate with different terminology, amongst which the most widely known 
are "political prisoners", "political trials" and "political refugees". 
795 According to some 
academics, asserting the political nature of a crime is virtually a mission impossible. 
796 
Almost the only point agreed upon is that `political' as an adjective qualifies the mental 
element of the crime, and that the political motive alone does not make the crime political. 
Apart from this, in the domestic practices of major jurisdictions there only exists a general 
understanding that "politics is about government". 
797 The underlying reason for the 
absence of a clear definition of "political element" is explained by David Forsythe, who 
points out that governments are generally reluctant to permit outside determination of 
issues that may undermine the authority of the government, or increase the authority of a 
non-national institution. Governments are especially reluctant to permit such determination 
792 See eg M Mainville, 'Yukos's Khodorkovsky Expected to Be Found Guilty' (2005) 25 April The Sun 
<http: //www. nysun. com/article/12732>accessed23 September 2007. 
793 Quinney, 'Crime in Political Perspective 20. 
794 On the definition of prosecution see M Bagaric and J McConvill, 'Refugee Law: The Irrelevance of the 
Framers'intentions' (2005) 14 Nottingham LJ 1-18,17. 
795 See eg Schtraks v Government of Israel [1964] AC 556,561. See also MC Bassiouni, International 
Extradition: United States Law and Practice (5th edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2007)167. 
796 G Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law (International Studies in Human Rights) (Brill, London 1991) 118. 
797 A Rasulov, 'Criminals as Refugees: The "Balancing Exercise" And Article 1F (B) of the Refugee 
Convention' (2002)16 Geo Immigr LJ 815-33,819. 
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when the issue raised implies governmental persecution or touches upon governmental 
security. 798 
The terminology related to political crimes and political motivation is used in the 
law of extradition799 and asylum and the law of human rights. 800 Political offenders are 
singled out for special protection in the law of extradition for both pragmatic and 
humanitarian reasons. 801 Their preemptive exclusion from the purview of extradition 
obligations is viewed as a necessary element of non-intervention in the internal conflicts of 
other states 802 Non-extradition of political offenders also serves to prevent the surrender of 
a person to a jurisdiction where his/her fair trial may be prejudiced by political 
considerations. 03 
Refugee law deals with political offenders more obliquely. 8041nitially, the 1951 
Convention allowed substantial state discretion in determining who was a refugee, 
including the question of whether political offenders meet the definition 805 Later this 
concept changed for two reasons. First, refugee status determination in the West became 
increasingly judicialized. It was no longer premised on largely unfettered state discretion 
but become primarily a matter of individual entitlement within a domestic legal system, 
7" Forsythe, 'Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection' 299. 
799 J Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, Toronto 1991) 221. 
800 D Weissbrodt, 'Intemational Trial Observers' (1982) 18 Stan J Int'l L 27-122,62. 
801 See BS Chimni, 'Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection' (2000) 13 J 
Refugee Stud 243-63,252-58; G Griffith and C Harris, 'Recent Developments in the Law of Extradition' 
(2005) 6 Melb J Int'l L 33-54,45. 
802 See eg SR Chowdhury, 'Response to the Refugee Problems in Post Cold War Era: Some Existing and 
Emerging Norms of International Law' (1995) 7 Int'l J Refugee L 100-18,115; JW Dacyl, 'Sovereignty 
Versus Human Rights: From Past Discourses to Contemporary Dilemmas' (1996) 9J Refugee Stud 136-65, 
136-40. 
803 See eg --, 'Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum' (1985) 99 (2) Harv L Rev 450-71,450-51. 
804 Chimni, 'Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection' 252. 
805 See eg P Weis, Development of Refugee Law' (1982) 3 Mich YBI Legal Stud 27-42,28-32; CJ Harvey, 
'Reconstructing Refugee Law' (1998) 3J CL 159-90,162. 
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albeit predicated upon falling within an 'international' definition. 806 Second, the end of the 
Cold War made the refugee's role in stigmatizing 'enemy states obsolete. 07 
Regardless of the absence of clear definitions, the difference between a political 
criminal and a victim of political prosecution has to be clearly identified. In the Yukos case 
this difference is evident as Khodorkovsky's alleged crimes have never been seen as 
political even in their tiniest aspect either by the investigators nor Khodorkovsky's allies or 
himself. 808 Khodorkovsky's supporters insist that these crimes either lack actus reus, or 
Khodorkovsky's connection to them has never been proved. 809 The most powerful 
arguement of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's defence is the procedural violations, with 
regard to their client's right to a fair and open trial, etc. 810 Therefore, presence of the 
"politically motivated prosecution" in the Yukos and Khodorkovsky case can be formally 
established in two routes: 
i. When Khodorkovsky, Lebedev or somebody with a connection to Yukos has been 
regarded as a victim of the political trial and later recognized as "political prisoners'8 1 or 
ii. When an individual, belonging to the Yukos "social group"812 has been granted 
political asylum813 or his extradition has been refused based on the "political offence" 
exception814 or both. 
806 M Bagaric and P Dimopoulos, 'Refugee Law - Time for a Fundamental Re-Think: Need as the Criterion 
for Assistance' (2003) 9 Canterbury L Rev 268 -93 262,73. 
807 See Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status n 3,7-8; R Rogers and E Copeland, Forced Migration: Policy 
Issues in the Post-Cold War (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, 
Massachusetts 1993) 98. 
80S See Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court'. 
09 See eg Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal Charges'. 
810 See eg Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 16-29. 
8" See eg All Russian News. com, 'Legal Experts Have Declared Khodorkovsky the Political Prisoner' (2007) 
8 February All Russian News. com <http: /allrussiannews. com/news/08-february-2007-legal-experts-have- 
declared-khodorkovsky-the-political-prisoner. html>accessed 30 March 2007. 
812 See eg Russian Federation v Kartasov Yladislav Nicolay [2008] Nicosia Dis Court App Ns 2/07 (In the 
Matter of the 95/70 Extradition Law) (Cyp). 
813 See --, 'DJ Lithuanian Court Confirms Russian Banker's Asylum Status'. 
814 See eg Kommersant. com, 'Cyprus Court Didn't Extradite Yukos Accused' (2006) 17 October Kommersant 
Online <httpi/www. kommersantcom/p713715/r 500/YUKOS_extradition>accessed 12 April 2008. 
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The role of the Russian authorities was to insist that Khodorkovsky had been charged 
and sentenced without any element of selectivity and without underlying political motives 
and no significant procedural violations have never taken place. 815 
Therefore, the presence of elements of "politically motivated" prosecution in the 
Yukos case can be ascertained through the analysis of the internationally recognized 
concepts of'political refugee', 'political asylum' and 'political prisoner' in application to the 
case and the individuals involved. 
3.4. Extradition and Asylum. The Political Offence Exception. 
The situation with the extradition and asylum is legally simpler than with laws on 
human rights, as refugee status can be granted by the government of the country or the 
extradition request can be declined or accepted by the court. 816 Therefore, certain formal 
results can be ascertained. 
Despite the number of similarities, there are differences between extradition and 
asylum in their approach to the "political" aspect g" While extradition law operates 
between states and is inclined towards bilateralism and reciprocity, the law of refugee 
protection is a branch of law in which "states do not have any interests of their own; they 
merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high 
purposes that are the raison d'etre [of this branch of law]. " 818 
The problem of "politics" in the extradition and asylum sphere is related to the 
problem of political crime or the so-called "political offence exception". 
819 
815 See eg The Moscow Times, Putin Says Yukos Case All About Murder'. 
816 Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 193. 
817 See eg ibid 193-201. 
S18 Rasulov, 'Criminals as Refugees: The "Balancing Exercise" And Article IF (B) of the Refugee 
Convention'. 
81 See eg D Bouffard, 'Extradition - Political Offence Exception' (1981-1982) (6) Suffolk Transnat'l LT 147- 
61; M Kellett, 'Extradition - the Concept of the Political Offence ' (1986) 8 LLR 1-22; RS Phillips, The 
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It is an accepted principle in international extradition law that political offences may 
not give rise to extradition 820 The Model Treaty on Extradition states that extradition shall 
not be granted if, inter alia, `the offence for which extradition is requested is regarded by 
the requested State as an offence of a political nature'. 82 1 So, the exception is universally 
accepted. 22 As the late British Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht observed, "In the legislation 
of modern states there are few principles so universally adopted as that of non-extradition 
of political offenders. "823 
Theoreticians emphasised the significance of the "political offence" exception as a 
political instrument dressed in legal robes: 
The political offence exception was crafted to delicately balance the receiving 
State's concern for the fugitive's welfare with its general aversion to involvement 
in the political affairs of the requesting State. The grafting of these interests onto 
a legal framework, with resolution vested in the judicial branch, may be 
designed to provide a "legal cloak" for what is essentially a political judgement. 
That cloak conveniently excuses the country's political branches from the knotty 
dilemma of having to deny extradition, thereby sparking a diplomatic 
confrontation. 824 
There are several universal principles pertaining to the "political offence exception" 
1) The courts have deliberately refrained from any attempt to formulate an 
exhaustive definition of what constitutes an offence of a political character. 
825 Gilmore 
pointed out: 
Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: Its Place in the Current Extradition Scheme and Proposals for Its 
Future' (1996-1997) 15 Dick J Int'l L 337-60. 
820 Kellett, 'Extradition - the Concept of the Political Offence' 2-20; Interpol, 'Extradition - Some 
Benchmarks' (2003) <httpi/www. interpol. int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/FactSheets/FSI l. asp>accessed 23 
March 2007. 
B21 Model Treaty on Extradition GA Res 116 (1990) UN GAOR 45th Sess UN Doc A/RES/45/1 lb 
g22 CM Bassiouni, 'Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition -a 
Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem' (1969-1970) 19 (2) DePaul L Rev 217-65,244; BA 
Wortley, 'Political Crime in English Law and in International Law' (1971) 45 Brit YB Int'l L 219-53,220. 
823 Phillips, The Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: Its Place in the Current Extradition Scheme and 
Proposals for Its Future' 340. 
824 DM Lieberman, 'Sorting the Revolutionary from the Terrorist The Delicate Application of The "Political 
Offence" Exeption in the U. S. Extradition Cases' (2006) 59 Stan L Rev 181-210,190 quoting G Gilbert, 
Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition and Other Mechanisms (International 
Studies in Human Rights) (Springer, New York 1998) 204-05. 
825 WC Gilmore, Extradition and the Political Offence Exception: Reflections on United Kingdom Law and 
practice' (1992) 18 Commw L Bull 701-18,704. 
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It has come to be regarded as something of an advantage that there is to be no 
definition of the term 'political offense'. The advantage seems to be that it 
leaves the court free to grant or deny extradition according to the respective 
merits of the fugitive and the requesting government, but this judicial 
opportunism is at the cost of any consistent principle and involves the 
abandonment of the raison d'etre of the political offense exception. Yet the 
fault for this lies only partially with the courts. It is not so much that they have 
failed to elucidate a complex concept; rather the concept itself is not an 
appropriate tool for the work required of it. 826 
2) The epithet 'political' indicates that 'the requesting State is pursuing [the fugitive] 
for reasons other than the enforcement of the criminal law in its ordinary, what I may call 
its common or international aspect. '827 
3) The latest and most authoritative test [of whether an offence is political] is 
whether the fugitive, the alleged offender, could claim with any prospect of success, 
political asylum. v828 
The definition of a political offence is an issue that has intrigued countries since the 
signing of the first extradition treaty. 829 Despite the lack of universal acceptance of a 
single definition, almost all international extradition treaties include language prohibiting 
extradition for crimes which are political in character. 830 Most treaties, bilateral and 
multilateral, do not attempt to define the term exhaustively. 831 The definitions contained in 
these treaties were initially so general as to be impossible to apply literally. 832 Therefore 
the inclusion of such language in treaties and the task of defining the parameters of the 
exception has been left to the judiciary of each country. 833 Nevertheless, the term 
926 JR Young, The Political Offence Exception in the Extradition Law of the United Kingdom: A Redundant 
Concept' (1984) 4 Legal Stud 211-22,216. 
827 Schtraks v Government of Israel [1964] AC 556,591. 
828 Young, The Political Offence Exception in the Extradition Law of the United Kingdom: A Redundant 
Concept' 216. 
829 See for the details Bouffard, `Extradition - Political Offence Exception' 150. 
s30 ibid. 
831 Bassiouni, 'Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition -a 
Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem' 243-44. 
932 G Griffith and C Harris, 'Recent Developments in the Law of Extradition' (2005) 6 Melb J Intl L 33-53, 
43. 
933 CM Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order (Oceana Pubns New York 1974) 371. 
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"political offence", as used in extradition, has received a broader interpretation then in 
other areas of law. 834 Lora Deere commented on this interpretational problem: 
The difficulty connected with political offenses arises mainly from the fact 
that, in connection with extradition, an exceptional extension is given to the 
conception "political offense. " Ordinarily, by a political offense is meant a 
purely political offense, i. e., one not accompanied by any offense against the 
ordinary law; but in connection with extradition the conception is frequently 
extended to cover ancillary offenses, i. e. offenses against the ordinary law 
connected with political acts or events. 835 
It is uncontroversial that it is intended to cover non-violent crimes such as 
slander of a head of state or offenses based on political protest. However, 
outside this area of clear exception, there is little consensus regarding which 
crimes, articularly crimes including violence, should fall within its 
confines. 36 
According to academics, surprisingly few occasions have arisen in practice in which 
the judiciary have had an opportunity to reflect upon the appropriate description of a 
political offence. 37 
Extradition law provides some of the most important resources for defining political 
prisoner status. This is primarily through state judicial interpretations of the political 
offence exception. Although there is no single definition available regarding political 
offences there are some broadly shared principles. All definitions agree that political 
offences are not limited to those involving solely anti-government opinions or non-violent 
expressions; acts which involve common law or statutory crimes may also be deemed 
political 838 
The changing global landscape of the past several decades has prompted a 
reexamination of the political exception's scope. 
839 An increasing number of countries now 
display intolerance for the exploitation of their immigration and asylum procedures by 
ssa LL Deere, 'Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition' (1933) 27 Am J Int'l L 247-70,248. 
835 ibid. 
836 Griffith and Harris, 'Recent Developments in the Law of Extradition' 43. 
937 Gilmore, 'Extradition and the Political Offence Exception: Reflections on United Kingdom Law and 
Practice' 704. 
938 GJ McDougall and CES Soderbergh, 'The Release of South Africa's Political Prisoners: Definitions and 
Expectations' (1990) 4 Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 1-22,8. 
639 Lieberman, 'Sorting the Revolutionary from the Terrorist: The Delicate Application of The "Political 
Offence" Exeption in the U. S. Extradition Cases' 182. 
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former political leaders, military officials, revolutionaries, and terrorists to avoid domestic 
prosecution. 840 Some scholars noted the irony between the origins of the doctrine and its 
modern application. As Professor Gilbert argued, 'The exemption was aimed to protect 
people fighting for liberal democracy, yet the same language is still applied today to 
persons intent on destroying liberal democracy. "841 For example, the State parties to the 
1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (European Terrorism 
Convention), agreed to exclude certain acts from the political offence exception, inter alia, 
"an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious unlawful detention, " 
and "an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or 
parcel bomb if this use endangers persons. " 842 The European Union, in agreeing to the new 
extradition convention, accepted the idea that the political offence exception might be 
safely eliminated because sufficient human rights mechanisms were already in place to 
protect a fugitive who may be at risk. 843 The 1996 European Union Convention Relating to 
Extradition between the Member States abolished the political offence exception altogether 
for extraditions between EU governments. 844 
Bassiouni, in his book on international extradition, quotes two recent decisions of the 
Paris Court of Appeal, ordering extradition of the individuals involved in a kidnap-murder, 
regardless to the political element, and points out that European courts are beginning to 
narrow down the exception. 845 However, outside the European context, many states remain 
reluctant to abandon the political offence exception. At best, they define certain 
particularly violent offences as beyond the scope of political justification. S46 
840 Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 709-10. 
841 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition and Other Mechanisms 
(International Studies in Human Rights) 209. 
842 G Vermeulen and TV Beken, 'New Convention on Extradition in the European Union: Analysis and 
Evaluation' (1997)15 Dick J Int'l L 265-95,291-92. 
943 RE Rao, 'Protecting Fugitives' Rights While Ensuaring the Prosecutionand Punishment of Criminals: An 
Examination of the New EU Extradition Treaty (1998) 21 BC Int'l & Comp L Rev 229-44,243-44. 
844 Vermeulen and Beken, New Convention on Extradition in the European Union: Analysis and Evaluation' 
291-92. 
845 Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 711. 
I" JC Hathaway and CJ Harvey, 'Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder' (2001) 34 Cornell 
Int'l LJ 257-321,283. 
186 
Closely related to extradition law is refugee law. 847 For example, in one of the 
leading UK cases T. v. Home Secretary one of the judges remarked: 
Indeed, it appears from the travaux preparatoires that the framers of the 
convention had extradition law in mind when drafting the convention, and 
intended to make use of the same conceept, although the application of the 
concept would be for a different purpose. 8 
Political asylum is itself founded upon two rationales. The predominant of these, the 
human rights principle, justifies asylum as being for the protection of the right to political 
freedom. The other, the principle of non-intervention, is based on the proposition that one 
state should not intervene in the affairs of another. Consistent adherence to political asylum 
should enable a state to avoid the appearance of taking sides between disputing parties in 
another state. 849 The decision to grant political asylum is an executive act and may be 
complicated by considerations of party or national interest, sometimes indeed in apparent 
breach of the principles of non-intervention. 850 
The Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol seek to protect the political 
fugitive. The difference in application of the two bodies of law is a matter of legal 
technicalities. The key phrase of the 1951 Convention states that it applies to one whom: 
As a result of events ... and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself ofthe protection ofthat country, or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it. 851 
Persecution "for reasons of political opinion" implies that an applicant holds an 
opinion which has been expressed or has come to the attention of the authorities. For 
refugee and asylum purposes, submissions about persecution based on political opinion 
847 See eg ibid 273-74. 
848 T vSecretary ofStatefor the Home Department [1996] AC 742,778. 
&'9 Young, The Political Offence Exception in the Extradition Law of the United Kingdom: A Redundant 
Concept' 212. 
850 ibid. 
811 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) 
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cover any opinion perceived to challenge governmental authority. 852 There may be 
situations in which the applicant has not given any expression to his opinions. Due to the 
strength of his convictions, however, it may be reasonable to assume that his opinions will 
eventually find expression and that the applicant will, as a result, come into conflict with 
the authorities. 53 Therefore, political opinion may be express, implied or imputed. 54 
As refugee law and the law of extradition do not play identical roles in international 
law, and because non-extradition and a grant of refugee status are not identical remedies, 
they approach the problem of "political" persecution from the different "ends": The 
"political offence exception" in extradition law provides that the individual cannot be 
extradited due to the political nature of his offence, as the prosecution for the "political" 
offence will also be "political"; refugee law says that an individual cannot go back to his 
country because of fear of prosecution for his political opinion, which is supposed to be 
also `Political'. Both of these institutions are criticised by academics and are subject to 
public scrutiny for potentially "harbouring" terrorists. Nevertheless, they still play an 
important role in international politics and law, allowing for the establishment of a 
"political" treatment element in application to the certain individual and providing them 
with adequate protection. 
3.5. Human Rights Protection. 
In the area of human rights protection, the most known terms are "political prisoner" 
and "prisoner of conscience". 
852 A Jones and A Doobay, Jones and Doobay on Extradition and Mutual Assistance (3nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2005) 200. 
853 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu' ges (UNHCR, Geneva 1992) para 82. 
954 Jones and Doobay, Jones and Doobay on Extradition and Mutual Assistance 200. 
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The concept of "political prisoner" leads to problems of definition that are not 
completely solvable. There is no definition free from problem, and therefore there is no 
adequate legal basis for a general approach to legal protection of political prisoners. 55 
Amnesty International has adopted the term "prisoner of conscience" to depict those 
individuals it views as political prisoners. It considers 'people detained anywhere for their 
beliefs, colour, sex, ethnic origin, language, or religious creed" who have neither used nor 
advocated violence, including those who have been detained without being charged or 
without trial, to be "prisoners of conscience. "856 In other words Amnesty International 
defines a political prisoner as "any prisoner whose case has a significant political 
element'. 857 
According the academics, the definition adopted by Amnesty international is an 
example of the "persecuted individual" school of thought. This approach defines a political 
prisoner as "one prosecuted by a government because of that person's 'political' beliefs. "858 An 
acknowledged problem with this definition is that it is often difficult to determine whether 
prosecution is being used as a means of persecution since the decision of whether to 
859 prosecute is generally a subjective one. 
A different school of thought utilizes a "government security" definition for political 
prisoners. According to this definition, "any person detained for constituting a threat to the 
security of the government" is considered a political prisoner. 860 As an example can be 
taken the U. S. State Department definition of "political prisoner", which includes persons 
who are prosecuted even under an ostensibly internationally acceptable law when the 
charges are trumped-up or the trial is unfair. 861A number of problems exist with such type 
855 Forsythe, 'Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection' 318. 
116 J Power, Amnesty International: The Human Rights Story (Mcgraw-Hill, New York 1981) 21-22. 
... Amnesty International, 'Russian Federation: The Case of Mikhail Khodorkovskii and Other Individuals 
Associated with Yukos' (2005) <http: /web. amnesty. org/library/print/ENGEUR460122005>accessed 10 
March 2007. 
858 Forsythe, 'Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection' 297. 
859 JL Taubner, 'Political Prisoners in the United States' (1992) 18 New Eng J on Crim & Civ Confinement 
63-89,65. 
860 Forsythe, 'Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection' 298. 
861 See Osborne, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "Democracy on the Retreat in 
Russia"' 11. 
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of definitions. They do not apply to political prisoners who have been "framed" on charges 
unrelated to government security interests, nor do they apply to those who have purportedly 
been detained under a false pretext of "non-security reasons. " United States former 
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst said: `There is enough play at the joints of our 
existing criminal law - enough flexibility - so that if we really felt that we had to pick up 
the leaders of a violent uprising, we could. We could find something to charge them with 
and we would be able to hold them that way for a while. '862 
The "government security" concept is based on the assumption that a political prisoner 
is a person held in confinement because of his associations or actions related to the 
government of society. According to Acoli, the operative word in this concept is 
"government. " It shows that the political prisoner is held for political reasons: matters 
related to government rather than matters related to law. 863 
The definition proposed by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) represents a mixture of the "government security" approach and the "persecuted 
individual" definition. PACE has adopted objective criteria developed by a group of experts 
to define "political prisoners. " According to PACE: 
A person deprived of his or her personal liberty is to be regarded as a political 
prisoner: 
" if the detention has been imposed in violation of one of the fundamental 
guarantees set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Protocols, in particular freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom 
of expression and information, freedom of assembly and association; 
" if the detention has been imposed for purely political reasons without 
connection to any offence; 
" if, for political motives, the length of the detention or its conditions are 
clearly out of proportion to the offence the person has been found guilty of or 
is suspected of, 
" if, for political motives, he or she is detained in a discriminatory manner 
as compared to other persons; or, 
862 Forsythe, 'Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection' 298. 
863 S Acoli, Unique Problems Associated with the Legal Defence of Political Prisoners and Prisoners of War 
(Pp/Pows)' (1996-1997) 24 SU LRev 113-20,113. 
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" if the detention is the result of proceedings which were clearly unfair and 
this appears to be connected with political motives of the authorities. W 
An examination of state practice leads to a relatively broad definition of political 
prisoner status. That definition would include all those jailed because their political beliefs, 
associations or deeds are considered a threat to state security, including all those who acted 
with political motives during and or as part of some form of uprising. Even those crimes, 
which are related to, as opposed to being in strict pursuit of, political goals are deemed 
within the category if there is a preponderant political motivation. These norms judge 
neither the validity of the political motivation nor the tactics. Rather, the mere existence of 
the antagonism between individual and government may be sufficient to call the person a 
political offender. 865 
Considering the definitions for political crime, political criminals, and political 
justice given in his papers, William Minor comes to the conclusion that a political prisoner 
is one who is imprisoned as a result of political crime or political justice. 866 Political justice 
is the discriminatory application of the machinery of criminal justice to the disadvantage of 
specific individuals or groups because they are perceived as threatening to the power of the 
established regime. According to Minor the "machinery of criminal justice" includes 
lawmaking, police practices, bail setting, imprisonment, parole procedures, and all other 
activities of the criminal justice system, not just the criminal trial. 861 
Therefore, the term "political trial" is subordinate to the term "political justice". In 
this context Kirchheimer uses the term "derivative political trial", i. e. a trial, where the 
weapons of defamation, perjury, and contempt are manipulated in an effort to bring 
disrepute upon a political foe. 868 
Following Kirchheimer, Becker discusses political trials as "the utilization of the 
judicial structure to engage political forces in combat by trial, and to dispose of opponents 
864 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 
Political Prisoners in Azerbayan (Doc No 9826 App 1,6 June 2003) 
865 McDougall and Soderbergh, The Release of South Africa's Political Prisoners: Definitions and 
Expectations' 4. 
866 Minor, 'Political Crime, Political Justice, and Political Prisoners' 394. 
867 ibid 393. 
868 Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends 46. 
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either permanently or temporarily. "869 Posner commented on political trials emphasising 
the presence of the same characteristics: `On this definition, a political trial occurs when 
the government uses the judicial process against its opponents ... who have not violated 
formal, generally enforced laws or who have violated only formal laws against political 
dissent. ' 870 
So, theoreticians stress the essential element of political trials: usage of judicial 
process for suppression of opponents who committed no formal violation of the law. 871 
The definitions of "political justice" and "political trial" supplement the last 
paragraph of PACE definition of the term "political prisoner". 872 
3.6. Khodorkokovsky and other Yukos-related Individuals as 
"Political Prisoners" and "Prisoners of Conscience". 
3.6.1. Structural Analysis of the Arguements of Khodorkovsky and Yukos 
Defendants on "Political Motivation" Aspect of the Case. 
The political prosecution issues in the Khodorkovsky-Yukos case have been 
addressed by different Russian NGOs, international foundations, experts, judicial bodies 
and governments. Such a variety of opinions appears misleading and may give the 
impression that political motivation in Khodorkovsky-Yukos case has been ultimately 
recognised not only by the international community, but also by all possible judicial and 
political bodies, which are involved in human rights protection and that they have the 
recognised authority to issue opinions regarding political prosecution. This is not the case. 
869 Becker, Comparative Judicial Politics 373. 
870 Posner, 'Political Trials in Domestic and International Law' 87. 
871 Political trials should be distinguished from transitional trials. Transitional trials occur when a newly 
democratic state tries officials of the old regime for acts that were lawful at the time they were performed. 
See ibid 133. 
872 On political trials see R Martin-Achard, 'Political Trials and Observers' (1971) 6 Int'l Comm'n Jur Rev 24- 
31; Weissbrodt, 'International Trial Observers'. 
192 
The majority of these opinions can be regarded only as opinions of independent third 
parties without any legal or political significance at all. Those who, like Amnesty 
International, are recognised foundations for granting "political prisoner" (prisoner of 
conscience) status, have not formed their opinions yet, or their opinions are not as 
favorable for Yukos and Khodorkovsky as their defenders may expect. 
There are four main types of Khodorkovsky and Yukos defendants873 such as: 1) 
their lawyers; 874 2) political allies; 875 3) independent joumalists; 876 4) political and 
economic experts. 877 All arguements used by them can be divided in the three groups: 
general arguements, concerning the situation in Russia, arguements related to 
Khodorkovsky's political and public activities, and arguements related to the investigation 
878 and fair trial. 
The core goal of this arguement is to demonstrate the presence of a strong political 
factor in the case. 879 Russian law does not contain any provisions against political 
prosecution except in very general statements in the Constitution saying that anybody can 
be prosecuted only for the crime that he has really committed and in accordance with the 
procedure, established by the law. 880 Therefore all the actions of the Khodorkovsky's 
defendants in Russia were focused on creating an "aura" of political motivation around the 
case and putting political pressure on the Russian authorities, related to the presence of the 
873 Excluding, of course, themselves and the former Yukos officials. See eg Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement 
to Meshchansky Court'. 
874 See eg K Moskalenko, 'Russia on Trial' (2004) 16 December Wall St J 3; Amsterdam and Peroff White 
Paper'. 
875 See eg Delyagin, The Yukos Case as a Mirror on the "Dictatorship of Squalor". 
976 See eg C Belton, 'Khodorkovsky Says Sechin Led Yukos Attack' (2005) 5 August The Moscow 
Times. com 3 <http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2005/08/05/01I. html>accessed 15 April 2006; C 
Belton, The Arrest That Proved a Turning Point' (2006) 25 October The Moscow Times. com 
<httpi/www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2006/1025/002. html>accessed 5 April 2007. 
877 See eg L Aron, 'The (Russian) Empire Strikes Back' (2003) 22 November American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research 1-5 <http: //www. aei. org/include/pub_print. asp.? publD=l 9405>accessed 22 March 
2007; Shlapentokh, 'Wealth Versus Political Power: The Russian Case'. 
878 For the details see Appendix 10. 
879 See eg Defence Attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Political Persecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky: 
Comments on MBK's Arrest'; Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper'. 
88° See Constitution RF (1993) art 19,46-49. 
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potential "political prisoners" in the country. 88' The documents, submitted by the lawyers 
to the Russian courts, and statements made by the opposition politicians and journalists 
were used during the international public hearing and at conferences. 882 They were then 
submitted to international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International 883 
and more importantly, they were submitted to the courts of other jurisdictions in the 
Yukos-related (mostly extradition) cases and to the European Court of Human Rights. 884 
The purpose of such submission in extradition cases was the confirmation of the political 
prosecution of Khodorkovsky's allies under the `umbrella" of the Yukos case and in 
compliance with the European treaties and laws of a particular country. 885 The decisions of 
the extradition and other courts, were submitted to the European Court of Human Rights 
with the same goal: to prove violation of Article 18 of the convention - "Limitations on use 
of the restrictions of rights", i. e. that Khodorkovsky's and his friend's detention, 
prosecution and sentencing have been "for other purposes"; namely to strip Khodorkovsky 
of his assets, and to silence him as a political threat to the Presidential Administration 886 
The arguements concerning the situation in Russia, have been reviewed in the section 
on the Rule of Law in Russia, history of the company and the first section of this chapter. 
All of them confirm that the state of the Rule of Law, the retreat of the democratic 
freedoms and the growing strength of the Siloviki regime, created the conditions for a 
politically motivated and selective prosecution in Russia. 
The arguements related to Khodorkovsky's political and public ambitions, can be 
summarised in an assessment of whether Khodorkovsky's political and public activities 
881 See eg "Common Action" Initiative Group, 'On Persons Being Prosecuted for Political Reasons in the 
Russian Federeation' (2004) 3 June "Common Action" IG Presscenter 1 <http: //odgroup. narod. rut>accessed 
2 March 2007; All Russian News. Com, 'Legal Experts Have Declared Khodorkovsky the Political Prisoner'. 
982 See eg "Common Action" Initiative Group, 'Public Hearings in Connection with Khodorkovsky - Lebedev 
and Pichugin - "Yukos" Case and Socio-Political Situation in Russia'" (2004) Lebedev presscenter 32 
<http: //www. lebedevtrial. conVpdfs/publik_eng. pdf>accessed 3 March 2007. 
183 Group Sovest, "'Sovest" Group Appeal to the Organisation «Amnesty International» on Recognition of 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky as Political Prisoner' (2006) <http: //amnesty. sovest. org/20060626_ AppealAl 
full_eng. htm>accessed 26 June 2006. 
884 See eg Schmidt's Witness Statement [Russian Federation v Temerko] (Bow Street Magistrates' Court 12 
December 2005). 
995 See eg Russian Federation v Dmitry Maruev et al; Russian Federation v Temerko. 
886 See eg Khodorkovsky (2) v Russia (App no 11082/06) ECHR (21 September 2006). 
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could represent any threat to the Siloviki regime and to Putin personally. 887 Both 
Khodorkovsky's opponents and supporters, agree that his political activities, including the 
strengthening of his position in the Duma, the sponsorship of the opposition political 
parties, the development of educational and charitable projects and his closeness to the 
certain Western circles, played an important role in his prosecution. 88$ Some researchers 
add also an anti-Semitic position of Siloviki. 889 However, this arguement has been spoilt by 
Khodorkovsky himself. In his final speech in the courtroom, he completely denied 
harbouring political ambitions. 890 The more precise position on these arguements is that 
leaders of the Siloviki coalition, including the notorious Igor Sechin, managed to persuade 
Putin that Khodorkovsky represented a significant political threat. 91 
Khodorkovsky's supporters have gained particular success in promoting the third 
group of arguements, concerning the right to a fair and open trial, degrading treatment, 
access to counsel and other similar violations. 892 Their concerns have been heard at an 
international level and have been supported by numerous governmental and public 
organisations, amongst those the most important are PACE, the U. S. Senate and, partly, 
Amnesty International. The international concerns have ultimately crystallised in the recent 
statement of Amnesty International "New Trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon 
Lebedev Must Meet International Fair Trial Standards", which names areas of particular 
international attention such as: (i) the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare 
defence and (ii) the harassment of the legal team. 893 Khodorkovsky's supporters have 
greatly contributed to the events unfolding around other Yukos-related individuals, for 
887 See eg -, 'The Tycoon and the President' (2005) May 19 Economist. com 5 <http: //www. cdi. org/ 
russia/johnson/9290-26. cfun>accessed 2 March 2007. 
888 See eg Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 5)'; Perekrest, 'Khodorkovsky (Part 4)'; Amsterdam and Peroff, 
'White Paper'. 
889 Kvurt, 'Selective Prosecution in Russia - Myth or Reality' 133-34. 
890 Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court'. 
891 See eg M Franchetti, 'Jailed Tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky 'Framed' by Key Putin Aide' (2008) 18 May 
Times online <http: //www. timesonline. co. uk/toVnews/world/europe/ artic1e3953694. ece? print=yes&r.. > 
accessed 18 May 2008. 
892 The best benchmark is the recent ECHR decision on the Lebedev case. See Lebedev v Russia (4493/04) 
(Unreported, 25 October 2007) ECHR. 
893 Amnesty International, 'Russian Federation: New Trial of Mikhail Khodorkovskii and Platon Lebedev 
Must Meet International Fair Trial Standards' (2007) <http: //web. amnesty. org/library/pdf/ 
EUR460522007ENGLISH/$File/EUR4605207. pdf>accessed 7 December 2007. 
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example, in the case of Vassily Alexanian 894On the problem of the denial of his access to 
the medical services, the European Court of Human Rights has issued three rulings 895 The 
arguementation concerning the procedural violations in the Khodorkovsky and Lebedev 
case is also supported by the European Court of Human Rights, which enumerated several 
procedural violations in its recent decision on the first Lebedev case. 896 
As can be seen from the brief analysis of the defendants' arguementation there are 
several elements for establishing "political motivated prosecution" in the Khodorkovsky 
and Yukos cases. An exception to this is Khodorkovsky's personal reluctance to recognise 
his political ambitions. The arguements of the most authoritative bodies on the political 
motivation aspect in the Yukos case are reviewed in detail below. 
3.6.2. Factors, Undermining the Political Motivation Argumentation in 
the Yukos Case. 
For a comprehensive picture of the "political motivation" position in the Yukos case, 
it is important to summarise the arguements that may prejudice the political motivated 
persecution arguementation in the case, during court hearings or public debates. Amongst 
these factors the most evident are: 
1. Yukos and its core shareholders, like other oligarchy groups, pursued the policy 
of close connections with the State and its institutions. The Group not only actively 
recruited former high rank officials, but also successfully transferred its high rank 
managers to the Government and the Duma. 
897 
894 See St. Petersburg International Collegium of Advocates, Vasily Aleksanyan Case Information' (2008) 
<http: //www. mka-london. co. uk/docs. asp>accessed 1 May 2008. 
895 See V Alexanyan, Testimony before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation' (2008) 22 January 
Robert Amsterdam Blog <httpJ/www. roberta. msterdam. com/2008/01/vasily_alexanyan_addresses the. htm> 
accessed 24 January 2007. 
896 See Lebedev v Russia. 
897 See Appendix 14. 
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2. Khodorkovsky had always been a one of the most visible and active members of 
the "oligarch" club, 898 a member of the notorious "Club of , 899 and a participant in 
all the important meetings with both presidents. 00 
3. The company promoted itself and its top managers as a company with a "state 
mentality" that found its expression in sponsorship and participation in the state-promoted 
programmes 901 
4. Since the beginning of the attack on the Company none of its top managers has 
ever made any remarks which could be understood as remarks "against the State or the 
President. , 902 
5. Whilst in detention, Khodorkovsky desperately attempted to employ his favourite 
strategy of negotiation to achieve a compromise with the President or "Siloviki" that would 
allow him to lose a part, but keep the whole. This strategy can be ascertained from his 
publications that were `written' in detention. For example, in his message "Liberalism in 
Crisis: What Is to Be Done? " He writes: 
For many of our businessmen (though certainly not all), Russia is not their 
homeland, but merely a free hunting ground. 
... The president 
is an institution that guarantees the country's territorial 
integrity and stability... 
We must accept that 90 percent of the population considers the results of 
privatisation to be unjust, and its beneficiaries not to be legitimate owners ... 
903 
6. In 2003-2004, whilst still under the indirect control of the "old" cores 
shareholders, Yukos made repeated attempts to reach a settlement agreement with the State 
and pay a fraction of its tax bill. 
904 
898 See Helque, 'The Oligarchs and the President: A Farce in Three Acts'. 
899 See M Ivanov, The Power of Seven' (2001) July bid 56. 
900 See Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia 100-27,77-442. 
901 --, 'Yukos Is One of the Founders of a New International Energy Prize' 
(2002) 5 (11) YUKOS Rev 25-27, 
25. 
902 The U. S. Council on Foreign Relations, 'A Conversation with Simon Kukes' (2004) <http: /www. cfr. org/ 
publication/6759/conversation_withSimon kukes. html>accessed 9 April 2007 (Kukes' interview). 
903 M Khodorkovsky, 'A Turn to the Left' (2005) 1 August Vedomosti <http: /www. khodorkovskytrial. com/ 
pdfs/mbk left. pdi>accessed 14 September 2006. 
904 Gateway to Russia, 'Yukos Agrees to Become State Company' (2004) <http: //www. gateway2russia. com 
/st/art 243419. php>accessed 7 April 2007; Kommersant. com, 'Yukos Asking for Mercy' (2004) 15 June 
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The above arguements have been used by the media and Khodorkovsky's opponents 
to prove that the political factor in the case, while appearing strong, is simply a result of 
manipulation 905 
3.6.3. The Position of the Council of Europe. 
The most significant international initiative was the PACE decision to appoint a 
special representative for the preparation of the independent report on the Case for the 
Assembly. A former German Minister of Justice, Mrs Sabine Leutheusser- 
Schnarrenberger, was appointed as a Special Rapporteur. She travelled to Russia, 
conducted several meetings with Russian officials, Khodorkovsky's lawyers and other 
people involved in the Case, and submitted her report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe .m 
In her report, Mrs Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger pointed out that facts, pointing to 
serious procedural violations committed by different law enforcement agencies against 
former leading Yukos executives, had been corroborated during her visits, whilst some 
allegations appear to have been exaggerated by the defence team. 907 However, on balance, 
the findings put into question the fairness, impartiality and objectivity of the authorities, 
which appear to have acted excessively in disregard of fundamental rights of the defence 
guaranteed by the Russian Criminal Procedure Code and by the ECHR 
908 
The most important violations, enumerated in the report are: 
Kommersant Online <http: /www. kommersant. coni/p-1031/YUKOS_Asking_for Mercy/>aecessed 20 
March 2007. 
905 See eg Komisar, 'Yukos Kingpin on Trial. Billionaite Mikhail Khodorkovsky Faces the Music in Moscow. 
Are the Charges Politically Motivated?. 
Presscenter, 'Timeline of Events' (2003) <http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/timelinet>accessed 3 March 
2007; S Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, The Circumstances Surrounding the Arrest and Prosecution of 
Leading Yukos Executives (2004) pars 14,62-68 <http: //assembly. coe. int/Documents/WorkingDocs/ 
Doc04/EDOC10368. htm>accessed 15 April 2006. 
907 Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Prosecution ofLeading Yukos Executives summary. 
908 ibid 76-79. 
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- shortcomings in medical attention to several former Yukos executives in prison in 
the face of serious concerns about their health; 909 
- unjustified restrictions on the publicity of certain court proceedings; 
910 
- several violations pertaining access of lawyers to their clients; 
911 
- search and seizure of documents in the defence lawyers' offices, summons of 
lawyers for questioning on their clients' cases and alleged eavesdropping against defence 
lawyers; 912 
- denial of bail (regarding Khodorkovsky); 
913 
In respect of the general situation unfolding around the Company, the Rapporteur 
summarised: 
... the presence of an 
interest of the State that exceeds its normal interest in 
criminal justice being done and includes such elements as: to weaken an 
outspoken political opponent, to intimidate other wealthy individuals, and to 
regain control over "strategic" economic assets - can hardly be denied. 
This assessment is based on the conjunction of (a) the accumulation of 
procedural violations and the absence of adequate safeguards against 
government interference in court proceedings, (b) information pointing at 
Yukos executives being deprived of their main assets, and (c) other items 
relevant to the "political" or "economic" circumstances of the proceedings 
against the leading Yukos executives 914 
In a matter of the "political" circumstances surrounding the attack on Yukos and its 
leading executives, the Rapporteur focused on Khodorkovsky's financial support for 
opposition groups, Yukos as business competitor of State-controlled Rosneft and Gazprom 
and a campaign of intimidation against Mr Khodorkovsky and his associates. 
15 
"9 ibid 8-15. 
9'o ibid 45-51. 
91 ibid 31-42. 
912 ibid 31-37. 
913 ibid 16-19. 
914 ibid 57-58. 
915 ibid 69-77. 
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The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in its Resolution passed in 
January 2005, established violations of the rule of law in the legal proceedings against 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. 916 
... the circumstances surrounding the arrest and prosecution of the leading Yukos executives strongly suggest that they are a clear case of non-conformity 
with the rule of law and that these executives were - in violation of the 
principle of equality before the law - arbitrarily singled out by the authorities... 
Intimidating action by different law-enforcement agencies against Yukos, its 
business partners, and other institutions linked to Mr Khodorkovsky and his 
associates and the careful preparation of this action in terms of public relations, 
taken together, give a picture of a co-ordinated attack by the state. 917 
The Parliamentary Assembly has requested from the Committee of Ministers, i. e. the 
Governments of Europe, to call upon the Russian Federation to introduce necessary 
judicial reforms with a view to strengthen its independence. 9'8 
The general importance of the PACE findings for the Khodorkovsky defence cannot 
be overestimated. Although, their "quasi-legal" nature is evident, the PACE Resolution has 
been used in numerous statements and applications, aimed at establishing the political 
motivation in the Case. 919 
3.6.4. European Court of Human Rights and the Yukos Case: a Long 
Way to Run. 
There are several applications filed with ECHR by Yukos-related individuals and the 
Yukos Oil Company itself, 920 concerning different types of violations, made during the 
916 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 'The Circumstances Surrounding the Arrest and 
Prosecution of Leading Yukos Executives' Resolution 1418 Doc No 14 (2005) <http: // 
assembly. coe. int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/ERES1418. htm ftnl>accessed 15 April 2007 (hereinafter - 
"PACE Res Ns 1418') pars 8. 
917 ibid para 9-11. 
91S ibid para 16-17. 
919 See eg Osborne, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 'Democracy on the Retreat in 
Russia'". 
920 See the data on the main Yukos-related ECHR applications in Appendix 12. 
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Khodorkovsky-Yukos case 921 These applications are mainly based on the arguements, 
quoted in the previous paragraphs, detailed and supplemented by various arguements and 
factual data. 922 The problem with the European Court of Human Rights cases is the general 
slowness in reviewing the application, which diminishes the practical significance of the 
ECHR decisions for applicants 923 
In October 2007, the European Court of Human Rights reviewed the first case 
brought before the court by the Yukos- related individuals. The case of Platon Lebedev, 
who was sentenced to eight years together with Khodorkovsky, concerned the issues of his 
arrest and preliminary detention. The European Court of Human Rights found that Russia 
had violated the former Yukos executive [Platon Lebedev]'s rights by holding him before 
trial without the necessary legal orders. The court decision mentioned five violations of 
Article 5 of the Convention, pointing out that one time Lebedev was in detention for a 
week without any court decision, several times the decisions on his detention were taken in 
his absence, and several times the Moscow City Court delayed the review of Lebedev's 
appeals on extension of his detention 924 It ordered Russia to pay him £10,000, or about 
$15,500, in compensation. 925 Although the decision does not say anything about the 
political motivation of the case, simply mentioning procedural violations that are quite 
common in Russia, the reaction of the Russian authorities was vigorous. The Russian 
Ministry of Justice announced that Russia would file a request under the Rule 73 of the 
Court926 that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. 927 It shows that the battle between 
921 There are more applications on the Yukos-related cases already filed with ECHR, but some of them can be 
regarded as "secondary", being under `umbrella' of the core ones. See eg Kommersant. com, Yukos 
Executive Goes to European Court' (2007) 4 July Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. com/ 
p779832/YUKOS_Trial_Pereverzin/>accessed 5 July 2007; Presscenter, 'Lebedev Submits Third Appeal to 
Strasbourg'. 
922 See for the main arguements of the ECHR applications Appendix 13. 
923 The recently decided first Lebedev's case was filed almost four years ago, so the group of applications 
filed by Khodorkovsky and Lebedev in 2006, are likely to be reviewed in 2010 when their first term almost 
expires. See also Gololobov and Tanega, 'Yukos Risk' 574-76. 
924 See Lebedev v Russia (App No. 4493/04) (2007) ECHR <http: //www. echr. coe. int>accessed 27 October 
2007. 
925 The Associated Press, 'Human Rights Court: Yukos Manager's Rights Breached During Arrest' (2007) 25 
October International Herald Tribune<http: //www. iht. com/articles/ap/2007/10/25/europetEU-GEN- 
European-Court-Russia. php>accessed 25 October 2007. 
926 See Resistry ofthe Court, Rules of the Court (2007) <http: //www. echr. coe. int/NR/rdonlyres/D1EB31A8- 
4194-436E-987E-65AC8864BE4F/0/RulesOfCourt. pdf>accessed 22 October 2007. 
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Khodorkovsky and his allies and Russia in the European Court of Human Rights is likely 
928 to begin 
3.6.5. "Political Motivation" and International Case Law. 
Although the issues of "political motivation" in the Yukos/Khodorkovsky case have 
been addressed by several political, human rights bodies and even governments, 929 
international case law provides just a few examples when presence of "political 
motivation" in the Khodorkovsky case would have been recognised by western courts. 
There are several remarks and comments that have been made by different courts 
while reviewing Yukos-related cases, which may help the other courts to confirm the 
presence of "political motivation" in the case. For example, the U. S. Bankruptcy court in 
the Chapter 11 case noted "... it appears likely that agencies of the Russian government 
have acted [in the Yganskneftegas action] in a manner that would be considered 
confiscatory under United States law. "930 
The core decisions confirming the presence of "political motivation" in the 
Khodorkovsky/Yukos case, have been brought in the Bow Street Magistrates' Court931 in 
927 M Lepina and A Miklashevskay, 'Lebedev Upheld in Strasbourg Court' (2007) 26 October Kommersant 
Online <http: /www. kommersant. ru/doc. aspx? docsid=818951>accessed 28 October 2007. 
928 See Platon Lebedev's Defence Team, 'Platon Lebedev Statement' (2007) 25 October Robert Amsterdam 
Blog <http: //www. robertamsterdam. com/2007/10/Platon_lebedev_statement. htm>accessed 25 October 2007. 
929 See eg Platon Lebedev Press Center, U. S. State Department Details Human Rights Concerns of Yukos 
Case' (2007) Platon Lebedev Press Center <http: //www. lebedevtrial. com/support/human_rights/state_7 
March2007. cfin>accessed 30 March 2007. 
930 Re Yukos Oil Company 2005 WL 517959 (Bankr SD Tex 2005) 408. 
931 The Bow Street Magistrates' Court was closed on July 14,2006, with the caseload moved to Hiorseferry 
Road Magistrates' Court, now renamed City of Westminster Magistrates' Court. See BBC, 'Bow Street Court 
Closes Its Doors' (2006) 14 July BBC News <http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/england/london/5179270. stm> 
accessed 26 December 2007. 
202 
the two extradition cases 932 In both cases, the Russian Federation sought extradition of the 
Yukos-related individuals for financial crimes 933 
In the proceedings, the defence advanced the following arguements to prevent the 
extradition of the individuals, who were pursued by the Russian Federation: 
Section 81(a) (extraneous considerations) [of the Extradition Act of 2003] - the 
request is made "for the purpose of prosecuting him or punishing him on account of 
his-political opinions". 934 
Section 81(b) (extraneous considerations) [of the Extradition Act of 2003] - says 
that 'he [the persecuted person] might, if returned be prejudiced at his trial or punished, 
detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his political opinions". 935 
Section 87 [of the Extradition Act of 2003] - Human Rights - it is said that his [the 
persecuted person] rights under the European Convention particularly under Articles 3,6 
and 18 will be violated if he is returned and that he would not receive a fair trial 
936 
Having considered the positions of the parties, the Court rejected both requests for 
extradition, pointing out in the case of Russian Federation v. Maruev and Chernisheva: 
... Khodorkovsky was seen as a powerful political opponent of 
Mr Putin. In view 
of the facts ... I am satisfied that 
It is more likely than not that the prosecution 
of Mr Khodorkovsky is politically motivated. As the allegation against these 
defendants is on the basis of a conspiracy with Mr Khodorkovsky, in my view it 
is the inevitable conclusion that the Prosecution of these two defendants is also 
937 politically motivated. 
This remark has emphasised the problem experienced by the Russian judicial system: 
... 
in respect of this particular case, I am satisfied that it is so politically 
motivated that there is a substantial risk that the Judges of the Moscow City 
court would succumb to political interference in a way which would call into 
question their independence. I have therefore after very careful consideration 
932 Russian Federation v Dmitry Maruev et al; Russian Federation v Temerko. For a comprehensive list of 
Yukos-related extradition cases see Appendix 11. 
933 See Russia Attracts British Lawyer to Get Extradition for Yukos Official' Kommers (Moscow 8 
November 2005) 3. 
934 Russian Federation v Temerko 2. 
935 ibid. 
936 ibid. 
937 ibid 4. 
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come to the conclusion that a fair trial of these two defendants is likely to be 
prejudiced by their political opinions and the opinions of those associated with 
them 938 
The arguementation used by the Judge was primarily based on the two reports to the 
Council of Europe, whose rapporteurs had been monitoring Russia's obligations, 939 and the 
experts' opinions, concerning the problems of the Russian judicial system: 940 `There was a 
long established pattern in the USSR of political leaders using criminal prosecutions (and 
often the mere threat of prosecution) as tools in struggles with their colleagues and 
opponents. ' This pattern has continued in post-Soviet Russia... '941 
One of the arguements, used extensively in the Temerko case, was the interrogation 
of defence lawyers, considering which the judge quoted the statement of one of 
Khodorkovsky's lawyers Yuri Schmidt. 942 This arguement was supplemented by the 
Professor Bowring's statement on his personal intimidation in a Russian airport, when his 
visa was cancelled and he was deported 943 In Russian Federation v Temerko the Judge 
stated: 
I have come to the conclusion that the motivation for the charges against Mr 
Temerko is inextricably entwined with the motivation for the prosecution of Mr 
Khodorkovsky. I therefore find that the prosecution of Mr Temerko is 
politically motivated and the request for his extradition is made for the purpose 
prosecuting or punishing him on account of his political opinions. 44 
Based on the two core cases, decided in the UK, 945 and similar arguementation 
(Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution No 1418, etc. ), the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Lithuania overruled the Vilnius District Administrative Court in 
the case Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Lithuania v The Migration 
"s ibid 5. 
939 ibid 4. 
940 See Russian Federation v Maruev et al Bowring 's Exp Rep (Bow Street Magistrates' Court 14 January 
2005). 
941ibid 6-7. 
942 Russian Federation v Temerko 5. 
943 ibid. 
944 ibid. 
gas On other Yukos-realted extradition cases see MosNews, 'Russia Asks Extradition of Former Yukos 
Executive Held in Italy; Kommersant. com, 'Khodorkovsky Accomplice Freed in Cyprus'; Krutilin, 'Criminal 
Alphabet ofYukos'. 
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Department, which granted the refugee status to one more Yukos-related individual I. 
Babenko, and stated: 
.. the 
data collected in the materials of the request for asylum prove, without a 
doubt, that the so-called "Yukos (Mikhail Khodorkovsky's)" trial in the 
Russian Federation was politicized, i. e., the circumstances of the criminal 
prosecution suggest that the interest of the State's action in these cases goes 
beyond the mere pursuit of criminal justice, to include such elements as to 
weaken an outspoken political opponent and to regain control of strategic 
economic assets. 46 
In Cyprus, The Nicosia District Court, reviewing an extradition case of another 
Yukos manager Vladislav Kartashov also remarked: 
In this case it is not important to determine whether (Kartashov) has any 
political views or whether he participated in any way in the political life in 
Russia.. . What is important is that the charges brought against him fall within 
the wider framework of the Yukos case. As a manager of a company 
connected with Yukos, the respondent must be considered as a member of the 
class of the "oligarchs", a class which the Russian authorities set as their 
political aim to dissolve ... 
947 
The most recent and most significant decision, based on the arguement of the 
presence of the political prosecution, is the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court on 
several Russian requests on mutual assistance sent to Switzerland between 2003-2006. The 
court declared that the political and discriminatory nature of the proceedings in Russia 
(against Khodorkovsky) was reinforced by the violations of guarantees respecting human 
rights and the right to a defence, apparently committed during the full length of the case. 94$ 
The decision said that Russian authorities' pursuit of what was once Russia's largest oil 
company had a "political and discriminatory character ... underlined by the infringement 
of human rights and of the [infringement of the] right to defence. 049 The legal actions 
against the company were organised, according to the ruling: "by the powers in place with 
the goal of putting to heel the class of rich people known as 'oligarchs' and sidelining 
9" No. A14-2193/06 (The Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania 15 October 2006). 
947 Russian Federation v Kartasov Vladislav Nicolay [2008] Nicosia Dis Court App NN 2/07 (In the Matter of 
the 95/70 Extradition Law) (Cyp) 53. 
948 See C Binham, 'Swiss Court Refuses Russian Bid for Yukos Assets' (2007) 24 August The Lawyer. com 
<http. i/www. thelawyer. com/cgi-bin/item. cgi? id=128027&d=122&h=24&f=46>accessed 24 August 2007; 
Thomson Financial, 'Swiss Court Refuses Russian Govt Legal Assistance in Yukos Case' (2007) 
<http: //www. hemscott. com/news/latest-news/item. do? newsId=48500918741984>accessed 23 August 2007. 
949 Bundesgerich [BGer] [Federal Court] 13 August 2007 14 para 3. 
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potential or declared political adversaries". 950 The Swiss court noticed that the facts 
surrounding the allegations remained obscure 951 The court finally declared that judicial 
assistance could not be granted, in compliance with article 2 of the Swiss federal law on 
international judicial assistance in criminal matters. 952 
Another decision, criticizing the tax attack on Yukos and indirectly confirming 
presence of the political motivation in the Yukos case, was brought in the Dutch court. 953 
On the Yukos bankruptcy procedure in Holland the court stated: 
... the way 
in which the additional tax assessment owed by Yukos Oil was 
assessed first by the Russian Tax Ministry and subsequently by the tax court 
cannot stand the test of criticism. .. The subsequent hearing before the tax court 
and the appeal are in violation of the fundamental principles of due process of 
law as generally accepted in the Netherlands and outlined in article 6 ECHR, 
but which also apply outside the sphere of applicability of that article of the 
convention... The conclusion must be, therefore, that in the course of the 
determination of the tax it owed to the Russian State, Yukos Oil was deprived 
of a fair tria19M 
Therefore the existing international case law shows that courts of different 
jurisdictions tend to recognise the presence of "political motivation" element in the Yukos- 
related extradition cases, although the high-ranking international judicial instances, such as 
ECHR have not yet had their say. 
3.6.6. The Position of Amnesty International and Others. 
The discussions concerning the recognition of Khodorkovsky as a `political 
prisoner" began soon after his detention. Several attempts have been made by different 
9s0 ibid 17 para 4. 
951 ibid 16. 
952 ibid. 
953 See Kommersant. com, Yukos Isn't Bankrupt in Holland' (2007) 1 November Kommersant Online 
<http: //www. kommersant. com/p820973/Yukos bankrupt Hollandhaccessed 5 November 2007; Reuters, 
'Dutch Court Voids Yukos Bankruptcy in Netherlands'. 
954 Godfrey et all Yukos Oil Company et al Rechtbank (Rb) [District Court of Amsterdam] Amsterdam 31 
oktober 2007,355622/HA ZA 06-3612 (Neth) 15 <httpi/www. zoeken. rechtspraak. nl>accessed 19 November 
2007. 
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NGOs to declare Khodorkovsky and his allies "political prisoners". Amongst them were 
the "Common Action Initiative", 955 the "All Russian Social Movement For Human 
Rights", 956 "Sovest (Conscience)", 957 and groups of the Russian writers, artists and 
academics958 together with human rights advocates. 959 Some of them went as far as 
granting the status of "political prisoner" to Khodorkovsky and Lebedev independently. 960 
Due to the internationally recognised status of Amnesty International as the top-level 
authority in this area, the relevant submissions have been filed with its head office 961 
One of the most important decisions, emphasizing the existence of "political 
motivation" in the Khodorkovsky case was the Resolution of the U. S. Senate "Expressing 
the view of the Senate on the trial, sentencing, and imprisonment of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev"2 In this Resolution, the Senate, amongst other 
things, stressed several points, important for the "political status" of the 
Khodorkovsky/Yukos case: 
915 "Common Action" Initiative Group, 'On Persons Being Prosecuted for Political Reasons in the Russian 
Federeation'. 
956 All-Russian Social Movement 'Tor Human Rights", 'Appeal for Recognition of RF Citizens Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev as Political Prisoners' (2004) Presscenter 9 
<http: //www. lebedevtrial. com/pdfs/ammnesty_8-3-04. pdf>accessed 21 March 2007. 
917 Group Sovest, 'On Recognition of Russian Citizens Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky and Platon L. Lebedev 
Political Prisoners (Appeal to Amnesty International)' (2005) <http: //www. sovest. org/gb/appeal_to MA 
220205_gb. htm>accessed 10 April 2007. 
958 L Akhedzhakova and others, 'Leading Cultural and Scientific Figures Demand Political Prisoner Status for 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky' (2005) Moscow Human Rights Bureau <http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/ 
human rights/archive/I 33313. html>accessed 20 March 2007. 
959 Prominent Members of Russian Civil Society, 'Appeal of the Representatives of Russian Civil Society' 
(2005) Presscenter 3 <httpJ/www. khodorkovsky. info/docs/civil_society_appeal. pdf accessed 22 November 
2006. 
%0 See International Society for Human Rights, Human Rights Court to Review Verdicts on Khodorkovsky 
and Lebedev - Judiciary and Media in Russia Follow Line of the Kremlin (International Society for Human 
Rights, Frankfurt 2005) <httpJAvww. mbktrial. com/pdfs/ISHR. pdf>accessed 20 November 2006. 
961 On the status and mandate of Amnesty International see ICE Cox, 'Should Amnesty International Expand 
Its Mandate to Cover Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights' (1999)16 Ariz J Int'l & Comp L 261-84. 
%2 See Expressing the sense of the Senate on the trial, sentencing and imprisonment of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev S Res 322 [109th] (2005). 
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1) The criminal justice system in Russia has not accorded Khodorkovsky and 
Lebedev fair, transparent, and impartial treatment under the laws of the Russian 
Federation; 963 
2) The criminal cases against Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, and their associates are 
politically motivated; 964 
3) In cases dealing with perceived political threats to the authorities, the judiciary of 
Russia is an instrument of the Kremlin, and such a judiciary is not truly independent 965 
As seen from the resolution, the issues of the Rule of Law in Russian in general and 
the judicial system in particular were the focus of Senate attention. 
However, after lengthy consideration, Amnesty International refused to recognize 
Khodorkovsky as a political prisoner, although it did call the trial of the former Yukos 
CEO as politically motivated. 966 The position of the INGO looked rather obscure as 
Amnesty International has criticised the Russian government before, 967 including the 
Khodorkovsky case as well 968 In its statement, Amnesty International emphasized several 
important points: 
- Russian human rights organisations and individuals believe that Khodorkovsky is 
being persecuted for his political activities. 
-A court in the United Kingdom in one of the extradition hearings concluded: "it is 
more likely than not that the prosecution of Khodorkovsky is politically motivated". 
969 
- PACE noted that the circumstances of the arrest and prosecution of leading Yukos 
executives suggest that the interest of the State's action in these cases goes beyond the 
963 ibid 3. 
964ibid 4. 
95 ibid 4. 
966 A Arutunyan and 0 Liakhovich, 'Amnesty International: Khodorkovsky Not a Political Prisoner' (2007) 
12 The Moscow News-corn 1 <httpi/english. mn. ra/english/issue. php? 2005-15-12>accessed 30 March 2007. 
967 Amnesty International, Rough Justice: The Law and Human Rights in the Russian Federation (Amnesty 
International Publications 2003) 100. 
%8 See Amnesty International, 'Russian Federation' (2005) <http: //www. amnestyusa. org/ 
countries/russian federation/document. 
do? id=80256DD4.. >accessed 9 March 2007. 
969 Russian Federation v Dmitry Maruev et al. 
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mere pursuit of criminal justice, to include such elements as to weaken an outspoken 
political opponent, to intimidate other wealthy individuals and to regain control of strategic 
economic assets. 
However, finally Amnesty International only demanded a fair trial for 
Khodorkovsky, regardless of the state's political basis for the accusations: 970 
"Nevertheless, irrespective of whether or not the charges are politically motivated, the 
Russian authorities must ensure that Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his associates receive a 
fair trial. 071 
Later, on the conviction of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, Amnesty International issued 
one more statement pointing out that: 
Amnesty International believes that the concerns in these cases are indicative of 
wider problems in the criminal justice system in the Russian Federation relating 
to the independence of the judiciary; access to effective legal counsel; 
conditions of detention; and the use of torture and ill-treatment in order to 
extract confessions 972 
There are several reasons on which Amnesty based its position. One of 
Khodorkovsky's lawyers commented that Amnesty International could not declare 
Khodorkovsky a political prisoner because he was wealthy. 973 The second reason is that 
Amnesty International now pays more attention to the application of fair trial rules to 
everyone, rather than exclusively to political prisoners 974 The third point was that the 
NGO had no proof that Khodorkovsky was in prison solely because of his peaceful 
political activities. 
75 That was quite evident from Khordorkovsky's final statement, 976 in 
970 Amnesty International, 'Russian Federation: The Case of Mikhail Khodorkovskii and Other Individuals 
Associated with Yukos'. 
971 ibid. 
972 Amnesty International, 'Russian Federation: On the Conviction of Mikhail Khodorkovskii and Platon 
Lebedev' (2005) 148 Public Statement 2 <http: //www. amnestyusa. org/news/document. do? id= 
80256DD400782B8480256FE000>accessed 30 March 2007. 
973 0 Popova, 'Schmidt: Prosecution Slapped Its Head' (2005) 4 April Delo <http: //get. adsmart. ru/ 
366/4. html>accessed 25 March 2007. 
974 A Kuznetsov, 'Khodorkovskomu Ne Udalos' Stat' Uznikom Sovesti [Khodorkovsky Failed to Be Declared 
"Prisoner of Conscious"]' (2007) 3 April Lenta. RU <http: //lenta. ru/articles/2005/ 04/14/amnisty/>accessed 27 
March 2007. 
975 Arutunyan and Liakhovich, 'Amnesty International: Khodorkovsky Not a Political Prisoner'. 
976 See Khodorkovsky, 'Final Statement to Meshchansky Court'. 
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which he attempted to assure Putin that he had no political plans and that he was harmless 
to his regime and deserved a suspended sentence 977 Therefore, Amnesty International 
found the political element in Khodorkovsky insufficient to declare him a `political 
prisoner", even though they recognized the presence of "politically motivated prosecution" 
and a "political trial". Possibly, having reviewed the appeals filed by the Russian human 
rights organisations, 978 Amnesty International may reconsider its position as there are 
powerful arguements for and against Khodorkovsky's recognition as a political prisoner, 
but for now the situation regarding his status remains unclear, regardless of the positions of 
human rights activists. 979 
3.7. Conclusion. 
The problem of political motivation is recognised as the core "pillar" of the 
Khodorkovsky-Yukos case. The real fight between the defence lawyers and the 
prosecution unfolds around this "pillar". Since the beginning of the case the defence 
lawyers have been attempting to prove, both publicly and legally, the presence of a strong 
political thrust in the case. As the Khodorkovsky-Yukos case branched out, the political 
rhetoric began to be extensively used by the lawyers representing other victims of the 
prosecution. 
Although the political motivation in the case is recognised by the independent mass 
media, NGOs and deeply felt by the some sections of the public, its legal recognition still 
encounters significant problems. These problems stem both from the complicated and 
ambiguous system of contemporary legislation and international case law related to 
political crime, political justice and the specifics of the Khodorkovsky-Yukos case. As 
977 On the Khodorkovsky's position see eg Khodorkovsky, 'Personal Property and Freedom'; M 
Khodorkovsky, "I Am Not at All Sure Whether Putin Is Going to Thank Them for That" (2007) 1 
<http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/statements/134795. htm1>accessed 25 March 2007. 
979 Arutunyan and Liakhovich, 'Amnesty International: Khodorkovsky Not a Political Prisoner'. 
979 L Alekseeva, My Ne KPSS - My Ne Soglasny S Amnesti Internashional [We Are Not the Communist 
party - We Disagree with 
Amnesty International]' (2006) Natsional'nyi Zhurnal [National Journal] 
. <http: //nationaljournal. ru/interview/2007-02-09/ ukosalekseeva/17>accessed 
20 March 2007; All Russian 
News. COm, 'Legal Experts Have Declared Khodorkovsky the Political Prisoner. 
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mentioned previously, the main condition for the case was the state of the Russian Rule of 
Law, which allowed the instrumentalisation of the Russian judicial system and put it under 
the close control of the new Russian political elite. 
The key problem in the sphere of political crime and justice is the complete absence 
of internationally recognised definitions of these notions. There is no recognised legal 
definition for the term "political persecution", thus its substance can be perceived only 
through the other notions, related to political criminology such as: "political crime", 
"political prisoner" and "political justice". However, whilst being subject to the lengthy 
discussions, these terms also lack clarity, which raises problems in application of the 
relevant concepts in practice. 
A number of theoreticians have concluded that there is a lack of a conventional 
definition of "political crime", and such a definition can hardly be created. The core reason 
for this is the general unwillingness of almost all the states to create such an international 
playing field that would interfere with their internal and external politics, leaving their 
governments no room for political manoeuvring. 
Although being subject to continuous academic scrutiny, the notion of a "political 
crime" is of practical importance. It is as important as the definitions of "political offence 
exception" and "serious non-political" crime, which are key in circumstances of 
extradition. Having a long and ambiguous history, the "political offence exception" serves 
to prevent the extradition of those who are suspected of being prosecuted for motives, 
other than their real commitments. According to the formula, incorporated in many 
treaties, extradition shall not be granted if the offence, for which extradition is requested, is 
regarded by the requested State as an offence of a political nature. 
It should be noted that the EU and worldwide approach to the concept of the 
"political crime" and the "political offence exception" has substantially changed during the 
last two decades. An important reason for this is the growing terrorist threat and general 
unwillingness of the nations to grant protection to terrorists. Moreover, EU countries have 
moved even further and have eliminated the notion of the political crime in the context of 
extradition inside the EU, reasoning that EU legislation already grants alleged offenders a 
high level of rights and warranties. 
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The concept of the "political offence exception" is linked to the protection of 
political refugees, i. e. those individuals who cannot return to their countries because of the 
fear of being prosecuted for the reasons of their political opinions. The mechanism of 
refugee protection was established by the Refugee Convention of 1951, which also 
provides a number of reasons, other than political opinion (such as religion, race, etc), for 
which an individual cannot return to his native country for fear of being prosecuted. 
Having a number of conceptual differences and similarities, both the "Political 
offence exception" and the "political refugee" concept, are aimed at providing legal 
defence to an individual who has either escaped from his/her country, or who does not 
want return to his/her homeland because of "political reasons", e. g. for involvement in 
political crimes, or the expression of political opinions. 
The concept of "political prisoner" which comprises an element of human rights 
protection is one more "line of defence" for individuals, the prosecution of whom bears a 
political element. Political prisoner protection is an old and well-known concept, yet it 
once again represents a problem of definition. There several definitions of "political 
prisoner" approved by different schools of thoughts. The definition approved and used by 
Amnesty International grants a "political refugee" status to individuals, prosecuted by the 
motive of religion, race, etc. Another school of thought considers political refugees as 
those who represent a threat to state security and who are therefore prosecuted. Definitions 
based on these principles are used by the U. S. administration. The definition adopted by 
PACE represents a mixture of the "government security" and the "persecuted individual" 
tests. PACE uses a series of objective criteria developed by experts to define "political 
prisoners. " 
The approach used by PACE shows the inseparable ties between the "political 
prisoner" concept and political justice. Some academics consider "political prisoners" as 
victims of political justice - the discriminatory application of the machinery of criminal 
justice to specific individuals- because they are seen as a threat to the established regime. 
The research on political prosecution through analysis of the related notions of: 
"political crime", "the political offence exception", "political refugee" and "political 
prisoner", demonstrates some conceptual similarities in the understanding of the political 
element in application to criminal law and criminal prosecution. This element can be 
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understood as the reason underlying the individual's prosecution, and having direct or 
indirect connections with politics. This political reason is different from the formal 
reasons given for the individual's prosecution. 
The selective and politically motivated treatment of Yukos, Khodorkovsky and his 
allies is recognised by different public and political forces, notably in the report of the 
PACE special reporter on the Khodorkovsky-Yukos case, and the resolution of the U. S. 
Senate on the case. There are a number of lesser known resolutions and statements, 
supporting the presence of significant procedural violations and political motivations in the 
Khodorkovsky-Yukos case. However the problem of political motivated prosecution in the 
Khodorkovsky-Yukos case has not been fully legally addressed yet. There are three main 
groups of legal decisions that mention the political motivation element in the case: the 
extradition decisions, brought by the UK and Lithuanian courts, prohibiting extradition of 
several Yukos-related individuals; the decision of the Swiss Supreme court, rejecting the 
cooperation between Russia and Switzerland in the Yukos case, and the decision in the 
U. S. Yukos bankruptcy case, containing several lines criticising the actions of the Russian 
government. The only decision on the Yukos-related case, brought so far by the European 
Court of Human Rights, is the decision on the preliminary detention of Khodorkovsky's 
friend Platon Lebedev, which only confirms several violations of the articles 5 of the 
Convention and says nothing about political motivation. Other ECHR decisions, which are 
certain to address the issues of political motivation in the case are expected in several 
years: 
The Strasbourg court has yet to address the central issues of fairness in the 
Yukos case, which triggered international criticism of the Kremlin for using the 
judicial system to muzzle political opponents and nationalize what had been the 
country's largest oil company. 980 
The current Russian regime strongly opposes any notion of political motivation in 
the case and uses every opportunity to prove that Yukos and Khodorkovsky story is solely 
about organised crime. Yet both Khodorkovsky's supporters and opponents claim that he 
had significant political ambitions. Supporters use this arguement to prove that 
Khodorkovsky has been prosecuted for his political activities. Opponents insist that he 
910 A Osborne, 'A Win for Former Yukos Hand' (2007) 26 October Wall St j 
<http: //online. wsj. com/article/SB 119332356639171445. htm1>accessed 26 October 2007. 
213 
represented and still represents a serious threat for the existing regime of "stability" as a 
potential organiser of an oligarchy coup. Khodorkovsky himself denies any political 
ambitions. Even a brief analysis of alleged Khodorkovsky's crimes shows that they have 
no political element and cannot be regarded as political. Thus, the significant political 
element in the case can be illustrated by the instrumental use of the Russian judicial system 
against Yukos and Khordorkovsky. 
Western democracies have taken the political position based on the political 
character of the Yukos case and their courts tend to reject extradition and cooperation 
requests on the case. However, his recognition as political prisoner is made difficult by a 
multitude of factors such as: the complexity of the case, its high-profile political rationale, 
the controversial character of Khodorkovsky as a representative of "oligarchy" class and 
his conciliatory position in the first trial. The Khodorkovsky-Yukos case also raises the 
controversial problem of using general fraud and money laundering charges for the 
purpose of political prosecution. 
981 Amnesty International, having rejected the first request 
for such recognition, now is reconsidering the case, but the results are not yet forthcoming. 
Together with the problem of political motivation, the Yukos case raises the problem 
of the Rule of Law in transitional economies. The turbulent Russian transition of the 1990s 
serves as a perfect example of how inconsistent judicial practice and political consideration 
completely eroded the application of the law. Business in the 1990s in Russia was 
governed by so-called "principles" - unwritten rules of interaction between business and 
the state - rather than laws. 
982 Everybody who wanted to gain any success in business was 
compelled to obey these "principles", violating the laws or creatively complying with the 
"letter of law" and not its spirit, and this effectively led to a state of affairs when "all 
fortunes in Russia have been accumulated in the most illegal manner". 83 Bearing 
significant "historical" criminal risks, the former oligarchs could either continue playing 
the same game of "willful" blindness with the government or sell (or simply lose) their 
981 Widely used in Russia nowadays. See eg Harding, 'From Russia with $3 Billion. Another Putin Opponent 
May Have Fled to London ; RIA Novosti, 'Berezovsky Faces New Fraud Charges in Aeroflot Case' (2007) 14 
April RIA Novosti <http. //en. rian. ru/russia/20070413/63616284. html>accessed 14 December 2007. 
912 See eg Barnes, 'Russia's New Business Groups and State Power'; Doeh, 'Oil, Law and Politics in Russia' 
207. 
! 83 Well known Russian proverb, coined by Ostap Bender. See <http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Ostap_Bender> 
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businesses. Khodorkovsky, who wanted to break this "circle of conspiracy" by cleaning up 
his business and structuring it in the recognised international manner, was punished as the 
State did not need, and does not need transparent, clean and thus potentially disobedient 
businesses. Even western major corporations have to play according to the "principles" 
pretending that they obey the laws. 
84 Thus, the Yukos case and various subsequent cases 
have effectively demonstrated that the problem of the transitional rule of law in Russia, 
and this can only be solved by the passage of time. 
984 See eg T Macalister and T Parfitt, '$20bn Gas Project Seized by Russia' (2006) 12 December Guardian 
<http.. //www. guardian. co. uk/world/2006/dec/12/business. oil>accessed 
12 March 2008; Royal Dutch Shell, 
'Susta. inability Report 2006' (2006) <http: /sustainabilityreport. shell. com/ workinginchallenginglocations/ 
sakhalin. htm1>accessed 10 
March 2008. 
215 
Chapter 4. 
The Yukos' Trading Scheme and the Yukos Tax Case. 
4.1. Introduction. 
The previous chapters demonstrate the unprecedented complexity of the Yukos 
affair, which includes dozens of different criminal cases. Regardless of the 
multidimensional character of the case, it is internationally recognised that its backbone is 
the notorious corporate tax evasion case, later supplemented by charges of money 
laundering that have been brought against the core shareholders and key managers of the 
Company. 985 
The aim of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it aims to give a comprehensive 
description of the Yukos tax optimisation strategies and outline the main principles of the 
Yukos cash-flow management policies and operational (trading) schemes. Although, 
according to the Russian Criminal Code, all tax crimes are exempt from the list of the 
predicate offences for money laundering, 986 episodes of alleged tax evasion and money 
laundering in the Yukos case cannot be analysed separately as they are economically, 
politically and legally interrelated. As can be seen from the money laundering charges 
brought against the core shareholders and top managers of the company, 987 the prosecutors 
treated the oil and oil-product transactions between parties within the Yukos corporate 
group, conducted with violations of the arms' length principle, as acts of embezzlement. 988 
985 See eg Yukos, Incremental Tax Assessed on Yukos Vs. Yukos Financial Perfomance (2004); Theede, 
'Speech Delivered at the CIS Oil & Gas Conference'. 
91" See CC RF art 174 and 174.1. 
987 See The Summary of the Chargers. 
988 See eg Amsterdam and Peroff 'White Paper; M Elder, 'Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Charged' MosTimes 
(Moscow 6 Februar' 2007) 117 March 2007; International Defence Legal Team, 'New Charges Brought 
against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev' (2007) 1 <httpJ/www. mbktrial. com/about/ 
mbk 04_01_2004. cfn>accessed 5 March 2007. 
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By doing so, they creatively replace the offences of alleged tax evasion with far more 
stringent money laundering charges, achieving political goals. 
According to the prosecutors, further "laundering" operations were also funnelled 
through the same operational and tax optimisation scheme. As a result, the Yukos tax and 
money laundering case demonstrates a perfect example of the nexus between tax evasion 
and money laundering 989 
Secondly, this chapter analyses the allegations made against the Company, during 
the course of the special audit that was initially conducted in 2003 on the 2000 accounts 
and later repeated in respect of the other years. 990 The allegations made by the Ministry of 
Tax and Levies were later confirmed by all the judicial instances, including the Supreme 
Arbitration Court, 991 and are seen as a result of the application of Russian and International 
anti-avoidance doctrines, never previously applied in the Russian judicial system. 992 
Several structural elements of the corporate tax case that are corporate in nature according 
to Russian law, can be also regarded as essential constituents of the criminal Yukos money 
laundering case, and can be understood only in conjunction with one another. 
Thirdly, the chapter attempts to describe the main Russian and international 
statutory interpretations and judicial doctrines on tax avoidance and evasion, and an 
attempt will be made to compare them to those used by the Russian courts in the Yukos tax 
case. 
This analysis potentially sheds light on the nature of the Yukos operational (trading) 
schemes and their role in the subsequent embezzlement and money laundering case. 
989 See L Sumin, 'Femida Na Raspute [Themis at the Crossroads]' (2007) 21 June Novye Izvestiya [New 
Izvestiya] <http: //www. newizv. ru/news/2007-06-21/71358t>accessed 25 June 2007. 
90 Yukos, "Tax Slides Update' (2005) <http: /www. yukos. com/mp_upload/images/Ts Feb 2005. pdf> 
accessed 1 April 2007. 
991 See Ernst & Young, 'The Constitutional Court Confirms the Statute of Limitations for Fines' (2005) May 
RussTax Brief 1-2 <www. tax. eycis. com>accessed 27 April 2007; V Egorov, 'Yukos: Kak Bylo Delo [Yukos: 
Just the Facts]' (2007) 1 Tvoi Nalogovyi Advokat [Your Tax Advocate]. 
992 See eg S Pepelyaev, M Ivlieva and I Khamenushko, Opinion Regarding Compliance with Legislation of 
Inspection Report No. 08-1/1 of December 29,2003 Issued by the Tax Ministry of Russia (2004) 
<www. yukos. com/taxes/final. pdf>accessed 15 January 2007; Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims 
Revisited'. 
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4.2. Terminology: the Yukos Tax Case. 
The core term used in this chapter is "the Yukos tax case". This term is more 
political in nature than it is legal, as it describes a multidimensional complex of economic, 
political and legal events that have resulted in draconian tax claims against Yukos and its 
subsequent liquidation. The Yukos tax case in the context of this thesis has the following 
basic characteristics. 
Tax claims against Yukos cover the period from 2000-2004. The first claim was 
considered in 2004 after an extraordinary tax audit conducted on the 2000 accounts. This 
claim established a number of precedents for the Yukos tax case as a whole and flagged a 
new era for Russian "non bona fide" taxpayers. 93 
The tax claims mostly pertain to the entities comprising the Yukos Corporate Group, 
the financial results of which were reflected in the Yukos consolidated accounts, including 
so-called "shell" companies (SPVs). 
94 In the Yukos tax case two distinct types of claims 
should be noted: 
Firstly, the claims judicially ascribed to the Yukos Oil Company in accordance with 
the decisions of the Arbitration Court of Moscow, which comprise the majority of the 
Company's tax indebtedness. These claims represent the main pillar of the tax case, and 
led to the bankruptcy and liquidation of the company. 995 
Secondly, the claims brought against different Yukos subsidiaries, which mostly 
concern their transfer pricing operations. These tax debts were not apportioned to Yukos, 
993 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, Resolution # 14-3-05/1609-1 to Hold the Taxpayer Fiscally Liable for a 
Tax Offence' (2004) 121 <http //www. yukos. com/taxes/YUKOStaxResolution_full. pdt>accessed 20 July 
2006; Yukos, Incremental Tax Assessed on Yukos Vs. Yukos Financial Perfomance. 
994 A special purpose vehicle (SPV) or special purpose entity (SPE) :a legal entity created to carry out a 
specific or limited purpose. 
See in general eg D Gololobov and J Tanega, 'Sham Spes: Part 1' (2006) 17 (11) 
ICCLR 304-17,311-312. See also Appendix 4. 
995 The Moscow Times, 'Court Upholds $3.4bin Yukos Tax Claim'; Yukos, Incremental Tax Assessed on 
Yukos Vs. Yukos Financial Perfomance. 
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but should be considered as part of the Yukos tax case in that they have influenced the 
financial position of the Yukos Group and have contributed to the bankruptcy of Yukos. 
996 
Overall the claims amounted to approximately $ 27 bn. although it depends on the 
number of claims included in the official list 997 
The tax claims, listed above, should be distinguished from the claims filed against 
the Company in the course of its bankruptcy procedure, which total approximately $ 32 
bn 98 
4.3. Literature Review. 
The sources on the Yukos tax case can be divided into two main groups. The first 
group aims to analyse the Yukos tax case as a separate phenomenon, which has opened the 
gates for new aggressive anti-avoidance strategies in Russia, and has provided a platform 
for the fight against tax avoidance. These sources focus on the characteristics of the Yukos 
tax optimisation strategies and the results of the infamous case and the lessons to be 
learned from it. The tendency to focus on these areas in the academic literature on the 
Yukos tax case can be illustrated by the publications by Artem Rodionov, a Russian tax 
law expert. His book "Tax schemes, for which Khodorkovsky has been detained" is 
actually the first publication that provides a detailed review of the tax episode in the 
Khodorkovsky - Yukos case. 
999 The article "A Look at Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's 
Taxes", 10°° written by the same author, describe the tax optimisation schemes, used by 
Yukos, the position of the Ministry of Tax and Levies and the court findings. They also 
996 See eg Kommersant, The Third Case of Pavel Anisimov'. 
99" See Appendix 15. 
"s T Osborne, Written Statement Addressed to the Participants of the Bankruptcy Court Hearing (2006); AE 
Kramer, 'Bankruptcy Auction Closes Book on Yukos' (2007) 11 May International Herald Tribune 
<http: //www. itcom/articles2007/O5/11/business/yukos. php>accessed 16 May 2007. 
999 Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky to Prison. 
10°° ibid. 
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provide extensive recommendations for tax practitioners regarding risk avoidance 
techniques. 1°°' 
The real value of Rodionov's book is its plain and accessible analysis of the Yukos 
tax schemes. It is invaluable as a source of primary data and commentary on the Yukos 
case, against a background of tenuous media publications on the case and a lack of any 
reliable information. 
The second group includes sources analysing the problem of tax avoidance and tax 
evasion in Russia as a continuous integrated process. These sources view the Yukos case 
and the Yukos-bom doctrines, in the context of Russian and international efforts aimed at 
tax avoidance and, as an opposing tendency, the protection of taxpayers' rights. Several 
books, demonstrating an academic approach, have been published by the lawyers of 
Russia's largest tax law firm "Pepelyaev, Goltsblat & Partnerss1002, which took part in the 
Yukos tax case as leading tax experts. This series of books includes "The Legal Problems 
of the Tax Administration of Major Taxpayers", written by Sergei Pepelyaev and Andrei 
Goltsblat, and two books written by other partners - "Tax Risks and the Tendencies of Tax 
Law" by Denis Scekin10°3 and "The Doctrine of Unfairness in Tax Law" by Sergei 
Savseris. 1004 
All the publications analyse the problems pertaining to Russian tax law and tax 
administration highlighted by the Yukos case. For example, Pepeliaev in his book points 
out: `In the future, we shall probably accept the experience of the western countries 
concerning disclosure and preliminary approval of business operational schemes and 
transfer pricing agreements, as they are used in the States. "°°s 
'0°'ibid 1. 
1002 See <http: //www. pgplaw. ru>. 
10°3 D Scekin, Nalogovye Riski I Tendentsfi Nalogovogo Prava [Tax Risks and the Tendencies in Tax Law] 
(Statut, Moscow 2007). 
1004 S Savseris, Kategorrya Nedobrosovestnosti v Nalogovom Prave [The Doctrine of "Unfairness" in Tax 
Law] (Statut, Moscow 2007). 
1005 S Pepelyaev (ed), Pravovye Problemy Nalogovogo Administrirovaniya Krupneishikh Nalogoplatel'scikov 
[Legal Problems of Major Taxpayers' TaxAdministration] (Wolters Kluwer, Moscow 2006) 
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4.4. Tax Avoidance and Evasion: International Aspects. 
4.4.1. Principles of Tax Planning. 
Academic sources and professional commentaries provide several core principles, 
concerning the problem of tax avoidance and evasion, which are regarded as conventional 
for taxation and tax optimisation in particular. 10°6 Below, two of them that are particularly 
important for this research are briefly reviewed. 
4.4.1.1. Right to Tax Optimisation. 
The right to tax optimisation is deemed to be recognized and unquestionable, 
providing the background for all tax optimisation strategies. 1007 The substance of this rule 
can be illustrated by a quotation from the Supreme Court of the United States: `The legal 
right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be the amount of his 
taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. "°°8 
It is also illustrated by an even more famous quotation used to describe the "freedom 
to pay reasonable taxes": `No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or 
other, so to arrange his legal relations to his business, or to his property, so as to enable the 
Inland Revenue to put the largest possible shovel into his stores. "1009 
Thus, the right of a taxpayer to "attract upon himself the least amount of taxes" is 
conventional, although it is subject to different interpretations and depends on a taxpayer's 
opportunities, which vary widely. 
'°'° 
10°6 See eg SC Ruchelman, United States' (2004) 8 May Economic Substance Around the World 79-94,79- 
80 <httpJ/www. ruchelaw. com/pdfs/EconomicSubstanceAroundWorkd. pdf>accessed 18 June 2005. 
10°7 MB Angell, 'Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance' (1938) 38 Colum L Rev 80-97 83. 
1008 Gregory vHelvering 293 US 465,469 (1935). 
1009 Ayrshire Pullman Motor Service v IRC (1929) 14 TC 754. 
'°'° See A Mumford, Taxing Culture (Ashagate, Dartmouth 2002)144. 
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4.4.1.2. Group Tax Planning. 
The group tax planning principle has actually never been recognized as a rule of 
universal application, but its significance cannot be overestimated, especially for corporate 
group tax planning. Moreover, creative and aggressive application of this rule has 
distinctly echoed through the Yukos case. 10" This rule can be deemed as a composite 
reflection of the case law doctrines applied to corporate groups, and it fixes a subordinate 
character of an individual company tax position to the group tax planning purpose. 
When, as in the present case, there are a number of associated companies, is 
the relevant purpose that of the individual company viewed in isolation or the 
purpose of the group as a whole? Is the whole scheme to be looked at or only 
that part of it in which the taxpayer companies are a direct participant? I have 
no doubt that in such a case regard has to be had both to the overall fiscal 
purpose of the group and the impact of its implementation on the group. 1012 
Thus, the tax schemes and tax benefits should be considered in the context of a 
corporate group tax optimisation plan, if such a plan exists. 
4.4.2. Tax Evasion: Definitional Aspects. 
The term "tax evasion" does not represent such a complicated problem of definition 
as "tax avoidance". 
1013 There is general agreement about what is tax evasion although there 
are grey areas at the fringes. 
1014 Tax evasion is a term that is succinctly defined by the 
OECD, '°'5 which noted that it involves: `... illegal arrangements through or by means of 
10" See eg The Summary of the Chargers. 
1012 Overseas Containers (Finance) Ltd v Stroker [1989] STC 364,370. 
1013 C Evans, 'Barriers to Avoidance: Recent Legislative and Judicial Developments in Common Law 
Jurisdictions' (2007) 19 March UNSWLRS <http: /www. austlii. edu. au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2007/ 
12. html#fn10>accessed 30 June 2007. 
3014 M McGowan, 'United Kingdom' (2004) 8 May Economic Substance Around the World 62 
<http: //www. ruchelaw. corn/pdfs/EconomicSubstanceAroundWorkd. pdtyaccessed 28 April 2005. 
1015 Evans, 'Barriers to Avoidance: Recent Legislative and Judicial Developments in Common Law 
Jurisdictions'. 
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which liability to tax is hidden or ignored ... [such that]... the taxpayer pays less tax than he 
is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information from the tax authorities, . 
1016 
The distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance is well recognized. 1017 It is the 
difference between working outside the law and working within the law (though against its 
spirit). 1018 
.... the 
ingenuity and complexity of some schemes greatly strain the 
philosophical boundaries between evasion and avoidance. The efforts of many 
distinguished academics have not succeeded entirely in solving the problem. 
Despite the fineness of the distinction, there is a clearly identifiable dichotomy 
of public opinion towards them. Evasion is regarded as improper, dishonest 
and reprehensible. Avoidance, on the other hand, is generally considered to be 
a sign of great acumen, perspicacity and skill. 1019 
Analysing the opinions of commentators on the characteristics of tax evasion, we 
cannot avoid quoting the position of Lord Templeman that tax evasion "involves 
concealment of the facts and as a criminal offence looks almost conventional". 1020 Other 
theoreticians echoed him either by pointing out that the fundamental distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion is minnred in the concept of a sham' 021 or by stating that: 
... the expression tax evasion should 
be deleted from the vocabulary as it is a 
euphemism which covers its true name, which is tax fraud. Tax evasion 
requires falsehood of some kind. Basically it requires either non-disclosure, or 
fabrication of a story which differs from the facts. No respectable tax adviser 
can be party to fraud or concealment. 1022 
Fraud in this context is conventionally understood as actual, intentional wrongdoing, 
with the specific purpose of evading tax. It is not established by negligence. 1023 It is not 
liability to tax that is being escaped from (which is a hallmark of tax avoidance) but 
1016 OECD, International Tax Terms for the Participants in the OECD Programme of Cooperation with Non- 
OECD Economies (OECD, Paris). 
1017 See eg Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance' 80-81; RWV Dickerson, 'Avoidance and Evasion: The 
Position of the Tax Practitioner' (1959-1963)1 U Brit Colum L Rev 19-22,19-20. 
1015 R Woellner and others, Australian Taxation Law (16th edn, CCH, Sydney 2006) 1544-45. 
1019 A Thompson, 'Some Thoughts on Tax Avoidance' (1978) 128 NLJ 629,629. 
1020 L Templeman, Taxation and Tax Avoidance' in S Adrian (ed), Tax Avoidance and the Law: Sham, Fraud 
and Mitigation? (Key Haven Publications PLC, London 1997)1-9,1. 
1021 R Venabels, Tax Avoidance- a Practiotioner's Viewpoint' ibid (Key Haven Publications) 25-77,26. 
`022 J Dilger, Tax Avoidance from the Practitioner's Perspective' ibid (Key Haven Publications PLC) 11-24, 
12. 
023 JH Murphy, 'Criminal Income Tax Evasion' (1953-1954) 48 Nw UL Rev 317-41,319. 
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payment of tax due. 1°24 Characterizing the doctrinal positions on tax evasion Dickerson's 
words are to be quoted: "Evasion of taxes is generally understood to refer to the actions of 
those who willfully disregard the words of a taxing statute in order to reduce the amount 
they have to pay, 9.1025 
Courts hearing tax evasion cases often define a willful act as "a voluntary, intentional 
violation of a known legal duty. i1026 Traditionally, a defendant can "willfully" violate the 
law regardless of the certainty or uncertainty of its interpretation. 1027 
The U. S. Supreme Court has illustrated it with the following words: 14 
Affirmative willful attempt may be inferred from conduct such as keeping a 
double set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices or 
documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or covering 
up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid making the records 
usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of which 
would be to mislead or conceal. 1028 
The above brief analysis of theoretical framework and case law shows that deliberate 
actions (e. g. non-submission of a tax declaration or other mandatory papers, deliberate and 
large-scale misreporting of data in the declaration) are conventionally regarded as tax 
evasion. 1029 In many jurisdictions tax evasion is an object of criminal law1030 and criminal 
rules and procedures are applied to tax evaders. 'o3' 
I'M Palmer, 'Treading the Fine Line: Tax Mitigation, Avoidance and Evasion' (2000) 8 ITCP 3-10,3. 
1025 Dickerson, 'Avoidance and Evasion: The Position of the Tax Practitioner' 19. 
102' ' United States vBishop 412 US 346,360 (1973). 
1027 J Stein, 'Criminal Liability for Willful Evasion of an Uncertain Tax' (1981) 81 Colum L Rev 1348-64, 
1356. 
1029 Spies v United States 317 US 492,499 (1942). 
102' Interfax Information Services, Tax Planning and Gray Techniques of Tax Evasion - Assessment of 
Threat' (2004) Interfax Information Services 4 <httpJ/global. factiva. com >accessed 25 May 2004. 
1030 See J Freedman, 'Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle' 
(2004) 4 BTR 347-48,347-48. 
1031 See Murphy, 'Criminal Income Tax Evasion'; R Leitman and others, Tax Evasion' (1995-1996) 33 Am 
Crim L Rev 1017-52; P Alldridge and A Mumford, Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ' 
(2005) 25 (3) Leagal Stud 3 53-73,360-61. 
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4.4.3. Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines. 
The courts have developed several doctrines over the years to deny certain tax 
motivated transactions their intended tax benefits. These doctrines are not entirely 
identifiable, and their application to a given set of facts is often blurred by the courts and 
the tax authorities. 1032 They generally allow the recharacterisation of transactions based on 
their economic substance. 1033 
It is difficult to generate "nutshell" definitions of these doctrines because courts have 
interpreted and applied them interdependently, and have at times melded them into single 
doctrines. '034 At their very foundation these doctrines are understood as indefinite, subject 
to precedential and interpretational flexibility and therefore difficult to apply with 
accuracy and consistency. 1035 
4.4.4. Doctrines v. Rules. 
The cornerstone of any system of taxation is the recognition of bona fide behavior 
as a general principle, which means that all transactions should have a genuine economic 
'036 
or commercial purpose rather than a purpose of tax avoidance. Every legal system has 
evolved concepts and methods for disregarding transactions which are not what they 
1032 AB Casarona, 'Regulating Corporate Tax Shelters: Seeking Certainty in a Complex World' (2000-2001) 
50 Cathoic UL Rev 111-42,119; Joint Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present Law Relating to 
Tax Shelters' (2002) Joint Committee on Taxation Publications No JCX-19-02 7 
<http: //www. house. gov/jct/x-19-02. pdf>accessed 15 April 2007. 
1033 The Tax Law Review Committee, Tax Avoidance (IFS Commentaries 1997) 27<http: //www. ifs. org. uk 
/tlrc/publications. php? publication_id=1908>accessed 18 May 2007. 
104 DB McGinty, 'Economic Substance, Business Purpose, and Tax Avoidance in Section 351 Contingent 
Liability Transactions after Black & Decker, Coltec, and Hercules' (2005-2006) 36 Cumb L Rev 1-62,28. 
1035 J Bankman, 'The Economic Substance Doctrine' (2000-2001) 74 S Cal L Rev 5-30,13,29. 
1036 See eg S Douma and F Engelen, 'Halifax Plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners: The ECJ Applies the 
Abuse of Rights Doctrine in VAT Cases' (2006) 4 BTR 42940,43 1. 
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seem. 1037 Anti-tax avoidance, evasion doctrines and rules deal specifically with this 
problem. 
In the fight against tax avoidance and evasion the tax authorities and courts have 
taken one of two approaches: 
" The introduction of anti-avoidance rules into the local legislation (dealt with by 
legislature e. g. parliament) 
" The development of an extensive set of court precedents aiming at the same 
purpose1038 
Equally, different countries tend to adopt either one of two approaches. In the first 
approach, tax courts take an active role in combating tax avoidance by developing tax- 
specific concepts; in the second approach the tax avoidance issues are dealt with by 
legislature in the first place, and only then by courts. 1039 
Courts in most legal systems play a major role in fighting tax avoidance. 1040 For 
more than fifty years courts have interpreted and applied tax law with the aid of various 
"common law" doctrines, such as substance over form, step transaction, business purpose, 
sham transaction, and economic substance. 1041 These doctrines are closely related to one 
another, and no single doctrine has done all the work. 1042 Quite often doctrines are used 
together with anti-avoidance rules, and are approved for different taxes. 1043 
Several countries, such as Australia, Canada and others have adopted the definition 
of tax avoidance as a legislative provision, presenting them as a key part of general anti- 
avoidance rules (GAAR), evidently seeing it as a better way in the anti-avoidance fight in 
1037 HF Fuller, 'Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation' 
(1962-1963) 37 Tul L Rev 355-98,367. 
1038 J Maximovskaya, Overview of the Bona Fide Concept and Anti Avoidance Legislation in Other 
Countries (International Tax Services 2006) 3<www. aebrus. ru/files/Ffle/EventFiles/Taxation-Committee 
Events/2005053 I/TaxMaximovskaya. ppt>accessed 20 May 2007. 
1039 ibid 4. 
1040 A Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax Avoidance 
Adjudication' (2003-2004) 25 Cardozo L Rev 953-1018,955. 
1041 Banlanan, 'The Economic Substance Doctrine' 5. 
10°2 ibid 6. 
1043 RS Nock, Tax Avoidance' in S Adrian (ed), Tax Avoidance and the Law: Sham, Fraud and Mitigation? 
(Key Haven Publications PLC, London 1997) 79-308,149. 
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comparison with the "old" common law doctrines. 1044 It is difficult to say whether the 
introduction of GAARs have greatly supplemented certainty between authorities and 
taxpayers, but it raises important questions about GAAR's relationship with the existing 
judicial approach to tax avoidance as expressed, for example, in the UK in Ramsay and 
subsequent cases. ' 045 
The role of doctrines is tremendous. Unlike most tax norms, anti-avoidance 
doctrines are meant to prevent abuse of the tax code. 1046 Kaplow points out that this means 
that they would often have to be designed as standards, because rigid rules are easier to 
circumvent. 1047 He also stressed that an additional consideration favoring the use of 
standards when dealing with tax avoidance is that tax avoidance doctrines are meant to 
regulate behavior, which varies greatly since tax avoiders often can choose among a large 
number of legal ways to circumvent a particular tax norm. Determining the appropriate 
content of an anti-avoidance rule which would cover all contingencies ex ante would be 
expensive and some of the expense would be wasted since it will not occur in 
practice. 1048Weisbach, commenting or rules and standards, said: 
... 
lawmakers and regulators have shifted the tax system toward standards, 
primarily by adopting what are known as "anti-abuse rules. " A typical anti- 
abuse rule allows the government to override the literal words of a statute or 
regulation. Instead, the government may require a "reasonable" tax result if the 
taxpayer enters into or structures a transaction with a principal purpose of 
reducing tax liabilities in a manner contrary to the purposes of the statute or 
regulation, even if the transaction otherwise literally complies with the 
rules! 049 
According to Weisbach the end result should be a system that is based on rules 
(which are more efficient) but also governed by overriding anti-abuse standards1050 which 
10'x' For the list of counties which use GAAR see ibid 113-49; 0 Ralph, 'Gaar: Empty Threat or Deal Stopper' 
(1998) 9 Int'l Tax Rev 13-16,15. 
1045 The Tax Law Review Committee, TaxAvoidance 36. 
'°"6 Lflchovski, 'The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax Avoidance 
Adjudication' 967. 
1047 L Kaplow, 'Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis' (1992-1993) 42 Duke LJ 557-629,618. 
104' ibid 564. 
1049 DA Weisbach, 'Formalism in the Tax Law' (1999) 66 U Chi L Rev 860-906,860. 
1050 See also J Freedman, 'Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of Parliament' (2007) 
123 LQR 53-90,90. 
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provide the "fuzziness" needed to prevent tax abuse; i. e. a mixture of rules designed for 
common transactions accompanied by anti-avoidance standards to be used for unusual 
1°5' transactions. 
The overview of development of the key Anglo-American anti-avoidance doctrines, 
given in Appendix 16, demonstrates that their genesis has been long, contradictory and 
inconsistent. '052 The doctrines are still under the eye of different courts and even their 
substantial aspects can be subject to further revision. 
4.4.5. Key Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines: Basic Characteristics. 
4.4.5.1. Sham Transaction Doctrine. 
Sham transactions are those in which the economic activity that is purported to give 
rise to the desired tax benefits does not actually occur. The transactions have been referred 
to as "facades" or "fictions" and, in their most egregious form might be characterized as 
fraudulent. 1053 The sham doctrine does not focus on economic substance, but on the real 
legal transaction between the parties. 'oM 
In one of the UK cases the sham doctrine is described as applying to: '°55 
... acts 
done or documents executed by the parties to the "sham" which are 
intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of 
creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the 
actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. 
'os6 
'051 DA Weisbach, "Ten Truths About Tax Shelters' (2001-2002) 55 Tax L Rev 215-54,248. 
10-52 See eg Freedman, 'Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of Parliament' 90. 
j053 Joint Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 8. 
1054 McGowan, 'United Kingdom' 63. 
1055 ibid. 
1056 Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786,802. 
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Sometimes a description of a transaction as a "sham", accompanied by mention of a 
tax-avoidance motive, suggests that "sham" means nothing more to the writer than "a 
transaction entered into to reduce tax liability.,, 1057 
In the U. S. the courts often apply the two-prong test for sham transactions 
established in Rice's Toyota World: 
... a transaction will 
be treated as a sham if the court finds [(1)] "that the 
taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax 
benefits in entering the transaction, and [(2)] that the transaction has no 
economic substance because no reasonable possibility of profit exists. '°58 
Close to the "sham" transaction doctrine is the concept of "abuse of law" or "abuse 
of rights". 1059 The meaning of "abuse" in this context seems to be not that the taxpayer 
commits an illegal or unlawful act in exercising the right, but that the taxpayer does not 
exercise the right "validly". ' 
060 This concept is more common in civil law countries. 1061 
The idea that a "right' 'can be "abused" is a strange one, both logically and conceptually, to 
a common law audience. 1062 Under the abuse of law doctrine, transactions entered into by a 
taxpayer to reduce his tax liability can be either disregarded for tax purposes, or substituted 
with another transaction which would not have had the fiscal effect intended by the 
taxpayer. 1063 The application of this principle to VAT was established in the case of 
Halifax (Case C-255/02). 10M The Court concluded in Halifax that: 
For it to be found that an abusive practice exists, it is necessary, first, that the 
transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal application of the conditions 
laid down by the relevant provisions ... and of national 
legislation transposing 
it, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary 
1057 A Gunn, Tax Avoidance' (1977-1978) 76 Mich L Rev 733-77,737. 
loss See eg Black & Decker v United States 340 F Supp 2d 621,623-24 (D Md 2004). 
1059 T Sanders, 'Netherlands Anti-Avoidance Relies on Abuse of Law' (1989-1990)1 Int'l Tax Rev 4042,40- 
41. 
1060 McGowan, 'United Kingdom' 64. 
1°6' But the U. S. has developed a similar doctrine, substantially separate from its Civil Law analogue. JM 
Perillo, 'Abuse ofRights: A Pervasive Legal Concept' (1995-1996) 27 Pac LJ 37-98,38. 
1062 JA Saunders, 'Recent Trends in United Kingdom Anti-Avoidance Law' (1993) 25 Case W Res J Intl L 
23-54,23; McGowan, United Kingdom' 64. 
1063 Sanders, 'Netherlands Anti-Avoidance Relies on Abuse of Law' 41; E Fena-Lagueny and F Rontani, 
'Abuse of Law' (2005) (774) Tax J 17. 
1064 Fena-Lagueny and Rontani, 'Abuse of Law ; MD Glaser, 'Implementing the Abuse of Law Principle' 
(2007) 128 De Voil ITI 9. 
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to the purpose of those provisions. Second, it must also be apparent from a 
number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned 
is to obtain a tax advantage. '065 
Thus, application of the "abuse of law" doctrine is conventionally based on the two 
"pillars": Intention to avoid taxation and contradiction to the purpose of the law. 
4.4.5.2. Economic Substance Doctrine. 
The economic substance doctrine and its predecessors have been around for many 
years. 1066 The economic substance doctrine, as it has evolved to date, may be summarised 
as providing that an arrangement will be recognized for tax purposes only if it 
"appreciably" affects the taxpayer's beneficial interest such that it can be said "with reason 
... to 
have purpose, substance, or utility apart from [its] anticipated tax consequences. i1067 
One commentator formulates the theoretical substance of the doctrine in the following 
way: `This so called doctrine of 'the substance' seems to me to be nothing more than an 
attempt to make a man pay, notwithstanding that he has so ordered his affairs that the 
amount of tax sought from him is not legally claimable. ' 
1068 
The courts generally deny claimed tax benefits, if the transaction that gives rise to 
those benefits lacks economic substance independent of tax considerations, regardless that 
the purported activity did actually occur. 1069 
The courts usually consider two factors in order to determine if the transaction has 
the requisite substance. First, they look to the "objective" economic substance of the 
transaction and asks "whether the transaction ha[d] any practical economic effects other 
1061 Glaser, 'Implementing the Abuse of Law Principle. 
10" J Bankman, Modeling the Tax Shelter World' (2001-2002) 55 Tax L Rev 455-64,458. 
1067 RT Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault Upon the Citadel' (1999-2000) 53 Tax Law 1-34,1 quoting 
Goldstein v Commissioner 364 F 2d 734,740 (2d Cir 1966). 
1068 per Lord Tomlin IRC vDuke of Westminster [1936] AC 1,20. 
1069 Joint Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 12; McGinty, 
'Economic Substance, Business Purpose, and Tax Avoidance in Section 351 Contingent Liability 
Transactions after Black & Decker, Coltec, and Hercules' 29. 
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than the creation [e. g. ] of tax losses" (e. g., whether it produced a profit). 1070 Second, the 
courts consider the "subjective" business purpose, looking for evidence of the taxpayer's 
motivation in entering into the transaction. 1071 Regarding the second prong, in Rice's 
Toyota World, it was held that a "transaction has no economic substance [where] no 
reasonable possibility of profit exists. "1072 In Black & Decker it was also stressed that this 
prong concerns "the objective reasonableness of the transaction. " 1073 Further it was 
clarified that, "[a] corporation and its transactions are objectively reasonable, despite any 
tax-avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in bona fide economically-based 
business transactions. t, 1074 Thus, economic substance exists based on the results and effect 
of a transaction, not on the intention of the parties. '075 
The judicially recognized primary limitation on the economic substance doctrine is 
that the doctrine cannot apply where a sensible reading of text, legislative intent, and 
purpose suggest it should not apply. 1076 
4.4.53. Business Purpose Doctrine. 
Another doctrine that overlaps with the sham transaction and economic substance 
doctrines is the business purpose doctrine. The business purpose doctrine holds that taxes 
can be reduced only if there is a real business. ' 
077 The business purpose doctrine, 
1070 See eg ACM Partnership v Commissioner 157 F 3d 231,248 (3d Cir 1998) (citing Jacobson v 
Commissioner 915 F 2d 832,837 (2d Cir 1990). 
1071 AM Walsh, 'Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax Shelters, Practical Reason and the New 
Textualism' (2000-2001) 53 Stan L Rev 1541-80,1555. 
'o72 752 F 2d 89,91-92 (4th Cir 1985). 
1073 McGinty, 'Economic Substance, Business Purpose, and Tax Avoidance in Section 351 Contingent 
Liability Transactions after Black & Decker, Coltec, and Hercules' 35. 
1074 340 F Supp 2d 623-24 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v United States 435 US 561,583-584 (1978)). 
1075 McGinty, Economic Substance, Business Purpose, and Tax Avoidance in Section 351 Contingent 
Liability Transactions after Black & Decker, Coltec, and Hercules' 36. 
1076 GWJ Miller, 'Corporate Tax Shelters and Economic Substance: An Analysis of the Problem and Its 
Common Law Solution' (2002-2003) 34 Tex Tech L Rev 1015-70,1057. 
1077 Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters' 237. 
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generally, is the subjective leg of the judicial doctrines, denying tax benefits based on the 
taxpayer's non-tax motives for entering into a transaction. 1078 
The so called 'business purpose test" originated in England in three decisions, those 
of Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson, 1079 IRC v Burmah Oil Co Ltd v IRC1°8° and 
Ramsay (WT) Ltd v IRC. 1081 In Halsbury Laws of England this test is summarised as 
follows: 
There is no rule of law against the making of genuine and lawful arrangements 
by which the incidence of tax otherwise eligible is lessened or avoided. 
However, where a taxpayer enters into a preordained series of transactions 
consisting of two or more steps and those steps are inserted for no commercial 
business purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to tax, the court will 
determine the tax consequences of the series by looking at the end result and 
ignoring the intervening steps. 1082 
In its common application, the courts use business purpose (in combination with 
economic substance, as discussed above) as part of a two-prong test for determining 
whether a transaction should be disregarded for tax purposes: (1) The taxpayer was 
motivated by no business purpose other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the 
transaction, and (2) The transaction lacks economic substance. 1083 
4.4.5.4. Substance over Form Doctrine. 
The concept of the substance over form doctrine is that the tax results of an 
arrangement are better determined based on the underlying substance rather than an 
10I McGinty, 'Economic Substance, Business Purpose, and Tax Avoidance in Section 351 Contingent 
Liability Transactions after Black & Decker, Coltec, and Hercules' 29. 
1079 [1984] 1 All ER 530. 
1080 (1981) 1 All ER 865 (HL). 
1051 [1981] STC 174. See L Olivier, Tax Avoidance and Common Law Principles' (1996) 1996 JS Afr L 
378-83,381. Also note that Ramsay principle has been overruled by the subsequent decisions (eg Barclays 
Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51). See also S Anstey, 'Restricting Ramsay? ' 
(2001) 13 December Taxation; P Ridd, 'Tax Avoidance - Legislative Intent. Can You See What It Is? ' (2007) 
876 Tax J 18-22. 
10u --, Halsbury's Laws of 
England (4th edn, Simon Hetherington, London 2000) vol XXIII § 25. 
1093 Joint Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 26 quoting Rice's 
Toyota World 752 F 2d 91. 
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evaluation of the mere formal steps by which the arrangement was undertaken. 1084 In 
general form it was stated in Kilburn v Estate Kilburn" as follows: "Courts of law will 
not be deceived by the form of a transaction: it will rend aside the veil in which the 
transaction is wrapped and examine its true nature and substance. 0086 
Under this doctrine, two transactions that achieve the same underlying result should 
not be taxed differently simply because they are achieved through different legal steps. 1087 
The Supreme Court has found that a "given result at the end of a straight path is not made a 
s1088 different result because reached by following a devious path. 
In National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mill & Co., the Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
This Court has observed repeatedly that, while a taxpayer is free to organise his 
affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax 
consequences of his choice, whether contemplated or not, [citations omitted], 
and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen to 
follow but did not. 1089 
Tax laws are very formalistic and, therefore, it is often difficult for taxpayers and the 
court to determine whether application of the doctrine is appropriate. 
1090 
4.4.5.5. Step Transaction Doctrine. 
An extension of the substance over form doctrine is the step transaction doctrine. The 
basic premise of the step transaction doctrine is that an integrated transaction cannot be 
broken into independent steps in determining tax consequences! 091 The step transaction 
10" ibid 26-27. 
1" 1931 AD 501,507. 
1085 Olivier, 'Tax Avoidance and Common Law Principles' 382. 
1087 Joint Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 27. 
1088 Minnesota Tea Co v Helvering 302 US 609,613 (1938). 
1099 Commissioner v National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mill Co 417 US 134,149 (1974). 
1090 Joint Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 27. 
1091 Ruchelman, 'United States' 93. 
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doctrine "treats a series of formally separate `steps' as a single transaction if such steps are 
in substance integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a particular result. " 1092 
The courts have developed several methods of testing whether to invoke the step 
transaction doctrine. 1093 The end result test is most frequently used. Under this test, 
separate business transactions can be collapsed when it is determined that they were 
intended to be component parts of a single transaction, designed for the purpose of 
reaching the ultimate result. 1° 
In determining whether to invoke the step transaction doctrine, the courts have 
looked to two primary factors: (1) the intent of the taxpayer, and (2) the temporal 
proximity of the separate steps. 1095 The courts are permitted the application of the step 
transaction doctrine if its application would create steps that never actually occurred. 1096 
4.4.6. Statutory Interpretations: General Anti-Avoidance Rules 
(GAAR). 
The tax law relating to business transactions is complex and ambiguous. 1097 This is 
fully applicable to a General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR), which are criticised for 
creating further uncertainty in the sphere of tax law and tax administration, instead of 
putting the results of several centuries of application of the common law doctrines in 
1092 Joint Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 27. 
1193 ibid. 
101 Ruchelman, 'United States' 93. 
'°95 Joint Committee on Taxation, Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 28. 
1096 ibid. 
'°g' DP Hariton, 'Sorting out the Tangle of Economic Substance' (1998-1999) 52 Bull Sec Tax'n 235-74,236; 
Casarona, 'Regulating Corporate Tax Shelters: Seeking Certainty in a Complex World 113. 
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proper order. 1098 The existence of GAARs also raises the problem of rules and standards in 
the tax law, which does not have a unanimous solution. ' 099 
When discussing GAAR, we should note that GAAR differs from other forms of 
statutory judicial anti-avoidance rules in several important respects. A general anti- 
avoidance provision is legislation that applies across all taxes or particular categories of 
tax, and applies to all forms of relevant transaction, not being limited to particular types of 
avoidance arrangement' 10° The purpose of GAAR is to deter or counteract tax avoidance 
where a person carries out a transaction that has tax avoidance as its sole, or main purpose, 
or as one of its main purposes. "°' Legislation may restrict or impose adverse taxation 
consequences upon certain types of transaction. 1102 Statutory anti-avoidance rules can take 
two forms: those where a tax avoidance motive is required and those where no such motive 
or purpose is needed! 103 This difference in approach is fundamental to the result of a 
transaction and it is important to recognize that a statutory provision may be anti- 
avoidance, despite the fact that those words do not appear. 1104 
As it is seen from Appendix 17, GAARs have been adopted in at least ten countries 
and the models of GAARs vary. While GAARs feature in the tax systems of countries as 
diverse as Sweden, Hong Kong, and Germany, the focus of this research is on common law 
jurisdictions- the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia -which share a common law 
legal tradition with the United States. ' 105 
Even taking into consideration the diversity of GAAR jurisdictions, Cooper proposed 
a theoretical model that provides a general understanding as to what features a general anti- 
avoidance rule should contain. The first and most obvious requirement is a provision that 
10" See D Crerar, 'Interpretations of Gaar: Before and Beyond Mcnichol and Rmm' (1997-1998) 23 
Queen's LJ 231-58,257. 
1099 See eg DA Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters' (2001) 54 SMU L Rev 73- 
82,79. 
10° Nock, Tax Avoidance' 113-14. 
1101 P Nias, 'UK Unwraps GAAR Proposals' (1999) 10 Int'l Tax Rev 44-45,44. 
1102 Nock, Tax Avoidance' 153. 
1103 ibid 153-54. 
X104 ibid 154. 
1105 See GS Cooper, 'International Experience with General Anti-Avoidance Rules' (2001) 54 SMU L Rev 
83-130,84. 
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defines the trigger for activating the GAAR i. e. a definition of "tax avoidance". 1106 A 
second element to the design of the GAAR should be a definition of the tax requirement, 
which is avoided in order to give rise to the unintended benefit. 1107 According to Cooper, 
another important feature of a standard GAAR is the provision permitting the revenue 
authority to reverse the tax outcome that has occurred, and substitute one of the possible 
tax outcomes that might have occurred. ' 108 
From the content of Appendix 18, which is based on Cooper's model, is clear that 
introduction of GAARs has not significantly influenced the tests and principles in the anti- 
avoidance fight that have been produced in the evolution of the judicial doctrines in the 
relevant jurisdictions. There is no doubt that the concept of a GAAR more suitable for the 
legal systems of civil law countries than anti-avoidance rules fixed in judicial precedents. 
4.5. The Yukos Tax Case and the Basics of the Russian Tax Law. 
4.5.1. Russian Civil Anti - Avoidance Doctrines before the Yukos Tax 
Case. 
It is recognized that before the Yukos case the means to fight large-scale tax 
avoidance and evasion in Russia were organisationally and legally limited. 109 The 
formalistic approach, similar to one declared in the landmark Duke of Westminster'110 case, 
was fully accepted by the tax authorities and the courts. 
' 111 It was one of the reasons why 
11'6 ibid 98. 
1107 ibid 102. 
1105 ibid. 
1109 See eg E Busse, The Embeddedness of Tax Evasion in Russia' in AV Ledeneva and M Kurkchiyan (eds), 
Economic Crime in Russia (Kluwer Law International, London 2000) 129-44,133-36. 
1110 [1936] AC 1,19 TC 490. 
""' See eg A Ryabov and D Melnik, 'Russia's New Transfer Pricing Rules' (1999) 18 Tax Notes Int'1 1487- 
88,1487; V Zaripov, 'Legal Instruments for Tax Planning in Russia' (2006) 26 May The Moscow Times. 
corn <http: //www. pgplaw. ru/live/Pubhcations. asp/two-id/top/id/I 1661 >accessed 10 December 2007. 
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the tax optimisation schemes became so popular in Russia. ' 112 In the absence of any 
definition of tax evasion in the Russian tax legislation, the Russian Constitutional Court 
simply served to define tax evasion, in general terms, as the illegal and intentional 
nonpayment of taxes. 113 At the same time, the Court ruled that tax planning is legally 
permissible and that a taxpayer may not be penalized for electing advantageous forms of 
business from a tax perspective, creating opportunities for further development of tax 
avoidance schemes-" 14 
However, it would not be correct to say that the Russian legislation and case law did 
not have any doctrines to fight tax avoidance and evasion at all»'5 Under the Russian Tax 
Code, the tax authorities were authorized to recharacterise the nature of transactions for tax 
purposes, treat them as sham, and challenge their validity. 
1116 Tax authorities were entitled 
to impute additional taxes in cases of recharacterisation of transactions (though only 
through court proceedings). ' "7 Nevertheless, the Russian Tax Code and the Russian tax 
authority regulations failed to provide any anti-avoidance rules, neither did they expressly 
require taxpayers to have a business purpose or demonstrate economic substance to be 
eligible for tax benefits. 
1118 As in many civil-law countries without specific legislative 
rules, anti avoidance principles in Russia, until recently, were developed by courts based 
on several civil-law concepts. 
" 19 At the beginning of the Yukos case, the business purpose 
1112 See eg C Patterson, Legal Due Diligence of Mining Projects in Russia (Canadian Mining Investment in 
Russia and Central Asia 2005) 15<http: //www. nrcan. gc. ca/mms/invest! 2005/rus/pdflpatterson. pdfaccessed 
20 February 2008. 
1 113 See Res of CC RF Ns 9-P. 
1114 See ibid. 
11"s The term "tax avoidance and evasion" is used in the dissertation for violations of the Tax Code that 
result both in tax (administrative) liabilty of the corporation and criminal 
liability of its managers, as 
happened in the Yukos case. According to the Russian laws, corporations cannot be criminally liable and, 
thus, in terms of the international law, can only be formally penalized for tax avoidance. Their managers can 
be prosecuted for tax evasion in accordance with art 198 of CC RF. 
116 See The Law on Tax Authorities art 7.11. See also Civil Code art 169 and 170. 
1117 Tax Code art 45.13. 
1' See A Seidov, 'Dealing with Judicial Antiavoidance Doctrines in Russia and the U. S. ' (2007)1 November 
Lexology <http //www. lexology. conm/library/detail. aspx? g=Obc37dad-1901-4ea3-8 0"fd7 f3f9e987c> 
accessed 10 December 2007. 
1119 See Appendix 19. 
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concept had not been sufficiently developed to cover sophisticated cases, similar to those 
in the U. S. or other continental system jurisdictions. 1120 
The weaknesses of the Civil Anti-Avoidance doctrines were based on the absence of 
legal statutory or judicial instruments for defining tax avoidance and evasion transaction. 
For example, in order to trigger the application of the Public Order Concept (Art 169 of the 
Civil Code) it was necessary to establish that a certain transaction was designed for tax 
avoidance and evasion purposes, but in the absence of the relevant tests, article 169 and 
other doctrines had quite limited, mostly politically driven application. 1121 
4.5.2. Russian Tax "Evasion": the Definitional Aspect. 
As previously mentioned, Russian legislation and case law do not contain definitions 
of "avoidance" and "evasion" as such, so the usage of both terms will be based on their 
international and conventional understanding. 1122 Moreover, the Russian legislation labels 
all operations aimed at minimizing tax payments, which failed and resulted in penalties, as 
"evasion". 1123 
Russian commentators, who aim to solve the problem of definition and gain clarity, 
suggest certain formalistic criteria, which comply with the "spirit" of the international 
principles. According to these criteria, tax avoidance as an essential element includes full 
informational disclosure to the tax authorities, and in the case of failure, will result in the 
payment of taxes, interest and penalties. 
1120 See Seidov, 'Dealing with Judicial Antiavoidance Doctrines in Russia and the U. S:. 
1121 See Ernst & Young, 'Court Orders Seizure of Assets Due to Tax Evasion' (2007) September RussTax 
Brief 1-2,2. 
3" See I Solov'ev, 'Uldonenie Ot Uplaty Nalogov I Optimizatsiya Nalogooblozheniya [Tax Evasion and Tax 
Optimisation]' (2001) Garant. RU <http: /www. garant. ru/nav. php9pid= 286&ssid=89&mv=1>accessed 20 
July 2007; T Gusev, 'Predely Osuscestvleniya Nalogovogo Planirovaniya S Uchetom Mezhdunarodnogo 
Opyta [International Experience: The Limitations of Tax Planning]' (2006) Garant. RU 
<http: //www. garantxu>accessed 20 July 2007. 
1123 See Yukos v Russia App Ns 14902/04 ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006); Yukos V Russia App Ns 
14902/04 ECHR Russia's Mem (15 April 2005). See also Appendix 20. 
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Tax evasion, which is based on intentional illegal acts and aimed at evading taxes 
due, will result in criminal sanctions against the responsible managers of the company 
(most frequently under Article 199 of CC RF), and additional penalties that do not exclude 
responsibility to pay the unpaid taxes, interest, etc. 1124 
A legal entity can only be penalized for corporate tax avoidance as it cannot be 
criminally liable according to Russian law, and if company managers organised tax 
evasion schemes, they will be personally sanctioned for tax evasion. A mixture of both 
elements is commonly and "politically" recognized as criminal tax evasion. This approach 
is used by the Russian Federation in its documents sent to ECHR. 
' 125 
4.53. The System of Sanctions for Tax Avoidance and Evasion in 
Russia. 
Corporate tax avoidance and evasion operations according to the Russian Criminal 
and Tax Codes may result in tax sanctions against corporations, and may also result in 
administrative and criminal sanctions for the managers responsible. The presence of such a 
complex and overlapping system of sanctions may be confusing for international lawyers 
and thus needs certain clarification, given in Appendix 20. 
The Yukos tax case has ultimately resulted in: (1) the forced collection of the 
principal sum of the tax claims, actually pertaining to the activities of the Yukos corporate 
group, but ascribed to, and collected from, the Yukos Oil Company as a legal entity; 
1126 (2) 
the forced collection of the accrued interest; (3) the forced collection of special double tax 
1124 See eg T Sergeeva, Melody I Skhemy Optimizatsii Nalogooblozheniya: Prakticheskoe Posobie [Methods 
and Schemes of Tax Optimisation: Practical 
Issues] (Ekzamen, Moscow 2005); A Elinskii, 'Opyt 
Velikobritanii I SSHA Po Razgranicheniyu Zakonnoi I Nezakonnoi Minimizatsii Nalogov I Ego Znachenie 
Dlya Sovershenstvovaniya Rossiiskogo Zakonodatel'stva [The UK and U. S. Experience Regarding 
Differentiation between Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion and Its Importance for Russian Legislation]' (2006) 
10 Zhurnal Rossiiskogo Prava [Journal of Russian Law] 140-43. 
112' See ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006); ECHR Russia's Mem (15 April 2005). 
112' Yukos, 'Tax Slides Update. 
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penalties (tax fines for repeated non-payment of taxes) from Yukos as a legal entity; 
1127 (4) 
the forced collection of the principal sum of the tax claims and penalties from Yukos' 
subsidiaries; (5) criminal charges, brought against several Yukos top managers; 
1128 and, (6) 
criminal charges, brought against several Yukos' subsidiary managers. 
1129 
4.5.4. The Yukos' Operational (Trading) Scheme in the Context of 
Russia in the 1990s. 
Aggressive tax optimisation strategies were an essential characteristic of Russia in 
the 90s. 113° The line between optimisation, avoidance and evasion was completely blurred, 
which made the application of transfer-pricing schemes, which were based on a complete 
disregard of the "substance over form" principle, indispensable practice for all big 
corporate groups. 1131 Those who were not involved in semi-legal tax competition were 
doomed to lose: 1132 
Under President Yeltsin, high tax rates and low levels of tax enforcement 
encouraged Russian firms to shelter income aggressively. Multiple taxes from 
different levels of government meant that tax obligations could even exceed 
profits. Company executives were not shy about how this tax burden affected 
their behavior. As Yukos Oil CEO Khodorkovsky argued, "As long as the tax 
regime is unjust, I will try to find a way around it. "1133 
1127 ibid. 
1128 Krutilin, 'Criminal Alphabet of Yukos'. 
11" ibid. 
1130 See eg Samoylenko, Government Policies in Regard to Internal Tax Havens in Russia; Vitkina and 
Rodionov, Tax Evaders of Putin's Epoch. 
1131 See Samoylenko, Government Policies in Regard to Internal Tax Havens in Russia; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit Ltd, Russia Risk: Tax Policy Risk' (2007) 22 January The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd 
4 <httpJ/global. factiva. com/aa/default. aspx9napc=S&fcpil=en&_XFORMSTAT AAN. >accessed 22 
January 2007. 
1132 V Radaev, 'Informal Institution Arrangements and Tax Evasion in the Russian Economy' (2001) 13-15 
September Higher School of Economics Working Papers 12 <www jobfunctions. bnet. com /whitepaper. aspx 
? docid=134430 >accessed 20 September 2005. 
1133 MA Desai, A Dyck and L Zingales, Theft and Taxes' (2004) September NBER Working Paper No 10978 
16 <http: /www. nber. org/papers/10978>accessed 22 March 2007. 
240 
Possibly, it is due to Khodorkovsky's determination to gain ultimate success that 
Yukos's schemes in particular are now under the international legal microscope. 1134 
4.5.4.1. The Yukos' Operational/Tax Optimisation Scheme in a Nutshell. 
According to the officially published court decisions and official reports, the Yukos 
tax scheme functioned as follows. One of Yukos's production subsidiaries 
(Yganskneftegas, Samaraneftegas or Tomskneft) sold crude oil at prices determined by a 
public tender 1135 to companies established in the Russian regions, which granted 
operational companies tax concessions. 1136 The operational companies resold the oil to 
domestic and foreign buyers at market prices or processed the oil at one of the Yukos' 
refining companies. 1137 In most cases the operational companies, delegated bookkeeping 
and other internal corporate matters to a special accounting company affiliated to 
Yukos. 1138 Most business and other transactions were conducted by the operational 
companies with other entities of the Yukos corporate group. 1139 Export operations were 
structured through Yukos as a commissioner, which had an access to export pipeline 
capacities. Yukos also arranged for payment, transport, processing and shipment of the 
oil. 140 The commission that Yukos and its affiliates received for these services was 
nominal (0.01- 0.5%). 
"a' 
113" See eg Yukos Oil Company v Russia App No 14902/04 ECHR (14 December 2004). 
1135 Initially the Company used prices published in special reference books. 
1136 See Ministry for Taxes and Levies, Yukos Resolution' 2-3; Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead 
Khodorkovsky to Prison 57-58. 
1137 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 2-3. 
1139 Postanovlenie Federal pogo Arbitrazhnogo Suda Moskovskogo Okruga po zayavleniyu Mezregionalnol 
Nalogovoi Inspektsii N_a I protiv Kompanii Yukos [Decision of the Federal Arbitration Court of Moscow 
Region on the case Interregional Tax Inspection NI v Yukos] [KA-A4013222-05] (Federal Arbitration Court 
of Moscow Region 30 June 2005) <garant. ru>accessed 23 May 2008; Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukon 
Resolution' 2-3. 
1139 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 2-3; Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky 
to Prison 57-59. 
11'° See interregional Tax Inspection NJ v Yukos [KA A40/3222-05]. 
1141 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 2. 
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Since the operational companies enjoyed concessions on profits, tax, as well as a host 
of revenue taxes, (such as road use tax, housing stock, social benefits tax and property tax), 
the corporate group, which created and controlled the operational companies, made 
considerable tax savings by using the scheme. 1142 
As follows from the above narrative, the Yukos tax optimisation scheme was 
primarily based on the two main techniques, as were other Russian production companies' 
tax optimisation schemes, including schemes employed by the oil and gas sector. These 
two techniques were: (1) the use of operational companies registered in low tax zones; 1143 
and, (2) transfer pricing 1144 
The particularities of both techniques used in Russia still remain unclear for 
international researchers. "45 The legal uncertainties pertaining to the application of both 
constituent parts of the tax optimisation schemes played a critical role in the Yukos case. 
4.5.4.2. Russian Tax Havens: Legal Status and Problems. 
The tax disputes involving Yukos have focused attention on the government's policy 
concerning tax havens, particularly on ZATOs. Such tax policies have implications far 
beyond Yukos and the other 1146 
Russia has for over a decade been experimenting with various forms of internal tax 
havens, in some cases giving regional governments the right to exempt taxpayers in those 
regions from a broad range of federal taxes. 
1147 The original policy objective for these 
X42 Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited' 2-3. 
'143 See eg ibid 6-8; Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky to Prison 57-58. 
1144 See eg Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited' 6-8; S Budilin, 'Dobrosovestnyi Ili 
Nedobrosovestnyi? Konstitutsionnye Osnovy Nalogovogo Planirovaniya: Novye Tendentsii [Fair or Unfair? 
Constitutional Grounds of Tax Planning - the New Tendencies]' (2006) 11 Rossiiskaya Yustitsiya [Russian 
justice] 33 - 35. 
>>45 For the only example see Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited'. 
3146 Samoylenko, Government Policies in Regard to Internal Tax Havens in Russia 3. 
1147 International Tax and Investment Center, OE Forecasting and SSD LL. P., Taxes on Profits of 
Multinational Companies and Implications forRussian (2004) 10. 
242 
havens was to encourage regional economic development and to allow a measured amount 
of regional autonomy. The hope was that reduced tax burdens in selected regions would 
stimulate investment there, and would help to boost the long-term prosperity of all Russia. 
Unfortunately, the hoped-for boom in investment in these regions did not materialise, and 
instead these regions became instruments for reducing tax payments. ' 148 Experts point out 
that tax avoidance and tax evasion practices within business groups were based on 
strategies of concealment of illegal activities and political bargaining for tax avoidance 
with local authorities and tax inspections! 
149 
The application of questionable tax schemes, based on the regional tax breaks was 
directly acknowledged by the Ministry of Finance: `... it appears that several companies 
actively use special tax evasion schemes, by using front companies registered in domestic 
and foreign offshore zones, and by manipulating prices. 
"'50 
Until the early 2000s these tax optimisation strategies were considered as acceptable 
or "legal" in nature by legal experts, given then current level of anti tax avoidance/evasion 
doctrines and techniques and the attitude of the authorities to the legislation. 
' 151 
There were several distinct types of tax benefit zones in Russia used in the Yukos 
schemes. 1152Analysis shows that regional governments effectively used to sell the regional 
concessions. Their distinct goal was to provide their "clients" with a tax avoidance 
instruments for a fraction of tax payments that should have been paid according to the law. 
1149 ibid. 
1149 D Rogachev 'Zato on Lovko Ukhodil Ot Nalogov [He Smartly Avoided Taxes]' (2004) 
<http: //www. compromat. ru/main/hodorkovskiy/zato. htm>accessed 25 June 2007. 
jj50 Whalen and Chazan, 'Russia Considers Probe into Oil Industry's Taxes - Official Accuses Companies of 
Evading Payments' A24. 
1151 Mironov, 'Economics of Spacemen: Tax Evasion and Firm Performance. Evidence from Russian Banking 
Transaction Data' 3. 
1152 See Budilin, 'Fair or Unfair? Constitutional Grounds of Tax Planning - the New Tendencies'; N 
Medvedeva, I Ragozina and N Milenina, Aklual'nye Voprosy Nalogooblozheniya, Nalogovogo I 
Byudzhetnogo Prava [Important Issues of Taxation, Tax and Budgetary Law] (Nalogi i Finansovoe Pravo 
[Tax and Finance Law], Moscow 2007). 
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4.5.43. Transfer Pricing in Russia and the Yukos Case. 
Taking into consideration the tremendously complicated and confusing situation 
with the regulation of trading operations of holding companies in the Russian Federation 
since their creation early 1990s and until 2003, several principal issues need to be 
addressed. 
4.5.4.3.1. Transfer Pricing and Minority Shareholders Problem. 
As discussed in the chapter on Yukos's history and structure, Russian holding 
companies were incorporated as vertical corporate groups, in which a head holding 
company quite commonly owned 50%+1 of the ordinary voting shares. 1153 Therefore, there 
were a large number of minority shareholders in the subsidiaries who quite rightly 
demanded dividends from the production companies where they held stock. hIM It strongly 
contradicted the idea of "virtually integrated holding companies" which had to be 
profitable as consolidated corporate groups. ' 155 
It should be noted that Russian corporate law demands the same "arms-length" 
approach to the transactions of companies as Western and international corporate laws 
do. "56 A special procedure of approving the related parties and major transactions must be 
applied to all the transactions inside the corporate groups. "57 
Until 2006, there were no mechanisms for the compulsory buyout of minority stock. 
That put newly established corporate groups in an ambiguous position: on one hand they 
did not want to pay shareholder-blackmailers who tried to enforce their rights, and on the 
1153 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 'Russian Privitization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong' 
1750-52; I Shitkina, Kholdingovye Kompanii [Holding Companies: Legal and Corporate Governance Issues] 
(Walters Kluwer, Moscow 2006) 214-21. 
1`4 See Gololobov and Bakhmina, The Three Stages in the Development of Oil Industry Bolding 
Companies'; Iji, 'Corporate Control and Governance Practices in Russia' 9-12. 
'I's See Gololobov, Company v. Shareholder 20-21. 
11-56 See Appendix 22. 
3157 The Law on Joint Stock Companies art 78-79,81-84. 
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other hand they had no legal means for the effective compulsory consolidation of the 
minority stock at the level of the head company. ' 158 In this situation, the management of 
big Russian production companies had to walk a tightrope between pressures exerted by 
minority shareholders and the demands of tax inspections and international auditors. 
Companies were also facing tough competition. This was at a time when those who did not 
optimise their taxes could not survive. Eventually, all the oil majors applied different 
transfer pricing schemes: 
To get a sense of the magnitude of the manipulation in transfer pricing, 
analyst reports indicate that Sibneft's production subsidiary was selling oil at 
just $2.20/ barrel, considerably below the average export price of $13.50, and 
the average domestic price of $7.20/ barrel' 159 
Khodorkovsky's unwillingness to pay the state more than it "had to be paid" resulted 
in the Yukos' adherence to transfer pricing! 160 
4.5.4.3.2. The "Russian" Fair Market Price. 
The Russian Tax Code codified the arm's length principle as the basis for 
determining corporate income. 1161 Nevertheless, a lack of judicial practice, the general 
weakness in tax administration and the Russian Federation's problematic economic system 
gave birth to a confusing system of willful statutory blindness. In this climate big 
corporations paid taxes on the basis of a special agreement with the Ministry of Tax and 
Levies, not on the basis of the tax code. Thus, the Russian government closed its eyes to 
the universal application of "transfer pricing" schemes. 
' 162 
j158 See S Savchuk and R Kadikov, Dobrovol'nyi I Prinuditel'nyi Vykup Aktsil: Prakticheskle Aspekty 
[Voluntary and Compulsory Buy-out of Shares: Practical Aspects] (INKOR, Moscow 2007). 
>>s9 See Korchagina, 'Sibneft's Owners Nation's Worst-Kept Secret; Sibneft Oil Company, Sibneft Bond 
O ering Prospectus (2002) F-8. 
1160 See eg L Komisar, Western Critics: Khodorkovsky Stole Yukos Fair and Square' (2007) 28 March 
Johnson's Russia List <http: //www. cdi. org/russia/johnson/2007-75-23. cfin>accessed 3 May 2007. 
1161 See also N Havard, 'Comparative Analysis of Tax Incentives Provided by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Russia to Domestic and Foreign Businesses' (2003-2004) 67 Alb L Rev 1159-83,1167. 
"D Treisman, Russia's Taxing Problem' (1998) 112 Foreign Policy 55-66,55-64; Samoylenko, 
Government Policies in Regard to Internal Tax Havens in Russia, 2-5. 
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Due to the peculiarities of the Russian oil trading system, the application of the "fair 
market price" rule faced significant problems. As the export capacity of the Russian oil 
companies was restricted by the physical pumping capacity of the export pipeline that 
belonged to the state-controlled company "Transneft", they were allowed to sell 
approximately one third of the produced crude to overseas consumers., 163 The rest of the 
oil had to be sold on the internal market or refined and sold as products. 11TM Therefore, 
there was the "world" fair market price, fixed by the international rating agencies for 
overseas sales, and the "internal" fair market price for domestic sales., 165 The internal 
market price did not actually exist as there was no public exchange for oil contracts, and 
the majority of the oil was refined. This phenomenon could easily be explained by political 
factors: the internal price of oil was deemed a core macroeconomic factor that determined 
internal prices. If it had not been statutory indirectly controlled, the country would have 
faced a tremendous price-rise shock. Former first vice Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, 
defending Khodorkovsky and Yukos, stated the following: 
According to an assessment by the Russian Ministry of Energy, in the year 1999 
more than 90% of the oil sold by Russian companies was sold via transfer- 
pricing... 
The Russian authorities have tried to incorporate this ['Outstretched Hand'] 
principle into the body of the Tax Code. This has failed... 
The `parties to the transaction' - the parent-company Yukos and its subsidiaries - 
did exactly this: They agreed on `the price of the product, works or services'. Was 
this a good or a bad thing? That's another matter. But it was legal under the 
existing law, and the government did not interfere in it. 1166 
"63 See the Main Conditions. 
1164 R Corzine and J Thornhill, 'Oil Price Collapse Threatens Russian Economy The Financial Times 
(London 19 March 1998) 2; C Mortished, 'Crude Oil Falls as Russia Lifts Export Curbs' The Times (London 
18 May 2002) 52. 
110 In case of Yukos, it exceeded five times the transfer price of their affiliated refineries. T Shiobara, 
'Oversights in Russia's Corporate Governance: The Case of the Oil and Gas Industry in S Tabata (ed), 
Dependent on Oil and Gas: Russia's Integration into the World Economy (Slavic Research Center, 2006) 85- 
115,96. 
"66 E Gaidar, 'Nikto Do Sikh Por Ne Proanaliziroval Na Chem Stroyatsya Obvineniya Po Delu Mikhaila 
Khodorkovskogo I Platona Lebedeva [Nobody Analysed the New Chargers Brought against Khodorkovsky 
and Lebedevl' (2007) 4 
The New Times <http: //newtimes. ru/magazine/2007/issueOO4/doc-1527. html> 
accessed 14 June 2008. 
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Criticizing the arguementation of the prosecution he also pointed out: "The fact that 
prices for oil and gas in Russia differ from world-prices is well-known ... to most Russian 
school-children. So it's not surprising that the courts also know about it... "t 167 
Therefore, the artificial absence of an internal market price should be understood as 
state policy, which suppressed the internal oil market and encouraged the application of 
transfer-pricing schemes. 
The above arguements describe the situation that took place in Russia between the 
early 90s and the beginning of the Yukos case. They provide a proper basis for 
understanding the reasons why Yukos, like many other production companies, aggressively 
used transfer-pricing operations incorporated in its tax and cash flow optimisation 
schemes. 
4.6. The Tax Avoidance and Evasion Allegations against Yukos. 
According to the position of the Russian Federation, the results of the tax audits 
demonstrated that between 2000 and 2004 the Yukos Oil Company had been adhering to 
tax evasion schemes resulting in its failure to pay taxes. 1168 The findings of the tax 
agencies regarding the failure of the company to pay taxes were upheld by the courts. 't69 
Initially, the allegations of tax evasion were described in detail in Resolution N2 14-3- 
05/1609-11170 to hold the taxpayer fiscally liable for a tax offence. 1171 They can be 
summarised as follows: 
1167 ibid. 
116' See for the position of the Russian Federation ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006); ECHR Russia's 
Mein (1 S April 2005). 
169 ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006) 4. 
1170 The Resolution was brought on the basis of the Act of Extraordinary Tax Audit, conducted in respect of 
the year 2000 accounts by the Inter-Regional Inspection of the FTS of Russia, related to the largest taxpayers 
Ns 1 (Tax Code art 87-89). 
1 171 See Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution'. 
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4.6.1. Organised Tax Evasion Scheme. 
The tax authorities alleged that the Yukos production subsidiaries sold crude oil at 
below-market prices to shell companies affiliated with Yukos that were established in the 
regions within Russia, which had granted such companies the relevant tax concessions. 
The shell companies resold the oil to domestic and foreign buyers at market prices. 1172 In 
the Resolution the tax inspectors pointed out: 
... the "owners" 
(shell companies) concluded commission agreements to buy 
commodity crude oil with the Yukos Oil Company. The Yukos Oil Company, 
in its turn, upon the instructions of the "owners" registered in tax preferential 
territories, bought oil from Yukos's producing subsidiaries or from shell 
companies. In these deals the Yukos Oil Comany purchased oil at undercut 
prices to lower the tax basis of the producers. ' 13 
The tax audit showed that due to the use of the mentioned illegal tax evasion 
scheme, the Yukos Oil Company itself had not shown the receipts from the sales of 
products. "74 
4.6.2. Control of the Organised Tax Evasion Scheme. 
The key arguement of the tax inspection for challenging the Yukos' schemes, was 
that the Yukos Oil Company, which was the ultimate parent of the group, and the entity 
against which additional taxes had been assessed, completely controlled the operations and 
the finances of the shell companies. The Company exercised control via the placement of 
directors, powers of attorney and via different agreements with the companies under which 
Yukos organised the purchase, sale, transport, processing and export of oil. 
1175 
" See eg Clateman, Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited' 2; Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead 
Khodorkovsky to Prison 58-61; Egorov, 'Yukos: Just the Facts'. 
1173 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 1-2. 
1174 bid 1. 
1175 See eg Clateman, Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited' 2; Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead 
Khodorkovsky to Prison 58-61. 
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Based on the above evidence, the tax inspectors came to the conclusion that the 
network of seemingly independent companies had been fully controlled by Yukos. The 
elements of substance over form, business purpose and economic substance doctrines can 
be distinctly seen in the arguement of the tax authorities. 
4.6.3. Illegal Tax Concessions. 
The second key arguement of the tax authorities was that the Yukos-controlled shell 
companies had illegally obtained tax benefits in the regions where they had been located. 
According to the Resolution, the specific taxation order was established by the 
relevant laws of the regions where Yukos' shell companies had been registered in order to: 
"create favorable conditions for investments in the economy of those regions, to improve 
their social and economic potential, to develop their securities market and create new 
1176 vacancies". 
The main arguement of the Ministry of Tax and Levies was that the "owners" 
registered in the territory of the regions, which provided the tax concessions, carried out no 
actual activities in their territories, attracted no capital and added no improvements to the 
social and economic potential of the region. On the contrary, their non-payment of taxes 
caused substantial damage to the local budgets, as well as to the federal budget. 
1177 
Thus, these organisations used the tax preferences without any intention to improve 
the economy of the relevant regions, but in order to help the Yukos Oil Company to evade 
taxes on its production, processing and sales operations of oil and products, and 
consequently acted against the law. 
"78 The elements of substance over form, business 
purpose, economic substance and other doctrines can be clearly perceived 
here as well. 
1176 ibid 3-8. 
1177 See ibid; Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky to Prison 60-61,77-79. 
11 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 4. 
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Figure 16 represents the main arguements, used by the tax authorities, to prove that 
Yukos Oil Company managed and controlled the shell companies which participated in the 
tax avoidance scheme. 
Figure 16. "Evidence of Control in the Vukos Tax Optimisation Scheme. " 
i i,, + 
X79 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukon Resolution' 2-3. 
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4.6.4. Dishonest Tax Conduct. 
The final formula used by the Ministry of Tax and Levies, was that the Yukos Oil 
Company's tax evasion, committed by means of registering shell companies in tax 
preferential territories, with the single aim of tax non-payment by fake organisations 
performing no actual activities in these territories, and making no investments in the 
regional economies, should be logically considered illegal and amounting to mala fide 
behavior by the Yukos Oil Company. 180 
The tax inspectors pointed out that, according to the Decree by the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation on the interpretation of the provision of Clause 3 point 7 
of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, the presumption of good faith applies in the tax 
sphere. ' 181 According to the position of the tax authorities, good faith is an abstract term 
that generally encompasses honesty of intention, abstention from taking unconscionable 
advantage of another, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances that ought to cause a 
reasonable person to investigate. In many countries this term was used in various areas of 
the law but had a special significance in commercial law. 1182 The inspectors stressed that 
following from the Decree, the presumption of good faith established by the Tax Code 
obliged tax bodies prove any unfair behavior, and carry out necessary audits to identify 
such unfair behavior by taxpayers, in order to balance the interests of the state and private 
entities. ' 183 Thus, the presence of bad faith in a taxpayer's behavior enabled the Ministry of 
Taxes and Levies to reassess the taxpayer's position and effectively conduct 
reapportionment of profit in a corporate group (identify the party who is the actual owner 
of the property and the ultimate recipient of the economic benefit). 
1184 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned arguements, the Ministry of Tax and 
Levies came to the following conclusion: 
j1B0ibid7. 
1'81ibid 7-8. 
Ernst & Young, Taxpayers' Good Faith Questioned' (2006) May RussTax Brief 3-4,3 
<http: //www. ey. com/global/download. nsf/Russia_E/RTBMay06/$flle/RTII May06. pdßaccessed 27 April 
2007. 
'" Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 7-8. 
"" ibid 116-17. 
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Firstly, in this case the Ministry had rights for reassessment (recharacterization). In 
order to strike a balance between public and private interests, the tax authorities may 
conduct inspections in order to identify the actual owner of property sold, and to ascertain 
the owner's bad faith, which manifested itself in using a tax evasion scheme. In doing so 
the tax authorities identify the party who is the actual owner of the property based on the 
actual relationship arising between parties to the transactions, irrespective of who is called 
the owner of the property in the documents submitted in the course of a tax audit. 1185 
Secondly, the Yukos Oil Company had been the actual and ultimate owner of oil and 
products. The Yukos Oil Company actually had the rights of possession, use and disposal 
in relation to oil and oil products and, in relation to them performed all actions, including 
alienation, transfer for processing, etc., through shell companies dependent on Yukos. 
That Yukos did this at its own volition is proved by the evidence described in the 
Resolution. 1186 
Thirdly, the ultimate tax liabilities of the Yukos Oil Company concerning particular 
taxes in the light of the extraordinary audit appeared as follows, according to the Ministry 
of Taxes and Levies. 
In respect of VAT and other taxes, the inspectors stated that the Yukos Oil Company, 
the actual owner of the oil and oil products, when selling them had incurred various 
liabilities: a value-added tax liability, a motorway user tax liability, a POL sales tax 
liability and a housing stock and social amenities maintenance tax liability, none of which 
had been paid within the prescribed time-limits. "87 
The Ministry of Taxes and Levies also pointed out that an economic benefit derived 
by an entity in monetary form, or in kind, gave rise to a profit tax liability, as prescribed by 
the Profit Tax Law, irrespective of whether this benefit was obtained by means of 
transferring funds directly to the accounts of the taxpayer, or to the accounts of other 
11 85 ibid 116. 
ý"86 ibid. 
ý"" bid. 
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parties. Therefore, the company via the shell companies dependent on it, was the ultimate 
recipient of the economic benefit, and was subject to the profit tax. 1188 
The tax inspectors stressed that property tax liability should be incurred by an entity 
who was obliged to reflect fixed assets, intangible assets, stocks and costs on its balance 
sheet. Since the field tax audit ascertained that the Yukos Oil Company had this obligation, 
this taxpayer also incurred a property tax liability. ' 189 
Finally, the Ministry of Taxes and Levies came to the conclusion that as the Yukos 
Oil Company intentionally took measures to evade taxes. It also concluded that as its 
executives, understanding the illegal nature of these activities, wished or intentionally 
allowed the harmful results thereof, the company is subject to extra (double) sanctions. 
This is established by Article 122 point 3 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, for 
non-payment or underpayment of taxes as a result of intentional illegal activity (inactivity) 
in the form of penalty to an amount of 40% of the sums unpaid. ' 190 The above arguements 
of the Ministry of Tax and Levies clearly confirm the indirect application of framework 
elements derived from the substance over form, business purpose and other doctrines, 
which supported the application of the Russian Civil Anti-Avoidance doctrines. 
According to the Resolution, the Yukos Oil Company had to pay approximately $ 3.4 
bn., which just flagged the beginning of the Yukos tax case. 
4.7. The Yukos Position. 
The position of Yukos regarding the Tax audit procedure and its results stated in the 
appendix to the Resolution may be summarised in the following main arguements: 
11 ibid 116-17. 
I"'ibid 117. 
190 See Tax Code art 110 (4). 
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4.7.1. The Legal Meaning of Interdependence of Shell Companies. 
The grounds for attaching the proceeds and tax liabilities of the shell companies to 
the Yukos Oil Company concern the interdependence between these companies and 
Yukos. Russian tax laws do not enable the tax authorities to demand that the taxes due 
from one company be paid by another company. In Russian legislation, interdependence 
of entities does not have the legal meaning that is attached to it in the Inspection Report. 
The company in its official comments pointed out: 
In current Russian legislation the status of interdependent entities has strictly 
definite legal implications for tax purposes. It means that if there is a fact of 
interdependence of entities, the tax authorities become entitled.... to adjust ... for tax purposes the results of the transactions between these companies. 1191 
The Company's position regarding the interdependence arguement was based on the 
statutory rules, which quite clearly provided that there were no other legal consequences 
of recognizing legal entities to be interdependent, except for those, stated in article 40 of 
the Tax Code providing the tax authorities with the right of adjustment. ' 192 
4.7.2. The Definition of a "Shell" Company. 
The position of the Company regarding existence of "shell companies" was based on 
the perception that current tax legislation did not contain the notion of a "shell" company. 
The company emphasized that: `... in order to conclude that these entities are fake 
companies, the tax inspectors should either challenge their state registration as legal 
entities or prove that these companies are not registered as legal entities at all, or are 
registered with material violations. ' 
1193 
1191 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 11. 
1192 See Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead Khodorkovsky to Prison 66; K Nepesov, Nalogovye Asperity 
Transfertnogo Tsenoobrazovanrya [Tax Aspects of Transfer Pricing] (Walters Kluwer, Moscow 2007) 2.1.2. 
"93 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 11. 
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The Company and its consultants clearly stated that the terms, "shell" or "front" 
companies, in the meaning implied by the Ministry of Tax and Levies, were unknown in 
Russian legislation and from a legal standpoint, all companies were properly registered and 
formally complied with all the characteristics of legal entities! 194 
4.73. The Company Cannot Pay Taxes for Third Parties. 
The Company's lawyers pointed out that by coercing the Company to pay taxes for 
the allegedly affiliated group of "shell" companies, the Ministry actually violated the tax 
law. The opinion of the Company's tax adviser said: `The statement saying that Yukos is 
obliged to pay taxes for other companies runs counter to art. 45 of the Tax Code of the 
Russian Federation, which provides that all taxpayers are obliged to meet their tax 
liabilities independently. "'9' 
The Company also added that the tax inspectors actually changed the status of the 
taxpayer, treating it as if it were obliged to pay the additionally charged amount for third 
parties. 
1 196 
It should be noted that the prohibition to pay taxes for any third party is one of the 
cornerstones of the Russian tax law, although it may look rather obscure to international 
lawyers. However, the Constitutional Court in its decision clarified that this prohibition 
had been stipulated by the law to provide proper identification of the funds transferred to 
the budget, and to prevent unnecessary interference of third parties in the process of 
taxation. 1197 It does not prevent companies from using duly authorized intermediaries. 
1198 
1 194 Pepelyaev, Ivlieva and Khamenushko, Opinion on the Yukos Inspection Report. 
3195 ibid. 
1196 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 112. 
1 197 See Res of CC RF Ns 41-0. 
1198 See eg T Matveicheva, 'Vozmozhnost' Perechisleniya Nalogov v Byudzhet Tret'imi Litsami Za 
Nalogoplatel'scika [On Whether Can Taxes Be Paid by Third Parties? ]' (2004) 3 Vash Nalogovyi Advokat 
[You Tax Advocate]. 
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4.7.4. Regional Tax Concessions. 
The Yukos position, regarding illegal administration of the tax concessions, was 
based on the assertion that the tax inspectors simply alleged that the said companies had 
not conducted activities on the territory of the relevant administrative and territorial 
formations, because the companies had not owned or leased any fixed assets for storing oil, 
and no oil had really been transported to the relevant regions! 199 The Company's advisers 
reacted: `We are not aware of any case in court practices where taxes reassessed upwards 
would be levied, not on the company that used the allowances, but on another entity. ' 1200 
The Company, in its Statement of Objections, 1201 also pointed out that the so-called 
"shell" companies' activities lay in the commercial intermediary services performed in 
these territories, irrespective of where the oil products were located, these companies' 
activities did not consist of selling oil or oil products on the territory of the relevant 
administrative and territorial formations. The law did not impose an obligation on 
companies to conduct commercial intermediary activities at the place where the trade item 
1202 is located. 
The company also mentioned in its Statement of Objections that the unlawful use of 
the tax concessions by third parties should not serve as a reason for bringing any 
allegations against the Yukos Oil Company, since the latter did not perform any actions 
(omissions) in connection with the use of the said concessions. 1203 
1199 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 113. 
'200 Pepelyaev, Ivlieva and Khamenushko, Opinion on the Yukos Inspection Report. 
1201 Cited as an Appendix to the Resolution. 
1202 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 113. 
1203 ibid 114. 
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4.7.5. Expiration of the Statute of Limitation Period. 
The Yukos Oil Company stated that the limitation period for imposing liability for a 
tax offence had expired. 1204 Article 113 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation clearly 
provided that no one may be held liable for a tax offence, if three years had expired 
(statute of limitation period) from the date on which the offence was committed or from 
the day following the end date of the tax period in which this offence was committed. 1205 
There were several other supplementary arguements summarised in the Yukos 
objections, submitted to the Ministry of Tax and Levies, such as procedural violations, 
breach of confidentiality rules and arithmetical mistakes. 1206 
The character of Yukos's objections showed that its consultants used contra- 
arguementation based on the formal and literal approach to the statutory provisions, 
completely denying application of any elements of the foreign doctrines, effectively used 
by the Ministry of Tax and Levies. 
4.8. The Court's Rulings on the Yukos Tax Case. 
Quite a number of decisions have been brought concerning the Yukos Tax Case. The 
court decisions pertain to different years, as the extraordinary audit was conducted 
subsequently in respect of the years 2000-2004. However, all the findings were based on 
the same principles, established in the decision brought for the year 2000. Moreover, the 
decisions of the subsequent Appeal and Cassation simply confirmed the findings of the 
First Instance, so the decisions of the Appeal and Cassation may be regarded as putting 
several findings of the First Instance into a more "polished" legal form. The Decision of 
the Supreme Arbitration Court and the Decision of the Constitutional Court, concerned 
only selected aspects of law pertaining to the named decisions. 
1204 The amount of fine calculated in the Inspection Report is RUR 18,887,192,996. 
1205 Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution' 114. 
1206 
ibid. 
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4.8.1. Findings of the Courts. 
The findings of the Moscow Arbitration Court, which considered the Yukos 
application to declare unlawful Resolution of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for 
Taxes and Levies dated 14.04.2004 No. 14-3-05/1609-1, served to confirm the allegations 
brought by the Ministry. 1207 
Firstly, the Court fully confirmed the existence of the scheme under which the Yukos 
Oil Company controlled operations with oil and oil products, through participation in 
transactions, acting either as the broker or by engaging other entities, affiliated with the 
Yukos Oil Company for participation in transactions, as brokers. 1208 
The Court also established that the Yukos Oil Company was the ultimate owner of 
oil and oil products. Purchase, transfer of oil for refining and sales of oil and oil products 
were actually performed by the Yukos Oil Company as the owner. This was witnessed by 
the direct participation of the Yukos Oil Company in all operations, and by the actual 
movement of oil and oil products from producing entities to refineries or to tank farms 
under control of Yukos, as attested by the goods shipping documents. 
1209 
Figures 17 summarises in a graphic form the court's arguementation concerning the 
Yukos' control of the shell companies which participated in the tax evasion scheme. 
1207 See the Decision in Appendix 23. 
1208 Reshenie Arbitrazhnogo Sudag Moskva po zayavlenyu Mezregional'noi Nalogovoi Inspektsi1 Ns 1 protiv 
Kompanii Yukos [Decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court on the case Interregional Tax Inspection NI v 
Yukos] [A40-61058//04-141-1510] (Moscow Arbitration Court 26 May 2004), 11. 
1209 ibid 12. 
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Figure 17. "The Arguements Used by the Court for Proving the Presence of the 
Yukos' Control of the Scheme. " 
Iglu 
Taking into consideration these factors, the Court came to the conclusion that the 
Yukos Oil Company should pay the property tax, profit tax, VAT and other taxes for all 
the "shell" companies in accordance with the Ministry's position. 
The court did not accept the arguement of the Yukos Oil Company that tax 
authorities had no right to collect taxes on sums of earnings received by the third parties. 
The Court stated that the Decision of Russian Federation Constitutional Court No. 138-0 
of 25.07.2001 confirms the right of tax authorities to present to the courts claims, which 
provide for the receipt of taxes in the budget, upon the established bad faith of the 
taxpayer. The Court then pointed out that the bad faith of the taxpayer, i. e. the Yukos Oil 
1210 ibid. 
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Company, and the fact that it effectively owned the earnings from operations with oil and 
products, is supported by the case materials. 1211 
The Court also stated that Yukos Oil Company was incorrect to argue that the status 
of interdependent persons had legal meaning only for application of the transfer pricing 
rules (i. e. application of the fair market price instead of the price used originally by the 
parties and, thus, reapportionment of the taxable income). The Court stressed that 
interdependence of persons in this case is a circumstance by which the taxation authority 
substantiated the bad faith of the taxpayer. 1212 
The Court established that application of tax benefits by entities affiliated with the 
Yukos Oil Company, and the participation in any tax evasion scheme created by it, is 
unlawful. 1213 Supplementing this finding, the Court pointed out that pursuant to Article 56 
of Tax Code, tax benefits are recognized as preferences, stipulated by the taxes and duties 
legislation, for certain categories of taxpayers as compared to other taxpayers, including 
the possibility of not paying the tax or paying it in lower amounts. 1214 
The Court emphasized that, following the presumption of good faith of taxpayers, tax 
benefits may be regarded as legitimately granted only if the amount of provided benefits 
virtually matches the sum of investments made by the investing entity into the economy of 
a relevant region. This principle complies with the purpose of tax benefits as a stimulus for 
investing in particular regions. As the level of benefits declared for taxes by the 
aforementioned entity and the sums of investments it made were obviously non- 
commensurate, the application of benefits was completely unlawful. 
121s The Court added 
that the application of tax benefits by the relevant entities had not been aimed at improving 
the economies of the regions, but had been pursued by the Yukos Oil Company in order to 
evade paying taxes on operations of production, refining and sales of oil and oil products 
and, consequently, must be seen as unlawful. 1216 In respect of the ZATO territories the 
1211 ibid 13-14. 
1212 ibid 19. 
1213 ibid 14. 
1214 ibid. 
1215 ibid 16. 
1216 ibid 15. 
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Court stated that investment contributions made by the taxpayers did not influence the 
development of their regions' economic systems. As the "shell" companies did not 
actually carry any activity in the ZATOs -they were not actually present in their territories, 
and there were no material resources and production facilities requisite for the procurement 
and storage of oil in the territory - the application of tax benefits by the mentioned entities 
contradicted the law. 1217 The court, in bringing the decision on the substance of the tax 
claims brought against Yukos thereby blessed the creative indirect application of the 
foreign anti-avoidance doctrines in combination with the old Russian ones. 
The Court then brought the most controversial and unexpected decision. In respect of 
the expiration of the limitation period for the imposition of fines, it stated that the 
presumption of good faith of taxpayers operates in the sphere of tax relations, as provided 
by the meaning of the provision contained in Article 3 of Tax Code. Reasoning from this 
presumption, the norms of tax legislation that confer rights, or guarantees, to bona fide 
taxpayers cannot be extended to mala fide taxpayers. Since, in the course of the 
extraordinary tax audit, the facts of Yukos Oil Company's bad faith conduct and 
abstraction of the tax authorities auditing activities had been established, the court came to 
the conclusion that the limitation period of calling Yukos Oil Company for tax liability had 
1218 
not expired. 
The Court also declined the Yukos' allegations of procedural violations made by the 
Ministry of Tax and Levies in the course of the extraordinary tax audit. 
1219 Finally, the 
Court almost fully upheld the claim of the Ministry of Tax, collecting from Yukos taxes to 
the amount of 47,989,073,311 RUR, fines to the amount of 32,190,430,314 RUR and 
penalties to the amount of 19,195,606,923 RUR for the income of the 
budget. 1220 
By the decision of the appellate instance of the Moscow Arbitration Court of 29 June 
20041221 and by the subsequent decision of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow 
1217 ibid 16-18. 
1218 ibid 19-20. 
1219 See Yukos, Violations Committed by the Arbitration Court of Moscow (2004). 
1220 Interregional Tax Inspection NI v Yukos [A40-61058104-141-1510] 22. 
1221 See ibid; The Moscow Times, 'Court Upholds $3.4bin Yukos Tax Claim'. 
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Circuit of 17 September 2004, the decision of the first instance (trial court) was upheld, 
except for some insignificant changes. 
4.8.2. The Findings of the Supreme Arbitration Court and 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. 
The Yukos Oil Company addressed the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian 
Federation with supervisory appeals on the reconsideration of the decision of the trial 
court, the judgement of the appellate instance, and the judgement of the Federal Arbitration 
Court in the order of supervision. 1222 The Yukos Oil Company also appealed to the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. The Company claimed that its 
constitutional rights had been violated in relation to the imposition of sanctions for a tax 
violation in 2000, and they asked the Court to review the consistency of articles 3 
(paragraph 7) and 113 of the Tax Code, with the relevant articles of the Constitution. This 
also meant a review of the courts' position as to the expiration of the statute of limitation 
period and the Civil Anti-Avoidance doctrine, which declined legal protection for mala 
fide taxpayers. 1223 
Initially, the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation 
adjourned consideration of the Company's appeal until it had obtained the position of the 
Constitutional Court. '224 
The Constitutional Court refused to accept the appeal for consideration on the basis 
that Article 113 is not unconstitutional and the correctness of the application of the law is a 
matter for the arbitration courts, not the Constitutional Court. 
1225 Amongst other things, the 
Court pointed out that granting relief to the taxpayer, in a case of an obstruction of a tax 
1222 See Presscenter, 'Timeline of Events'. 
11 See I Kuznets, 'Kommentarii K Postanovleniyu Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF N2 9P [Commentaries to the 
Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Ns 9 P]' (2005) 4 Vash Nalogovyi Advokat 
[You Tax Advocate]. 
122' See Presscenter, 'Timeline of Events'. 
1225 See Res of CC RF NO 9-P (II). 
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audit committed by the taxpayer, which had resulted in expiration of the limitation period 
for imposition of tax penalties, would amount to a violation of the principle of equality, 
and would be unfair to other taxpayers. According to the Constitutional Court's position, 
courts considering the case of a particular taxpayer shall distinguish bone fide and mala 
fide taxpayers and should not allow mala fide taxpayers to avoid sanctions exclusively 
because of expiration of the limitation period. 1226 
The Supreme Arbitration Court, after renewing the hearing of the Yukos case and 
taking into consideration the findings of the Constitutional Court, declined the arguements 
of the Yukos' supervisory appeal in full, declaring that: 
The Constitutional Court pointed out.... that in case of obstruction of measures 
of tax control and tax audit by a taxpayer, a relevant court may establish that 
the reasons of expiration of the limitation period shall be regarded as good 
reasons, and impose sanctions for the violations identified in the course of the 
tax audit... 
In the Yukos cases presence of such good reasons was established by the Arbitration 
Court of Moscow. 1227 
Other cases related to the Yukos case have never reached the level of the Supreme 
Arbitration or Constitutional Court. Once established, the complex "Yukos precedent" 
was applied to other tax cases 
1228 pertaining to subsequent years. This situation let Yukos 
without any viable options for successful litigation in Russia. In the findings pertaining to 
subsequent Yukos-related cases, which can be seen as precedent of "selective" application, 
the Yukos case established two important case law precedents at the highest level of 
Russian case law. 
Firstly, transactions accounted for by a taxpayer in non-compliance with their actual 
economic substance can be re-classified by the court for taxation purposes based on their 
122" See for comments Budilin, 'Fair or Unfair? Constitutional Grounds of Tax Planning - the New 
Tendencies'; Ernst & Young, 'Taxpayers' Good Faith Questioned'; A Zolotarev, 'Razgranichenie 
pravomernoi Praktiki Nalogovoi Optimizatsii I Ukloneniya Ot Nalogooblozheniya [Legitimate Tax 
Optimisation and Tax Avoidance]' (2006) 2 Tvoi Nalogovyi Advokat [Your Tax Advocate]. 
1227 See FTS v Yukos Ns 8665/04 
1228 See Yukos, Incremental Tax Assessed on Yukos Vs. Yukos Financial Perfomance; Yukos, 'Tax Slides 
Update'. 
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actual economic substance. 129 Secondly, the fact of violations of tax liabilities by a 
taxpayer's counterparties does not in itself constitute evidence of a taxpayer obtaining an 
invalid tax benefit. Nevertheless, a tax benefit may be deemed invalid if the tax authorities 
prove that the taxpayer acted without due care and circumspection and should have been 
1230 
aware of the violations committed by its counterparty. 
4.8.3. The Position of the Western Courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
Some aspects of the Yukos tax case have been reviewed by several Western courts. 
The former Yukos management and the minority shareholders coalitions have tendcd to 
use arguements concerning procedural violation and the forceful sale of Yganskneflegas in 
the suits being filed with the international courts. 1Bl 
The tax evasion scheme applied by the Yukos Oil Company was the cause for its 
minority shareholders to file lawsuits against the company's directors with the U. S. court. 
One of such lawsuit that was related to gross violation of the Russian tax legislation by the 
company, and which was filed with the United States District Court, Southern District of 
New York, was found partially admissible, but later reconsidered and rejected. The 
plaintiffs alleged that Yukos and its officers failed to disclose material facts concerning 
Yukos's alleged tax evasion scheme, such as: 
First ... 
Yukos touted the Company's operational success and reported 
increasingly positive financial results that overstated profits and understated 
tax liability. 
Second, Yukos represented that its financial results were in conformity with 
U. S. GAAP and other established reporting standards. 
Third, Yukos represented that it reduced its effective tax rate because certain of 
its subsidiaries took advantage of lower regional taxes. 
12" Res of SAC Ns 53. For comments see Y Lermontov, 'Rezolutsiya Ns 53 Plenuma VAS [Resolution Ns 53 
of the Plenum of SAC]' (2007) 3-4 Audit i Nalogooblozhenie [Audit and Taxation] 
<www. garant. ru>accessed 10 December 2007. 
1230 ibid. 
1231 See eg <http: //www. yukosshareholdercoalition. com>. 
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Finally ... Yukos represented that it dealt at arms-length with related parties. 
1232 
The suit filed with the U. S. court, in its legal substance represented a securities fraud 
action. It alleged that Yukos, its external auditor and certain of its executives and 
controlling shareholders had knowingly concealed the risk that the Russian Federation 
would take action against Yukos, by failing to disclose that Yukos had employed an illegal 
tax evasion scheme since 2000.1233 The important aspect of this case was that the U. S. 
court scrutinized the problem of the legitimacy of the Yukos tax schemes by analyzing the 
transfer pricing ("Article 40") and illegal tax benefits allegations. 
The findings of the U. S. court, being based on the limited amount of data, 1234 directly 
contradicted the position of the Russian judicial instances. ' 235 However, it should be noted 
that the main decisions in the Yukos tax case were not submitted for the Court's 
observation in this case, and the Russian State was not a party to it. This gave the 
Company only a partial victory. 
On 27 April 2004, when all the domestic remedies had been exhausted, the 
Company lodged an application with the ECHR, basing its position on the violations of 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 13 of 
the Convention. It claimed violation of the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and the right 
to an effective domestic remedy. 1236 The grounds for the Application are the result of the 
Applicant's complaints about the bogus tax re-assessments and their draconian 
enforcement. Grounds for the Application also resulted from the controversial auction of 
YNG, and its consequential acquisition by the State owned and controlled Rosneft. 1237 
The admissibility of the application has not been determined as of January Ist 
2008.1238 As the application and the ECHR procedure are more concerned with the 
procedural violation, rather than the substance of the tax evasion allegation brought against 
1232 Re Yukos Oil Co Sec Litig Not Reported in F Supp 2d 2006 WL 3026024 (SDNY 2006) 24. 
1233 See ibid. 
1234 As the Russian government was not a party to the proceeding and did make any submissions. 
1235 See Appendix 24. 
1236 See on the Court's reaction to the application ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006); ECHR Russia's 
Mem (15 April 2005); Yukos v Russia App Ns 14902/04 ECHR Protective App (23 April 2004). 
1237 Yukos v Russia App Ns 14902/04 ECHR Comm to the Rebgun's Letter (23 April 2007) 6. 
1239 ibid 2. 
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the Yukos Oil Company and its managers, for the purpose of this research it is more 
important to highlight the general "politicized" treatment of the Yukos tax case by the 
Russian authorities. The summarised approach of the Russian Government to the Yukos 
tax case is quite clearly expressed in the Additional Memorandum of the Russian 
Federation of October 30th 2006. Russia strongly refuted declined Yukos' allegations of 
procedural and other violations by stating: 
The tax evasion scheme, abetted by factitious "dummy companies" set up and 
controlled by the company, was the main focus of the courts' evaluation. The 
scheme was held to be illegal by the courts. It was held that the preferential 
lax assessment procedure, applied by the applicant company, was contrary to 
the Tax Code... and that actions of the company did contain elements of mala 
fide. 1239 
Thus, the Russian Federation continued to pursue a hard-line strategy in the Yukos 
case, including its tax-driven aspect, even in highest international judicial instances. 
4.9. The Main Legal Implications of the Yukos Tax Case. 
4.9.1. Anti - Avoidance Doctrines in the Yukos Tax Case. 
The claims comprising "the Yukos tax case" should be seen as based on the 
application of Russian Civil Anti-Avoidance doctrines, as formally stated in the official 
court decisions, and on the international anti-avoidance concepts, analysed in the first part 
of this chapter. 
Although the characteristics of these doctrines and methods of their application 
differed significantly from the similar ones used internationally or in Anglo-American 
jurisdiction, 1240 the substantial elements of such doctrines were virtually identical. They 
were also applied not in their undiluted form as they are normally applied in Anglo- 
American jurisdictions, but in close interaction with the Russian Anti-Avoidance doctrines. 
1239 ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006) 10. 
1240 See Seidov, 'Dealing with Judicial Antiavoidance Doctrines in Russia and the U. S:. 
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As the Russian Anti-Avoidance doctrines were poorly developed and their application was 
of a limited nature before the Yukos case, 1241 the international doctrines et cctively 
supplemented and extended their application, promoting their further development in 
Russia. Figure 18 below represents the main international, Russian civil and Yukos 
driven doctrines, used directly or indirectly in the Yukos-related tax cases. 
Figure 18. "International, Russian Civil and Vukos - Driven Doctrines. " 
CLASSIC 
COMMON LAW 
DOCTRINES 
CLASSIC 
RUSSIAN CIVIL 
DOCTRINES 
1241 See R Vakhitov, 'Recent Developments Regarding Judicial Anti-Avoidance in Russia' (2005) 45 (4) FT 
163-66; Seidov, 'Dealing with Judicial Antiavoidance Doctrines in Russia and the U. S. '. 
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Some practitioners have opined that the mixed creative application of the 
international and Russian doctrine, may have even given rise to specific Yukos-driven 
doctrines. 1242 However, these doctrines so evidently originate from the international ones, 
that they can only be regarded as "secondary" doctrines lacking independence from the 
main ones. 1243 
Although applied indirectly and creatively, the core anti-avoidance doctrines are to 
be considered as the actual pillars of the Yukos tax case. 12' For example, both the civil 
doctrine of "bad faith" and the presumably Yukos-driven "Actual Ownership" doctrine 
were applied through the prism of the Economic Substance and Business Purpose 
doctrines, as the court established that transactions between the shell companies were 
conducted without any real business purpose except for tax avoidance. 124S 
This "mixture" of doctrines was used in the Yukos case with the propose of 
achieving a complete recharacterization of all the business operations of the Yukos 
corporate group. This led to apportionment of all the operational profit to the Yukos Oil 
Corporation as a legal entity and to the ascription of all assumingly unpaid corporate taxes 
and penalties to the Company. Creative application of these doctrines enabled the Russian 
authorities to; (1) negate the result of tax optimisation schemes, implemented with 
involvement of legal entities registered in the tax benefit zones; (2) make the adjustments 
of the profit obtained within the Yukos corporate group with the assumed violation of arms 
length principle; (3) ascribe to the Yukos Oil Company all the income earned by the Yukos 
corporate group in 2000-2004 and charge the interest and penalties. 
1246 
However, regardless to the significance of the doctrinal aspect, the cornerstone issues 
of the Yukos tax case are that neither classic anti avoidance doctrines, nor any Russian- 
specific doctrines based upon them, have ever before been applied in such combinations 
1242 See Maximovskaya, Overview of the Bona Fide Concept and Anti-Avoidance Legislation in Other 
Countries 8. 
1243 See Appendix 25. 
1244 See Appendix 26. 
1245 See Interregional Tax Inspection Ni v Yukos [A40-61058/04-141-1510]. 
1246 Pepelyaev, Ivlieva and Khamenushko, Opinion on the Yukos Inspection Report, Egorov, 'Yukos: Just the 
Facts'. 
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and so stringently in Russian judicial practice. 1247 It highlights the likelihood of a political 
thrust to the case, previously reviewed in detail. 
In general, the impact of the Yukos tax case can be assessed as critically changing 
the very substance of the judicial approach to the tax avoidance/evasion fight in Russia by 
employing recognized international and western anti-avoidance doctrines. '248 
4.9.2. The Yukos Tax Case and the Contemporary Russian Case Law. 
One of the significant aspects of the Yukos tax case is the lack of similar cases in 
contemporary Russian case law. This issue was raised by the ECHR in its communications 
with the Russian Government, as this matter represented a particular interest from the 
standpoint of selectivity in the Yukos case. The Russian authorities did their best to prove 
that the Yukos case was not unique in Russia, but their list of precedents looks rather 
limited and only serves to confirm the opposite point. 1249 
Analysis conducted independently by Russian tax practitioners shows that none of 
these cases is comparable with the Yukos Case in its precedential nature, general size and 
impact on the taxpayer company. 1250 Even the notorious Rusneft case, considered to be the 
closest to the Yukos tax case in the line of the Post-Yukos cases is hardly comparable with 
the latter in respect of the size, severity and creativity. 125 1 However, it should be noted that 
1241 Clateman, 'Further Legal Observations on the Yukos Affair; Pepelyaev, Ivlieva and Khamenushko. 
Opinion on the Yukos Inspection Report. 
1248 See eg BBC News, 'Putin Calls for End to Tax Terror' (2005) 25 April BBC News 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/business/4481685. stm>accessed 7 December 2007; V Milov, Pravovye Itogi 
[Legal Results]' (2007) 31 October Vedomosti <httpi/www. robertamsterdam. com/2007/10/vladimir_milov 
the legal_resul. htm>accessed 3 November 2007. 
1249 ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006) 32. 
1250 For the information of these cases see Vitkina and Rodionov, Tax Evaders of Putin's Epoch. 
1251 See eg Reznik, 'Gutseriyev's Personal Case'; N Sergeev, 'Police Undertakes Mikhail Gutseriyev' (2007) 
15 May Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. com/p765407/Russneftt>accessed 20 May 2007. 
269 
professionals stress the positive outcome of the Yukos case as a lesson for other taxpayers 
and claim it has had a positive impact on tax discipline in Russia. 1252 
The second question regarding the genesis of Russian case law is the impact of the 
Yukos case on its further development. 
In October 2006, the Supreme Arbitration Court, under significant pressure from 
taxpayers and from a Government that wanted to put "the rules of the game" in proper 
order, prepared and issued the general clarifications of the problem of validity of tax 
benefits (unjustified tax benefits). 1253 This clarification, being obligatory for the lower 
courts, represents something in-between a Ramsay type approach and a GAAR (general 
anti-avoidance rule). 12M The Resolution substantially revised the term "bad faith taxpayer", 
which the Constitutional Court introduced into court practice in 2001. 
'2,55 The Supreme 
Arbitration Court proposed that the concept of the valid receipt of tax benefits must be 
used instead. 1256 The Resolution sets up the several basic principles. 
1257 Taxpayers are 
presumed to be acting in good faith and actions resulting in the receipt of tax benefits are 
presumed economically sound. 
1258 A tax benefit is defined as: the reduction of the amount 
of tax liabilities as a result of reducing the tax base, obtaining a tax deduction or tax 
concession, applying a lower tax rate, and obtaining the right to a tax refund 
(deduction). 1259 A tax benefit may be deemed invalid in cases of accounting for taxation 
1252 See eg C Mortished, 'BP Venture Pays $1bn in Back Taxes as Russia Gets Tougher' The Times (London 
11 November 2006) 56; Kommersant. com, Yukos Bankruptcy Sorts out Russia's Budget Problems' (2007) 
12 July Kommers ant Online <http: //www. kommersant. com/p781872/Budget Spending_Revenue YUKOS > 
accessed 14 July 2007. 
us3 M Filinov and I Lemetyuynen, Russia: New in 2007' (2007) February Int'l Tax Rev 
<http : //www. in temational taxreview. com/? Pag e=10&PUB ID=3 5 &IS S=23343 &SID=673 790&TYPE-20>a cc 
essed 2 July 2007. 
1254 See E Mosin, 'Doktrina Obosnovannoi Nalogovoi Vygody [The Doctrine of Valid Tax Benefit]' (2007) 5 
Tvoi Nalogovyi Advokat [Your Tax Advocate]. 
125$ Salans, 'Letter from Russia' (2006) October Tax Alerts 4,1 <httpi/www. salans. eom/FileServer. aspx? olD 
=1594&1ID=O>accessed 31 October 2007. 
1256 ibid 1-2. 
1257 D Gololobov, 'The Yukos Tax Case or Ramsay Adventures in Russia' (2008) 7 (1) Fla St U Bus L Rev 
165-253,213-15. 
1258 Res of SAC Ns 53 para 1. 
1259 ibid. For comments see E Arora, Neobosnovannaya Nalogovaya Vygoda [Ungrounded Tax Benefit] 
(IndeksMedia, Moscow 2007); Lermontov, 'Resolution N2 53 of the Plenum of SAC'. 
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purposes, for transactions that do not correspond to their actual economic substance, or do 
not stem from reasonable economic or other reasons (business objectives). 126° 
In 2008 the Supreme Arbitration Court in its decision on a different case, reversed 
the practice of imposing double "extra" fines for the repeated violation of the tax law, 
applied by the courts in the Yukos case. It would have brought the company back 
approximately $ 3.5 bn. 126' It should also be noted, that in its clarification the Supreme 
Arbitration Court has fully excluded the application of the Public Order Concept (Art 169 
of the Civil Code) to tax disputes, but this problem may become a case for the 
Constitutional Court. '262 
Important changes to the precedents, established by the Yukos case, additionally 
confirm the problem with the state of the Rule of Law in Russia. In the Yukos tax case the 
deviation from the principles was so significant and the court had to bend the law to such a 
degree, that it actually flagged the begining of several years of "tax terror" in Russia, when 
the taxpayers had no judicial protection. 1263 The Yukos tax case, in the eyes of the public, 
exemplifies the selective utilisation of the judicial system, namely the Arbitration courts, 
for the purpose of prosecuting political opponents by the effective confiscation of their 
business in favor of a new political elite. 1264 This arguementation has been extensively 
used in the ECHR application on the Yukos corporate tax case and, therefore, is sure to get 
further assessment at an international level. 1265 
1260 Res of SAC Ns 53 pars 3-4. For comments see Arora, Ungrounded Tax Benefit; R Lewis, M Maximov 
and N Lobova, 'Russia: Guidance on Legitimacy of Tax Optimisation Arrangements Provided by Supreme 
Arbitration Court Ruling' (2007) January Euro TS 28-29; Mosin, 'The Doctrine of Valid Tax Benefit'. 
1261 Kommersant. com, 'Yukos Paid 90bn in Excess to Budget' (2008) 4 April 2008 Kommersant Online 
<http: /www. kommersant. com/p-12299/Yukos_excess finehaccessed4 April2008. 
'262 Res of SAC N2 22 para 6. 
1263 BBC News, 'Putin Calls for End to Tax Terror'. 
1264 See Osborne, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "Democracy on the Retreat in 
Russia'" 2-6. 
1265 See Yukos v Russia (App no 14902/04) ECHR Protective App (23 April 2004). 
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4.9.3. The Criminal Aspect of the Yukos Tax Case. 
The criminal aspect of the Yukos tax case is vague. Formally, the Yukos Oil 
Company was not held criminally liable for commission of criminal offences, in the 
meaning of the provisions of the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation. This is 
because, according to Article 19 of the CC RF, only a physical person may be subject to 
criminal liability. 1266 In 2004, the General Prosecutor Office, taking into consideration that 
the "deeds of the directors of Yukos Oil Company to evade taxes were of deliberate 
nature" brought criminal charges against the general director of the company that provided 
accounting services to the Yukos Group, Irina Golub (Chief Accountant). ' 267 The charges 
were formulated as, "evasion to pay corporate taxes and (or) contributions committed by a 
group of persons acting in conspiracy on an especially large scale (Article 199 §2 (a) and 
(b) of CC RF). s1268 The General Prosecutor's Office believed that Golub and unidentified 
persons used shell companies to avoid paying taxes on Yukos subsidiaries. Therefore the 
charges are legally based on the allegations made in the corporate tax case. ' 269 The 
company officially commented on the charges, stressing that they did not take into account 
the company's operational schemes: 
The ongoing investigation by the Russian prosecutor ... completely ignore the 
very clear fact that the YUKOS Oil Company is a vertically integrated 
corporation. Further, the allegations do not consider even the most basic 
principles of consolidation accounting. 1270 
1266 CC RF art 19. For comments see Duyunov and others, Commentaries on the Criminal Code of the 
Russian Federation; A Guev, Kommentarii K Ugolovnomu Kodeksu Rossiiskol Federatsii Dlya 
Predprinimatelei [Commentaries on the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for Entrepreneurs] 
(Ekzamen, Moscow 2006). 
1267 ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006) 10. 
1269 ibid. 
1269 See D Butrin and D Skorobogat' ko, 'Yukos Tolkayut v Dolgovuyu Yamu [Yukos Is Pushed to Debtor's 
prison]' (2004) 3 August Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. tu/ doc. aspx? docsid=502602> 
accessed 30 June 2007 
1270 Yukos, 'Statement: Yukos Refutes Continuing Unfounded Russian Government and Administration 
Allegations'. 
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Since that time, no developments of the case have been made public by the 
prosecutors or the defendant. 1271 However, the term "evasion", extensively used by the 
Russian authorities in the official documentation filed with the ECHR, demonstrates that it 
is the position of the Russian Federation to consider the Yukos' operational schemes as 
organised corporate tax avoidance and evasion. This has resulted in negative pecuniary 
consequences for the company (including its subsequent liquidation) and criminal charges 
against particular responsible managers. 1272 This position is also confirmed by the criminal 
case against the managers of the subsidiaries. 1273 
4.10. Conclusion. 
The Yukos Oil Company organised and used a trading and tax optimisation scheme, 
which can be regarded as a typical scheme for Russian vertically integrated companies 
between 1995-2003.1274 All these schemes, including the Yukos scheme were based on 
transfer-pricing sales of oil, gas and other raw materials to special purpose vehicles that 
were registered in tax benefit or tax-free zones. This was where the profit from the tax 
optimised operations was accumulated and was later, either transferred abroad through 
dividends or distributed to the head company of a corporate group, which as a public joint 
stock company, paid dividends to its shareholders. 
1275 
The core element of the tax schemes from 1995-2003, was tax concessions that could 
be legally granted to companies who complied with the local laws on tax benefit, and were 
approved on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Russian Tax Code, or the Law on 
127 S Mashkin, The Khodorkovsky Family to Lease Cottage' (2006) 31 July Kommersant Online 
<http: //www. kommersant. ru/doc. aspx? docsid=693919>accessed 30 May 2007. 
1272 See eg ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006); ECHR Russia's Mem (1 S April 2005). 
1273 See eg Cherkasova and Dorokhov, The Line of Sentences: The Yukos Cases Are Being Put on the 
Conveyor'. 
1274 See Iji, 'Corporate Control and Governance Practices in Russia' 14-25; Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax 
Claims Revisited'. 
1275 See Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia; Vitkina and Rodionov, Tax Evaders 
of Putin's Epoch. 
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Closed Administrative Zones. 1276 The primary goal of these concessions, given to them by 
a legislator, was to establish a system of incentives for the external investors (investors, 
located outside the relevant regions) to invest in the economy of the designated regions, 
where military enterprises had formerly been located. 1277 However, these regions had 
difficulty fording reliable investors, and so rapidly became tax concessions "shops" for big 
"oligarchic" production companies. 1278The Government, upon finding huge loopholes in 
the Law, amended them too late. The damages sustained by the budget as a result of 
"statutory approved" tax avoidance were not countable in principle. 1279 
The situation with the application of the arm-length principle and transfer-pricing 
rules was even more ambiguous and complicated than that of the tax concessions. The 
enormous difference between the internal sales of oil and gas and their export price made 
application of those rules, which formally existed, politically unacceptable as it would have 
created an unbearable burden for the population. 128° As a result almost all the Russian 
corporate groups were forcefully dragged into a game where everybody pretended to sell 
its product at the "market" price, whilst recognising that this price had nothing in common 
with the real market. 
Although the major Russian oil and gas companies aggressively used tax 
optimisation schemes, they needed to raise capital, sell products to foreign customers and 
improve their business reputation in the eyes of the international business community. 1281 
1176 See G Brock, The Zato Archipealago Revisited. Is the Federal Government Loosening Its Grip? A 
Research Note' (2000) 52 (7) Europe-Asia Stud 1349-60; Samoylenko, Government Policies in Regard to 
Internal Tax Havens in Russia. 
1277 See Samoylenko, Government Policies in Regard to Internal Tax Havens in Russia; International Tax 
and Investment Center, Forecasting and L. L. P., Taxes on Profits of Multinational Companies and 
Implications for Russian 10. 
1278 See Samoylenko, Government Policies in Regard to Internal Tax Havens in Russia; Rogachev, I le 
Smartly Avoided Taxes'. 
1279 See Rogachev, 'He Smartly Avoided Taxes. 
1280 See S Stroykova, 'Courts Extend Application of Russian Transfer Pricing Rules' (2006) March Int'I Tax 
Rev <http: /www. intemationaltaxreview. com/includes/magazine/PRINT. asp? SID=616738&IS... >accessed 
30 April 2007; I Paliashvili, A Butenko and V Dmitriev, 'Transfer-Pricing Rules in Russian Legislation' 
(2007) <http: //www. rulg. com/documents/Transfer Pricing_Rules. ht n>accessed 10 June 2007. 
1281 See eg CE Perotti and S Geifer, 'Red Barons or Robber Barons? Governance and Financing in Russian 
Financial-Industrial Groups' (1999) 45 (9) Eur Econ Rev 1601-17; B Black, The Corporate Governance 
Behavior and Market Value of Russian Firms' (2001) 2 (2) Emerging Markets Review 89-108; Shiobara, 
'Oversights in Russia's Corporate Governance: The Case of the Oil and Gas Industry'. 
274 
Therefore the companies retained numerous top level consulting, PR, legal and auditing 
fines, which assisted them in preparation and careful application of special strategies and 
techniques. It was this that allowed the majors to conceal the questionable nature of the 
optimisation schemes from the international business community. Through creative 
drafting of their financial reports and via other similar means, Yukos persuaded the 
international business community that the applied strategies were perfectly acceptable in 
countries with transition economies. 
1282 
In the course of the Yukos affair, recognising that fraudulent privatisation and other 
charges of similar legal nature were unable to generate significant financial claims, and 
were thus insufficient to ruin the Khodorkovsky Empire, the authorities decided to launch a 
multi-level tax evasion case against the Yukos Oil Company, the major source of 
Khodorkovsky's financial power. 1283 In order to boost the amount of tax claims to a level 
enabling the authorities to commence a bankruptcy procedure, sell the company's assets 
and liquidate it, the Government had to apply a completely new approach to auditing the 
Company. This approach, which was based on the creative application of the "old" Russian 
Civil Anti-Avoidance Doctrines, and several foreign anti-avoidance doctrines, is known to 
international and Commonwealth case law. 1284 Amongst the Russian doctrines, 
aggressively and creatively applied in the Yukos tax case, were such concepts as the "bad 
faith" taxpayer and the abuse of law, amongst others. However the Russian doctrines were 
applied exclusively in conjunction with, and through the prism of, established international 
judicial concepts such as business purpose, economic substance and substance over 
form. 1285 For example, "Equilibrium of Tax Concessions to Economic Input" doctrine was 
applied, which being a reflection of "substance over form", "business purpose" and 
"economic substance" doctrines, allowed tax authorities and courts to challenge the 
1282 See on the problem eg RS McIntyre, 'Tax Cheates and Their Enablers' (2005)12 April Economic Policy 
Institute Tax Enforcement Forum 2 <httpi/www. ctj. org/pdf/epishel. pdf>accessed 5 March 2007; 0 
Pleshanova, PwC Discovered a Group Crime' (2007) 26 June Kommersant Online 
<http: //www. kommersant. ruJdoc. html? docld=777939>accessed 26 June 2007. 
1283 See ECHR Protective App (23 April 2004); Yukos, Incremental Tax Assessed on Yukos Vs. Yukos 
Financial Perfomance; Osborne, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 'Democracy on 
the Retreat in Russia"'. 
1284 See Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited'; Saunders, Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the 
Criminal Charges'. 
1285 See eg Budilin, 'Fair or Unfair? Constitutional Grounds of Tax Planning - the New Tendencies'; 
Nepesov, Tax Aspects of Transfer Pricing; Savseris, The Doctrine of "Unfairness" in Tax Law. 
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disproportionate tax benefits, obtained by Yukos-related companies in the tax concessions 
zones. 
1286 
The courts confirmed the position of the Ministry of Tax and Levies, that the Yukos 
trading and tax optimisation schemes had been created exclusively with the purpose of tax 
avoidance and evasion. Not only did the relevant transaction with crude and products have 
to be ignored, but a complete recharacterization of the commercial activities and ownership 
inside the Yukos Group had to be conducted. 1287 This recharacterisation led to the 
ascription of actual ownership of oil and products to the Yukos Oil Company and thus the 
imposition of unpaid taxes, interest and special penalties on the Company. 1288 Moreover, 
amongst other findings the court declared the SPVs that were registered in regions with tax 
breaks, to be "sham" companies, i. e. that they had no assets, no legal personality, 
conducted no independent business and were fully under Yukos' control, and hence 
affiliated with the company. As that was effectively concealed, all the transactions with 
those companies should be treated as sham and the Yukos scheme amounted to tax 
evasion. 1289 The problem surrounding the issue of tax avoidance and evasion in the Yukos 
case also stems from the absence of clear statutory, or judicial, definitions of tax avoidance 
and tax evasion, and the difference between them in Russia. This loophole helped the 
authorities to represent the case as blatant criminal tax evasion. 1290 
The right of a taxpayer to optimise its taxes and chose commercial schemes that 
allow him to pay less tax is internationally recognized. 1291 However, the duty of taxpayer 
to pay taxes generally in accordance with the economic substance of his commercial 
activities, and the right of tax authorities to disregard schemes and transactions aimed 
12" This docrine actually based on the same principles as thouse, pronounced in Rv Inland Revenue 
Commissioners Ex p Matrix Securities Ltd. - "Once a tax avoidance scheme has been identified, the scheme 
must be construed as a whole and the taxing statute must be applied to the results in fact achieved by the 
scheme ... 
The claim to initial tax allowance of £38m. based on a pretended expenditure of £95m. must fail" 
[1994]l W LR 334,346. 
1297 The Moscow Times, 'Court Upholds $3.4bin Yukos Tax Claim'. 
1289 See Pepelyaev, Ivlieva and Khamenushko, Opinion on the Yukos Inspection Report, Osborne, Testimony 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "Democracy on the Retreat in Russia'". 
1289 See Yukos, Incremental Tax Assessed on Yukos Vs. Yukos Financial Perfomance. 
1290 Butrin and Skorobogat'ko, Yukos Is Pushed to Debtor's Prison'; Yukos, 'Statement: Yukos Refutes 
Continuing Unfounded Russian Government and Administration Allegations'. 
1291 See Gregory v Helvering 293 US 465 (1935); Ayrshire Pullman Motor Service v IRC (1929) 14 TC 754. 
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exclusively at avoidance of certain taxes is also conventional. 1292 These principles vary 
significantly, depending on the particular jurisdiction and characteristics of commercial 
activities of a particular taxpayer. The research conducted in this chapter shows that the 
framework elements of the doctrines applied by the Russian authorities in the Yukos case 
comply in their substance with similar doctrines of Anglo-American and Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. However, the existing concepts set up the principles, which allow authorities 
to disregard certain transactions and conduct the apportionment of the income, actually 
mean that income apportioned to one taxpayer and then taxed, should be deducted from the 
income of his counterpart to whom it has been previously mistakenly allocated. 1293 
In the Yukos tax case, this means that the income ascribed to Yukos, and the taxes 
then imposed, should be deducted from the income and taxes paid by the relevant 
production companies and SPVs. This would have led to the recharacterisation and 
recalculation of all the taxes inside the corporate group, and would not have led to the 
imposition of such severe taxes as has happened in reality. 14 This assumption is 
confirmed by the recent Resolution of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian 
Federation on the validity of tax benefits. This resolution describes the "economic 
substance", "substance v. form" and "business purpose doctrines" and provides that if 
certain tax benefits are declared invalid, the court should apply rules regulating the rights 
and duties of a taxpayer in accordance with the economic substance of a transaction. 1295 
Analysis of the judicial doctrines and general anti-avoidance rules adopted and used 
in Russian and Anglo-American jurisdiction, show that the conventional approach to tax 
evasion is based on the understanding of evasion operations as fraudulent (sham) 
intentional operations, aimed at evasion of taxes which are lawfully due. 1296 In the Yukos 
1292 Angell, 'Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance' 85; Joint Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present 
Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 26-27. 
1293 See eg HM Revenue and Customs, A General Anti-Avoidance Rule for Direct Taxes: Consultative 
Document (1998) 19<http: /www. hmrc. gov. uk/consult/consult_l. htm>accessed 20 September 2007; Joint 
Committee on Taxation, 'Background and Present Law Relating to Tax Shelters' 4. 
1294 See Pepelyaev, Ivlieva and Khamenushko, Opinion on the Yukos Inspection Report, Lermontov, 
'Resolution Ns 53 of the Plenum of SAC'. 
1295 See Res of SAC Ns 53; Zolotarev, 'Legitimate Tax Optimisation and Tax Avoidance. 
1296 See eg GS Cooper, 'Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion' (1994-1995) 50 Tax L Rev 33-152; A Wafters and 
J Levy, Avoiding Evasion: Disclosure, Concealment and Fraud' (2003) 710 Tax J 10-12. 
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tax case, the key arguement used by the authorities was that registration and usage of the 
SPVs ("sham" companies) in different regions with tax breaks is turning tax avoidance into 
tax evasion. 1297 Nevertheless, the concept of "sham" entities used in the case has never 
before been applied in the context proposed by the prosecutors in Russia, and it is not 
generally in compliance with the position of the Supreme Arbitration Court, which was 
announced after the case was actually finished and the company went into liquidation. 1298 
Also non- disclosure of affiliation in a situation, when the rules for such disclosure were 
unclear and were not complied with by other companies, could not itself mount to tax 
evasion, counting the fact that the company was subject to numerous audits that found no 
violations. The position of the U. S. court on Yukos' compliance with the concession rules 
should also be noted. 1299 All these factors, with the fact that anti-avoidance Hiles in 
western jurisdiction have developed gradually over a fifty-year period, brings to the agenda 
the question of the rule of law, selective treatment and political prosecution in the Yukos 
case. 
Due to the political and economic conditions existing between 1995-2003, the Yukos 
Oil Company, like many other Russian production companies established a complicated 
corporate trading scheme, which, being based on transfer pricing sales and the usage of 
SPVs located in the regions with tax breaks, could be seen as specially designed for tax 
avoidance purpose. The scheme used the opportunities provided to Yukos by its corporate 
group structure and advanced technologies of corporate governance and international 
accounting. 
Such tax optimisation schemes were implemented due to the numerous legislative 
loopholes and willful blindness of the Government. In a situation when political realities 
required the quick and effective liquidation of Yukos, the Government and courts used a 
number of established western judicial doctrines to ground tax claims against the 
Company, although application of such aggressive strategies were evidently selective and 
1297 ECHR Russia's Mem (30 October 2006) 10; Butrin and Skorobogat'ko, 'Yukos Is Pushed to Debtor's 
Prison'. 
1298 Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited' 10; Rodionov, Tax Schemes That Lead J odorkovsky 
to Prison 58-68. 
1299 See Re Yukos Oil Co Sec Litig 26. 
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politically motivated, which was confirmed by the subsequent clarifications of the high 
judicial instances. 
The Yukos tax case raises again the problem of the Rule of Law in Russia, the state 
of which allows the new political elite to use the Russian judicial system to prosecute its 
political opponents and reach its economic goals. Tax cases are the most powerful 
instrument for ruining the business of those who do not want to dance to the Siloviki 
fiddle. The Yukos tax case has already become a benchmark case of state tax terror, so 
severe, that it had to be stopped personally by Putin. The subsequent judicial decisions, 
effectively changing the precedents established by the Yukos case, confirm the selectivity 
and the outrageous violation of the principles of the Rule of Law. 
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Chapter 5. 
The Yukos Money Laundering Case. 
5.1. Introduction. 
The quintessence of the Yukos case is the money laundering case that was launched 
in February 2007 against Khodorkovsky and his allies. 1300 These charges are actually a 
new front in Russia's campaign against the nation's one-time richest man. The prosecutors 
said that Khodorkovsky and his friends had illegally acquired more than $25bn worth of oil 
from Yukos subsidiaries from 1998 to 2003, passing off crude as "well fluidi1301 and then 
selling it on to consumers at prices three or four times higher. Several managers are also 
accused of laundering the proceeds. 1302 
The new proceedings can be seen as a sign that the state is keeping up pressure on 
Khodorkovsky after he was charged in October 2003 with fraud and tax evasion. 1303 
Experts see that the money laundering and embezzlement charges give authorities a chance 
to portray the Yukos dismemberment as the Russian equivalent of the Enron case, rather 
than a state assault on a private firm. 1304 
1300 MosNews, 'Khodorkovsky Charged with Money Laundering' (2007) 5 February Mosnews. com 
<http: //www. mosnews. com/news2007/02/05/khodorkovskycharged. shtml>accessed 29 April 2007. 
1301 See A Nikol'skii and I Reznik, 'Ukrali Vsyu Skvazhnuyu Zhidkost' [All Porous Liquid Is Stolen]' (2007) 
12 February Vedomosti <http: //www. vedomostixu/newspaper/ opinions. shtml? 2007/02/12/1205332> 
accessed 20 July 2007. 
3302 C Belton, 'Khodorkovsky 'Laundered $23bn" (2007) 9 February FT. com <http: //proquest. umi. com/ 
pgdweb? did=1213854061&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=44714&RQT=309&VName=PQD >accessed 18 July 
2007. 
1303 The Moscow Times, 'Khodorkovsky Faces Laundering Charges' (2005) 17 January The Moscow 
Times. com 5 <http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2005/01/17/045. html>accessed 18 July 2007. 
1304 C Schreck, Khodorkovsky Likely to Face Fresh Charges' (2006) 27 December ibid I 
<http: //www. moscowtimes. ru/stories/2006/12/27/002. html>accessed 18 May 2007. 
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The significance of money laundering and embezzlement charges is in fact much 
broader than Khodorkovsky and his business partners being kept in jail for another ten of 
fifteen years. 1305 These charges give proper grounds for considering the whole Yukos 
corporate group as a complex "laundering" machine, generating tainted profit. 1306 A 
complex money laundering case launched against the top managers of the biggest Russian 
oil company, known for its adherence to advanced accounting and corporate standards, 
highlights the conflict between principles and rules which regulate corporate and business 
activities of corporate groups, and contemporary international anti-money laundering 
legislation. 1307 
The main goal of this chapter is to show a new dimension of international money 
laundering cases, stemming from the conflict of the activities of corporate (business) 
groups and contemporary anti- money laundering legislation, and also to demonstrate a 
nexus between tax avoidance and evasion schemes and money laundering, using the 
example of the Yukos embezzlement and money laundering case. 
5.2. Literature Review. 
There are only a few publications on the problem of money laundering in the Russian 
Federation as a phenomenon related to contemporary Russian capitalism. The majority of 
publications dealing with the money laundering problem in Russia either link this problem 
with the general problem of the Russian mafia worldwide, 
1308 or simply mention several 
conventional facts such as the notorious Bank of New York scandal, 
1309 which confirms 
1305 See Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 4-6. 
1306 A Karavaeva, Prokuratura Protiv Yukosa [Prosecutors against Yukos]' (2004) <http: //www. scilla. ru/ 
works/uprdem/yukos-ch. html>accessed 18 July 2007. 
1307 See comments in P Lebedev, 'Open Letter to Vedomosti Concerning Its Article on PwC ' (2007) 
<http: //www. khodorkovsky. ru/speech/7013. html>accessed 9 July 2007. 
3308 See cg M Galeotti, Mafiya: Organized Crime in Russia (Special Report No 10 1996); J Bäckman, 
Russian Organized Crime: Research Report Summaries 1996 (1997); LL Fituni, 'Russia: Organised Crime 
and Money Laundering ' (1998)1 
(4) JMLC 360-73. 
1309 See Economist, 'Crime without Punishment' (1999) (26 August) Economist. com 
<http: //Economist. com/background/displaystory. cfrn? story_id=234642>accessed 30 June 2007; PL Robinson 
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that corruption, money laundering and Russian oligarchy capitalism are synonyms in 
substance. 1310 It should be noted that due to the absence of any enforceable substantial anti- 
money laundering legislation until 2001,131' all the publications, either in Russian or other 
languages, were mostly of a socio-political character and described the money laundering 
problem as a socio-economic phenomenon. 1312 
The key publication on the relationship between Russian capitalism and money 
laundering is a report of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
"Russian Capitalism and Money laundering", published in 2001.1313 Although it is six 
years old, the general ideas expressed in the report are not outdated. The report highlights 
the basic principles of the money laundering fight in Russia, which will be in force for at 
least a couple of decades: "No accurate figures exist to indicate the overall level of money 
laundering in the Russian Federation because it involves activities which are hard to 
observe or detect "1314 The report provides an explanation of the role of privatisation in the 
promotion of general lawlessness Russian Federation, by pointing out that privatisation as 
it evolved not only halted the trend towards fair, competitive and efficient markets, but also 
promoted inefficiency and wider acceptance of arbitrary rules. Privitization facilitated the 
capture of the Government at various levels by groups whose critical mission was to use 
the State to legalize their fraudulent acquisition of wealth and mask its origins. 131S A key 
part of the report analyses the initial stage of the anti-money laundering fight in Russia and 
shows its perception by the population, which understands it as a powerful tool for 
redistribution of the property illegally obtained through privatisation tenders. 1316 The 
and ES Burger, The Regulatory Framework and Potential Implications of the Bank of New York Money- 
Laundering Scandal for Russia and the United States' (2007) Winter Russ Bus Watch 
<http: //www. american. edu/traccc/resources/publications/burger0l. html>accessed 21 July 2007. 
1310 See eg M Galeotti, 'The Mafiya and the New Russia' (1998)44 (3) Aust J Polfit 415-29. 
1311 For the statistical data see <httpJ/www. kfrmru/eng>. 
1312 See eg F Varese, 'Is Sicily the Future of Russia? Private Protection and the Rise of the Russian Mafia' 
(1994) 35 (2) Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 224-58; SD Syfert, 'Captialism or Corruption - Corporate 
Structure, Western Investment and Commercial Crime in the Russian Federation' (1998-1999) 18 NYL Sch J 
Intl & Comp L 357-406; A Cohen, 'Corruption, Western Economic Assistance, and the Future of the Russian 
Economy'(2000) 7 Brown J World Aff 157-66. 
1313 See United Nations, Russian Capitalism and Money- Laundering (United Nations Austria 2001). 
13'4 ibid 1. 
13'5 ibid 8. 
1316 ibid 18-22. 
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importance of the report lies in its attempt to explain the origin of the widespread money 
laundering problem in Russia, as stemming from social inequality, illegal redistribution of 
statutory property and illegal methods of governance. 
There are two other comparatively recent publications important for this stage of the 
research. Both articles represent the somewhat limited number of international 
commentaries on the new Russian legislation. The first one is "New Russian Money 
Laundering Legislation" by Markus Schaer. 1317 It gives a brief overview of the new 
Russian legislation on money laundering and the situation with money laundering in 
Russia just before its enactment in 2002.13'$ The second article, "Breaking the Wash 
Cycle: New Money Laundering Laws in Russia" by Olga Sher, represents a much more 
comprehensive analysis, from political and criminological standpoints, of the situation 
which led to the adoptation of the new anti-money laundering laws in Russia. 1319 The 
article highlights a strange paradox: although Russia is definitely a complying country 
now, 1320 the money laundering legislation is being aggressively used as a regulator of the 
financial and economic system and is being used to suppress of opponents of the 
Government. 
1317 See also 0 Mikhailova, New Russian Law on Combating Money Laundering' (2001) 16 (12) JIBL 302- 
04. 
1318 M Schaer, New Russian Money Laundering Legislation' (2001) 291nt'l Bus Law 369-73. 
1319 0 Sher, 'Breaking the Wash Cycle: New Money Laundering Laws in Russia' (2003) 22 NYL Sch J Int'l & 
Comp L 62746. 
1320 Financial Action Task Force, Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) 18<http//www. oecd. org/dataoecd/ 
j 2/27/2789358. pdf>accessed 21 May 2008; HM Treasury, 'Statement on Equivalence' (2008) 
. <http: 
//www. hm-treasury. gov. uk/documents/financiaI services/money/fincrime equivalence. cfm>accessed 
24 May 2008. 
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5.3. The Money Laundering Legislation of the Russian 
Federation: a General Brief. 
It is recognized that the period of transition from socialism to capitalism in the 
Russian Federation appeared to present limitless opportunities for international money 
laundering. 1321 
Money laundering in the Russian Federation is intertwined with the wide-ranging 
political, economic and social processes in the country. It has become one of the core 
characteristics of contemporary capitalism in the Russian Federation. 
1322 It is accepted 
that, in Russia, it remains incredibly difficult to prosecute alleged criminals, due to the lack 
of appropriate legal frameworks to fight sophisticated financial crimes. 
1323 However, the 
Yukos case demonstrates the opposing tendency, confirming that Russian anti-money 
laundering legislation is a valid legal instrument even for combating sophisticated, 
- organised crimes. 
The development of anti-money laundering legislation in Russia has come through a 
number of obstacles. For a while, the Russian Federation strongly opposed the idea of anti- 
money laundering legislation and President Yeltsin personally vetoed a project on anti- 
money laundering laws. 1324 Experts think that Russia's inability to detect and to prosecute 
money laundering activities was created intentionally, and permitted former members of 
the Soviet governmental apparatus to legitimize their embezzled funds. 
1325 
In 1996, the Russian Federation enacted a new criminal code that criminalized 
money laundering. 1326 The Code was a product of both the need to address the changing 
social, political, and economic conditions of contemporary Russian society, and the need to 
1321 United Nations, Russian Capitalism and Money - Laundering 1. 
1322 ibid21. 
"2' ibid 7. 
1324 S Chung, 'Criminalizing Money Laundering as a Method and Means of Curbing Corruption, Organized 
Crime, and Capital Flight in Russia' (1999) 8 Pac Rim L& Pol'y J 617-50,623-24. 
1325 ibid. 
1326 See Appendix 5. 
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confront the drastic increase in post-Soviet crime. 1327 Article 174 of the Russian Criminal 
Code, entitled "Legalization of Money (Money laundering) or of Any Other Assets 
Acquired Illegally, " specifies punishment for financial transactions involving assets that 
have been acquired by illegal methods. 1329 Academics understand Article 174 only as a 
skeletal provision, purporting to criminalize money laundering activities. Stated in another 
way, "[the CC RF's] primary importance is as a theoretical normative statement... the new 
code announces the principles under which Russians one day hope to live. "329 
On July 13,2001, the Duma, proceeding with the fight against money laundering in 
Russia, passed an anti-money laundering bill. 1330 The law came into effect in February 
2002 in parallel with a law that amended the Russian Criminal Code and other legislative 
acts . 
1331 These laws actually established the general anti-money laundering framework in 
Russia. 1332 The core characteristics of this framework, pertaining to the definition of 
money laundering and key elements of offenders' liability, as follows: 
1327 See Burnham, 'The New Russian Criminal Code: A Window onto Democratic Russia'. 
1329 See CC RF art 174. 
1329 Chung, 'Criminalizing Money Laundering as a Method and Means of Curbing Corruption, Organized 
Crime, and Capital Flight in Russia' 629. 
1330 See the Law on ML. For comments see Financial Action Task Force, Review to Identify Non-Cooperative 
Countries or Territories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering pleasures 
(2000) 9<http: //www. fatf-gafi. org/dataoeed/56/43/33921824. pdf>accessed 26 May 2007. 
3331 For practical implementation of the Law on ML were adopted the Amendments to CC RF. 
1332 The Act found its development in the decrees of the President, act of Government and regulations of the 
FIU. See 0 Zinmin and B Boltonskii, 'Sravnitel'no-Pravovoi Analiz Mezhdunarodnykh I Natsional'nykh 
pravovykh Norm RF v Oblasti Borby S Legalizatsiei Dokhodov, Priobretennykh v Resul'tate Soversheniya 
Prestuplenii [A Comparative Analysis of the International and National Laws of the Russian Federation on 
the Fight with Laundering of Illegal Gains]' (2007) 4 Pravo i Ekonomika [Law and Business] 94-98. 
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5.4. Definition and General Provisions of the Substantive Law. 
The current Russian legislation defines the offence of money laundering as: 
The legalization (laundering) of earnings received in an illegal way', means 
bringing a legal appearance to the possession, use or disposal of amounts of 
money or other property received as the result of committal of an offence 1333 
Earnings received in an illegal way', means amounts of money or other 
property received as the result of committal of an offence. 1334 
The Criminal Code gives a definition of a substantive money laundering offence: 
The accomplishment of large-scale financial transactions and other deals in 
amounts of money, or other property, knowingly acquired by other persons in 
an illegal way (except the offences stipulated by Articles 193,194,198 and 
199 of the existing Code), 1115 and bringing the appearance of legality to the 
possession, use and disposal of the said amounts of money or other 
property... 1336 
This definition is valid for both offences of money laundering, incorporated into the 
Russian Criminal Code: Article 174 (when the laundering operations are conducted by a 
person who has not been involved in the predicate offence) and Article 174.1 (when the 
laundering operations are conducted by the person who actually committed the predicate 
1337 
offence). 
According to the Russian Criminal Code and the Law on Money Laundering, the 
offence of criminal money laundering does not require any negative consequences for any 
persons or for the economic system of the state in order to be considered as completed. 1338 
1333 The Law on ML art 3. 
1334 ibid. Such definition generally corresponds to the international practice. See RE Bell, 'Abolishing the 
Concept Of'Predicate Of ecnce' (2002) 6 (2) JMLC 137-40. 
1335 Tax crimes exception. See Zinmin and Boltonsldi, 'A Comparative Analysis of the International and the 
National Laws of the Russian Federation on the Fight with Laundering of Illegal Gains'. 
'336 CC RF art 174. 
1337 CC RF art 174 and 174.1. For the purpose of Article 174 CC RF an offender should not be, in any case, 
involved in commitment of the predicate offence. N Lopashenko, Ekonomicheskie Preslupleniya [Economic 
Crimes (Author's Commentary)] (Walters Kluwer, Moscow 2007) part on art 174. 
1338 See 0 Zinmin and D Grebnev, Problemnye Voprosy Kvalifikatsii Legalizatsii Denezhnykh Sredstv Ili 
Inogo Imuscestva, Priobretennogo Prestupnym Putem [Problematic Questions of Qualification of Money 
Laundering Offences]' (2007) 3 Rossiiskaya Yustitsiya [Russian Justice] 17 - 21. 
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One of the key problems in defining the responsibility of those involved in money 
laundering activities is defining the term "financial transactions and other deals". The law 
gives the general definition: 
Transactions in amounts of money or other property' as the actions of natural 
persons and legal entities involving amounts of money, or other property, 
irrespective or the form and method thereof, aimed at instituting, altering or 
terminating of civil rights and duties related thereto. 1339 
The Plenary Session of the Supreme Court has clarified that this term covers actions 
of persons aimed at instituting, altering or terminating the rights of such persons in respect 
of funds, securities and other assets. 1340 The same clarifications also say that even a single 
deal or act of disposition with the illegal funds would amount to money laundering. 1341 
The absence of the definition of the term "bringing a legal appearance", leaves a 
significant gap in the Russian anti-money laundering law and judicial practice. This has 
been only discussed at an academic level, and has already led to the confusion between 
acts of laundering (intentional acts of bringing a legal appearance to the illicit funds), and 
mere acts of selling stolen goods simply to obtain money. 1342 
5.4.1. Qualified (Grave) Money Laundering Offences. 
It should be noted that the articles on money laundering offences contain provisions 
which qualify as grave offences, committed by a group of persons in a preliminary 
agreement; committed repeatedly by a person abusing his/her position, and as the most 
1339 The Law on ML art 3. 
134° Res of SC Ns 23. See also M Zhuravlev and E Zhuravleva, 'Otvetstvennost' Za Legalizatsiyu (Otmyvanie) 
Prestupnykh Dokhodov: Zakon I Sudebnaya Praktika [Sanctions for Money Laundering: The Law and 
Judicial Practice]' (2004) 3 Zhurnal Rossiiskogo Prava [Journal of Russian Law] 32-42. 
134' ibid. Article 6 of the Law on ML contains a list of reportable transactions. 
1342 See eg M Lapunin, Vtorichnaya Ugolovnaya Deyatel'nost' [Secondary Criminal Activity: Definition, 
Types, Issues of Qualification, Criminalization and Penalization] (Walters Kluwer/Garant. RU, 2006) <www. 
garant. ru >accessed 20 July 2007; Zinmin and Grebnev, 'Problematic Questions of Qualification of Money 
Laundering Offences'. On the AML regime in Russia see also A Orlova, 'Russia's Anti-Money Laundering 
Regime: Law Enforcement Tool or Instrument of Domestic Control? (2008) 11 (3) JMLC 210-33. 
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grave offence, acts of money laundering, committed by a organised group. 1343 in 
application to commercial organisations, two qualifying provisions arc important: the 
abuse by a person of his/her position, which is conventionally applied to managers of 
companies '1344 and the problem of organised groups and money 
laundering, which is not 
well researched, and thus creates problems in practical applications. 
5.4.2. Predicate Offences. 
The definition of laundering offences in the Russian Criminal Code remained rather 
broad since the notion of 'crime' under Russian law includes all criminal offences 
irrespective of their gravity. 1345 However, it reflects the international tendency to cover as 
many offences as possible with the definition "criminal activity". 1346 The previous 
definition did not make the offence dependant on the purpose of disguising the criminal 
origin of the money. However, the words 'through illegal means' were replaced by'through 
criminal means', which meant that only criminal offences (offences defined by the Russian 
Criminal Code) may be regarded as giving origin to illicit funds. 1347 
5.43. Problem of Knowledge. 
In application to money laundering offences, the Criminal Code contains the word 
'knowingly', which also restricts the possible application of the articles 177-174.1. 
". s See relevant CC RF art 174 and 174.1. 
1344 See Zhuravlev and Zhuravleva, 'Sanctions for Money Laundering: The Law and Judicial Practice'; 
Zinmin and Grebnev, 'Problematic Questions of Qualification of Money Laundering Offences'. 
" It further excluded offences defined by articles 193,194,198 and 199 of the CC RF. i. e. the failure to 
repatriate funds in accordance with exchange control regulations, avoidance of the payment of taxes and 
customs duties. 
1 See Bell, 'Abolishing the Concept of "Predicate Offecnee"; United Nation Office on Drug and Crime, An 
Overview of the UN Conventions and the International Standards Coneernlg Anti-Money Laundering 
Legislation (Global Programme Against Money Laundering 2004) 36-40. 
1347 Schaer, New Russian Money Laundering Legislation' 369-70. 
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Essentially, this means that the offence must have been committed intentionally, with 
negligence not being a sufficient excuse. 1348 The existing judicial clarifications provide that 
an offender must have actual knowledge of the illicit origin of funds and have an intention 
to commit an act of laundering. 1349 This clarification creates significant problems for 
investigation, as the clarification obliges any investigation to collect evidence confirming 
the fact that an offender not only suspected the illicit origin of funds, but had an actual 
knowledge about it, which definitely differs from the provisions. For example, UK 
legislation provides that an offender must simply suspect that property has been derived 
from criminal activities. 135° However, in the case of money laundering in corporate groups 
or in a group of business allegedly controlled by a single criminal group, this useful 
provision of the Russian law will not help offenders. 
5.4.4. General Reporting Requirements. 
According to theoreticians, article 6 of the Law containing reporting provisions is 
comprehensive in nature and corresponds to the international standards. It covers almost all 
activities commonly associated with money laundering. 1351 As reporting is considered the 
weakest area in Russian money laundering legislation, most of the recent legislative efforts 
have concentrated on its improvement. 1352 In the context of this research it is important to 
note that the financial operations of Russian holding companies after 2001, were conducted 
1348 Chung, 'Criminalizing Money Laundering as a Method and Means of Curbing Corruption, Organized 
Crime, and Capital Flight in Russia' 633. 
1349 The Res of SC Ns 23. See also Lopashcnko, Economic Crimes (Author's Commentary) part on an 174. 
1S0 Section 340(3) POCA. See also R Rhodes and S Palastrand, 'A Guide to Money Laundering Legislation' 
(2004) 8 (1) JMLC 9-18,9-10. 
1351 ibid 634. 
1352 Sec KPMG, KPD IGr Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2007: Russia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (2007); Zinmin and I3oltonskii, 'A Comparative Analysis of the International and the National Laws of the Russian Federation on the Fight with Laundering of Illegal Gains'. On the legislative 
developments see <http: //www. kfin. ru/law_ list_I. html? topic-6>. 
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after the enactment of the general reporting rules, so the authorized body should have been 
informed about any suspicious operations, had any of them taken place. '353 
5.4.5. General Assessment and Political Realities. 
In giving general assessment to the Russian anti-money laundering framework, 
practitioners have pointed out that the definition of the offence seems to meet minimum 
standards set by the Strasbourg Convention, '354 and the recommendations of the OECD 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), '355 and that Russia is moving 
towards a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. '356 The Russian legislation 
deviates from the international best standards in such aspects as: determination of the 
grounds for money laundering countermeasures and the substance of such measures; 
criminal sanctions for money laundering and application of confiscatory measures, 
including international cooperation; and special police measures. 1357 
However, as analysts have noted, in the Russian context, the question of defining the 
criminalization of money laundering has crystallized the moral issues at stake in 
implementing international recommendations in this field. The decision on whether or not 
to integrate forms of economic delinquency common within the Russian business 
community was liable to radically modify the objectives of anti-laundering and the 
definition of its targets. 1358 Favarel-Garrigucs points out: 
1353 See The Federal Financial Monitoring Service, 'Novoc Kachestvo Rezul'tatov [The New Quality of 
Results]' (2006) <http//www. kfm. ru/press_20042006 767. html>accesscd 20 July 2007; The Federal 
Financial Monitoring Service, 'Informatsionnoe Soobscenie [Press Statement]' (2007) 
<http: //www. kfm. m/news-22052007_277. html>acccssed 20 July 2007. 
1354 Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime (8 November 1990) ETS No 141. 
1335 Schaer, New Russian Money Laundering Legislation' 370, 
"56 Sher, 'Breaking the Wash Cycle: New Money Laundering Laws in Russia' 646, 
1357 Zinmin and Boltonskii, 'A Comparative Analysis of the International and the National Laws of the Russian Federation on the Fight with Laundering of Illegal Gains'. 
"-" G Favarel-Garrigues, 'Domestic Reformulation of the Moral Issues at Stake in the Drive against Money Laundering: The Case of Russia' (2005) 57 (185)1nt Soc Sci 1529-40,537. 
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In analyzing the case of Russia, I wish to show that the implementation of 
international standards against money laundering does not necessarily imply a 
commitment to common values, or even to a common vision of the objectives 
of this campaign. The Russian example highlights, on the contrary, the latitude 
afforded to states to define the moral issues at stake in efforts to combat 
money laundering within their borders, in accordance with domestic 
concerns. '359 
A number of factors support the hypothesis that the anti-laundering 
mechanism constitutes a valuable resource in the political management of the 
business community. Its instrumentalisation is wholly in line with government 
action based on the exploitation of the legal vulnerability of Russian economic 
and financial elites. 13 
His assumption, that such a regulatory instrument as money laundering legislation 
could ultimately be used to crack down on certain personalities and, ultimately, be used to 
intimidate the business community by centralizing information on bank transactions and 
institutions, 1361 has been fully realised by the recent Russian criminal cases. 1362 
The message from this brief overview of contemporary Russian anti-money 
laundering legislation is that by the date of Mikhail Khodorkovsky's arrest and by the time 
the Yukos case commenced, the core provisions of Russian anti-money laundering 
legislation had already been enacted. The legislation had not been developed enough in 
several important aspects, but the main elements were in place and generally complied 
with the main international guidelines. 1363 The "backbone" provisions were in place and 
found the reflection in case law. 1 
1359 ibid 536. 
136° ibid 538. 
1361 See ibid. 
1362 See Orlova, 'Russia's Anti-Money Laundering Regime: Law Enforcement Tool or Instrument of 
Domestic Control?, 225-26. See eg the Case of Bank Neftanoi - see Banki. RU, 'Linshits Accused of Money 
Laundering' (2006) <httpJ/www. banki. rulnews/engnews/? ID=123940>accessed 23 April 2007; Lepina, 
"Bank Neftyanoi Top-Managers Are Charged with Organised Crime'. 
I" In October 2002, the FATF removed four countries, including Russia, from the NCCT list. 
1364 See the Res of SC Ns 23. 
291 
55. The Khodorkovsky/Yukos Embezzlement and Money 
Laundering Case: General Characteristics. 
It is important to note that"The Yukos Embezzlement and Money Laundering Case" 
is based on the two main "pillars". The first is "organisational" (structural), morphing from 
"The First Khodorkovsky Case" and the accompanying cases, when Khodorkovsky and his 
allies were charged with the organisation and management of a network of shell 
companies, which were designed and used for corporate tax evasion and other crimes. 
1365 
The "organisational" element (creation of a special corporate structure for illicit purpose) 
was transmitted from the First Case to the Second Khodorkovsky/Yukos Embezzlement 
and Money Laundering Case, where the organisation and management of the shell 
companies' network comprises one of the fundamental episodes of organised 
embezzlement and money laundering. 
1366 
The other "pillar" of the Second case is "financial" and deals with the trading 
operations, cash flow and taxation of Yukos as a corporate group. 
The claims of the 
Ministry of Tax and Levies, amounting to $ 27 bn., roughly match the sums, mentioned in 
the charges, brought in the Second case. Therefore, they are both evidently based on the 
assumption that the same funds were the object of tax avoidance and evasion operations 
and further laundering and legalization. 
1367 Hence, the money laundering charges and 
corporate tax claims originate from the same source - the Yukos corporate group structure 
and company's operational tax optimisation scheme. 
Figure 19 demonstrates the genesis of the Yukos embezzlement and money 
laundering case as stemming from the peculiarities of the Yukos corporate structure and its 
operational schemes. 
1365 See Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 43-51. For comments see Saunders, 
Pappalardo and Logan, 'Analysis of the Criminal Charges'. 
1366 See The Summary of the Chargers and Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 43-51. 
1367 See Yukos, Incremental Tax Assessed on Yukos Vs. Yukos Financial Perfomance; 0 Pleshanova, I 
Moiseev and N Grib, Pricewaterhousecoopers Blamed in Yukos Tax Affair' (2007) 21 March Kommersant 
Online <http //www. kommersant. com/p751697/Yukos, PricewaterhouseCoopers, _taxes/>accessed 
4 April 
2007. 
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Figure 19. "Elements of the Yukos Embezzlement and Money Laundering Case. " 
One of the distinct characteristics of the Yukos/Khodorkovsky case is its intense 
publicity, unprecedented in Russia. The General Prosecutor's Office has itself published 
several important documents concerning "The First Case" including the Summary of the 
Judgement. 1368 When the investigation into "The Second Case" had been finished, the 
General Prosecutor's Office published the Summary of the Charges, brought against 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, on its official website. 13`9 
The other important feature of the case is that the embezzlement and money 
laundering charges brought against Khodorkovsky and others in the Second Yukos case, 
showed the formation of a new concept in Russian criminal law - the "criminal corporate 
See Bill of Indictment for Lebedev; Bill of Indictment fir Khodorkovskv ; General Prosecutors Office, 
One More Case against the Former Yukos Managment'. 
1169 See 
Appendix 27. 
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group". 1370 This is a corporate group, created for the purposes of tax evasion and money 
laundering, managed by a group of individuals recognized as an organised criminal 
''" After bringing the charges against Khodorkovsky, group. ý the embezzlement and money 
laundering case became the "backbone" to the Yukos case, uniting other cases in a 
comprehensive and interrelated system. 1372 Figure 20 shows the interrelation between the 
Yukos-related cases as based on the same principles. 
Figure 20. "Interrelation of the Yukos Cases. " 
First Khodorkovskv case 
Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Tax Evasion Case 
Personal Tax Evasion Case 
VNK Embezzlement Case 
SAME PRINCIPLES 
AND STRUCTURES 
The Khodorkovsky/Yukos 
Embezzlement and Money 
Laundering Case 
The new charges against Khodorkovsky and his allies, completing the general 
picture of the Yukos case, highlight the distinct characteristics of the case. 
137' See on the concept of' organised criminal group" section 2.3.2.2. 
371 There is a similar tendency growing in the United States. See GE Lynch, 'Rico: The Crime of Being a 
Criminal Parts I and 11' (1987) 87 Colum L Rev 661-764,662. 
1372 See Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 9-15; Gololobov, ' The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock 
Case'. 
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5.5.1. The Time Line. 
The alleged organised criminal group headed by Khodorkovsky and his friend 
Lebedev (later - the head of the Menatep Group) was evidently formed as a group before 
1994 when it was involved in the Apatit case. According to the Summary of the Charges, 
this organised criminal group had "also been engaged in criminal activities in the country's 
petroleum industry". 1373 Therefore the "Menatep-Rosprom-Yukos" group, due to its vast 
variety of interests (property, oil production, banking, ) can be seen as a "diversified 
organised criminal group". 1374 Thus, the activities of the criminal group lasted from 
approximately 1993 until 2003 (probably even longer, as the management controlled by 
Khodorkovsky left the Company for London in October-November 2004). 1375 
5.5.2. Criminal Activities of the Group: General Characteristics. 
The prosecutors represent the whole story of the Menatep-Yukos-Rosprom Group as 
a continuous process of criminal activities focused on the misappropriation of privatised 
assets1376 and the obtainment of illegal profit from the misappropriated assets, by means of 
tax evasion and money laundering schemes. 1377 The investigation considers even formal 
actions undertaken in the course of business and corporate activity of the group as a part of 
the continuous criminal offence. For example, the corporate restructuring procedure which 
1373 See The Summary of the Charges. 
1374 See -, 'The Criminal Analysis of the Actions Committed by the Yukos Group'; L Komisar, 'Criminal 
Complaint Filed against Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, and Golubovich in Switzerland' (2003) 28 November Russ 
J <http: //thekomisarscoop. com/2006/08/21/criminal-complaint-filed-against-khodorkovsky-lebedev-and- 
golubovich-in-switzerland>accessed 20 May 2007; 0 Pleshanova, 'PwC Discovered a Group Crime' (2007) 
26 June Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. ru/doc. html? docld=777939>accessed 26 June 2007. 
1375 AE Kramer, 'Yukos Managers Are Now Targets of Prosecutors' NY Times (New York 17 August 2006) 
9. 
1376 See The Summary of the Charges. 
1377 See -, 'Yukos Bosses to Face New Charges' The Independent (London 17 January 2007) 19; MosNews, 
'Khodorkovsky Charged with Money Laundering'. 
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took place in 20001378 has been described in the Summary of the Charges as follows: `In 
order to fulfill his criminal aspirations... and obtain the right to their strategic and 
operational direction, Khodorkovsky, together with the members of the organised group, 
created management companies controlled by them for OAO NK YUKOS... ' 1379 
Even salaries and annual bonuses paid to the employees and managers have been 
announced as a form of bribery: 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev bribed those shareholders who were not under 
their control and those members of the higher management who were likely to 
put up active resistance to their nefarious activities. The bribe took the form of 
the unlawful payment of a bonus from the bank accounts of foreign companies 
under the control ofKhodorkovsky and Lebedev. 1380 
The assessment of the general activities of the Yukos Group as a continuous criminal 
offence is, according to the prosecutors, confirmed by the amount of funds allegedly 
laundered by the organised criminal group through Yukos. 1381 Therefore, according to the 
prosecutors, the Yukos corporate group were (a) created with a criminal goal; (b) on the 
basis of illegally privatised assets; (c) managed by criminals; (d) generate illicit funds. 
5.53. Khodorkovsky's Position in the Corporate Group. 
Khodorkovsky's position in the legal entities is named in the Summary of the 
Charges in one of the key aspects of the case. In the "First Khodorkovsky Case", his 
lawyers used the arguement that neither Khodorkovsky, nor Lebedev had controlled the 
corporate structure of the group of affiliated companies (the corporate group). 1382 The 
Summary does not name all the posts taken up by Khodorkovsky, but gives several 
"'g M Khodorkovsky, 'The Third Alternative' (2001) 3 YUKOS Rev 16-19,16-19; Iji, 'Corporate Control 
and Governance Practices in Russia' 20-22. 
1379 The Summary of the Charges. 
1380 ibid. 
"B" See Yukos performance at M Khodorkovsky, Yukos' (2003) YUKOS Oil Company Web Site 1-26 
<yukos. com/newý-ir/pdf/April-03. pdf>accessed 10 June 2007; Yukos, 'Tax Slides Update'. 
1382 See Padva, 'Closing Arguements Given in the Meshchansky Court on April 6'. 
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examples of the control that Khodorkovsky and his allies exercised over the Corporate 
Group and the personnel. 1383 
From the content of Figure 21 and Appendix 28 it becomes clear that the prosecutors 
have applied a concept similar to the UK concept of the "shadow director" 1384 or the U. S. 
concept of the "controlling person"1385 to both Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. The diagram 
below shows that they have proper grounds to prove that Khodorkovsky had been the sole 
controlling individual, not only for the Yukos and Menatep Groups, but for the Open 
Russia Foundation as well. By emphasizing Khodorkovsky's controlling and managerial 
functions, the prosecutors want to show that all the cash flows, within the Yukos Corporate 
Group and outside it (dividends, paid to the Menatep Group; dividends paid by the 
Menatep Group to its shareholders and the funds distributed to the the Open Russia 
Foundation), were ultimately under control of the same person - Khodorkovsky- who 
understood their illicit origin perfectly. By introducing a concept similar to the "shadow 
director" or "controlling person", the prosecutors purport to demonstrate that 
Khodorkovsky and other members of the organised criminal group actions were 
intentionally aiming at the continuous laundering of "dirty" funds, and their accumulation 
abroad. Figure 21 represents all the offices held by Khodorkovsky in the Yukos Group and 
its related companies and foundations, which allowed him to be in control of operations, 
considered as embezzlement and money laundering. 
1383 See Appendix 28. 
1384 Shadow directors arise from a statutory concept created under the Companies Act (UK) in order to extend 
obligations of directors to persons who exercise the same kind of influence over the company as appointed 
directors would do. They are, in effect, not real directors and have no legal powers to act on the company's 
behalf. See S Plant and M Prior, 'Officers' and Directors' Liability in the Context of Insolvency (2000) 28 
Int'l Bus Law 303-12,304. Shadow directors are persons in accordance with whose instructions the 
company's directors are accustomed to act; thus a shadow director might be a significant shareholder or 
creditor of the company. See CM Hague, Directors: De Jure, De Facto, or Shadow' (1998) 28 Hong Kong LJ 
304-14,307-08; C Bradley, 'Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and Societies' (1998-1999) 53 
U Miami L Rev 269 -315,294-94. 
1385 The American concept of "control-person liability" is much broader. Controlling shareholders of 
corporations in the United States may be subject to a duty of fair dealing similar to the duties imposed on 
directors and officers of the corporation, and breach of this duty will give rise to liability in the same way. 
Unlike the liability imposed on shadow directors in Britain, this liability will not arise only on insolvency of 
the corporation. See Bradley, Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and Societies' 293-94. 
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Figure 21. "Khodorkovsky's Positions in the Group and Outside. " 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
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13h6 
I3 See Gololobov, 'The Yukos Money Laundering Case' 19. 
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Although Russian law doesn't directly recognize the concept of "shadow 
directorship" or the "controlling person" in the form as they are recognized by the UK and 
U. S. legislation and case law, Article 56 of the Civil Code and Article 3 of the Federal Law 
on Joint Stock Companies, provides that if a person is able to give orders to a company, 
they can be held liable for the damages incurred in a course of the company's bankruptcy, 
if the bankruptcy arose from such orders. 1387 
However, by describing Khodorkovsky's position inside and outside Yukos Group in 
detail and by stressing his actual managerial position, the investigation aimed to solve the 
threefold problem. Firstly, they tried to prove Khodorkovsky's actual position as a head 
manager and core owner of the Group before and after his formal resignation, for the 
purpose of the ongoing criminal investigation and the court hearing in Russia. 1388 
Secondly, the prosecutors attempted to create proper grounds for the Yukos money 
laundering case in the light of current European anti-money laundering legislation, 
including confiscation, seizure and civil recovery provisions, which might help the 
investigators to seize the funds allegedly belonging to Menatep, Khodorkovsky and his 
allies abroad. 1389Thirdly, the investigators wanted to create grounds for prospective civil 
actions against Khodorkovsky in the West and internationally, by additionally confirming 
his role as the ultimate controlling person in the Group. 1390 
1397 See Civil Code, The Law on Joint Stock Companies. 
1388 See G Faulconbridge, 'Khodorkovsky Gives up Yukos' (2005) 13 January The Moscow Times. com 5 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2005/01/13/041. html>accessed 20 July 2007; Presscenter, 
'Custody Extended until October 2' (2007) <http//www. khodorkovsky. info/khodorkovsky in-cOlony/ 
135331. html>accessed 20 July 2007. For the legal implications see Res of SC Ns 51 pp 22-24. 
1399 See D Rebrov, 'Vremya, Rynok I Auktsion Vse Rasstavyat Po Mestam [Time, Market and Auctions Will 
Put Everything in Place]' (2007) 24 July Kommersant Online <http: //www. kommersant. ru/ 
doc. aspx? DocsID=789184>accessed 24 July 2007on the Yukos' funds abroad. 
1390 Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 4. 
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5.6. The Core Episodes of the Khodorkovsky/Yukos Money 
Laundering Case. 19' 
The Summary of the Charges represents a "secondary" document, which only 
summarises the main points of the official charges in the form that the prosecution would 
like to represent them to the public. 1392 Yet the Khodorkovsky/Yukos case is extremely 
complicated from a legal perspective, spans over a ten-year history of several dozens of 
companies, and is interrelated with quite a number of other corporate, tax and criminal 
cases. For that reason the episodes covered in the money laundering case should be 
analysed in line with the corporate story of the Group and other related data. The Summary 
of the Charges focuses primarily on the most indicative parts of the alleged activities of the 
organised criminal group, omitting detailed discussion of several important points, such as 
the problem of a predicate offence in the case, which will be analysed in a separate 
paragraph. 
5.6.1. The Creation of the On Shore Networks of Shell-Companies. 
5.6.1.1. The First Stage 
The arguements of the prosecutors generally reflect the findings of the Yukos tax 
case, especially on the "shell" companies' network, but have certain specifics concerning 
the characteristics of the "fraudulent scheme" due to the criminal character of the case. 1393 
1391 The Summary of Charges also includes an episode on the illegal alienation of the subsidiaries shares 
belonging to VNK (see 2.13 " The "VNK" Case. "). This episode does not concern the main Yukos 
operational schemes and does not represent the case that needs an in-depth analysis. 
1392 A full version of the official charges is available only for the defendants and their lawyers. See K 
Moskalenko, 'On the Case of M. B. Khodorkovsky' (2007) 8 February Robert Amsterdam Blog 
<http: //www. robertamsterdam. com/MotionMoskalenkoGPO%20%23254619. pdf>accessed 20 July 2007. 
1393 The prosecutors see it not as a part of corporate tax optimisation strategy, but as a part of the plan of the 
organised criminal group. 
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They clearly see two stages in the development of the Yukos' shell-company network. The 
first stage, which lasted approximately from 1997 to 2000, is characterized by the use of 
shell companies1394 registered in so-called "closed cities" or ZATOs: areas authorized to 
grant tax exemption to the companies producing something in their territory. 1395 The 
prosecutors use the following formula: 
Thus, between 1997 and 1998 in the closed community of ... [one of the 
ZATOs] the subordinates of Khodorkovsky... registered at their instigation the 
following commercial organisations: 
These organisations were essentially dummy legal entities, using the 
movement through them of petroleum, petroleum products, securities and cash 
as their raison d'etre. On behalf of these dummy companies, which gave them 
the right of ownership of the extracted petroleum, Khodorkovsky, Lebedev 
and the other members of the organised group disposed of the petroleum as if 
it were their personal property. 1396 
Therefore, as clearly as the findings of the Yukos tax avoidance and evasion case, 
the Summary of the Charges demonstrates that the large-scale use of so-called "shell" or 
"dummy" companies was the key element of the alleged embezzlement, tax evasion and 
money laundering scheme created by Yukos. 
It is important to note that before the Yukos case, the term "shell company" had had 
an extremely rare application in Russian criminal law. 1397 The definition of the "shell" or 
"front" company, given in the Judgement on Khodorkovsky case, is, actually, the first 
comprehensive definition that sets standards for Russian case law. 1398 
The companies... had not actually possessed any functions or features of a 
legal entity, envisaged by articles 48 through 50 of the Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation, i. e.: 
1394 During this period the secretarial services to the Company were provided by Peter Bond and the holding 
and secretarial company Valmet Group Limited (Bermuda). See The Summary of the Charges. 
1395 The same as in the Yukos tax case. 
1396 The Summary of the Charges. 
1397 See I Degtyarev, 'Inostrannye Kholdingi Na Zascite Rossiiskikh Aktivov [Overseas Holding in the 
Guarding of Russian Assets]' (2005) 18 Ekonomika i Zhizn [Econ & Life]. 
1398 It should be noted that the same position has been expressed in the Yukos-related tax cases. See 
Interregional Tax Inspection NI v Yukos [A40-61058/04-141-1S10]; Reshenie Arbitrazhnogo Suda g Moskva 
Po zayavleniyu Nalogovoi Inspektsii N_g 5 protiv Zakrytogo Aktsionernogo Obscestva Priceuoterkhaus/wpers 
[Decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court on the case Tax Inspection Ns 5v ZAO PwC7 [N 40-77631/06- 
88-185] (The Arbitration Court of Moscow 20 March 2007) 
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  did not posses, manage or operate a separate property for processing, storage 
and sale of crude oil and oil products, 
  were not able to achieve and exercise their rights of property on their own 
without the orders, 
  were not able to perform their activity, the main objective of which was to 
receive profit, since their activity was unprofitable, 
  meant for the purposes of evasion of taxes by the oil-production and oil- 
refining subsidiary enterprises of OAO 'NK 'YUKOS', engaged in sale of oil 
and oil products, and profit-making organisations affiliated to it. 1399 
Although the substance of the term "shell company", as it is understood by the 
Russian court, is close to that of international case law, 1400 the absence of any statutory or 
consistent judicial guidelines raises again the question of the application of the "Rule of 
Law" in the Russian Federation. 1401 
It should be noted that according to the Arbitration court decisions, the network of 
on-shore companies was created and used mainly for the purpose of tax evasion, as an 
illicit "profit-making" corporate activity. 1402 In parallel with obtaining illegal profit derived 
from the tax evasion operations, the network of "shell" companies was used for its 
"secondary purpose". This was the purpose of laundering illegal gains by putting the illicit 
funds in the corporate group internal "wash cycle", where allegedly the laundered funds 
were used many times for acquisition of crude, i. e. further avoidance and evasion 
operations. 1403 
This "dualistic" approach, based on the recognition of the illicit nature of the Yukos' 
offshore and onshore company network, has actually allowed the authorities "to kill two 
birds with one stone". The tax side of the story has lead to the liquidation of the company 
and forced sale of its assets; the money laundering aspect has led to new charges being 
brought against its owners and managers. 
1399 Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 40. 
1400 AR Pavkov, 'Ghouls and Godsends -a Critique of Reverse Merger Policy (2005-2006) 3 Berkeley Bus LJ 475-514,501-03; D Gololobov and J Tanega, 'Sham Spes: Part 2'(2006) 17 (12) ICCLR 369-80,378-80. 
1401 See Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited'; Rodionov, 'A Look at Khodorkovsky and 
Lebedev's Taxes'. 
1402 See Interregional Tax Inspection N1 v Yukos [A40-61058104-141-1510]. 
1403 This scheme sets up a perfect example of nexus between money laundering and tax evasion. 
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5.6.1.2. The Second Stage. 
The prosecutors point out that by 2001 Khodorkovsky, and the other members of the 
organised group, concentrated a huge amount of wealth in Russia and in foreign companies 
under their control. Because of the criminal nature of this accumulated capital and their 
intent to continue increasing that capital, the group of changed their system of 
misappropriating petroleum and laundering money. They organised a new system to move 
petroleum and products via companies, registered in the other regions that gave them tax 
breaks. 1404 For this purpose the executives of the companies, controlled by the organised 
group, drew up appropriate agency agreements, purchase and sale agreements, 
commissions and other documents needed for the purchase and sale between petroleum 
and products companies. '405 The key principals of the system were, according to the 
prosecutors, "false" publicity gained through the scheme of forced changeability: 
With the aim of concealing the bogus nature of the said companies from the 
tax and other regulatory authorities, the plan worked out by Khodorkovsky 
and the other members of the organised group to misappropriate other 
people's wealth entrusted to them, made provision for the periodic renewal of 
the artificial systems of sales of petroleum and petroleum products, i. e. the 
regular replacement in these systems of just the dummy organisations - the 
petroleum traders - which were engaged in the resale of petroleum and 
petroleum products to other organisations, including newly founded ones. 1406 
The investigators insist that between 2001 and 2003 Khodorkovsky and the other 
members of the organised group misappropriated 202,214,394 tonnes of petroleum from 
the main Yukos production subsidiaries, with a total value of $ 27 bn. 1407 
'4°4 Evenkia, Mordovia and some others. See Appendix 21. 
1405 The Summary of the Charges. 
1406 ibid. 
1407 ibid. 
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5.6.2. Using the Auditor's Opinion as a Shelter. 
According to the prosecutors, while using the network of shell companies, 
Khodorkovsky and his allies, acting as managers of the corporate group, undertook several 
steps to conceal the illegal character of the operations: 
.... Khodorkovsky and the members of the organised group declared the balances of these dummy companies, which they nominally referred to as 
operational companies, side by side with the balances of their subsidiary 
petroleum-extracting and petroleum-processing plants when presenting their 
financial statements to the international auditors. By this deception they 
convinced everybody that the dummy companies were all within the sphere of 
influence of Yukos. '408 
Prosecutors point out that, having received the false opinion from the auditors that no 
infringements had been involved in the sale of petroleum and products, the members of the 
organised group continued to use the major portion of the funds for their personal 
enrichment. Only a fraction was paid to the production companies engaged in petroleum 
extraction and processing, allowing the criminal scheme to run. 1409 However, the Summary 
of Charges contains no evidence that the funds, accumulated on the balance of the 
corporate group as a consolidated company, were used illegally or were in violation of the 
appropriate corporate procedures. The absence of any significant violations has been 
confirmed by the consolidated accounts audited by PwC since the beginning of 1997. 'x'° 
Nevertheless, the charges are based on the assumption that the consolidated accounts of the 
Company are just a method of concealing the embezzled and laundered funds. That PwC's 
opinion was considered as a tool for such concealment was later confirmed by PwC itself 
when its Russian office withdrew the opinions. 1411 
1 ibid. 
1409 
ibid. 
1410 See eg Yukos, Consolidated Financial Statements, 31 December 2000 (2001); Yukos, U. S. GAAP 
ConsolidatedFinancial Statements 31 December2002 (2003). 
1411 See C Belton, 'PwC Withdraws Yukos Audits' (2007) 24 June FT. com <httpJ/www. msnbc. msn. com 
/id/19402423/print/l/displaymode/1098haccessed 25 June 2007; GL White, 'Yukon Audits Withdrawn' 
(2007) 25 June Wall St J Online <http: //online. wsj. com/article/SBI18271730700546328. html? mod= rss_ 
whats_ news_europe>accessed 25 June 2007. 
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Significantly, the role of the international auditor (PwC) in the collapse of Yukos, 
and its alleged involvement in the Yukos schemes, had not been assessed in any way until 
the Russian Ministry of Tax and Levies, represented by one of its inspections (local 
agencies), filed an unprecedented application with the Moscow Arbitration Court, claiming 
PwC's actual knowledge, and its direct facilitation of, the Yukos fraudulent tax 
schemes. 1412 The Moscow court sided with accusations from Moscow city tax officials, 
who claimed that PwC had aided Yukos in perpetrating tax evasion by covering up the 
company's tax shelter schemes, and drawing up two different audit reports in over three 
years. 1413 Accordingly, the court found that the audit agreements between Yukos and PwC 
Audit for the years 2002-2004 were invalid because they constituted illegal and unethical 
deals according to the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. The court awarded the 
government 16.8 million rubles ($480,000) in restitution. 1414 PwC was also charged with 
"misleading Company shareholders", "wrongful acts resulting in substantial harm to 
society and the state" and providing a "knowingly false audit report". 1415 This case is the 
first and the only example of when a company such as PwC has been recognized as an 
accomplice and a facilitator of the Yukos schemes, 1416 although PwC had used the same 
formula to describe the tax risk for all its "big" clients in the Russian oil sector, which is 
clearly seen from Appendix 29. 
However, PwC, due to assistance of its long-standing client Gazprom, finally started 
collaborating with the authorities and withdrew its opinions, 1417 issued for almost nine 
years, declaring significant non-disclosure and misrepresentations on the Yukos side. 1418 it 
did not represent a significant problem for PwC, as the legislation in the period of the "hot" 
1412 See E Judge and T Halpin, TwC Faces Court Action in Russia over Yukos Audits' (2006) 28 December 
Timesonline <httpi/business. timesonline. co. uk/tol)business/law/corporate/articlel264576. ece? print=... > 
accessed 20 April 2007; Pleshanova, 'PwC Discovered a Group Crime'. 
1413 The court case revealed that the firm had compiled two sets of accounts - one for internal use and 
another for shareholders. See Interregional Tax Inspection NI v Yukos [A40-61058/04-141-15101. 
1414 Pleshanova, Moiseev and Grib, TricewaterhouseCoopers Blamed in Yukos Tax Affair'. 
14" Lebedev, 'Open Letter to Vedomosti Concerning Its Article on PwC'. 
1416 See Y Komarova, PwC Appeal Likely to Be Sustained at Top Level' (2007) 28 April The Moscow 
News. com <http: //english. mn. ru/english/issue. php? 2007-14-20>accessed 29 April 2007. 
1417 T Adelaja, 'PwC Is Criticized for Pulling Yukos Audits' (2007) 26 June The Moscow Times. com 
<http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2007/06t26/046. htm1>accessed 26 June 2007. 
1419 ZAO "PricewaterhouseCoopers", 'Otzyv Auditorskikh Zaklyuchenii [Letter of Withdrawal]' (2007) 26 
June Kompromat. RU <http: //www... ru/main/hodorkovskiy/ pwcotzyv2. htm>accessed 26 June 2007. 
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transition from 1995 to 2003 was quite vague and an auditor can always find serious 
omissions in client's representations. 1419 Now PwC has decided to play together with the 
prosecutors and its position based on the assumption of the Yukos' intentional 
misrepresentations will be aggressively used in pending trials, domestically and 
internationally. '420 
The PwC story is far from at an end, as the notorious court's decision can be 
appealed up to the Supreme Arbitration Court, whose final ruling sets precedent on any 
occasion, and it will set the benchmark for auditors' liability in Russia. 1421 
5.63. The Creation of the Offshore Network of Shell (Dummy) 
Companies. 
The Summary of Charges provides that, for the purpose of legalizing the 
misappropriated petroleum, Khodorkovsky acquired dummy ("shell") companies abroad. 
Through these dummy companies he created a network of foreign sales organisations for 
petroleum and products based on the following pattern: Yukos (or a dummy company 
registered in Russia in a preferential tax assessment zone) sold oil and products to a 
controlled foreign company registered in Switzerland, which resold them to a controlled 
foreign company registered offshore, which, in turn, resold them to an actual buyer at a 
petroleum-processing plant, in the form of a foreign company. '422 
14" See eg Kommersant. com, 'Court Blasts PricewaterhouseCoopers' (2007) 2 April Kommersant Online 
<http: //www. kommersant. com/p755086/PricewaterhouseCoopers Audit_YUKOSt>accessed 5 April 2007; 
Pleshanova, 'PwC Discovered a Group Crime'. 
142° See Presscenter, "Now PwC Has Taken the Side of Oficials in the Yukos Trial"' (2006) 
<httpi/www. khodorkovsky. info/timelinel135412. html>accessed 12 July 2006; F Sterkin, 'PwC Pobedil v 
VAS [PWC Won in SAC]' (2007) 11 July Vedomosti <http: //www. vedomosti. ru/newspaper/article 
. shtml? 2007 
/07/11/128995>accessed 12 July 2007. 
1421 See Komarova, PwC Appeal Likely to Be Sustained at Top Level'. 
sau The Summary of the Charges, Komisar, Yukos Kingpin on Trial. Billionaite Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
Faces the Music in Moscow. Are the Charges Politically Motivated?; M Teagarden, 'Yukos Defaults on 
Long-Term Contracts to Supply Oil' (2005) 20 January Bloomberg. com <http: /www. energybulletin. net/ 
4105. html>accessed 30 April 2007. 
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The objective of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and the other members of the 
organised group, was to mislead the regulatory authorities and foreign 
businessmen by including in the network a foreign company, controlled by 
them and registered in Switzerland, which was enough to impart an image of 
reliability and trustworthiness to OAO NK YUKOS operations involving the 
export of petroleum and petroleum products. 1423 
In his defence statement Khodorkovsky replied: 
Any vertically integrated company, including the vertically integrated oil 
company Yukos, which was set up by presidential decree, combines the 
productive and financial activities of a number of enterprises that are inter- 
related, both technologically and in share-ownership. 
The accounting processes of all vertically integrated companies, including 
Yukos (treated as a single unit), take the form of consolidated accounts that 
enable one to see the various sources of income and expenditure, and the assets 
and liabilities of the company. (See, for example, accounts prepared by 
Gazprom, Rosneft, Gazpromneft and Yukos: Source, Federal Financial 
Markets Service. )'424 
The fact that almost all major Russian companies used the same tax 
optimisation/operational schemes has never been a secret, and it has been addressed by 
several pieces of research that comment on Russian corporate governance problems. 1425 All 
Russian oil and gas corporations have off-shore company networks, which reside primarily 
in the same jurisdictions as Yukos. 1426 
It is only in the case of Yukos that the creation of several off-shore companies has 
been recognised as a constituent part of the criminal offence. The fact that information 
about the core off-shore companies, which were directly controlled by Yukos, had been 
publicly disclosed according to the regulations of the Federal Securities and Exchange 
Commission has not been given any consideration at all. 1427 Figure 22 describes the 
relationship of ownership and control in the Yukos offshore network before the attack on 
the Company. 
1423 The Summary of the Charges. 
1424 M Khodorkovsky, 'Statement by Mikhail Khodorkovsky' (2008) <http: //www. khodorkovsky. info/ 
khodorkovsky_in_colony/136452. htm1>accessed 1 July2008. 
1425 See S Guriev and others, Corporate Governance in Russian Industry (NES-CEFIR-IET, Moscow 2003); 
Goriaev and Sonin, 'Is Political Risk Company - Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair'. 
1476 See as an example the structure ofAlfa Group at <http: //www. alfagroup. ru/276/about. aspx>. 
1427 See <http: /www. yukos. ru/files/10938/spisok 03_11_03. pdf>. 
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Figure 22. "Yukos' Offshore Network. " 1428 
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1428 Before the restructuring and collapse. 
laze Re Yukos Oil Compamv Appeal Brief Par 1.11 Gispen's Dccl No 06-B-10775 (RDD) (Bankr SDNY 26 
May 2006) 6-7. 
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5.6.4. The Accumulation of Profit on the Foreign Accounts. 
The key element of the charges is that by organising the sale of petroleum and 
products by the Swiss company to the "shell" offshore company, the organised group 
accumulated part of the money, laundered through the sale of misappropriated petroleum, 
in their ofd shore bank accounts in order to reduce the tax burden on the Company's profits 
obtained via illegal operations. '430 The prosecutors claim that Khodorkovsky and the other 
members of the organised group transferred funds from the bank accounts of the "trading" 
shell companies (SPVs) to the bank accounts of the other ("financial") shell companies 
(SPVs) controlled by them. Subsequently, the organised group manipulated these funds for 
their own interests. 1431 It should be noted, that although the Summary of the Charges says 
nothing about the tax evasion schemes as irrelevant in principle to the money laundering 
case, the elements of tax avoidance and evasion can be seen everywhere, which, 
considering the tax exemption provision in the CC RF, significantly undermines the 
genuine character of the money laundering charges. 1432 
As in the previous paragraphs on the problem of the Yukos' off-shore network, 
comments may be limited to the remark that it is quite evident that almost all leading 
Russian companies used offshore schemes and fund-accumulation techniques. 1433 
Moreover structuring the corporate group cash flow through offshore treasury companies is 
an internationally recognized business practice. 1434 It is evident that the prosecutors' 
approach to business practice erodes the line between legal business operations and illegal 
business practices, putting political prosecution issues on the agenda. 
1430 The Summary of the Charges. 
1431 
ibid. 
1432 Eg regarding shams companies registered in Russia in a zone of concessionary taxation. 
'433 Eg Sibneft schemes. See M Tul'skii, 'Pochemu Abramovich Perekachivaet Za Granitsu Po $1 Mlyd. v 
God [Why Roman Abramovich Is Transferring One Billion Dollars a Year Abroad]' (2004) 
<http: //compromat. ru/main/abramovich/pokupki. htm>accessed 20 April 2007. 
1434 See G Green, 'Transfer Pricing Techniques for Group Treasury Companies' (2001) 12 Intl Tax Rev 23- 
26,23-26. 
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5.6.5. The Redistribution of the Illegal Profit through Shared Re- 
distribution and Dividends. 
The final "masterstroke" of the prosecutors was the part of the Summary that stated 
that, Khodorkovsky had redistributed the share capital of the Menatep Group, under the 
guise of official dividend payments, amongst the several members of the organised group 
to conceal their "remuneration" for the crimes committed. The investigation claims that it 
was done with the purpose of making them partners and owners of shares in Yukos, and 
other companies on the accounts of which the legalized funds were kept. 1435 
Taken separately from other episodes, these allegations mean that any redistribution 
of shares in a holding company (a head company of a corporate group) could be taken as 
concealment of illegal operations inside the group. 
5.6.6. The Laundering Operations: General Summary. 
In the Summary of Charges, the prosecutors have separately enumerated several 
laundering operations, allegedly conducted by the members of the organised group through 
the corporate stricture of the Company: (1) cancellation of the Menatep Bank's creditor 
indebtedness to foreign banks; (2) acquisition of Eurobonds, and; (3) the performance of 
various financial exchange operations. 1436 This was evidently done with the sole purpose of 
"illustrating" the wrongdoings of the criminal group. All the operations generally 
complied with the publicly known business activities of the Company and its core 
shareholder the Menatep Group. The bulk of these activities was disclosed in the audited, 
quarterly and annual, Company accounts. 
In his statement on the problem of Yukos's financial operations, Khodorkovsky 
comments in the following way: 
tars The Summary of the Charges. 
1436 See Appendix 30. 
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The consolidated profits of Yukos as a vertically integrated company are 
reflected in the consolidated accounts for 1998-2003, and are higher than 
average for the sector. These profits were spent on capital investment, the 
acquisition of assets, and the payment of dividends, in accordance with the 
decisions of the Yukos board of directors in 1999-2003. 
The transactions described in the charge sheet as "legalisation" are single 
instances of a great number of ordinary transactions for the (temporary) 
placement of Yukos funds on the Russian and international financial markets 
by the company's finance department. The same term is applied to the rest of 
the company's usual financial and economic activities, which find reflection in 
the accounts of the individual legal entities and in Yukos's consolidated 
accounts (see relevant accounts). 1437 
The analysis of the Summary of the Charges provides surprising results. Excluding 
the Yukos tax avoidance and evasion case, which is legally not related to the 
embezzlement and money laundering case, the Summary of Charges does not name any 
corporate or operational activity of Yukos as a corporate group that would not generally 
comply with international business practice, and the practices of comparable Russian 
companies. The language of the Summary does not contain any corporate restructuring 
transactions or business operations that cannot be found in the accounts and reports of 
other Russian oil giants. This arguement is aggressively used by the defendants' lawyers 
for dissolving the case. 1438 Therefore the alleged illegality of the Yukos operational 
scheme, represented by the prosecutors as a money laundering cycle, is based on the 
violation of the arm's length principle in application to the acquisition of crude from the 
production's subsidiaries, allegedly qualifying to the predicate offence of embezzlement. 
5.7. A Predicate Offence in the Khodorkovsky/Yukos Money 
Laundering Case. 
For the "Second Khodorkovsky case/Yukos Money Laundering Case" the 
prosecutors have chosen a model of the predicate offence, unprecedented in the recent 
1437 Khodorkovsky, 'Statement of 1 July 2008'. 
1439 See Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, 'Khodataistvo 0 Prekrascenii Dela [Motion to Dissolve 
the Case]' (2007) <http: //www. khodorkovsky. ra/docs/7637_Hodatajstvo. pdflaccessed 22 December 2007. 
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history of Russian criminal justice. According to their innovative scheme, all acts of sale of 
crude from the Yukos' production companies to the SPVs ("dummy" or "shell" companies, 
also controlled by Yukos, ) at a price which was evidently below the market price, should 
be deemed as a predicate offence for the further acts of laundering. Therefore, the 
prosecution says that transfer-pricing sales represent acts of embezzlement. As all 
operations have been conducted under the alleged control of Khodorkovsky and the other 
members of the organised criminal group, the following operations with oil and funds 
represent a continuous series of money laundering acts. 1439 The defence lawyers' labeled 
the prosecutors argucmentations as "insane" and they emphasised the absence of the 
predicate offence in the case, and the absence of money laundering in the affair as a 
whole. 1440 It should be noted that the detailed analysis of the Yukos affair as a whole 
shows that, initially, the investigators aimed to use the fact that the production companies 
had actually overproduced oil, to create their "Yukos Money Laundering Case". '441 The 
offence of over-production, according to Russian criminal case law, could qualify as illegal 
entrepreneurship, which can be deemed a predicate offence for the further money 
laundering operations. '"2 Figure 23 represents the scheme of the relationships between the 
companies inside the Yukos group. This scheme was deemed by the investigators to be 
embezzlement and money laundering. 
3439 The Summary of the Charges. 
"°0 Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, 'Motion to Dissolve the Case 28-29. 
`3 E Naumova, Tavel Anisimov Taken to Court' (2005) 2 March Kommersant Online 
<http //www. kotmnersanLoomlp55l4l8s'r 1/Pavel Anisimov_Taken to Court/>accessed 20 July 2007; 
Mangileva, 'The Director of Samameftegas Sentenced Twice. 
1"2 CC RF art 171 and 174. See also Duyunov and others, Commentaries on the Criminal Code of the 
Russian Federation an 171.174. 
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Figure 23. "The Principal Scheme of the Predicate Offence in the Yukos Case. " 
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However, the investigators have declined this scheme, as acts of illegal 
entrepreneurship do not amount to a serious criminal offence in Russia, and the prosecutors 
have found them not completely suitable for such a significant criminal case. 1441 As 
Russian criminal law contains tax crime exception provisions in respect of money 
laundering offences, the Summary of the Charges does not mention tax evasion issues, 
describing the schemes used for the alleged corporate tax evasion as schemes designed and 
used for money laundering. 1444 
The arguement of the prosecutors, concerning the Yukos operational (and also tax 
avoidance and evasion) scheme, as analysed in the previous chapter, are based on several 
cornerstone assumptions. 
Firstly, the sale and purchase agreement between Yukos-controlled entities were 
false, as they named Yukos as a purchaser, when it actually was not. The Summary of the 
Charges says: 
141 CC RF art 171. See also Ciuev, Commentaries on the Criminu/ Code ofthe Russian Federation for 
Entrepreneurs art 171. 
1444 CC RF art 174. 
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... Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and their friends were perfectly well aware that Yukos Oil Company was not in fact a purchaser of petroleum, and that the 
products of the petroleum-extracting companies were shipped directly and 
independently to Russian and foreign customers. 1445 
Secondly, the price of oil and products was not a "fair market price" and was 
determined by the members of the organised group. It represented only the cost of 
extracting the raw material and was on average 2-4 times lower than the market price. 14'16 
The third arguement was not expressly reflected in the Summary of the Charges, but 
it is seen from the Arbitration Court decisions on the Yukos tax claims and concerns public 
auctions, conducted by the Company's production subsidiaries for the oil produced. The 
actions have been declared sham, as concealing the true nature of the transaction, aimed at 
sale of the crude to the Yukos-controlled "sham" companies (SPVs) for tax evasion 
purposes. 1447 
Combining the above arguement with the arguements concerning Khodorkovsky's 
ultimate managerial position in the Yukos Corporate Group, the investigators concluded 
that the organised criminal group headed by Khodorkovsky had committed embezzlement 
of the Yukos' production subsidiaries' oil and funds. 1448 
The key element of this offence was the scheme where members of the organised 
group, through specially structured corporate mechanisms, coerced the production 
subsidiaries to sell crude below its fair market price, i. e. in violation of the arm's length 
princip1e. 1449 Violation of the existing transfer pricing rules, which resulted in the negative 
consequences in taxation of the Yukos Group, is only one of the implications of this 
offence. 
The defendants' lawyers attack this arguement in general by pointing out that the 
notion of "fair market price" was hardly applicable in Russia in early 2000s because of the 
1445 The Summary of the Charges. 
1446 ibid. 
1441 See Interregional Tax Inspection NI v Yukos [A40-61058/04-141-1510]. 
1448 The Moscow Times, Khodorkovsky Faces Laundering Charges'; MosNews, 'Khodorkovsky Charged 
with Money Laundering'. 
1 See eg E Mangileva and E Naumova, Deputy Anisimov Doesn't Pass for Director' (2005) 15 March 
Kommersant Online <httpi/www. kommersant. com/p554494/r 1/Deputy _Anisimov_ 
Doesn t Pass for 
Director>accessed 20 July2007. 
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export restrictions and actual absence of internal market. 1450 They also stressed the Yukos 
subsidiaries' sale prices were fully comparable with the prices of other oil companies. '45' 
However, previous experience shows that such "statistical" arguementations can be easily 
defeated by the opinions of the investigators' experts, which are welcomed by the court. '452 
Transfer pricing in its conventional understanding, as it shown in the previous 
chapters, is "simply the process of setting prices between companies in the same 
group ", 1453 It represents the realization of the arm's length principle in the tax law, 
particularly in taxation of related parties, including members of corporate groups. It is 
widely recognised, that the arm's length principle, as embodied in the model tax treaties 
and OECD Guidelines, is accepted throughout the world. '454 This principle permits 
national tax authorities to adjust the accounts of enterprises under common control, if they 
consider that "conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations, which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises", in order to reallocate profit which would have accrued but for 
those conditions. '455 By incorporating the separate entity concept, the arm's length 
principle places related and unrelated enterprises on an equal footing for tax purposes, 
avoiding the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that would otherwise distort the 
relative competitive positions of either type of entity. '456 
However, arm's length principle is multidimensional phenomenon, violation of which 
may have other consequences. These consequences depend on characteristics of a 
particular violation. For example, the Russian corporate law provides that a person, 
considered interested in a particular transaction must disclose its interest to the Company. 
1450 Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, 'Motion to Dissolve the Case' 27. 
1451 ibid. 
1452 See eg NovayaGazeta, Defence Attacks'. 
1453 D Hoi Ki Ho, 'International Transfer Pricing Regulation: Does East Meet West' (2007) 28 (7) Comp Law 
212-23,212. 
1454 R Ackerman and E Chorvat, 'Modern Financial Theory and Transfer Pricing' (2001-2002) 10 Gco Mason 
L Rev 637-74,640. 
1455 picciotto, 'Transfer Pricing and Corporate Regulation' 398; E Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: 
A Global Proposal for Simplification' (2005-2006) 59 Tax Law 941-80,952-54. 
1456 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD 
publishing, Paris 1995) 1.7; OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Policy Brief 
(2001) 1-8. 
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If a person fails to do so, it will be responsible for damages incurred by a Company, 
including damages from sales below market price resulting from the violation of the arm's 
length principle. 1457 In the Yukos embezzlement and money laundering case, taking into 
consideration all the circumstances of the case (the fact that the subsidiaries sold crude 
under constraint, allegedly committed by members of the organised group through 
corporate mechanisms) violation of the arm's length principle takes a form of one of 
economic crime, namely embezzlement. 
Embezzlement in Anglo-American jurisdictions lass is quite conventionally 
understood as fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been 
entmsted. '459 Historically, the U. S. A generally followed the English pattern. 1460 
Embezzlement is purely a statutory offence, and is punishable, as such, only as and 
to the extent that the legislature has by statute provided! 461 By statute in most states, 
officers and agents of private corporations are made criminally liable for embezzling or 
fraudulently converting to their own use, money or property, to or in the possession of the 
company. 1462 The gravamen of embezzlement, as defined in the statutes, consists of the 
subsequent conversion of the property of an incorporated company, whose original 
possession by the accused was lawful, with a felonious intent on the part of the officer, 
agent, or employee so accused, to convert the same to the accused's own use. 1463 
In the U. S. the statutes and existing judicial practice in a case of embezzlement 
demand four factors to be proven in court: 
1. There was a relationship of trust between the defendant and the victim. 
1457 See the Law on Joint Stock Companies art 81-84 
14ss Analysis of the law in the EU countries shows basically the same understanding of the offence see eg N 
Stolowy, 'Company-Related Offences in French Legislation' (2007) January JBL 1-15.2. 
1459 See DK Fantaye, 'Fighting Corruption and Embezzlement in Third World Countries' (2004) 68 J Crim L 
170-76,173; OG Obermaier and RG Morvillo, White Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory Offences (Law 
Journal Press, New York 2005) 2.34.1. 
1460 WR Lafave and JS Austin W, Substantive Criminal Law (West Group, New York 1986) 368-69; S 
Wilson, 'Law, Moralty and Regulation' (2006) 46 Brit J Criminology 1073-1099,1082. Note that now in the 
UK embazzelment is not a separate crime and is punishable as one of the types of fraud. See Fraud Act 2000 
s (4). 
1461 Lafave and Austin W, Substantive Criminal Law 368. 
1462 House v United States 78 F2d 296. 
1411 People v Heilemann 362191322,199 NE 792. 
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2. This relationship must be proven to have resulted in the defendant's 
obtainment of the property or moneys in question. 
3. Confirmation that the defendant unlawfully assumed rights to the property. 
4. The appropriation must be proven intentional. 1464 
These requirements generally comply with Russian judicial practice. 146S International 
practice also complies with Russian case law in that managers of companies, to whom 
company's funds and assets are entrusted, are recognised as abundant offenders in 
1466 
Nevertheless, regardless of the legal, economic and political argucments, 
qualification of sales of crude and product below the fair market price as a form of 
embezzlement raises significant questions. Russian legislation and case law also consider 
as embezzlement, 1467 an act of personal misappropriation or transfer to a third person 
without any compensation, of the assets, which have been entrusted to the offender. The 
assets may also be under his control due to other legitimate reasons (agreement, order, etc. ) 
and he could exercise the rights of possession, management or delivery in respect of these 
assets. The replacement of assets for less valuable ones shall also be considered as 
embezzlement. 1468 Therefore, according to the commentators, the actus reus in the offence 
of embezzlement according to the Russian legislation should involve the following 
characteristics: 
(a) The offender has the legal and official control over the certain assets (he does not 
hold them illegally). This control may originate from an agreement, power of attorney or 
orders of the owner. 
14' See JW Bartram, 'Pleading for Theft Consolidation in Virginia: Larceny, Embezzlement, False Pretenses 
and 19.2-284' (1999) 56 Wash & Lee L Rev 249-94,271-80; 
Obermaier and Morvillo, If7üte Collar Crime. 
Business and Regulatory Offences 2-36-2-46. 
1465 See Res of SC (USSR) Ns 4 and Res of SC N2 51. 
1466 See eg Lopashenko, Economic Crimes (Author's Commentary) 49-50; Stolowy, 'Company-Related 
Offences in French Legislation' 2-10. 
1467 Embezzlement by means of the large-scale misappropriation. The Summary of the Charges. 
'4" See The Res of SC Ns 4 and and Res of SC Ns 51 pars 19-20. 
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(b) The offender has a legal right to alienate the assets to himself or transfer assets to 
a third party. 1469 
This legislative and case law approach in application to Khodorkovsky/Yukos case 
raises two main questions in this respect. 
The first is whether a chief executive officer or a "shadow director" of the managing 
company (head company of a corporate group) can be considered a person to whom the 
property of the corporate group in whole has been entrusted, in the meaning given to its 
definition by article 160 of the Russian Criminal Code and Russian Case Law. 
Taking into consideration the particular language of the Charges, this question may 
be reformulated in the following way: Was the property of the Yukos production 
subsidiaries formally entrusted to Khodorkovsky and several other members of organised 
group, who took high managerial positions in the Yukos group? The critical point here is 
the absence of any criminal precedents on similar cases, and a lack of legal clarity in 
managerial and liability issues in Russian corporate groups. 
The position of Khodorkovsky, as the overall head of the Yukos Group as an 
enterprise, and the key role that he played in the unified management of the corporate 
group, is critical to the assessment of the situation from the standpoint of Russian criminal 
law. 1470 The advocates, in their motion to dissolve the case, filed with the Investigatory 
Committee of GPO. They insist that the allegedly embezzled assets, including crude and 
products, were not entrusted to the Defendants and there is no actual evidence in the Case 
supporting the prosecutors' allegations. 1471 
However, it is likely that question of whether or not Khodorkovsky was formally 
entrusted with property of the Yukos production subsidiaries will get an of imiative 
answer. 1472 An examination of the language of the Summary of the Charges, which assume 
1469 Res of SC Ns 51 para 19-24. See also Duyunov and others, Commentaries on the Criminal Code of the 
Russian Federation art 160. 
3470 See eg ibid. 
147 Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, 'Motion to Dissolve the Case' 24-25. 
1472 That time he was sentenced for "embezzlement of other people's property entrusted to the guilty party in 
large scale" regarding the Apatit trading scheme. See Russian Federation v Khokorkovsky et al (Judgement) 
14-19. However, later, the Moscow City Court stated in its cassation decision that "The apatit concentrate has 
not been entrusted to Khodorkovsky and Lebedev". See Lebedev's Legal Team, 'Supervision Appeal to the 
318 
the position of Khodorkovsky's actual control on the subsidiaries, the position of the 
commentators, 1473 and the judgements, brought in the "First Khodorkovsky case", where 
he was actually recognised as a head of a corporate group, only serve to support the case 
against him. The court decision on Khodorkovsky's position and responsibilities will set a 
precedent for other Russian corporate groups and may urge them to change their 
management structures. 1474 
The second question is whether transfer pricing transactions, conducted for the 
benefit of the parent company that fully owns its subsidiary, can be considered as 
damaging for the subsidiary? 
Our analysis of the international legislation on corporate groups shows that the 
separate entity doctrine is conventionally unrestrictedly applicable to fully owned and 
controlled subsidiaries in corporate groups. However in Russian case law, the 
responsibility of the parent company for the damages caused to its fully owned subsidiary, 
as a member of a multi-level corporate group, is not clear. 1475 Nevertheless, Article 71 of 
the Law "On Joint Stock Companies" points out that an individual manager, or a managing 
company, owes same general fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the company they 
manage 1476 as they do in UK and U. S. law. 1477 Article 6 of the Law also fixes the 
responsibility of the parent company whose instructions have led to the insolvency of its 
presidium of the Moscow City Court' (2005) 26 December Lebedev pressecnter 
<http: //www. platonlebedev. ru/docs/default. asp? sid=2&mid=1478&open=l #doc>accessed 10 December 
2007. This decision may create certain problems for the second case, but it is evident that this inconvenient 
precedent can be easily overruled. 
1473 VD Larichev and DV Kudryavtsev, 'Osobennosti Prestuplenii, Sovershaemykh Rukovoditelyami Bankov 
[The Characteristics of the Offences Committed by the Chief Bank Officers]' (2005) 2-3 Advokat [Advocat] 
28 - 37 art 160; V Belik, 'Za Chto Finansovogo Direktora Mogut Priviech K Ugolovnoi Otvctstvennosti 
[CFO's Criminal Risks]' (2006) 7-8 Finansovyi Direktor [Fin Dir] <httpi/www. fd. ru/articlc/ 
21264htmbaccessed 5 May2007. 
1474 See eg on managements risks in Russia Kommersant. com, 'Risks Less Manageable Than Prices' (2007) 
21 December Kommersant Online <httpl/vwvw. kommersant. com/p838658/r 528/ risk management> 
accessed 22 December 2007. 
1475 Shitkina, Holding Companies: Legal and Corporate Governance Issues 328.412. 
1476 The Law on Joint Stock Companies art 69-71. 
1477 E Makeeva, Pravovye Kollizii Vnutri Kholdinga [Legal Collisions inside }folding Companies]' (2005) 5 
Konsul'tant [Consaltant]; A Molotnikov, Otvetstvennost' v Akuionernykh Obscestvakth [Accountability in 
Joint Stock Companies] (Walters Kluwer, Moscow 2006). 
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subsidiary. 1478 The U. S. law would give a similar answer to this question by using 
"separate entity", "limited liability" and "piercing the veil" doctrines. 1479 The defence 
lawyers express the disapproval of the prosecutors' positions based on the assumption that 
the interests of Yukos' subsidiaries were seriously damaged, but do not provide any clear 
arguementation. '480 
Concluding on the problem of the predicate offence in the Yukos money laundering 
case, it is important to stress that all Russian oil companies used different similar schemes, 
which varied in the level of prices, types of SPVs and other aspects. 148 ' The new precedent, 
which is likely to be set in the new Khodorkovsky/Yukos case, is sure to create a new legal 
threat to all Russian production majors. This threat will exist at least for seven years, and 
could be used as a effective tool in a new wave of politically motivated redistribution of 
big property and industry in Russia. '482 
The embezzlement charges clearly demonstrate that an unscrupulous political elite, 
who are looking for redistribution of large-scale property, 1483 can bend criminal law in any 
possible way, allowing for the effective suppression of the opponents. Any modifications 
to the substantive criminal law cannot change the situation significantly, as the problem 
arises when the law is selectively applied and selectively enforced. 1484 The analysis, 
conducted in this section, shows that even the state-owned concerns are likely to have 
problems, if the new Yukos case succeeds. '485 However, this possibility does not prevent 
'a's Shitkina, Holding Companies: Legal and Corporate Governance Issues 316-29. 
1479 See eg EM Dodd, 'Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry. Massachusetts' (1947-1948) 
1351 Harv L Rev 61-88; PI Blumberg, Blumberg on Corporate Groups (Second edn, Panel Publishers 2005) 
part 1-2. 
laso See Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, Motion to Dissolve the Case' 27. 
gast See eg Reuters and A France-Presse, TNK-BP Disputes Tax Claim' (2005)13 April International Herald 
Tribune <http: //www. ihtcom/articles/2005/04/12/business/rusoil. php>accessed 9 May 2007; Mortished, 'BP 
Venture Pays $1bn in Back Taxes as Russia Gets Tougher; A Medetsky, 'Tax Service Launches Russneß 
Suits' (2007) 14 June The Moscow Times. com 5 <httpJ/www. themoscowtimes. com/Stories/2007/06/14/ 
041. html>accessed 17 June 2007. 
1482 See Gololobov, ' The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock Case'. 
1483 See eg Franchetti, 'Jailed Tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky `Framed' by Key Putin Aide. 
1484 See eg TNK-BP case R Hotten and A Blomfield, TNK-BP Strikes an Invisible Obstacle in Russia ' 
(2008) 25 May Telegraph. co. uk <http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/money/main. jhtml? xml=/money/2008/05/24/ 
cnbp 124. xml>accessed 25 May 2008. 
1495 See Gololobov, The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock Case'. 
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the new political elite from pushing new Yukos case to the trial, as they are sure that the 
weakness of the Rule of Law in Russia will allow them to avoid the application of the 
same rules to the companies that they control. 14 6 
5.8. The Nexus between Money Laundering and Tax Evasion in 
the Khodorkovsky/Yukos Money Laundering Case. 
The problem of the nexus between money laundering and tax evasion is one of 
extreme complexity. Money laundering is associated with all, types of crimes - from tax 
evasion to kidnapping. 1487 The Anti-money Laundering Guidance for UK accountants says: 
"Tax related offences are not in a special category. The proceeds or monetary advantage 
arising from tax offences are treated no differently from the proceeds of theft, drug 
trafficking or other criminal conduct. "1488 
However, the opposite opinion also exists. The European Banking Association in its 
Report, augmenting its disagreement with creation of an offence of "fiscal" money 
laundering, pointed out that customer tax fraud does not create an identifiable asset to 
which the banker can apply the money laundering prevention measures. According to the 
banker's position, tax fraud consists in hiding legally obtained money, whereas money 
laundering consists of integrating money from illegal activities into the financial system. 
Accordingly, from a technical point of view, since tax fraud is the exact contrary of money 
laundering, it is not possible to fight these two offences with the same tools. 1489 
The Yukos embezzlement and money laundering case is a perfect example of a legal 
controversy that may rise in a jurisdiction where anti-money laundering legislation 
1486 See eg Bremmer and Charap, The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want' 84. 
1487 See eg M Bridgers, The Nexus Between Tax Evasion and Money Laundering' in A Clark and P Burrell 
(eds), A Practitioner's Guide to International Money Laundering Law and Regulation (1st edn, City and 
Financial Publishing, Surrey 2002) 243-66,250. 
1488 Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies, Anti-Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime and 
Terrorism) Second Interim Guidance for Accountants (ICAEW, 2004) 489<http: //www. icaew. com/ 
index. cfm? route=143796>accessed 20 July 2007. 
1499 See Alldridge and Mumford, Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002' 371-73. 
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contains a tax exemption provision. 1490 The defence lawyers of several of the sentenced 
SPV managers argue that the verdicts of the criminal courts, brought on money laundering 
cases, 1491 interrelated with the Yukos embezzlement and money laundering case, directly 
contradict the decisions of the arbitration courts on the Yukos corporate tax case, and 
contradict decisions on tax evasion in the Yukos subsidiaries, and several other 
decisions. 1492 
This controversy concerns several rulings. The first is the ruling of the Supreme 
Court dated January 15,2007 in the case of the former executive of Yukos subsidiary 
Samaraneftegaz, Pavel Anisimov, who was given 2.5 years on parole for tax evasion1493. 
The second is the decision of the Nefteyugansk regional court in 2006 concerning 
Yuganskneftegas manager Tagirzyan Gilmanov, who received a three-year parole term for 
aiding in tax evasion. '494 It also concerns the decision delivered in March 2007 by the 
Moscow Arbitration Court on the case lodged by the federal tax service against the Yukos 
auditor - PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
1495 These decisions are based on the same principle: 
Yukos was the owner of the oil produced by its subsidiaries, and its dealings with affiliated 
Yukos companies were aimed solely at tax evasion. 
1496 However, in the sentence passed by 
Basmanny Court on the directors of the affiliated companies, which should be regarded as 
having a prejudicial character for the pending Khodorkovsky trial, it was clearly pointed 
out that they embezzled oil. 1497 According to this decision, the oil was not owned by 
1490 See European Banking Federation, Anti-Money Laundering Report 2005 (2005) 11,57, 
89<http: //www. euractiv. com/29/images/FBE%202004%2OReport%2OMoney%2Olaunder tcm29- 
141008. pdf>accessed 23 July 2007. 
1491 See BBC News, 'Moscow Court Imprisons Yukos Duo' (2007) 5 March BBC News 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/business/6419409. stm>accessed 20 May 2007. 
1492 See M Elder, 'Yukos Trial Postponed as Suspect Disappears' (2007) 17 January The Moscow Times. 
com <http: /www. themoscowtimes. com/stories2007/01/17/002. html>accessed 18 July 2007; 
Kommersant. com, 'Yukos Executive Goes to European Court'. 
1493 See Mangileva and Naumova, 'Deputy Anisimov Doesn't Pass for Director'; Naumova, 'Pavel Anisimov 
Taken to Court'. 
1494 See Cherkasova and Dorokhov, The Line of Sentences: The Yukos Cases Are Being Put on the 
Conveyor; Rychkova and Lepina, 'The Prosecutor Doesn't Believe Ile's Innocent'. 
1495 See Belton, 'PwC Withdraws Yukos Audits'; Pleshanova, Moiseev and Grib, 'Pricewaterhousecoopers 
Blamed in Yukos Tax Affair'. 
1496 See also Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, 'Motion to Dissolve the Case' 28. 
1497 People's Daily, Yukos Officials Embezzled $13b' (2007) 2 March People's Daily Online 
<http: //english. peopledaily. com. cn/200703/02/eng20070302 353657. html>accessed 2 March 2007. 
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Yukos, but by its subsidiaries. 1498 The defence lawyers commented: "If the oil was stolen 
by individuals, as the Basmanny court said, why did the arbitration court earlier force 
Yukos to pay taxes on its oil profits? "1499 
The position of the lawyers on the uncertainties and ambiguities in the Yukos-related 
cases can be supported by the fact that none of the jurisdictions where the allegedly 
laundered Yukos' funds were transferred, invested or simply kept, have ever attempted to 
seize or arrest the funds in accordance with the international anti-money laundering treaties 
and domestic legislation, either in the context of tax evasion or the money laundering 
case. 150° 
Summarising the arguements of the defence, we can see the following controversies 
in the Yukos tax case and the Yukos embezzlement and money laundering case. Firstly, the 
tax case is based on the principal assumption that all the revenues of the corporate group 
should be apportioned to the Yukos Oil Company, which as the ultimate owner, should pay 
all the taxes, penalties and interest. 1501 
According to the lawyers, Yukos, as the ultimate owner, could not launder the funds 
belonging to it. 1502 Secondly, the embezzlement and money laundering case has different 
grounds: the organised group embezzled the crude and products from the production 
subsidiaries and laundered it through its network of "shell" companies. The laundered 
funds were partly dispersed inside the corporate group and were used as its own funds, part 
of which were paid as dividends to the alleged members of the organised group and 
effectively owned by them. The role of Yukos Oil Company in this case did not exceed the 
role of a mere SPV ("shell' company). '503 
Recognizing the presence of the problem raised by the lawyers, we have to point 
out that formal apportionment of the corporate group's income to Yukos Oil Company 
1498 Kommersant. com, 'Yukos Executive Goes to European Court'. 
1499 
ibid. 
1500 See E Zapodinskaya, 'Basmanny Court Fabricates a Criminal Group' (2004) 24 March ibid 
<http: //www. kommersant. com/p459847/r 1Basmanny_CourtFabricates a Criminal_Grouphaccessed 20 
July 2007. 
1501 See Ministry for Taxes and Levies, 'Yukos Resolution'; Yukos, 'Tax Slides Update'. 
1502 See also Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, 'Motion to Dissolve the Case' 28-29. 
1503 The Summary of the Chargers. 
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does not make it impossible that the operations of SPVs, and further operations with the 
funds, constitute money laundering. The Yukos tax case, which has already been decided 
by courts, is a corporate tax avoidance case with elements of tax evasion. So, following the 
logic of the Anglo-American doctrines, creatively applied in Russia, the courts ordered 
"recharacterization" of the transactions and income inside the corporate group, declaring 
several transactions sham, null and void. Nevertheless, declaring transactions null and void 
does not mean that they have not been used for the purpose of money laundering. 1504 
The defence's attempt to challenge the court's decision by using existing 
discrepancies and overlaps emphases the importance of understanding of the nexus 
between the Yukos tax and money laundering cases. 1505 For proper analysis of this problem 
the structural elements of the cases are represented in the Appendix 31. 
The most important point, which is evident from the content of the table, is that in all 
the core Yukos-related cases (tax, money laundering), regardless to their legal substance, the 
same corporate structure has been used for an allegedly illegal purpose. However, from a 
legal standpoint, in the corporate case the Company used its own structure to avoid taxes for 
the benefit of the company; in the tax evasion case the top-managers of the Company used 
its structure (including submission of allegedly false information on the part of it) to evade 
taxes for the benefit of the Company again; in the embezzlement and money laundering case 
the "organised criminal group", several members of which were managers of the Company, 
used the corporate group in total as a tool to launder and legalize the embezzled funds, 
allegedly for the benefit of the members of the organised group. '506 
It is obvious that all the offences are closely interrelated, as the tax avoidance and 
evasion operations amongst other shareholders benefited the core shareholders of the 
company, who were, allegedly the key members of the organised criminal group. '507 
Therefore, in all the criminal schemes the only instrument for the illegal operations was the 
1504 See - Kommentarii K Grazhdanskomu Kodeksu RF [Commentaries to the Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation] (Yurait-Izdat, Moscow 2005) art 169; M Mamaev, '0 Kvalifikatsii Nezakonnogo 
Obnalichivaniya Denezhnykh Sredstv [Qualification of Illegal Cash Operations]' (2006) 1 Zhurnal 
Rossiiskogo Prava [Journal of Russian Law] 44-52. 
1505 See eg Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, 'Motion to Dissolve the Case' 27. 
1506 See on the structure of the case Gololobov, 'The Yukos Money Laundering Case'. 
1507 See in general GS Cooper, 'The Return to Corporate Tax Evasion in the Presence of an Income Tax on 
Shareholders' (1996)12 Akron Tax J 1-124,20. 
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corporate structure of the group, including the SPVs. It should be noted that the sale 
operations with crude oil, violating the arm's length principle, were recognized as a key 
element of the tax avoidance and evasion allegations, and deemed a key element of the 
embezzlement and tax evasion case as acts of embezzlement. ' 508 It is quite evident that the 
prosecutors used this scheme with the intention of creating a proper money laundering case, 
which would be impossible if they wanted to use tax evasion charges, because the tax crimes 
are exempt from the list of the potential predicate offences in the Russian Criminal Code. 1509 
However, in this case, the Russian authorities aim to create a very dangerous precedent by 
effectively substituting a tax evasion offence for artificial money laundering schemes. 
Having been approved at the highest judicial level, such a scheme can be widely used for the 
criminal suppression of political opponents and illegal redistribution of property. '510 
The Yukos case shows that, on the one hand, exemption of tax crimes from the list of 
predicate offences works for the benefit of potential offenders, as it protects them from 
ungrounded money laundering Investigations, if they commit mere tax evasion. This is 
critically important for countries with transition economies that 
do not have well established 
anti tax avoidance and evasion legislation and the relevant case law. 
On the other hand, 
situations like Yukos' may easily encourage authorities to launch "artificial" money 
laundering cases, which would substitute tax evasion cases. 
"" Once established, such 
precedent would fix that any tax avoidance/evasion transactions used by a corporate group 
and based on transfer pricing sales could occasionally qualify as being a money laundering 
scheme. Any tax-free income recognized as derived from embezzlement and qualified as 
proceeds of crime, would make all the funds of the group "dirty". It creates unpredictable 
risks for corporate groups and their shareholders, which may only increase if the anti-money 
laundering legislation develops along the same lines. '512 
1508 See eg Clateman, 'Yukos Part VI: Tax Claims Revisited' 3-4. 
1509 See Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper'. 
1510 See Gololobov, The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock Case'. 
15" Eg the case ofNeftjanoi concern. See Banki. RU, 'Linshits Accused of Money Laundering'. 
1512 See Gololobov, 'The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock Case'. 
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5.9. Conclusion. 
The new embezzlement and money laundering charges, brought against 
Khodorkovsky and his allies in February 2007, have actually finalized the "white collar 
crime" side of the Yukos story. '513 
One of the key aspects, closely related to the validity and international recognition of 
the embezzlement and money laundering charges, is the compliance of the contemporary 
Russian anti-money laundering legislation with the international principles and 
requirements, fixed in international treaties. The analysis, conducted in this chapter, 
demonstrates that, regardless of several officially recognized deviations and omissions, the 
Russian money laundering legislation generally complies with the international standards, 
especially in the sphere of substantive offences and their criminal prosecution. 
'514 
Moreover, the Russian anti-money laundering laws and regulations are being aggressively 
used by the existing political regime for suppression of its economic and political rivals. 
This has had the effect of turning anti-money laundering legislation into an effective 
macroeconomic instrument. '515 
The charges, summarised in a brief official document, published on the General 
Prosecutor Office's web site, give a general impression of the principles of the new 
15" See MosNews, 'Khodorkovsky Charged with Money Laundering'; Presscenter, U. S. State Department 
Issues Comment on New Charges' (2007) <httpJ/www. mbktrial. com/about/new_charges. efm>accesscd 10 
March 2007. 
1514 See eg J Thomas, 'New Money-Laundering Report Gives Russia Good Marks' (2006) 1 March USINFO 
(The Washington File) <http: //usinfo. state. gov/xarchives/display. html? p washfile-english&)-2006&m 
=March&x=200603011200331CJsamohTO. 9108393>accessed 1 March 2006; Zinmin and Boltonskii, 'A 
Comparative Analysis of the International and the National Laws of the Russian Federation on the Fight with 
Laundering of Illegal Gains'. 
uis See eg E Zapodinskaya, 'Ot Basmannogo Do Lazurnogo [From Basmanny to Lazumyi]' (2007) 31 July 
Kommersant Online <httpi/www. kommersant. ru/doc. aspx? DocsID=791282>accessed 12 October 2007. 
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case. 1516 The charges creatively use the findings of the previous Yukos and Khodorkovsky- 
related cases, representing them from the angle, convenient for the prosecution. 1517 
The new charges comprise the "backbone" case of the Yukos affair, to which all the 
other cases play a "secondary" and subordinated role, creating prejudicial precedent where 
they are needed. 1518 The embezzlement and money laundering case has crystallized the 
"pillar" principles, common to all other cases. 1519 It is also evident, that any other Yukos- 
related case, should any new one be launched, will have to be in a full compliance with 
those principles. 
One of the basic principles of the case is the presentation and creative description of 
all the corporate and operational activities of the Yukos and Menatep Groups as a 
continuous process of preparatory and direct illegal activities, preplanned and controlled by 
the organised criminal group, headed by Khodorkovsky and his allies. '520 
The second "pillar" principle is the emphasis of Khodorkovsky's control over the 
Yukos Oil Company, Menatep Group and other entities involved in the business and 
corporate schemes. The purpose of this emphasis is to demonstrate his actual knowledge 
and full control as head of the organised group over all the operations of the Yukos Oil 
Company and its partners. 1521 From the standpoint of the international anti-money 
laundering treaties and the Russian legislation, it enables the prosecutors to assume that 
Khodorkovsky and his friends, having actual knowledge about the illegal origin of the 
'516 See The Summary of the Charges. 
1517 See R Amsterdam, 'Mikhail Khodorkovsky Will Never Have Justice in Russia' (2007) 14 March FT. com 
<http: //www. ft. com/cros/s/bl3dbd38-dld0-lldb-b921-000bSdfl0621. html>accessed 20 July 2007; 
Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper'. 
1518 See Kommersant. com, 'Heads of Yukos's Subsidiary Suspected of Money Laundrying' (2006) 20 
September Kommersant Online <http: /www. kommersant. com/p706l44/1Ieads of YUKOS's 
_Subsidiary _Suspected of.. 
>accessed 25 March 2007; Kommersant. com, Yukos Executive Goes to 
European Court'. 
1519 See Gololobov, The Yukos Money Laundering Case'. 
1520 See eg Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper'; Khodorkovsky and Lebedev's Legal Team, Motion to 
Dissolve the Case' 25-27. 
1521 See on the problem M Johns, 'Khodorkovsky Crimes' (2006) 49 Russ Life 5; Presscenter, Timeline of Events'. 
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corporate funds, arranged and controlled all the operations of the Yukos group, comprising 
a continuous "wash cycle". 1522 
In this situation, the only formal legal problem standing in front of the prosecution is 
the problem of the predicate offence in the Yukos case. The Russian criminal legislation 
contains a tax exception provision, which excludes all the tax crimes from the list of the 
potential predicate offences for the crime of money laundering. It put the prosecutors into 
the position where they had to "invent" a new type of predicate offence for corporate 
groups (vertically integrated holding companies). According to the Summary of the 
Charges, the predicate offence that actually generated the "dirty" funds was the continuous 
acts of sale of crude and product from the Yukos subsidiaries to the Yukos Oil Company or 
to the controlled SPVs below fair market price, i. e. in violation of the arm's length 
principle. 1523 Russian criminal legislation and case law contains several provisions that can 
be used for setting up such a precedent. However, promotion of this approach would lead 
either to creation of a new criminal "instrument", which would enable the authorities to 
bring charges of embezzlement and money laundering against management of any Russian 
corporate group that has used transfer pricing schemes, or would urge the authorities to 
demonstrate that application of this approach in the Yukos case is selective again. '524 
The Yukos tax case and the Yukos embezzlement and money laundering case 
represent a perfect example of the nexus between money laundering and tax evasion in 
corporate groups. In the Yukos case, the violations of arm's length principle considered in 
the tax case as a violation of transfer pricing rules, was regarded as embezzlement in the 
money laundering story. This provided the starting point of the corporate group's 
transformation into a "washing machine". 1525 Effectively, the same off-shore and on-shore 
structures, comprising the corporate group were used with a threefold purpose: for day-to- 
day operational activities, for tax avoidance and evasion and for money laundering. This 
1522 See Gololobov, The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock Case'. 
1523 The Summary of the Charges. Gololobov, The Yukos Money Laundering Case'. 
1524 See Gololobov, The Yukos' Five-Year Plan: A Deadlock Case'. 
" See A Kramer, 'Criminal Case Likely to Put All of Yukos in State Hands' (2007) 6 February NY Times 
<http: //select. nytimes. com/gst/abstract. htn-fl? res=FlOF12F8385BOC758CDDABO894DF404482>accessed 18 
July 2007; AE Kramer, 'Yukos Tax Case Coming Full Circle' (2007) 6 February Herald Tribune 1 
<http: //www. iht. com/articles/2007/02/06/business/yukos. php>accessed 30 April 2007. 
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phenomenon demonstrates, that in the current situation, when the international anti-money 
laundering legislator framework is extremely tight, corporate groups, functioning 
especially in transition economies, and those involved in illegal or semi-legal tax 
optimisations schemes, can easily become dirty money generators. '526 
Multinational business groups from countries with transition economic systems aim 
to conquer the international securities markets, showing an unprecedented level of 
production and capitalization growth. The majority of such corporations, acting primarily 
in the oil, gas and metal sector, demonstrate a high level of compliance with advanced 
international corporate governance, accounting and other standards, retaining the best 
consultants, lawyers and auditors available on the market, who assist the companies' shares 
with their transformation into "blue chips". 1527 However, the Yukos case shows the 
general vulnerability of such compliance. This case puts on the international agenda the 
question of whether or not advanced international corporate standards, even when 
meticulously applied by companies from the countries with transition economies, can 
protect international investors from unexpected scandals and losses. It also raises the 
question of what role anti-money laundering legislation may play in the promotion of such 
scandals. 
In the context of the Yukos case, the role of the gatekeepers, specifically 
international auditors, should be highlighted. The situation with PwC, one of the "big 
four", and the most experienced in Russian matters, shows that even nine year long audit 
guarantees nothing to the shareholders, and can be easily withdrawn for the benefit of the 
host state. 1528 
Ultimately, the Yukos case has unveiled the potential dangers of money laundering 
legislation in the hands of transition economy governments with and weak democratic 
traditions. Even if the anti-money laundering laws of the country comply with international 
pronouncements to the letter, there are still a number of ways to use them. They can 
1526 See cg Banki. RU, 'Linshits Accused of Money Laundering'. 
'527 Ostrovsky, 'Russia's IPO Rush'; PricewaterhouseCoopers, IPO Match Europe: Review of the Year 2006 
(IPO Watch Europe 2007). 
15211 See eg Adelaja, TwC Is Criticized for Pulling Yukos Audits'; M Elder, 'Echoes of Yukos Surround PwC 
Case' (2007) 11 July The Moscow Times. com <http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2007/07/10 
/002. html>accessed 11 July 2007. 
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effectively be used with the purpose of pressing political opponents or redistributing of 
property. Therefore, the problem of the Yukos Embezzlement and Money Laundering Case 
stems mostly from the general problem with application of the principles of the Rule of 
Law in Russia. The Yukos Embezzlement and Money Laundering Case was launched with 
the main purpose of keeping Khodorkovsky in jail for at least another decade1529 and in the 
course of the investigation many "tricks" were played, including the attack on PwC and the 
numerous extensions of investigation, which hardly complied with the principles of the 
Rule of Law. 1530 The Yukos Embezzlement and Money Laundering Case, even within the 
limits of the general Yukos case, exemplify selectivity of prosecution and instrumental use 
of the judicial system. 
In the Yukos case, money laundering charges were interrelated with the charges of 
corporate tax evasion, which taken separately in Russia, represent a rather weak tool for 
suppressing the political opponents, but are perfect for the confiscation of assets. This 
allowed the investigators to represent the activities of a giant corporate group as a process 
of committing an organised criminal offence, lasting for more than seven years. 
1529 See M Franchetti, 'Oligarch Could Face Another 27 Years in Jail' (2007) 20 May Times online 
<http: /www. timesonline. co. uk/tol/news/world/europe/articlel810190. ece>accessed 22 May 2007. 
1 S3OSec eg Amsterdam and Peroff, 'White Paper' 9-15. 
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Chapter 6. 
Conclusion. 
Since 2003, the events unfolding around Yukos have made headlines in the Russian 
and international press. These events taken altogether are now conventionally referred to as 
"the Yukos Affair" or "the Yukos case", both internationally and in Russia. 
The Yukos Affair should be understood as a complex multidimensional case, which 
has had a significant impact on the Russian political, economic and legal landscape. Its 
commencement clearly flagged the end of the "oligarchy" period of the Post-Soviet 
Russian state and the beginning of the "Neo-KGB" state under Putin and silovarchs 
control. The Russian state ceased to be public and began morphing into a "corporate" state, 
being managed as a huge corporate conglomerate. 
The Yukos case represents a web of civil and criminal cases launched and 
investigated against entities comprising the Yukos business group and their former 
employees, managers and shareholders. The Yukos case cannot be understood separately 
from the personality of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the founder of Menatep Group and the 
former CEO and the core shareholder of Yukos. His tragic destiny has already become an 
example of a disastrous conflict between a man and a non-democratic transitional state, 
unseen since Stalinist times. The Yukos case started in 2003 and it is difficult to forecast 
when it will end. 
The Yukos case is inseparably interrelated with recent Russian history and the 
privatisation of state industries is its constituent part. Perestroika, announced by 
Gorbachev, flagged the end of the Soviet Era, creating at the same time numerous new 
business opportunities for the young, the talented and the unscrupulous. Khodorkovsky and 
his friends were just one out of many groups of young entrepreneurs who started their 
business under the aegis of the withering Komsomol, which was looking for options for the 
investment of its funds in the new economic conditions. Several years later, having 
accumulated some capital and having made several useful friends, they began a banking 
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business that was regarded as the most profitable in the early 1990s in Russia. Their Bank 
Menatep quickly became the first investment bank in Russia and, like a handful of other 
successful banks, started creating its own business group. 
Menatep, under Khodorkovsky's leadership, managed to become a member of an 
extremely close group of the emerging Russian financial institutions, headed by those 
multitalented and shrewd people who later received the name "oligarchs", and Menatep 
greatly benefited from large-scale privatisation. These entrepreneurs, internationally 
known as "the Group of Seven", persuaded President Yeltsin to give them the opportunity 
to buy the cream of Russian industry on conditions dictated exclusively by them in 
exchange for funding his misfortunate election campaign. The large-scale privatisation, a 
gigantic redistribution of former Soviet property, initiated by the oligarchs is still 
considered "the grab of the century". It gave rise to a number of tremendous fortunes, but 
also to an even greater number of bankruptcies, crises and notorious large-scale scandals. 
Menatep played an aggressive role at all the stages of privatisation, forming, as a 
result, an industrial-business group Rosprom. Rosprom group controlled several major 
industrial companies, such as Apatit, Avisma, Rosprod and other. The most successful 
Menatep-Rosprom deal was the acquisition of Yukos Oil Company, one of the biggest 
Russian Oil producers, which was going through a general decline of exploration and 
production operations at the time. 
Under Khodorkovsky's management and with Menatep's backing Yukos quickly 
overcame the post-privatisation problems and conducted corporate restructuring, turning it 
into a modem oil company. The policy of corporate transparency and adherence to the high 
corporate governance standards made Yukos a leader in the Russian blue-chip market. 
Through vast utilisation of modem production technologies, the company became a 
leading oil producer in Russia. At the pinnacle of its development it had the following 
corporate and legal characteristics: 
" The management was centralized at the level of the head managing company of the 
corporate group - Yukos Moscow. Most of the corporate services, including legal, PR and 
GR were united at the level of the head managing company. 
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" All the main decisions concerning the group's business strategies were considered 
by the Yukos Oil Company's Board of Directors, which functioned as the board of a 
corporate group as a whole. 
" The shares of the main subsidiaries were owned by the Yukos Oil Company, which 
was a publicly held joint stock company, listed in Russia and in the U. S. 
The company did not have any "external" shareholders in its main subsidiaries. So, 
the internal governance procedures were also significantly simplified. 
" The company had a united financial and accounting policy, planning, tax 
management and disclosure procedure. 
9 The company prepared its consolidated accounts, audited by an independent auditor 
as consolidated corporate group accounts. 
" The brand "Yukos" was used by the entire corporate group. 
The company had a consolidated system of trademarks and unified corporate 
regulations and procedures. 
" The company communicated as a united corporate group with the third parties. 
One of the distinct characteristics of the Yukos group, like the rest of the Russian 
major production companies, was aggressive use of tax optimisation schemes, based on 
transfer pricing and SPVs registered in the "internal off-shore zones". These schemes 
allowed the company to compete successfully with other oil majors and demonstrate 
outstanding financial results, making it extremely attractive 
for domestic and international 
investors. The company took all the necessary measures to incorporate its tax optimisation 
schemes in its cash flow and operational structure. It was 
done in such a way that Yukos 
would represent benefits from tax optimisation as resulting 
from its general production and 
financial performance. These outstanding financial results were then reflected in the Yukos 
accounts, audited by PwC, and thus played an important role 
in the promotion of Yukos as 
the most successful company in Russia. Therefore, one of Khodorkovsky's key 
achievements was the combination of questionable Russian tax optimisation strategies and 
western corporate governance and accounting standards. This "package" was successfully 
`sold' to trusting international investors. 
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After Yeltsin's resignation and Putin's rise, Khodorkovsky and some of the Yukos 
core shareholders, recognising the inseparable ties between politics, state power and big 
business in Russia, made a series of political actions including the creation of several 
charitable public foundations. These were declaratively aimed at promotion of democratic 
values and children's education and the sponsorship of several political parties and 
political contacts with the West. All these politically provocative steps were also 
supplemented by aggressive lobbing in the Duma, and an attempt to merge Yukos with an 
international oil giant. The rising Siloviki group, headed by the President's personal friend 
Igor Sechin, succeeded in representing these controversial strategies to the President as an 
attempt at an organised power grab. The reaction was prompt and fierce. Acting upon the 
Kremlin's commands, the General Prosecutor Office launched a number of criminal 
investigations against the employees and managers of the Company. Khodorkovsky, his 
friend Platon Lebedev and a number of other managers were detained and the rest of the 
key managers left Russia. In parallel, the Ministry of Tax and Levies started a series of 
extraordinary audits that led to the imposition of tremendous back-taxes and fines on the 
Yukos Group. As a result, initially the Government arranged for a forceful sale of the key 
production unit of the company and a year later, acting together with a consortium of 
Western banks, commenced a bankruptcy procedure. This finally led to the company's 
liquidation. Yukos assets were sold off in a series of public tenders and the bulk of these 
assets was successfully acquired by the Russian state oil giant Rosneft. Due to these 
acquisitions, Rosneft became powerful enough to compete with the world oil majors and it 
represents one of the main pillars of the Russia's super-power energy state. 
Regardless to the collapse of Yukos, the Yukos case still continues. In February 2007 
new money laundering charges were brought against Khodorkovsky and his allies that 
resulted in yet another chapter of the case. The investigation has not been completed, but 
even in its elementary stage it is evident that it will set new standards for white collar 
crime and money laundering concepts in Russia and probably, internationally. It is also 
certain to have implications for the concept of transitional justice as well. The impact of 
the Yukos case on the international perception of the transitional risks in general, and 
Russian risks in particular, is significant as it has demonstrated that the conventional 
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strategies of investor protection such as: transparency, corporate governance and 
disclosure, may not work as expected in transitional economies. 
One of the key problems arising from the Yukos case is the absence of recognition of 
the concept of the corporate group by Russian authorities and investigators, although large 
business conglomerates of financial-industrial groups are actually the main players in the 
Russian industry. The prosecutors have persistently been trying to show that the Yukos Oil 
Company is nothing more but an organised criminal group, which controlled numerous 
companies, used exclusively for illicit purpose. This raises the question whether the Yukos 
Oil Company complied in principle with the characteristics inherent to an international 
corporate group. 
As a result of a detailed analysis conducted on the concept of contemporary 
corporate groups, which mostly function as multinational companies, several important 
aspects have been highlighted. Corporate groups emerged as a result of the interaction 
between the internationally recognised doctrines of limited liability and separate entity and 
mechanisms of corporate control. Limited liability guarantees a certain level of business 
independence for particular members of corporate groups and restricts a group's exposure 
to external and internal risks. Legal mechanisms of control allow a group to function under 
a unified management as a unitary business. 
The structures of corporate groups may significantly vary, but for groups under 
Anglo-American and EU jurisdictions, the structure when one head or holding company 
directly or indirectly controls the shares of other members of the group is more common. 
Those corporate groups, composed of some companies with "external" shareholders 
(shareholders, which are not members of the group) are doomed to conflicts between 
shareholders of subsidiaries and the head (holding) company. This problem stems from the 
concept of unified management, which is focused on the profitability of the group in 
whole, but not its members. 
However, there are a number of other doctrines, which protect members of corporate 
groups and their shareholders from potential abuses. The most important one is fairness as 
a basic principle of transactions inside a group and appropriate taxation of those 
transactions. The doctrine of fairness quite conventionally crystallises in the arms' length 
principle of dealings between members of a particular group, which is reflected in 
335 
international regulations and legislation of many countries. Implementation of this 
principle is guaranteed by a number of mechanisms, amongst which the most important are 
special rules of taxation for transactions that violate the arms' length principle. 
These rules, although they may vary significantly depending on a jurisdiction and 
type of transaction, are aimed at the fair reapportionment of the taxable income between 
entities comprising a corporate group, which may be mostly located in different countries. 
The specifics of a particular group are strongly dependant on a group's structure, its level 
of centralisation and on the local business and legal conditions. For the majority of modem 
corporate groups, is essential to prepare groups' consolidated accounts, which are subject to 
consolidated audit, conducted by an independent auditor. 
One of the most important points in legal regulation of corporate groups is special 
mechanisms of the recognition of groups in statutes of general and specific application. These 
statutes establish special riles for the recognition of corporate groups in certain circumstances, 
when such recognition is dictated by public interest, such as: antitrust, labor relations, 
trademarks, environmental control, etc. The problem of recognition of corporate groups by 
statutes, and the imposition of sanctions for violations committed by a member of a group, is 
related to the more general problem surrounding the recognition of the separate entity doctrine 
and imposition of liability on the parent company in some exceptional circumstances. This 
doctrine, commonly called in Anglo-American case law "piercing the veil jurisprudence", 
allows courts to impose liability on controlling companies of corporate groups when they 
intentionally use benefits of separate entity and limited liability doctrines to evade the law. 
A comparative analysis of the main characteristics of the Yukos corporate group and 
characteristics recognized by the existing concepts of 
international corporate groups, 
shows that the Yukos Oil company was organised and functioned as genuine international 
corporate group from 2001-2004. The most distinct common characteristic of the Yukos 
group was a unified management and financial policy. Several differences could be 
attributed to the specifics of the Russian transitional legislation and business environment. 
For example, the principle of fairness in dealing between members of a corporate group 
was significantly distorted by the existing statutory limitations on export operations with 
crude, resulting in establishing of two types of "fair" market price: "internal" - for 
transactions inside the country and "external" - for export transactions. Moreover, there 
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was a long period when the local authorities had the right to grant tax concessions. From a 
legal and tax standpoint, the country at this time, ran a complicated and obscure system of 
internal off-shore zones, which were effectively used by the oligarchy and other 
structures. This can be defined as a period of "tax anarchism". 
The Yukos case from a legal standpoint represents a complex web of different 
criminal and civil cases launched against Yukos-related entities and individuals. The case 
consists of two distinct groups of cases: 
1) Tax cases against the Yukos Oil Company and its subsidiaries, launched with a 
purpose of grabbing the company's assets through a bankruptcy procedure, and; 
2) Criminal cases against the Yukos' managers, employees and shareholders. 
The Yukos criminal cases have two stages in their development. In the first stage two 
distinct groups of cases were launched. The first group was launched against 
Khodorkovsky and his close friend and the head of Menatep Group, Platon Lebedev. These 
cases included the case on the illegal privatisation of Apatit and several related cases (non- 
compliance with a court ruling, forgery of official documents), illegal privatisation (illegal 
acquisition of shares) in an academic institute, conspiracy to evade corporate tax 
obligations by an organised group, evasion of personal tax and social security obligations 
by an individual and others. This was publicly known as "The first Khodorkovsky case". In 
parallel with the case against Khodorkovsky, a number of other criminal cases against the 
employees and managers of the company were launched. They were related to different 
aspects of the corporate and business activities of the company, but the main factor 
connecting all of them was that almost none of these individuals were regarded by the 
authorities as criminal before the attack on Yukos. Many of these investigations were 
launched with the evident goal of squeezing the potential accused out of the country in 
order to weaken the company's defence. 
The tax cases against Yukos and its subsidiaries were even more important for 
Siloviki than the criminal investigations. The Yukos tax case was aimed at ruining the 
financial strength of Khodorkovsky's empire and Yukos' image as the most transparent 
Russian company. The main tax cases against Yukos was based on the allegation of mixed 
tax avoidance and evasion resulting from the application of tax optimisation schemes based 
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on the use of SPVs registered in internal off-shore zones. The courts, applying previously 
rarely used Russian Civil anti-avoidance doctrines, supplemented by the elements of the 
international anti-avoidance doctrines, effectively declared all the Yukos' SPVs as being 
sham companies. The tax benefits, granted to them were declared, null and void, and the 
courts ordered the apportionment of all the operations, in reality conducted by the SPVs to 
Yukos Oil Company. Thus, the Yukos case was actually the first and only large tax case in 
Russia where the courts applied doctrines of substance over form, economic substance, 
step transaction and abuse of rights. These doctrines were applied in combination with 
Russian Civil doctrines, but the latter have never been used in such an uncompromising 
and aggressive way. 
The analysis of these doctrines, including some issues of their genesis, shows that 
they are quite conventionally used to combat tax avoidance in Anglo-American 
jurisdiction. Their application in corporate groups/transnational companies' tax avoidance 
cases quite commonly leads to recharacterization a corporate group's transactions. In such 
cases the implications for the group are not usually disastrous, as the taxpayer has to pay 
its taxes as if there were not any tax schemes employed i. e. effectively the taxpayer has to 
compensate the ungrounded tax benefits and pay the interest. 
The Anglo-American anti-evasion doctrines are less complicated and more unified 
than anti-avoidance ones. The concepts of tax-evasion are conventionally based on the 
principles of tax fraud, general dishonesty and sham. Contemporary Russian legislation 
does not contain such clear definitions of tax avoidance and tax evasion as the Anglo- 
American statutes and case law, but the concept of criminal tax offence is close to the 
Anglo-American evasion concept and is based on the provision of false declarations and 
data to the fiscal authorities. In any case, the genesis of the modem Anglo-American anti- 
avoidance and evasion doctrines lasted for a least a century and their application is still 
subject to permanent reconsideration, related to the problem of finding a proper balance 
between the fiscal interest of the state and the rights of individual taxpayers. 
In the Yukos tax case, the courts ordered a complete recharacterization of the internal 
transactions of the group applying a composition of anti-avoidance and evasions doctrines 
aggressively and creatively, especially the doctrine of "abuse of rights" by tax evasion 
operations. All the profit, received by the SPVs, was apportioned to Yukos, which finally 
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had to pay the tax charged on this profit, the interest and the special penalty totaling 
approximately to 27.5 bn. dollars. However, the recharacterization of the Yukos group's 
operations was "unilateral" as it did not lead to compensation from the budget to those 
companies that effectively overpaid the taxes. Ultimately, the tax claims led to the forceful 
alienation of the company's main production unit and Yukos' subsequent bankruptcy and 
liquidation. The "domestic" anti-avoidance strategies used by the courts in the Yukos case 
received strong opposition from professionals, academics and entrepreneurs who 
recognized that these strategies created a risky and unpredictable business environment in 
Russia. As a result that the Supreme Arbitration Courts of Russia issued a clarification on 
application of economic substance, substance over form and step transactions doctrine, 
providing the courts with guidance on these doctrines which generally comply with 
existing international practice. However attempts to use the concept of "abuse of rights" in 
political and confiscatory cases in Russia still continues. 
The presence of the criminal tax evasion element in the Yukos cases has not been 
properly addressed and creates significant confusion as all Yukos' operational schemes 
were subject to the numerous international audits and due diligences. This problem cannot 
be addressed by international courts or European Court of Human Rights, as it is closely 
tied up with the mass of Russian data held by the prosecution and courts. So, taking into 
consideration the liquidation of the company, constant criticism of the existing court 
decisions for their inconsistency on the Yukos taxes, and problems with the Rule of Law in 
Russia, this problem is likely to be addressed in the future only at an academic level. As 
for now, the existing decisions and available data allow assessment of the Yukos tax 
optimisation strategies only as acts of tax avoidance, common to almost all oligarchy 
business groups in Russia in the mid 1990s to early 2000. The recharacterization of the 
Yukos' transactions, if conducted in accordance to internationally recognized anti- 
avoidance doctrines, or the recent post-Yukos Russian legal pronouncements, would have 
led to significant sums of taxes and interest payable to the budget, but would have never 
resulted in confiscation of the company's assets and its liquidation. 
One the "pillars" of the Yukos affair, which has been evident from its very 
beginning, is the issue of political motivation. 
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The problem of "political prosecution" can be analysed through the existing 
doctrines of "political prisoner" and "political refugee", which, in their turn, are closely 
related to the terms "political justice", "political trial", "political opinion" and other terms 
in the sphere of human rights protection and extradition/political asylum. 
The recognition of former Yukos employees and managers as "political refugees", 
and the fight against the extradition requests, was faily straightforward, as administrative 
bodies and courts in various international jurisdictions established with ease, that the 
Yukos employees had been prosecuted and pursued for reasons other than the enforcement 
of criminal law in its common or international aspect, i. e. the international courts applied 
recognized concept of "the political offence exception". 
Granting "political prisoner" status to Khodorkovsky or to any other detained Yukos' 
employee or executive was more complicated, as historically the status of "political 
prisoner" had been granted to those allegedly involved in political crime. Amnesty 
International demonstrated an evident unwillingness in granting Khodorkovsky political 
prisoner status as the very existence of political crimes in the EU and Anglo-American 
jurisdiction is currently under question, and in the Khodorkovsky/Yukos case the victims 
were mostly accused of economic (white collar crime) criminal offences. The position of 
Amnesty International was also based on the fact that Khodorkovsky had been quite rich 
and had not himself clearly recognized the political nature of his prosecution, even in the 
courtroom. Nevertheless, the evidence made internationally available by Khodorkovsky's 
lawyers distinctly confirms the presence of political justice in the Khodorkovsky/Yukos 
case and gives proper grounds for recognition presence of such criteria, established by 
PACE for political prisoners, as unfairness and discrimination of the proceedings and 
detention. 
The presence of political motives in the Yukos case was recognized by a number of 
international and governmental bodies including PACE and the U. S. Senate. The case law 
confirming the presence of political motivation in the case is not so extensive and is 
represented mostly by the decisions of the extraditions courts of the UK, Italy, Cyprus and 
Lithuania. However, the recent decision of the Swiss Supreme Court, prohibiting any 
mutual cooperation with Russia in the Yukos case, can be deemed a great contribution to 
the political motivation paradigm. 
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Regardless to the evident confirmation of the political thrust in the Yukos case, its 
politically motivated character may be ultimately recognized only by the European Court 
of Human Rights, which is now considering approximately nine applications from different 
Yukos-related individuals but still has not issued any final decisions. 
The results of the first stage of the Yukos affair were disastrous for Yukos' managers 
and the company itself. All the Yukos-related criminal cases, including Khodorkovsky's 
case, ended with guilty verdicts and severe sentences. The appeals did not significantly 
change the situation. The company was doomed to bankruptcy, regardless to numerous 
attempts by the management to rescue it, including the filing of a Chapter 11 restructuring 
application with the U. S. court. However, the Siloviki group deemed the results of the first 
stage of the Yukos Affair as insufficient, as the authorities and the prosecutors did not 
manage to prove at an international level that the Yukos case was not politically motivated, 
or that Khodorkovsky was a real criminal deserving an eight-year sentence. 
In such circumstances, the Siloviki, headed by Igor Sechin, managed to persuade the 
President to sanction a new case against Khodorkovsky and his allies. The new case was 
grounded on findings made in the previous decisions on the criminal and tax cases relating 
to Yukos. Nevertheless, the legal concept of the new case was different from the previous 
ones in that it was based on the money laundering and embezzlement charges, modeled in 
accordance with the recently adopted laws on money laundering, which complied with the 
principles of recent international anti-money laundering treaties. According to the charges 
brought against Khodorkovsky, an organised criminal group headed by him and Lebedev, 
organised a continuous large-scale embezzlement of crude produced by the Yukos 
productions subsidiaries. They coerced their management to sell the crude below the 
market price to the SPVs, allegedly controlled by the members of the organised criminal 
group. The embezzled oil was then funneled through the same system of SPVs, which was 
used for tax avoidance and evasions purposes. The crude was then refined and sold, either 
on the domestic market or through the international network of the controlled off-shore 
companies. The funds obtained from the trading operations were used for funding further 
production or invested in different instruments abroad. All the operations with crude, and 
proceeds from its sale following acts of alleged embezzlement were considered by the 
prosecution as transactions aimed at laundering and legalizing of the illicit funds. So, 
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according to the prosecutors, the company, functioning as a corporate group, represented a 
huge "washing machine", inside which circulated illicit funds derived from the 
embezzlement offences. Several main assumptions made by the prosecution provided the 
basis of the new criminal case. These assumptions were: 
1) The role of Khodorkovsky, as a CEO of the Yukos, core shareholder of 
Menatep Group and the head or controlling person of other entities allegedly involved in 
the "washing cycle". By putting this arguement into the charges the prosecutors aimed to 
prove that Khodorkovsky and his friends - the members of the organised group 
intentionally controlled all the laundering operations. 
2) The embezzlement of the crude, carried out by the companies comprising 
the Yukos corporate group, was achieved through members of the organised group 
pressurizing their managers to sell it on a low price. This questionable concept overlaps 
with the findings of the Yukos tax case, where the same operations were treated as 
elements of tax avoidance and evasion offence. 
3) The prosecutors effectively used a significant gap in legal regulation of 
corporate group activities in the Russian Federation. The laws on holding companies, or 
any similar laws, have never been adopted in Russia and this creates significant problems 
for Russian corporate groups, especially in the tax and criminal sphere. The existence of 
corporate groups is recognized only by several statutes of specific and general application, 
such as the anti-trust law. Thus private business groups, whose formation was based on 
the unitary business doctrine, functioned in a legal "vacuum", when the discretion of the 
controlling and prosecution bodies was unlimited. The lack of regulation and practice 
allowed the prosecutors to consider all entities comprising the Yukos group as 
independent. Therefore, they alleged that any corporate decisions taken at group level, 
were just actions of the organised criminal group, and were aimed at illegal control of the 
independent companies. Also, the fulfillment of the united financial policy was seen as 
aimed at tax evasion and money laundering, and the use of SPVs was deemed as the 
creation of, and the illegal use of, shell companies. Nevertheless, this approach did not 
hamper the existing practice of the state owned concerns, like Gasprom and Rosneft, which 
pervasively applied transfer-pricing strategies which were not unlike ones used by Yukos. 
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4) The utilization of the same internal and external off-shores structures for the 
purposes of tax avoidance and evasion and money laundering. This overlap, on the one 
hand, confirms the internationally recognized nexus between tax evasion and money 
laundering, but, on the other hand, demonstrates the questionable and creative approach of 
the prosecution to the new charges. The investigators, taking into consideration the tax 
exemption rule, existing in Russian criminal law, replaced the genuine fiscal offences with 
evidently fabricated embezzlement to make "a strong case" against Khodorkovsky and his 
allies. 
5) Yukos, headed by Khodorkovsky and controlled by the organised criminal 
group, undertook measures to conceal the illicit character of its operations by using the 
annual and quarterly accounts. These accounts were prepared in compliance with the 
internationally accepted accounting principles and audited by one of the biggest 
international auditing firms, PwC. This assumption is strongly supported by the position of 
PwC, which being under the tremendous pressure of the prosecution and the Russian 
government, took side of the General Prosecutors Office in the Yukos case. 
Such an approach, taking into consideration the negative perception of the Yukos 
case by the international community, would allow the Russian authorities not only to try to 
white-wash the case's "dirty image" internationally, but to seize the remaining 
Khodorkovsky assets. In reality, it will allow Khodorkovsky to be kept in jail for some 
twenty years. '53' 
The Khodorkovsky/Yukos case has significantly changed the contemporary Russian 
political and legal landscape, confirming the erosion of the Rule of Law in Russia and 
giving a politicised taint to the Russian judicial system. Politically it meant an end to the 
oligarch era and the beginning of the silovarchs epoch. Economically it flagged the 
beginning of creation of the Russian super energy power state, the pillars of which are the 
statutory-owned conglomerates, powerful enough to compete with the existing 
transnational giants. 
1531 On the perspectives of the Khodorkovsky's early release see Appendix 32. 
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The research shows that the Yukos group, despite possessing, regardless to several 
differences, all the main characteristics of an international corporate group, became 
involved in the money laundering case due to the following reasons: 
1) The privatisation and the following transition period predisposed the 
emergence of an extremely competitive environment for all corporate groups from 1990 - 
early 2000. During this transitional period all major business groups used questionable tax 
and cash flow optimisation strategies, were involved in numerous abuses of minority 
shareholders rights, and aggressively practiced lobbing and corruption. Privatisation deals 
were generally not transparent and were questionable. This formed the "risky" post- 
transitional legacy of the main Russian corporate groups. 
2) Seeking international recognition and additional sources of funds, some 
Russian corporate groups, including Yukos as a leader, adopted advanced international 
corporate governance, accounting and disclosure policies. Through the dedicated 
application of these policies and the retention of numerous advisers, these companies 
managed to "polish" their image, combining it with slightly modified, but virtually the 
same tax optimisation schemes as before. This strategy put their shares at the top of 
Russian blue-chip rankings and helped them become favourites of the international 
investment community. 
3) Adoption of the new criminal and anti-money laundering legislation, based 
on the international principles, provided the new Russian authorities with a useful and 
internationally recognized tool for suppression of its opponents. 
4) The political clash between the owners of Yukos and the new Russian FSB 
regime led to the politically motivated application of new Russian criminal and anti-money 
laundering legislation to the questionable transitional "legacy" of Yukos. 
The Yukos case thus provides several important lessons for the international 
community: 
1. The modem concept of white collar crime, including tax and money 
laundering offences is uncertain. It is often quite difficult to perceive whether any crime 
has been committed, and what the characteristics of this crime are. Although the anti- 
money laundering legislation of many transition countries, including Russia, comply with 
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the principles, declared in international treaties, the general uncertainty surrounding the 
white collar crime concept, supplemented by politicized transitional justice, makes such 
legislation an effective instrument for the suppression of economic and political opponents. 
2. The period of transition and post-transition should be deemed as a time of 
general legal uncertainty and a time of potentially widespread application of elements of 
redistributive and political justice. In a period of transition very often property rights are 
acquired through questionable mechanisms of privatisation, corruption and lobbing, thus 
they cannot be guaranteed during the period of post-transition. The methods of 
deprivatisation, re-nationalization and redistribution may differ significantly, depending on 
the specifics of a particular case. In the case of Yukos, its property was redistributed to the 
state companies through the mechanism of tax claims, based on the company's activities in 
the period of transition. 
3. Taking into consideration the problems raised during the course of the 
Yukos case, issues of transparency and good corporate governance in companies from 
countries with transitional, or post-transitional, political and economic systems should be 
considered from a different angle. When a company from a country with transitional 
economy formally complies with all international standards and listing requirements, but 
its previous commercial activity contains embedded risks and its property rights are not 
guaranteed, this company can become a "trap" for international investors. The Yukos case 
distinctly shows that formal mechanisms of investors' protection do not work properly in 
countries with transitional and post-transitional economies. 
The Yukos case demonstrates how the parallel development of advanced corporate 
governance strategies, willingly implemented in the transitional economies as fund raising 
instruments with international assistance, and genesis of the modem anti-money laundering 
doctrine, also readily implemented in non-democratic countries under international 
pressure, may give rise to unexpected corporate collapses. 
All the named implications of the Yukos Affair confirm the need for a significant 
reconsideration of the investor-protection strategies for those wishing to invest in business 
groups that have emerged from the countries with transitional economies. The rules and 
standards regulation application of anti-money laundering legislation to corporate groups 
must also be reconsidered. 
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Although it has been five years since the Yukos case was effectively launched and it 
has already established quite a number of domestic and international legal benchmarks, it 
still represents a huge "Pandora's box" which is likely to give birth to shocking new 
precedents. 
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